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This study investigates the legal and regulatory aspects of credit default swaps 
(CDSs), a controversial financial transaction that functions as a type of credit risk 
insurance or credit risk transfer. The study offers, firstly, an overview of the 
nature of CDSs in terms of their functioning, markets, uses, regulatory reforms 
and relationship with related financial instruments (chapter 1). It then 
investigates the legal characterization of these transactions (chapter 2), with 
special attention to their classification as insurance contracts (chapter 3) or 
financial derivatives (chapter 4). The question of legal characterization is followed 
by an analysis of regulatory policy issues, starting with a survey of the issues and 
challenges posed by CDSs (chapter 5), after which the principal regulatory 
strategies are analyzed and the principal reform alternatives are examined 
(chapter 6). 
Methodologically, the study combines traditional legal-doctrinal analysis 
with the economic and institutional analysis of law. There are relatively few legal 
sources that deal explicitly with CDSs, and the application of earlier legal 
categories (for example insurance, financial securities and swap contracts) raises 
many issues. By analysing the institutional history of the relevant legal categories, 
the study seeks to shed light on their interpretation in novel situations. Economic 
analysis is particularly relevant for the evaluation of regulatory policy 
alternatives. The study incorporate insights from new methodological 
approaches in economics (including behavioural economics), and reviews a wide 
range of empirical studies on financial stability concerns and on the impact of 
CDS usage. 
The study finds that, although there is significant legal uncertainty and 
confusion regarding these transactions, CDSs should normally be classified as a 
form of credit insurance unless such classification has been specifically excluded 
by legislation (as is the case in the United States following the Dodd-Frank Act). 
It is technically incorrect to classify them as financial securities, because the way 
in which they are traded (novations) implies that they cannot be subject to 
secondary-market trading in the proper sense. Similarly, their classification as 
swaps does not correspond to the standard financial meaning of swaps. It is 
further argued that the swap-based terminology was applied to CDS contracts as 
a consequences of the regulatory lobbying victories of the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA). Recent legislation has broadened the 
category of swaps to include these transactions in some cases, but the outcome is 
unsatisfactory in terms of legal doctrine, because functionally identical 
transactions may now be insurance, derivatives, or both. 
Regarding regulatory policy, it is found that the issues posed by CDSs should 
be tackled by a combination of different regulatory strategies. At present, the 
leading regulatory framework in this field is the industry self-governance 
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architecture designed and controlled by ISDA; despite its many weaknesses it 
also has advantages, which might be harnessed through light-touch co-
regulation. This should also address certain institutional failures of the current 
ISDA architecture. In terms of transparency, the post-crisis regulatory reforms 
have somewhat reduced the opacity of the CDS market; increased transparency 
is fundamental, but this does not appear to be the main issue in the future, 
because there are limits to what can be demanded and it seems unlikely that 
increased disclosures would address the main problems associated with CDSs. 
Compulsory central counterparty (CCP) clearing has acquired prominence in the 
post-crisis regulatory reforms; it is however unlikely to function well for CDSs, 
because they are functionally not swaps but credit insurance, so that their risk 
structure is asymmetric and involves significant fat tails and macroeconomic 
correlation. In the future, the key issue is the creative application of credit 
insurance regulation principles in a way that addresses the the peculiar concerns 
raised by CDSs. Targeted protection selling limits might be applied within the 
post-reform regulatory scheme that covers CCPs and compulsory collateral 
requirements. Regarding targeted protection buying regulation, the new 
European short selling regulation is an interesting test case that will be studied 
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  INTRODUCTION 
Credit default swaps (CDSs)—a form of credit risk insurance or credit risk 
transfer—are highly contested. At one end of the spectrum, there are those such 
as Alan Greenspan to whom CDSs are a wonderful innovation that has made the 
global financial system more stable.1 At the other end there are those to whom 
CDSs are “instruments of destruction”2 or “financial weapons of mass 
destruction”3 that damage global finance.4 This chapter provides, first, an 
overview of the nature of credit default swaps in terms of their functioning, 
markets, uses, regulatory reforms and relationship with related financial 
instruments. Second, a literature review is offered, outlining the research 
situation concerning CDSs and identifying the principal research needs. Third, 
the objectives of the present study are explained, after which a discussion of 
methodological choices and challenges follows. The final section outlines the 
structure of the rest of the study. 
1.1 UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
1.1.1 Description 
The history of CDSs extends to the early 1990s, as the first credit derivatives were 
invented by J.P. Morgan investment bankers in 1994.5 The CDS market peaked in 
2007 at $57.8 trillion in notional value, although market size can only be estimated 
and continues to be subject to disputes regarding measurement methodology.6 
CDSs were a relatively unknown phenomenon until 2008, when they hit 
mainstream business news due to their alleged involvement in the global 
financial crisis.7 Their public presence reached a peak as a result of Charles 
Ferguson’s documentary film Inside Job (2010), in which credit default swaps 
figured at large. 
                                                 
1 Greenspan 2005: 7 states that “as is generally acknowledged, the development of credit 
derivatives has contributed to the stability of the banking system.” 
2 Foster 2009, citing Soros, who mainly referred to naked CDSs. 
3 See Buffett 2003: 16, who wrote that “derivatives are financial weapons of mass 
destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.” The expression 
was not limited to CDSs, yet credit derivatives were Buffett’s main concern: see ibid. 14–15. 
4 See Buiter 2009 (arguing that CDSs are harmful). 
5 See Tett 2006. 
6 See BIS 2007: 21; Shadab 2010: 432–433. 





There are many possible reasons why credit default swaps remained largely 
unknown for several years. Their supposed complexity should not, however, be 
included in those reasons. Despite the technical jargon surrounding these 
financial contracts, their basic structure is simple. A credit default swap is a 
contract between two parties, whereby one party (normally called the protection 
buyer) pays periodic fees in return for a promise by the other (the protection seller) 
to compensate the loss of value of one or more reference obligations in the case of 
a credit event on those obligations.8 The notion of credit event is usually defined 
broadly, so that it will include also events other than outright non-payment, and 
can be negotiated by the parties.9 The essential structure of CDSs can be 
represented visually as in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 The basic structure of a credit default swap.10 
In spite of the terminology, credit default swaps functionally resemble traditional 
financial arrangements such as credit insurance and financial guaranties. 
According to Bank of England’s David Rule, “[a] CDS is similar, in economic 
substance, to a guarantee or credit insurance policy, to the extent that the 
protection seller receives a fee ex ante for agreeing to compensate the protection 
buyer ex post, but provides no funding.”11 René Stulz goes even further as his 
writes: “There is nothing particularly exotic about credit default swaps. They are 
                                                 
8 For example Banks, Glantz and Siegel 2007: 7 (“In a basic CDS the credit protection buyer 
pays the credit protection seller an up-front or periodic fee in exchange for a compensatory 
payment that becomes due and payable if the reference credit defaults during the life of the 
contract”). For a longer description, see for example ISDA 2014a and Parker 2007: 27–30. 
9 Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 361–362; Parker 2007: 28. 
10 See for example Mengle 2007: 2. 
11 Rule 2001: 118. 
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as easy to understand as insurance contracts.”12 Stulz is, of course, writing from a 
strictly economic point of view, but it will be seen that this functional similarity 
with insurance contracts is one of the key tensions surrounding credit default 
swaps—also from a legal-doctrinal and a regulatory-political viewpoints. There 
is at least a two-fold paradox here. On the one hand, whereas financial guaranties 
necessarily involve three parties, CDSs are two-party relationships, and in this 
respect they resemble insurance more than anything else.13 On the other hand, 
insofar as CDSs can be legally bought without being subject to insurance 
regulation, and sold without being economically exposed to the credit risk, they 
differ from insurance and can become “a private contract in which private parties 
bet on a debt issuer’s bankruptcy.”14  
1.1.1.2 Product Categories, OTC Markets, and Settlement 
Over the years, the global CDS market has developed into a range of different 
products, the principal categories of which are known as single-name CDSs (i.e. 
based on a single debtor) and index CDSs (structured on a basket of different 
debts). According to the financial derivatives industry organization ISDA, the 
majority of CDSs are single-name transactions, about a third are based on indices, 
and the remaining are so-called tranches.15 These concepts are well explained by 
Houman Shadab: 
CDSs are classified broadly by the type of obligation or entity they reference, and different 
types of CDSs typically have unique terms associated with that type of CDS. The two most 
common types of CDSs are single-name CDSs and CDS indices that reference corporate 
bonds. A single-name CDS references a single bond or a single reference entity. CDS 
indices typically reference 125 reference entities that have some common theme, such as 
all being American or European investment-grade companies. CDSs that reference 
sovereign debt make up nearly twenty percent of the CDS market, while CDSs that 
reference loans or the debt issued in securitizations (i.e., asset-backed securities) constitute 
approximately two percent of the market.16 
Another key notion concerning the CDS market is that it is—or least at has 
been until post-crisis legislation—an over-the-counter (OTC) market, which means 
that the contracts are bilaterally negotiated and not publicly traded.17 As will be 
seen later, recent legislation seeks to channel most OTC derivatives to centralized 
clearing, so that they would no longer be OTC products in the strictest sense. 
There are limits, however, to both the formal applicability of this legislation and 
                                                 
12 Stulz 2010: 74. 
13 See Aicher, Cotton and Khan 2004: 921 (comparing guaranties and insurance). 
14 Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1021. 
15 ISDA 2014b (citing DTCC data from 2011). 
16 Shadab 2012: 1034. 




its practical enforceability and side-effects. It should be emphasized, however, 
that despite the OTC nature of the CDS market so far, it has in practice been highly 
standardized around the contract architecture developed by ISDA.18 
There is finally an important technical distinction concerning the settlement 
of CDSs, which happens when the reference entity defaults on its debt and 
protection seller must pay the relevant compensation. The settlement of the 
contract may in principle take place in one of two ways, depending on what the 
parties have agreed to.19 One is so-called physical settlement, in which case the 
party effecting payment (the protection seller) accepts delivery of the underlying 
assets and pays par value for them; economically, this implies that the protection 
seller is making the protection buyer whole, i.e. providing compensation for the 
loss of value of the reference assets. Alternatively, the contract may be subject to 
cash settlement, in which the protection seller simply pays, in cash, the difference 
between the par value of the assets and their market value after default. In this 
case, no underlying assets are implicated other than for purposes of calculation, 
and indeed it may be that neither party is in possession of those assets. 
1.1.1.3 Market Size and Participants: Informational Difficulties 
One consequences of the over-the-counter nature of the global CDS market is that 
there is no precise data on its early development. David Mengle of ISDA has 
provided some data from 1997 onwards and described its development in generic 
terms;20 yet even today it must be acknowledged that the information on the OTC 
market in credit default swaps is rather imperfect and even inaccurate.21 
The most reliable source of market size data on OTC derivatives seems to be 
the survey data collected by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which 
indicates that the global “credit default swap market was US$6 trillion in 2004, 
[…] $57 trillion by June 2008, and $41 trillion by the end of 2008” in notional 
terms.22 Apart from the staggering growth of the market leading up to the crisis 
of 2008, what is interesting here is the apparent decline of the CDS market after 
the crisis, a decline that seems to be confirmed by BIS data indicating that the 
notional values fell further to $29.9 trillion in 2010.23 
This apparent decline is quite interesting precisely because it is simply false. 
It turns out under closer inspection that the fall in notional values was due not to 
market diminution, as it was caused by increasing trade compression, which is a 
                                                 
18 See Braithwaite 2012a. 
19 Banks, Glantz and Siegel 2007: 33. See also Feder 2002: 708–709 (describing cash-
settlement and physical settlement in OTC derivatives generally). 
20 See Mengle 2007: 7–12. 
21 Stulz 2010: 79. 
22 Ibid. 78. More details are found in ibid. 80. 
23 Dømler 2013: 36. 
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financial technique of netting economically offsetting transactions between two 
counterparties, so that the notional values of the outstanding contracts are 
subsequently reduced.24 The practice of trade compression was significantly 
increased around and after the financial crisis, and Dømler calculates that in its 
absence, the CDS market “would have reached an estimated amount of US$80 
trillion in 2009”.25 In other words, the CDS market actually continued to grow 
during the crisis.26 One of the problems of increasing trade compression is that it 
has rendered cross-temporal comparisons difficult, because the real content of the 
standard notions is not the same at different moments in time. 
Indeed, there is a wider question regarding the best way to measure CDS 
market size. It is widely agreed that notional values of outstanding contracts can 
give an exaggerated picture of the risks involved. As an alternative, Dømler 
among others proposes: “A more appropriate measure for the risk exposure is the 
gross market value, as it resembles the replacement costs of all open contracts at 
mark-to-market prices. […] This amount constitutes only 5.5 per cent (or US$1.67 
trillion) of the notional value.”27 It must be noted, however, that if our 
informational interest concerns the risk element of the CDS markets, then gross 
market value is also an inappropriate measure, because it is based on current 
mark-to-market prices, which in CDSs may fail to reflect real risks, especially in 
relation to the systemic aspects of credit risk. In fact, Dømler goes on to make 
another proposal: 
An even more precise measure is the current credit exposure and liability value, as it also 
takes into account the legally enforceable bilateral netting effect and would therefore 
constitute an even lower exposure. This value therefore represents the claim for the actual 
amount changing hands if the contract were settled immediately. Unfortunately, these 
data sets for CDS are not developed.28 
In conclusion, then, there is presently no entirely satisfactory way of 
measuring CDS markets. For the purposes of this study, it is not a major issue, 
but when it comes to the notional value of outstanding contracts, one should keep 
in mind its limitations and avoid reaching erroneous conclusions. 
Another informational imperfection concerns market participation, on which 
there is even less accurate and reliable data. Survey data by the British Bankers’ 
Association (BBA) reveals that banks, securities firms, and hedge funds are active 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 36–37. 
25 Ibid. 37.  
26 The same idea emerges from BIS data on notional and gross market values, revealing 
that between 2007 and 2008, the notional values of compressed outstanding CDSs contracted, 
but gross market values more than doubled. See Stulz 2010: 80. 
27 Dømler 2013: 37. 




on both sides of the table, and insurers mainly contribute to protection selling.29 
According to Fitch Ratings data, the largest exposures are held by global 
investment banks.30 Hopefully more accurate and timely data on market 
participation will be developed, as this is of great importance for regulatory 
policy as well as for research. 
1.1.2 CDS Uses and Regulatory Implications 
Insofar as credit default swaps are exempt for limitations regarding their buying 
and selling, they can be used for a range of purposes, which raise a number of 
regulatory concerns. These issues will receive a more detailed reflection later in 
the study, but a brief introduction to these questions is opportune here so that the 
principal policy issues and debates can be contextualized. 
1.1.2.1 Hedging, Speculation, and Regulatory Arbitrage 
In general terms, financial instruments can be used for three primary purposes: 
(a) hedging, i.e. taking investment positions intended to offset potential losses that 
may be incurred by a companion investment; (b) speculation, i.e. seeking to profit 
from an anticipated price movement; and (c) arbitrage, i.e. simultaneously 
purchasing and selling economically equivalent assets that are differently 
priced.31 
In addition to these primary functions, there is another motivation for using 
derivatives, known as regulatory arbitrage. In the words of Frank Partnoy, this 
refers to “financial transactions designed specifically to reduce costs or capture 
profit opportunities created by differential regulations or laws.”32 André Scheerer 
defines the regulatory arbitrage opportunities of credit derivatives as providing 
“access to credit markets which are otherwise restricted by corporate statute or 
off-limits by regulation.”33 Derivatives may be used, for example, to reduce taxes, 
                                                 
29 See Mengle 2007: 9 (providing details from 2000–2006). See also Duffie 2008a: 4–6 
(summarizing data on United States banks and CDSs). 
30 Mengle 2007: 10 (providing data from 2003–2006). 
31 See for example Partnoy 1997: 223–227; Feder 2002: 717–721. Financial derivatives are 
also used for (d) diversification, i.e. reducing overall portfolio risk by investing in a variety of 
assets that are not perfectly positively correlated; however, diversification and hedging are 
simply variations on a theme: hedging is a form of diversification in which the assets are 
negatively correlated. 
32 Partnoy 1997: 227. See also Feder 2002: 721, referring to one type of arbitrage as 
“obtaining indirect exposure to items to which direct access is denied by law.” Importantly, 
regulatory arbitrage is distinct from the financial concept of arbitrage. 
33 Scheerer 2000: 151. 
UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
21 
to avoid accounting requirements or investment restrictions, or to obtain 
government subsidies.34 
As a matter of first impression, the regulatory issues concerning credit default 
swaps can be simplified by noting that, in strictly functional terms, CDSs are 
structurally straightforward, insurance-like contracts. This means that their basic 
structure presents no special novelties, implying that their attraction resides 
principally in regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, there is substantial agreement that 
much of the CDS market is related to regulatory arbitrage.35 On the one hand, 
covered CDS transactions are mainly driven by the fact that they enable banks and 
other lenders to leverage their lending capacity by laying off their loan risks 
without transferring those loans outright (called synthetic securitization or 
regulatory capital relief).36 On the other hand, uncovered CDSs enable investors to 
bet against debtors, as was observed already.37 
Is regulatory arbitrage economically and socially beneficial? It may be, 
assuming that it enables market participants to engage in activities that otherwise 
would be unreasonably restricted or prohibited.38 But if the normal restrictions 
are well founded, the economic and social implications of regulatory arbitrage 
will be ambiguous or negative. 
1.1.2.2 Benefits 
In order to obtain a more accurate picture of the policy issues surrounding CDSs, 
it firstly necessary to acknowledge that the economic consequences of these 
transactions are complex and imperfectly understood, and the opacity of the CDS 
market makes it difficult to assess their impact.39 The regulatory question also 
touches upon deeply held convictions relating to the purpose of financial markets 
                                                 
34 Partnoy 1997: 228–235 (describing these uses of derivatives). 
35 See Ayadi and Behr 2009: 186 (describing the principal motivations for using credit 
derivatives); Shadab 2012: 1022–1027 (discussing motivations for credit risk transfer activities, 
particularly risk management, regulatory capital relief, and beneficial accounting treatment). 
36 For a description and discussion of synthetic securitization, see generally Bell and 
Dawson 2002. 
37 It is opportune to note that the terminology of covered and uncovered CDSs may be 
confusing, because the same terminology is used in other contexts to refer to something 
different. In stock markets, this distinction refers to two different types of short selling, so that 
a “covered” short position is one where the short seller has borrowed the relevant shares 
before selling them (thereby ensuring subsequent settlement), whereas in a “naked” position 
the seller has not borrowed shares to settle the transaction (thereby leaving the position as it 
were exposed to settlement risk). With CDSs, in contrast, covered positions are long positions 
and uncovered positions are short positions. 
38 See Goodhart et al. 1998: 63–64. 




and the scope of legitimate intervention. It is therefore natural that the need to 
regulate CDSs is a matter of ongoing controversy.40 
The principal benefits of CDSs derive from an improved ability to manage 
certain risks and to obtain investment positions that are efficiency enhancing.41 
They are more flexible than conventional guarantees or credit insurance, because 
they can be more easily tailor-made to suit particular risk profiles regardless of 
asset ownership.42 Alfred Steinherr argued this back in 2000, commenting on 
credit derivatives generally: 
To the extent that they provide a more systematic way of evaluating and transferring 
credit risk, credit derivatives offer financial institutions a flexible tool for the management 
of risk. […] Credit risk markets are among the last strongholds of non-competitive 
markets, be it only for asymmetric information. Credit derivatives will, without a doubt, 
improve credit risk markets. In this sense their economic value cannot be overestimated.43 
There are also indirect benefits due to the positive externalities of the CDS 
market. One is that there are so-called network externalities that arise as the 
market develops and attracts more participants.44 Given that the CDS market has 
become more liquid and standardized, it has become easier to trade the 
instruments and their pricing has probably become more efficient.45 Another 
positive externality is that, as the CDS market grows and begins to be publicly 
quoted, CDS prices have become a source of timely information on the market’s 
estimates of credit risk and default probabilities. 
1.1.2.3 Risks and Concerns 
But CDSs are not without problems. Firstly, there are firm-level risks, as CDSs may 
be transacted without fully understanding and controlling the risks.46 For 
example, becoming a CDS protection seller is functionally equivalent to selling 
insurance, which is a highly complicated and risky industry, and firms may not 
have sufficient managerial understanding or adequate control procedures.47 
                                                 
40 For balanced discussions of the benefits and problems of CDSs, see for example Partnoy 
and Skeel 2007: 1022–1027, 1032–1040; Johnson 2011: 199–216; Baker 2010: 1303–1309. 
41 See Ayadi and Behr 2009: 189–191 for a balanced assessment of the risk-management 
implications of CDSs. 
42 Rule 2001: 118. 
43 Steinherr 2000: 166–167. 
44 Network externalities, or network effects, are also known as demand-side economies of 
scale. See generally Page and Lopatka 2000. 
45 Lack of price transparency in OTC derivatives markets tends to mean that dealers 
exploit less well-informed end-users: Steinherr 2000: 157 cites evidence that “OTC issuers may 
charge up to 45% over the theoretical option price.” 
46 Mugasha 2004: 220. 
47 Ibid. 
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Other firm-level issues include liquidity problems, short squeeze risk, and legal 
uncertainty.48 There is a wealth of evidence that traders and entire units in large 
financial institutions may get carried away by attractive deals that are later 
converted into extreme losses.49 
Secondly, CDSs appear to negatively influence incentives. On the one hand, they 
may harm borrower-lender relationships by reducing screening and monitoring 
incentives.50 On the other hand, it is feared that CDSs misalign incentives in the 
event of default.51 CDS value is determined by credit events, so that bondholders 
possessing CDS protection may benefit from pushing distressed debtors into 
bankruptcy (this is called the empty creditor problem).52 This can be socially costly, 
given the wider social and economic ramifications of company restructuring and 
bankruptcy. 
Thirdly, the use of CDSs for regulatory arbitrage purposes is problematic 
insofar as the normal legal restrictions are reasonable: CDSs have enabled 
financial institutions to take on more risks, and these risks have been highly 
opaque to both investors and regulators, so that instead of improving the pricing 
of credit risks, CDSs may make it more difficult to correctly locate and price 
risks.53 In addition, there is evidence that CDSs are used for insider trading.54 
Fourthly, credit default swaps may give rise to negative externalities, as 
spreading credit risk more widely has increased systemic risks.55 In other words, 
credit risk transfer may improve risk management in individual cases, but it has 
exacerbated system-wide instability, because difficulties in one sector have 
extended to the entire market.56 The opacity of the CDS market has also made it 
possible for huge amounts of risk to be concentrated without the notice of other 
                                                 
48 See Scheerer 2000: 160–169 (discussing risks of credit derivatives); Tijoe 2007: 398–413 
(discussing risks presented by credit derivatives). 
49 See Partnoy 2003 (describing a series of financial derivatives debacles); FCIC Report 
2011: 256–279 (providing evidence of the inability of finance experts to correctly perceive the 
risks related to subprime mortgages). 
50 See Ayadi and Behr 2009: 187–189 (describing incentive issues associated with credit 
derivatives). 
51 McIlroy 2010: 307–309 (discussing incentive issues of CDSs in the case of default). 
52 Hu and Black 2008 (developing the theory of “empty voting” and “hidden (morphable) 
ownership”); Bolton and Oehmke 2011 (demonstrating formally that credit default insurance 
reduces the incidence of strategic default, but causes an inefficiently high incidence of costly 
bankruptcy). See however ECB 2009: 72–73, pointing out that “empty creditors” do not 
necessarily have destructive incentives, and that they are not always able to cause a default. 
53 McIlroy 2010: 305–307 (discussing the opacity and complexity created by CDSs). 
54 Acharya and Johnson 2007. 
55 For a detailed study on the notion of systemic risk in financial markets, see Schwarcz 
2008. 




market participants or regulators.57 Before the crisis that started in 2007, many 
commentators downplayed the issue,58 but subsequent events—particularly the 
AIG fiasco—have proven otherwise.59 
Fifthly, unrestricted opportunities for betting on debtors’ default can be 
destabilizing in distressed markets.60 In theory, these opportunities might 
improve market efficiency—facilitating lower borrowing costs—but in practice, 
there seem to be little empirical support for this, and many borrowers have 
suffered from CDS trading.61 In informationally imperfect markets, CDSs may 
also be used to generate destabilizing signals, and regulators have been 
concerned about market manipulation.62 
1.1.3 The Financial Crisis 
1.1.3.1 Criticism and Debate 
Many of the aforementioned worries regarding credit default swaps were known 
to financial market experts before the global financial crisis, which in the eyes of 
sceptical observers seemed to confirm their worst fears. During the financial 
turmoil, which began as a banking crisis in 2008 and extended into the European 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010, credit default swaps “were widely blamed for 
exacerbating the financial crisis on both sides of the Atlantic.”63 
Although the events in 2008 seemed to be restricted to a special market known 
as subprime mortgages in the United States, the crisis soon spread much wider 
both geographically and in terms of institutions and product categories. Ayadi 
and Behr, for example, note the “huge write-offs” on so-called ABS (asset-backed 
security) CDSs, which provided “protection against credit events on securitised 
                                                 
57 McIlroy 2010: 309; Shadab 2010: 444–452 (discussing overconcentration of CDS 
exposure). 
58 For example, Weithers 2007 discussed systemic risk and argued that risk dispersion had 
reduced systemic risk in banking, although he admitted that risk concentration in hedge funds 
could have been a problem. 
59 On the AIG case, see Sjostrom 2009; FCIC Report 2011: 139–142, 200–202, 243–244, 265–
274, 344–352; Shadab 2010: 447–452. See further below, chapter 5.2.3.2. 
60 See Juurikkala 2012a: 325–328 (discussing empirical evidence). 
61 Ibid. 325–326. See also Ashcraft and Santos 2009 (finding insignificant benefits overall, 
and major adverse effects on risky and informationally opaque borrowers). 
62 Juurikkala 2012a: 328. See also Cox 2008 (explaining an enforcement investigation and 
referring to “the significant opportunities that exist for manipulation in the $58 trillion CDS 
market, which is completely lacking in transparency and completely unregulated”). 
63 Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 360. See FCIC Report 2011: 8–10, 50–51, 140–146, 188–195, 200–
202, 243–244, 348–351, 376–379; Turner Review 2009: 22, 71, 82, 108–110. 
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assets.”64 These losses, which were linked to the collapse of the mortgage markets, 
“led to huge write-offs on the portfolios of a number of banks including well-
known global players such as Citigroup and UBS, but also some not so well-
known banks such as the mainly government-owned IKB Bank or the fully 
government-owned Landesbank Sachsen, both from Germany.”65 
The common view as to why this happened was that, before the post-crisis 
reforms, CDSs were generally treated as bilaterally negotiated over-the-counter 
(OTC) financial derivatives, and were largely exempt from regulation.66 In 
consequence, market participants could sell and purchase credit risk almost 
without restrictions, which led some to argue that aggressive CDS speculation 
had aggravated the situation of troubled banks and sovereign borrowers.67 
Existing bank regulations also enabled lenders to free up regulatory capital with 
CDSs by transferring credit risks to non-bank entities, including hedge funds.68 
The OTC character of the transactions made it difficult for both regulators and 
market participants to know what was going on and who was holding the risks.69 
Even Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the United States Federal Reserve, 
underwent something of a change of heart and admitted errors in his earlier, 
highly optimistic view of credit derivatives. 70 
Not all subscribed to the criticism of credit default swaps, however. Among 
their most radical apologists was the industry-body ISDA, which in the aftermath 
of the crisis stated that “CDS had nothing to do with the crisis.”71 More moderate 
defenders of CDSs denied that there had been sufficient “evidence that 
unregulated derivatives, and particularly credit default swaps (CDS), was a 
                                                 
64 Ayadi and Behr 2009: 184. 
65 Ibid. 
66 In the United States, the explicit deregulation of CDSs was due to the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified in scattered 
sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.) [CFMA], which determined that OTC swaps, including 
CDSs, were exempt from both federal securities laws and commodity derivatives regulation: 
see Sjostrom 2009: 984–986; Wynkoop 2008: 3099–3100. For a detailed overview of CFMA, see, 
e.g., Hazen 2005: 388–395. In Europe, the legal situation has been less clear, as will be seen 
later. 
67 Münchau 2010; Rickards 2010. 
68 See Shadab 2012: 1023–1024 (explaining regulatory capital relief); Wynkoop 2008: 3104–
3109 (arguing that hedge fund participation in CDSs is problematic). 
69 See Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1046–1048 (proposing more disclosure); Wynkoop 2008: 
3123–3125 (proposing compulsory disclosures and transaction reporting). 
70 This included even Alan Greenspan: see Greenspan 2008 (written testimony of Alan 
Greenspan, former Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, admitting defects in his earlier views); 
Johnson 2011: 201 (describing Greenspan's change of heart on CDSs). 





significant contributor to the financial crisis through ‘interconnections’.”72 Still 
others pointed to other factors that had contributed to the crisis, including 
excessively lenient monetary policy and imprudent government policies that had 
facilitated the development of a housing market bubble.73 
1.1.3.2 Post-Crisis Regulatory Reform 
There was, then, a growing consensus that something had gone wrong, and that 
CDSs were possibly implicated, but there was little agreement as to what should 
be done.74 The political outcome was a mixed bag of modest changes, the CDS-
related aspects of which are mainly found in the United States Dodd-Frank Act,75 
and, in Europe, in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)76 and 
the new Short Selling Regulation.77 Some minor consequences for CDSs are also 
found in other European reforms, firstly the updated version of the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive or MiFID78 (the update is also known as MiFID 
                                                 
72 FCIC Report 2011: 447 (dissenting opinion) 
73 On the monetary policy argument, see for example Taylor 2009: 1–14 (investigating the 
failure of US monetary policy); Greenwood 2009: 37 (charting the recent successes and failures 
of monetary policy in the UK). On imprudent government mortgage policies, see Nichols, 
Hendrickson and Griffith 2011: 237; Liebowitz 2008: 4 (blaming the crisis on US government 
interventions that undermined mortgage underwriting standards since early 1990s); Butler 
2009: 51–57 (highlighting ill-advised government policies in the mortgage sector since the 
1970s). 
74 For example, see Shadab 2012: 1040–1046 (arguing that the existing governance 
mechanisms are sufficient, even if some CDSs—those used with subprime mortgages—were 
problematic). 
75 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, H.R. 4173 (2010) 
[Dodd-Frank Act]. 
76 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 
2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [2012] OJ L 201/1 
[EMIR]. For a technical overview, see for example Slaughter & May 2012a. EMIR clearing rules 
are broadly similar to the Dodd-Frank clearing rules, but not entirely: see Shearman & Sterling 
2013 for a comparison. 
77 Regulation (EU) 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 14 March 2012 
on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps [2012] OJ L86/1 [Short Selling 
Regulation]. See Juurikkala 2012a  (analyzing CDS-related aspects of the Regulation). There 
are also various other minor changes in Europe: for an overview and evaluation of the 
European financial markets reforms, see Schröder et al. 2011. 
78 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments [2004] OJ L145/1 [MiFID]. 
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II),79 and secondly the updates to the Market Abuse Directive (MAD),80 consisting 
of the Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation (Market Abuse 
Regulation or MAR)81 and the Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse 
(CSMAD).82 The crisis, finally, led to a meek tightening of international bank 
capital standards (generally known as the Basel Accords), producing the Basel III 
framework.83  
These legislative reforms are highly complex in their totality, but for credit 
default swaps, they imply three principal changes. First, CDSs will be subject to 
more disclosures than before, even though we will see that there are limits to both 
these dislosures and their efficacy.84 Secondly, many CDSs must be cleared with 
a registered central counterparty (CCP).85 Thirdly, CDSs linked to European 
government debt can in principle only be purchased for hedging purposes.86  
1.1.4 CDS and Other Financial Products 
One of the challenges in trying to understand credit default swaps is that they 
embody a curious mixture of the old and the new. Functionally, they resemble 
                                                 
79 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU [2014] OJ L 173/349 [MiFID II] The main implication for credit default swaps is 
that MiFID II for the first time establishes a principle of transparency for non-equity 
instruments such as bonds and derivatives. 
80 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 
on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) [2003] OJ L96/16 [MAD]. 
81 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 
2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC [2014] OJ L 173/1 [MAR]. This Regulation broadens and 
strenthens market abuse rules. 
82 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on 
criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive) [2014] OJ L 173/179, 12.6.2014 
[CSMAD]. This Directive strenthens and harmonizes criminal sanctions for market abuse 
offences such as insider dealing, unlawful disclosure of information and market 
manipulation.  
83 See BIS 2011. Among other things, “Basel III narrows the definition of capital, increases 
capital requirements, and imposes new requirements in regard to leverage, liquidity, 
countercyclicality, and counterparty risk” (Shadab 2012: 1024). For more detailed studies, see 
for example Pausch and Welzel 2012 (providing a technical analysis of the effect of Basel II 
and III on credit risk transfer with CDSs); Hellwig 2010 (providing a critical analysis of the 
Basel III reforms); Dowd et al. 2011 (criticizing the Basel regimes generally). 
84 See below, chapter 6.2. 
85 See below, chapter 4.3.1 and 6.3. For non-centrally cleared contracts, there will be 
separate collateral standards, in addition to which Basel III rules restricts the use of CDSs for 
regulatory capital relief if they are not centrally cleared: see Shadab 2012: 1024. 




insurance and other financial guarantees, but they are wrapped up in the 
technical jargon of modern financial derivatives and they are used for purposes 
that go far beyond traditional insurance products. This section seeks to enlighten 
this double dimension of CDSs by elaborating on the ways in which they, on the 
one hand, form part of the larger family of credit derivatives, and on the other 
hand, are akin to insurance. The derivatives dimension also raises the question of 
whether CDSs should be seen as one more OTC derivative or whether there is 
something special about them. 
1.1.4.1 Credit Derivatives 
It is customary in the finance literature to categorize CDSs as a credit derivative. 
This is a generic expression that covers a range of novel transactions that are 
associated with credit markets instead of stocks or commodity markets. Some 
authors think that there are two principal categories of credit derivatives: those 
related to credit spreads (forwards or options) and those related to default risk 
(principally credit default options or credit default swaps).87 
Given the vagueness of the notion of credit derivatives, there are however 
disagreements on its demarcation. According to an expansive view, the credit 
derivatives family includes a wide range of transactions such as total return 
swaps, credit linked notes, repackaged notes, and others.88 Of these, total return 
swaps are essentially an off-balance-sheet sale of an asset.89 Economically 
speaking, they transfer the entire asset, which is why many experts prefer not to 
call them credit derivatives in the proper sense.90 Credit linked notes (CLNs), in 
contrast, are securities “issued as a result of the securitization of credit 
derivatives.”91 In other words, they are not independent transactions, but 
products built on CDSs or other credit derivatives: “a CDS is practically 
                                                 
87 See Steinherr 2000: 164–166. 
88 See Ayadi and Behr 2009: 180; Mugasha 2004: 217–220. 
89 Mugasha 2004: 218. Ibid. 217 provides the following description: “The total return swap 
seeks to replicate the total performance of a loan asset. The investor assumes the full risk and 
cash flow of the underlying asset. The bank (originator) passes through all payments of the 
underlying asset, and in return the investor makes a payment akin to a funding cost.” See also 
Feder 2002: 711, who describes total return swaps as arrangements in which “the protection 
buyer, or total return seller, artificially sells a reference asset to the protection seller, or total 
return buyer.” 
90 See Feder 2002: 712 (“because a total return swap synthetically transfers ownership in 
an asset, some market professionals do not see the transaction as a true credit derivative”); 
Nelken 1999: 173 (“One definition of a CD [credit derivative] is any contract whose economic 
performance is primarily linked to the credit performance of the underlying asset. This 
definition would technically rule out TR [total return] swaps, because their performance is 
only partially linked to the credit quality of the underlying and is mostly linked to the market 
risk of the underlying.”). 
91 Mugasha 2004: 218. 
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embedded in the CLN.”92 Repackaged notes are similar, tailor-made packages of 
risk, created by placing a range of “securities (bonds, loans, or cash) and 
derivatives in an SPV [special purpose vehicle], which then issues customized 
notes that are backed by the instruments in the SPV.”93 
According to a narrower view of credit derivatives, credit default risk 
products are the only credit derivatives in the strict sense.94 They are also by far 
the bigger market segment, as CDSs take up more than half of the entire credit 
derivatives market, broadly defined.95 Adopting this narrower view, Frank 
Partnoy and David Skeel reduce credit derivatives into the two principal 
categories of credit default swaps (CDSs) and collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs).96 The latter category is, however, quite flexible, and it partly coincides 
with the earlier definitions of CLNs and repackaged notes: 
a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is a pool of debt contracts housed within a special 
purpose entity (SPE) whose capital structure is sliced and resold based on differences in 
credit quality. In a “cash flow” CDO, the SPE purchases a portfolio of outstanding debt 
issued by a range of companies, and finances its purchase by issuing its own financial 
instruments, including primarily debt but also equity. In a “synthetic” CDO, the SPE does 
not purchase actual bonds, but instead enters into several credit default swaps with a third 
party, to create synthetic exposure to the outstanding debt issued by a range of companies. 
The SPE finances its purchase by issuing financial instruments to investors, but these 
instruments are backed by credit default swaps rather than any actual bonds.97 
The multiplicity of different but partially overlapping products is a sign of the 
desire of the arranging investment banks to introduce new products. For present 
purposes, the boundaries of the credit derivatives family of products is not of any 
fundamental importance, but in terms of the bigger picture, it is relevant to know 
that there are other products with some similarities and some differences. 
1.1.4.2 CDSs within the Wider Debate on Financial Derivatives 
From a practical point of view, there are many similarities between CDSs and 
other types of credit derivatives, broadly defined. The main regulatory concern 
raised by these arrangements is that they all, including total return swaps and 
credit linked notes, seem to be structured so as to avoid existing investment 
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restrictions.98 There are also transparency issues, and in the case of securitization 
arrangements, it can be asked whether they truly add economic value, as they 
involve significant documentation and legal fees.99 
The similarities are not limited to other credit derivatives, however, because 
the question about CDS regulation is closely related to the wider debate on 
financial derivatives, particularly OTC derivatives that are not publicly traded. 
Financial derivatives, which René Stulz defines as “financial instruments whose 
promised payoffs are derived from the value of something else,”100 have been 
subject to continuous debates at least since the 1980s, which is when the market 
for complex and exotic OTC derivatives took off.101 
It is not claimed here that derivatives cannot be beneficial if prudently used.102 
Yet it cannot be denied that their history is marked by repeated cases of misuse 
and even abuse. Lynn Stout, for example, highlights the 1994 case of Proctor & 
Gamble, which “suffered a $157 million trading loss speculating on interest rates 
through derivatives”, an event “overshadowed only a few months later by the 
unexpected bankruptcy of Orange County’s pension fund, which lost $2.5 
billion.”103 It is noteworthy that neither of these losing institutions had a real need 
for such financial derivatives, at least not in the speculative way in which they 
were used. 
During the US congressional hearing in the aftermath of the 1994 derivatives 
scandals, investor George Soros argued that the current legal rules for investor 
protection could not adequately deal with the most complex innovations, the 
risks of which may not be properly understood even by the most sophisticated of 
investors.104 Litigation following these and other crises also demonstrated that the 
end-users of ill-suited or poorly understood derivatives instruments would find 
it difficult to obtain damages.105 Catastrophic events are, of course, open to a range 
of interpretations. One representative of the pro-dealer view concludes that the 
1990s cases “highlight some of the challenges ISDA and its members face: large 
market participants can and do go bankrupt; disgruntled counterparties will 
challenge contracts in court; and regulators will become involved when problems 
                                                 
98 See Mugasha 2004: 218–220. For example, “Credit linked notes are used for a number of 
reasons. Often it is because the investor (protection seller) has the capacity or authority to 
invest in notes but not directly in an over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transaction.” Ibid. 
218. 
99 Mugasha 2004: 218. 
100 Stulz 2004: 173. 
101 See Stulz 2004: 176–179; Kuprianov 1995 (discussing the cases of Metallgesellschaft and 
Barings, and arguing that even relatively simple and regulated derivatives can cause 
tremendous losses if operational risk management is inadequate). 
102 See Stulz 2004: 179–180 (describing the potential benefits of financial derivatives). 
103 Stout 2011: 20. 
104 Soros 1994. 
105 See Partnoy 2001: 446–478. 
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arise.”106 The existence of conflicting interpretations is only natural, but the depth 
of the division is notable. 
Extreme postures on financial derivatives are not mere exaggerations in the 
blogosphere, but are shared by economists at the top of their profession. For 
example, Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel-prize winner in economics, proposed in 2009 
that the world’s largest banks should be banned from using derivatives (why not 
small banks, too, one is inclined to ask). In response, Myron Scholes, another 
Nobel laureate and a notable intellectual figure behind the development of 
derivatives, quipped that a ban would be a “Luddite response that takes financial 
markets back decades.”107 Stiglitz’ proposal may have been exaggerated, but one 
also wonders whether it is inappropriate to point out that Scholes happened to be 
one of the directors of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), the biggest 
hedge fund of the 1990s, which suffered huge leveraged losses in 1998 and almost 
caused a collapse of the international banking system.108 Perhaps that makes 
Scholes only better suited to evaluate the matter. 
Scholes has talent for one-liners, moreover, such as this: “Cars cause accidents 
but we don’t ban them.”109 The comparison between cars and derivatives is 
surprisingly fitting, as it demonstrates that the issues that we face in the world of 
complex finance are not that dissimilar from other fields of regulatory policy. 
Cars are useful, but their use can cause all kinds of problems: firstly, because of 
their speed and physical mass, which cause significant damage when accidents 
occur; and secondly, because people can be drowsy, incompetent, impatient, in 
bad health, drunk or simply imprudent. As a result, cars can be used, but under 
a string of conditions, including minimum age, seat belts, speed limits, driving 
license, no alcohol, compulsory insurance, stopping at lights, a range of other 
traffic rules, and of course a series of regulations concerning car manufacturing 
so as to reduce the risks of and the damage caused by accidents. 
What makes the analogy all the more intriguing is the fact that there are some 
experts who question the necessity and usefulness of driving-related regulations. 
Sam Peltzman famously argued that compulsory seat belts do not reduce accident 
costs overall, because the increased feeling of safety makes drivers less careful.110 
Subsequent research on traffic accidents shows, however, that this risk 
homeostasis (or risk compensation) hypothesis should be rejected, because user 
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responses are more nuanced and it is rare that the collective response cancels the 
safety benefits.111 
1.1.4.3 Unlike Ordinary Derivatives: CDSs, Credit Risk and Insurance  
Despite these significant similarities between credit default swaps and the wider 
world of financial derivatives (and indeed of risk regulation generally), it will be 
argued here that CDSs have peculiar features that distinguish them from other 
financial derivatives. The principal issue is that CDSs are not concerned with 
ordinary market price movements, but with discontinuous changes in credit risk; 
this is important, because, as Houman Shadab points out, “[c]redit risk has 
unique properties that differentiate it from market risk and other types of 
financial risk.”112 
It is in this respect that CDSs are much more like insurance products. Despite 
the fact that credit default swaps are normally categorized as credit derivatives, 
it is almost universally acknowledged that they seem very much like insurance. 
Mark Anson’s Credit Derivatives manual notes this plainly: “This type of swap 
may be properly classified as credit insurance, and the swap premium paid by 
the investor may be classified as an insurance premium. The dealer has literally 
‘insured’ the investor against any credit losses on the referenced asset.”113 Frank 
Skinner agrees: “Credit default swaps […] are actually default insurance.”114 So 
does one of the early credit derivatives specialists, Israel Nelken, who writes that 
“a credit derivative works very much like an insurance policy. […] The credit 
swap market is very similar to the insurance and reinsurance markets”.115 
Similar statements could be repeated ad infinitum. “The CDS is similar to an 
insurance contract.”116 “CDSs […] are a form of insurance.”117 “In essence, CDSs 
function like insurance contracts.”118 This insight has been captured in recent 
times by commentators in the financial media, who have begun to refer to CDSs 
as credit insurance and default insurance.119 The big question is what, if anything, 
this means for law and regulation. 
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1.2 RESEARCH SITUATION 
Later chapters will provide more details on the legal and financial CDS literature, 
but it is opportune to consider the bigger picture of the CDS research situation at 
this stage in order to better situate the objectives and scope of the present study. 
This section provides a summary of the principal features of the research situation 
on CDSs, firstly in terms of its historical development, secondly with respect to 
legal scholarship in the proper sense, and thirdly regarding the economic and 
regulatory-political viewpoints. Finally, the status questionis in Finnish law is 
summarized. 
1.2.1 Historical Perspective: The Growth of CDS Research 
In terms of historical development, scholarly research on credit default swaps is 
a relatively recent phenomenon. This is not surprising considering that CDSs 
themselves have not been around for much more than twenty years. It is however 
noteworthy that significant scholarly interesting in these products can only be 
found in the wake of the global financial crisis starting in 2007. Indeed, Partnoy 
and Skeel wrote in 2007, just before the crisis begun, that “the academic literature 
has largely ignored these instruments.”120 
There are many possible reasons for the relatively slow development of an 
academic interest in these transactions. Their existence was not widely known 
outside the banking world until the credit crisis. It may moreover be that many 
of those who took the trouble of understanding the complex world of financial 
law soon found themselves more attracted by the rewards available outside 
academia; in fact, much of the earlier CDS literature was written either by 
practitioners or by law students.121 Indeed, the majority of CDS books before the 
crisis were practitioners’ manuals that focused on the pragmatic side of the 
financial and legal aspects of CDSs.122 Today, in contrast, there is a burgeoning 
scholarly literature on CDSs.  
1.2.2 Legal-Doctrinal Scholarship 
Despite the growing scholarly CDS literature, there are important limits and 
lacunae. The area with the greatest limitations in terms of scholarly attention is 
the legal-doctrinal aspect of credit default swaps. In many publications, CDSs has 
been commonly situated within the broad category of credit derivatives, and the 
question concerning their legal status has been treated only in passing, normally 
referring to the US Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000 as 
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authority that they are unregulated OTC derivatives.123 The role and scope of 
CFMA will be critically examined later; at this point it is sufficient to note that 
these studies rarely entered into the trickier legal issues. A good example of this 
is Agasha Mugasha’s 2004 article, in which the discussion on legal and regulatory 
issues is limited to a summary of the few available cases concerning the 
interpretation and enforceability of ISDA standard form documentation.124 
There is ultimately only one major legal-doctrinal theme that has been debated 
in the literature: Are CDSs insurance contracts or not? This question, which forms 
the backbone of the present study, has surrounded CDSs from the beginning—or 
at least from 1997, when Robin Potts, an English barrister, wrote an influential 
opinion at the request of ISDA, arguing that these contracts are not insurance 
under English law.125 In the CDS literature, this is generally referred to as the Potts 
opinion and cited almost like a definitive legal ruling. In essence, Potts claimed 
that the contract in question was not insurance, because the obligation triggered 
by the credit event was not conditional on a loss on the part of the protection 
buyer, so that he did not need to have an insurable interest. 
This argument, and its reception, will be discussed and scrutinized in due 
course.126 For the moment, let us only note that what surprises one when 
confronted with the literature on this question is the quantity of unreflective 
analysis.127 As an exception, Paul Ali and Jan Job de Vries Robbé published two 
articles in 2005 in which they noted in passing that there was a continuing legal 
risk that credit derivatives might be recharacterized as insurance; they in other 
words recognized that the legal-doctrinal question was not as clear as was 
routinely assumed by practitioners.128 Nevertheless, these authors did not analyze 
the question any further, and it seems that it was only in the wake of the global 
financial crisis that commentators began to probe into the issue with a critical eye. 
Writing in 2008 (although the article was written before the full scale of the crisis 
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had revealed itself), Kimball-Stanley concluded sceptically concerning the Potts 
opinion: 
The premise of these arguments [that CDSs are not insurance] is that the insurable interest 
and indemnity doctrines are defining characteristics of insurance contracts. This premise 
is incorrect. These doctrines are policy responses to the moral hazard that insurance 
contracts create. Though they have become defining characteristics of insurance in some 
contexts, distinguishing CDSs from insurance using these requirements is disingenuous 
and circuitous.129 
In conclusion, the question of insurance law and credit default swaps has 
attracted little sustained attention. Most studies addressing it have provided 
insufficient analysis, whereas some others, for example those Henderson, 
Saunders and Schwartz, have focused on the viewpoint of regulatory policy, i.e. 
focussing on the question of whether CDSs should be regulated as insurance or 
otherwise.130 There have, in addition, been significant factual errors in the earlier 
literature (notably in relation to New York Insurance Law).131 There is, therefore, 
a great need for a careful examination of all the arguments, and for a balanced 
reflection on the broader legal-doctrinal question. 
1.2.3 Studies on Regulatory Issues 
The scholarly interest on credit default swaps has been greatest in the fields of 
finance and regulation, which is not surprising given the attention attracted by 
these transactions during the financial crisis. This literature can be divided in 
three principal categories: studies on the economics of credit default swaps 
generally, policies studies proposing regulatory solutions, and studies evaluating 
recent reforms. 
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1.2.3.1 Financial and Economic Scholarship 
The number of publications is the largest in the field of finance and economics, 
where there are both theoretical and empirical studies. As Ayadi and Behr point 
out, though, the majority of these studies are theoretical (i.e. model-based) 
“because of the lack of data in this area.”132 These theoretical studies have 
especially focused on “how CRT [credit risk transfer] transactions can change 
incentive structures, what the implications of these changes are and how the real 
economy might be affected by the introduction of CRT transactions.”133 These 
issues and the relevant literature will be examined later in detail. 
There is, nevertheless, a slowly growing body of empirical studies, and the 
post-crisis legislation will no doubt facilitate this line of research by rendering the 
market somewhat more transparent and subject to certain disclosure 
requirements. Some of the existing studies have sought to empirically test and 
quantify the theoretical models by studying the effect of credit risk transfers on 
lending activity.134 But perhaps the issue where the greatest empirical 
development has taken place is the question concerning the effects of CDSs on 
the underlying bond markets.135 
For the present study, the financial and economic CDS scholarship is more like 
a tool than an object of direct investigation. It will be seen that it is of great 
practical relevance when it comes to the examination of the regulatory policy 
issues, because we cannot make well-established policy evaluations if we do not 
know what the real issues are and how important they are. These studies are also 
important for estimating the practical effects that may be caused by different 
regulatory policies. 
1.2.3.2 Regulatory Policy: Issues and Proposals 
Based on these and similar studies, several authors in the fields of economics and 
law have contributed to our understanding of the regulatory policy concerns 
related to credit default swaps. A frequent theme in this literature is the 
description of the benefits and costs created by CDSs. A representative example 
is the seminal article by Partnoy and Skeel, published on the eve of the financial 
crisis.136 Among the benefits of CDSs, these scholars include reducing lenders’ 
risk exposure, facilitating access to capital, and providing market-based 
information about credit risks.137 Among the problems, they mention reducing 
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incentives for banks to monitor, creation of incentives to affirmatively destroy 
value, opacity, industry self-protection, and systemic risk in the CDS market due 
to high leverage and interconnections.138 
There is today a large literature on these issues. Among the more interesting 
contributions one should specifically mention Houman Shadab’s 2012 article on 
credit risk transfer governance, which examines governance problems in credit 
risk transfer markets broadly, distinguishing between “funded” and “unfunded” 
credit-risk transfer transactions (mainly securitization and CDSs, respectively).139 
In addition to its contribution to theoretical systematization, Shadab’s analysis is 
interesting in that he is not excessively naive about CDSs, but he still goes on to 
argue that the existing (largely self-regulatory) governance mechanisms are 
sufficient.140 
Many authors have proposed regulatory reforms. Some of these proposals are 
now partially outdated given the legislative changes that have taken place after 
the financial crisis. It is nevertheless useful to look at some examples of the 
directions taken in the literature. In the seminal study by Partnoy and Steel, there 
is only a sketch of “preliminary ideas” for reform;141 these include more disclosure 
regarding transactions and ISDA documents, a reform of credit ratings (this is 
relevant for CDOs), and a limitation of the privileges of derivatives in 
bankruptcy.142 The first and last of these ideas will be discussed later in detail, 
whereas the second is only relevant for CDOs, which fall outside the scope of this 
study. 
David McIlroy mentions a much wider range of regulatory options, without 
however examining any of them in depth.143 They include, firstly, the 
standardization of CDSs, which is already significant, and is probably not the key 
issue. Secondly, there is the use of central counterparties and exchange trading, 
which McIlroy admits requires standardization and significant liquidity, and 
creates problems due to greater risk concentration. The third proposal is 
mandatory collateralization, which is an important issue, but probably the key 
question is not the existence of collateral, but the unhelpful and even destructive 
dynamics of bilateral collateral management with CDSs.144 Fourthly, we have co-
insurance and “retaining skin in the game,” which is an interesting proposal for 
bank risk transfer incentives, but its efficacy is unclear, and McIlroy notes that it 
would be “difficult to enforce”.145 In order to reduce destructive incentives, he 
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fifthly discusses negotiations with the defaulting reference entity, like in ordinary 
insurance.146 Finally, there are the proposals for prohibiting uncovered CDS 
protection and imposing large exposure counterparty limits (both as in insurance 
regulation), both of which are interesting proposals that will be examined later. 
Noah Wynkoop’s 2008 article goes into much more detail in proposing 
compulsory disclosures and transaction reporting for credit derivatives.147 
However, this study is not only outdated but it is also limited in its ambition; it 
acknowledges the systemic risk implications due to liquidity shocks and high 
leverage, but it rather optimistically assumes that transparency is enough to 
resolve the problems.148  
Kristin N. Johnson’s 2011 article is more up-to-date, and it is also highly 
interesting in that it offers a more permanent theoretical contribution by 
comparing CDS markets with traditional “commons” situations, which in this 
case may give rise to a tragedy of commons due to the externalities of financial 
risk.149 This study has the advantage of systematically highlighting the externality 
problems, which cannot be reduced to opacity or leverage. Johnson’s policy 
proposal is also quite original: she advances a so-called community-governance 
model, which would be based on federally registered self-regulatory 
organizations.150 This is therefore a hybrid or co-regulatory model, which in the 
case of CDSs would probably involve the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) as the likely candidate. 
Johnson’s proposal is interesting, because ISDA already wields significant 
self-regulatory power, and the community-governance model would subject that 
self-regulatory power to governmental oversight, including authority to alter the 
self-regulator rules.151 Johnson mentions that the Dodd-Frank central clearing rule 
is an example of this model,152 but a hybrid model could be a modest 
improvement for the situations where clearing is not compulsory.153 This 
proposal will be further discussed later in connection with the ISDA architecture. 
Colleen Baker has advanced a related proposal for OTC derivatives generally, 
focusing on the problem of regulatory cooperation.154 Firstly, she proposes domestic 
                                                 
146 This is examined later critically. In this connection, McIlroy also notes, and doubts, the 
proposal of Ayadi and Behr 2009: 194 for demanding physical settlement instead of cash 
settlement. I would add that this would effectively dismantle ISDA’s dispute resolution 
regime, which avoids physical settlement. In this respect the proposal would have wider-
ranging implications than it seems at first sight. 
147 See Wynkoop 2008: 3123–3125. 
148 Ibid. 3105–3107. 
149 See Johnson 2011: 177–190. 
150 Ibid. 242–256. 
151 See ibid. 247. 
152 Ibid. 250–251. 
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154 See Baker 2010. 
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regulatory cooperation (in the United States context) between the SEC and the 
CFTC, the two principal financial regulators in the US.155 Baker’s objective is 
simply to overcome regulatory turf wars, which for decades have plagued the 
financial regulatory landscape in the United States.156 She proposes the creation 
of a specialized OTC derivatives super-regulator, which ”would have regulatory 
jurisdiction over all major market participants, all currently unregulated OTC 
derivative products, and all significant market infrastructure institutions such as 
CCP clearing facilities and trade repositories.”157 Secondly (and this is relevant 
more generally), Baker proposes international regulatory cooperation in the form 
of public-private partnerships between states and private actors such as ISDA.158 
She does not enter into great detail on this, but it is another example of the co-
regulatory direction found in the post-crisis literature. 
Some authors, including Timothy Lynch, have recommended more radical 
changes such as the prohibition or non-enforcement of purely speculative (non-
hedging) OTC transactions.159 This perspective receives inspiration from the 
traditional approach of American law, whose leading scholarly advocates include 
Lynn Stout.160 In some respects, this proposal coincides with the view advanced 
in the CDS debate that uncovered CDSs should be prohibited, although Lynch 
would extend it to other OTC transactions that fall outside the present study. 
This perspective will be discussed later in detail, but it can again be noted 
already that this proposal alone is not sufficient, because it fails to address other 
issues, including the stability and systemic risk problems associated with the use 
of CDSs for hedging purposes (transfer of real credit risks). Moreover, if the 
proposal were limited to mere non-enforcement of purely speculative 
transactions,161 then the contracts could be enforced through extra-legal means by 
way of a central counterparty, for example. Thus the regulatory logic would 
largely coincide with the obligation of clearing with a central counterparty, which 
turns out to be problematic, particularly for CDSs. Therefore, regardless of what 
one thinks of the overall direction proposed by Lynch and Stout, it should be 
understood that the regulatory consequences are very different depending on 
whether it is prohibition or non-enforcement that is adopted. 
The viewpoint that has attracted perhaps the least systematic attention in the 
scholarly literature is the idea that CDSs are essentially similar to insurance. This 
is probably because the general tendency is to view that as an OTC derivative and 
to search for regulatory solutions from that ambit. The perspective of insurance 
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regulation nevertheless receives brief positive observations from David McIlroy, 
as already mentioned; Robert Jarrow likewise proposes insurance-like 
regulations such as higher collateral and capital charges for CDS traders.162 The 
most explicit defence of the insurance perspective has come from Benjamin 
Saunders, who advocates the prudential regulation of CDS protection sellers.163 
He also provides a brief comparison of prudential regulation as opposed to 
compulsory clearing.164 Nevertheless, Saunders’ article is quite short and does not 
examine the arguments against it, nor does it provide any detail on the possible 
adaptation of the regulatory regime for the peculiarities of credit risk insurance. 
It should finally be pointed out that the review of the literature on regulatory 
issues uncovers some factual inaccuracies. Among them is the following claim 
regarding the position of CDS market participants in the current UK regulatory 
system: 
Because derivative dealing is categorized as a regulated activity in the UK, all persons 
dealing in derivatives must be duly authorized by the FSA. This in turn subjects them to 
the conduct of business rules foreseen in the FSA Handbook (under COBS). Therefore, 
despite the absence of direct product regulation, participants in the OTC derivative 
market are as tightly regulated by the FSA as any authorized firm.165 
I mention this because it seems not to be an isolated view.166 The flaw in this 
argument is quite evident. Although the fact of being a so-called authorized firm 
in UK financial markets does have some regulatory implications, the rules 
governing all authorized firms are generic and not especially demanding. These 
authorized firms include all the hedge funds that are (or were) broadly 
considered largely unregulated. In fact, the troubles of AIG were precisely due to 
the CDS activities of its (largely unregulated) London-based hedge fund.167 Where 
more demanding rules kick in is at the level, not of general authorization, but of 
permission to conduct specific financial activities.168 
1.2.3.3 Studies on Recent Regulatory Reforms 
The post-crisis financial market reforms included some changes to CDS markets, 
as was mentioned earlier, and these reforms naturally sparked a lively debate. 
This is especially the case with respect to the requirement of compulsory 
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centralized clearing for OTC derivatives, which forms the backbone of the post-
crisis approach to derivatives regulation, and which presumably applies to CDSs, 
too. This literature highlights the ways in which the compulsory clearing of these 
transactions has both benefits and dangers, as it facilitates counterparty risk 
management but creates larger risk concentrations than before.169 
In contrast to the centralized clearing rules, less scholarly attention has been 
given to the new European rules, which restrict short selling and uncovered 
positions in sovereign-debt related credit default swaps.170 It is briefly criticized 
by Frederik Dømler on the grounds that the restrictions make sovereign-debt 
CDSs “less liquid and traded less frequently.”171 However, the issue is not 
analyzed there in any detail, which is understandable, because Dømler’s article 
focuses on central counterparty regulation. 
1.2.4 Institutional Studies 
A name that has already appeared repeatedly is that of the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA). This organization has played a fundamental 
role not only in the development of standardized contracting in OTC derivatives 
(CDSs inclusive) but also in the political and legislative process surrounding these 
markets. Regarding the first of these roles, financial derivatives lawyer Schuyler 
Henderson observed already in 2002 that the “ISDA master agreement is perhaps 
the most successful financial form document ever, anywhere. There cannot be any 
other standard document which governs as many transactions, with as much 
credit exposure among as many different parties.”172 Agasha Mugasha further 
notes that this has become “a form of self-regulation or ‘soft’ law.”173 The ISDA 
regime is therefore of great interest for legal scholarship, too. 
Regarding ISDA’s political role, one might cite among others the following 
observation by Annelise Riles: “In the United States, intensive lobbying on the 
part of ISDA has resulted in important revisions of New York state law, the UCC 
(Uniform Commercial Code), and the national bankruptcy law, and has averted 
other proposed regulation opposed by ISDA.”174 The organization’s political 
influence is similarly noted in the sociological, interview-based study of Isabelle 
Huault and Hélène Rainelli-Le Montagner, who note its importance in 
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channelling the voice of the banking sector: ”At the international level, banks 
again chose to put their weight against the regulators within the ISDA. The ISDA 
had very significant means at its disposition: ‘At a global level the ISDA has 
colossal clout, they pay lawyers worldwide, all the profession joins, and they 
lobby the regulators.’ (A trader).”175 
In legal scholarship, ISDA attracted hardly any attention before the global 
financial crisis. Among the earliest studies on ISDA was the 2001 article by Sean 
Flanagan, who offered a pro-ISDA perspective to its history and activities.176 In 
the pre-crisis literature, one should also mention Frank Partnoy’s extensive study 
on financial derivatives scandals, in which ISDA receives much (and less positive) 
attention.177 
After the financial crisis, there has been a growing interest in the organization. 
Joanna Braithwaite has studied ISDA’s Master Agreement regime and its 
interaction with the courts.178 Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati have examined 
ISDA’s dispute resolution system.179 Other scholars have focused on its political 
role; these include Colin Scott and John Biggins on ISDA’s relations with nation 
states;180 Huault and Rainelli-Le Montagner on ISDA’s influence strategies;181 
Glenn Morgan on its activities following the 2008 crisis;182 and Heather McKeen-
Edwards and Tony Porter on ISDA’s role in global finance.183 In addition, one 
cannot fail to mention Gillian Tett’s best-selling work of post-crisis financial 
journalism in which ISDA plays an important role.184 
1.2.5 Credit Default Swaps in Finnish Legal Scholarship 
1.2.5.1 General Issues and Insurance Law 
Credit default swaps have so far received only limited attention in Finnish legal 
scholarship, but there are sufficient contributions to render them worthy of a 
discussion in the present study. The first Finnish contribution is by Miki 
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Kuusinen, dating from 2005, that is from the time before the financial crisis.185 This 
is an LLM thesis, entitled Luottoriskinvaihtosopimuksen sisältämästä sitoumuksesta 
erityisesti varallisuusoikeuden kannalta, in which Kuusinen studies CDSs from the 
viewpoint of general contract law and property law. 
An entire chapter of Kuusinen’s study is dedicated to the broad description 
and discussion of CDSs.186 Most of the discussion remains at an abstract level 
without getting into legal specifics,187 but even at this level some interesting points 
are raised, for example that credit risk as such cannot be the precise object of 
contractual transfers; what can be transferred is specific legal rights such as those 
embodied in a loan contract, which of course is economically subject to risk.188 
Thus the transfer of credit risk is the economic effect of the contract, but its specific 
legal content must be characterized differently. This is a worthy point that has 
hardly been mentioned anywhere else in the literature.189  
Regarding the contractual characterization of CDSs, Kuusinen dedicates some 
attention to the similarities between CDSs and insurance.190 The discussion is only 
preliminary, and the author acknowledges that more research is needed.191 I will 
later return more specifically to what he proposes.  The study in any case reveals 
that Finnish law presents many interesting legal-doctrinal questions for credit 
default swaps. 
After the financial crisis, there have been some more studies, among which we 
can firstly note an article by Juho Kivi-Koskinen, who analyzes the securitization 
of sub-prime mortgages and their role in the financial crisis.192 However, the 
article only marginally touches upon credit default swaps, as it is more concerned 
with the economic-legal dynamics generally than with the implications in terms 
of Finnish law. 
Of much greater interest is the LLM thesis of Lauri Ahokallio, entitled 
Luottoriskinvaihtosopimuksen oikeudellinen luonne erityisesti vakuutusoikeuden 
näkökulmasta.193 Ahokallio dedicates particular attention to the relationship 
between CDSs and insurance law, but he also touches upon several other points, 
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including the contractual nature (sopimusluonne) of CDSs,194 the differences 
between CDSs and loan agreements generally (velkakirja),195 the differences 
between CDSs and property securities (esinevakuudet)196 and what Finnish law 
calls personal securities (henkilövakuudet), such as third-party guarantees (takaus) 
and letters of credit (reimburssi).197 Another point of great interest is the difference 
between CDSs and financial securities (arvopaperi).198 The most important 
contribution, however, pertains to the insurance law question, which will be 
studied later in a critical dialogue with Ahokallio.199 
1.2.5.2 Translating Credit Default Swaps 
There is one practical question that both Kuusinen and Ahokallio raise: how 
should credit default swaps be called in Finnish? This term was translated as 
luottoriskinvaihtosopimus by the Finnish Financial Services Authority back in 2004, 
and this has stayed as the standard expression in Finnish.200 Kuusinen notes, 
however, that the word vaihto (i.e. exchange or swap) is descriptively ill-suited 
for this purpose, because CDSs economically transfer credit risk instead of 
exchanging or swapping them.201 
Ahokallio shares this terminological critique, arguing that CDSs should be 
called credit risk transfer contracts, not swaps, because a swap implies an exchange 
of related interests (here, of credit risks), so that a credit risk swap properly 
speaking would be an exchange of two different credit risks.202 I entirely agree 
with both Kuusinen and Ahokallio. Perhaps we should adopt the expression 
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luottoriskin siirtosopimus (written separately, of course). I will later argue that 
CDSs should not be called swaps in English, either.203 
There may be scope for further terminological precision, however. Ahokallio 
refers to CDSs as credit risk swaps, possibly as a consequence of retranslating back 
into English the original Finnish translation luottoriskinvaihtosopimus. This is 
inaccurate, because the original English expression refers to credit default (in 
Finnish, luottotappio), which is narrower than the generic concept of credit risk. 
Some examples of non-default credit risk are market risk (e.g. price changes in 
secondary credit markets, and asset liquidity risk) and legal risk (e.g. the risk that 
an agreement is deemed illegal or unenforceable). CDS contracts provide no 
protection against these risks; they are specifically triggered by default events 
specified in the agreement. Secondary price movements, of course, influence CDS 
markets, and the default payments under CDSs are normally determined 
according to post-default prices in secondary markets, but without a specific 
default event, there is no compensation whatsoever under CDSs. It follows that 
the best translation would seem to be luottotappioriskin siirtosopimus. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
The previous discussion on the research situation has unearthed a range of 
important research needs. This section outlines and explains the objectives and 
scope of the present study. It starts by considering the principal research 
questions, which are divided into legal-doctrinal and regulatory-political 
questions. It then explains the choices of legal jurisdiction that have been made 
for purposes of limiting the scope of legal material. Finally, a brief comment is 
provided on some of the issues that have been specifically excluded from this 
study. 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
The present study is built around two general questions: What are credit default 
swaps legally, i.e. how should they be legally categorized (the legal-doctrinal question) 
and how should they be regulated (the regulatory-political question). Each of these 
bigger questions implies several smaller questions, the principal of which are 
outlined next. 
1.3.1.1 Questions concerning Legal Doctrine 
There are at least four sets of questions concerning the legal classification of credit 
default swaps. The first question concerns the fact that there remains significant 
                                                 




uncertainty and confusion regarding the legal characterization of CDSs. Before 
attempting to clarify the legal question itself, it is asked what factors have 
contributed to this uncertainty, and why the question is supposedly difficult. One 
obvious explanation is that CDSs are historically novel financial instruments, and 
they are contracted using a terminology that greatly differs from the terminology 
of traditional legal categories. This would explain, at least in part, why these 
products may be lacking clarifying legislation and why they cannot be easily 
fitted into traditional legal categories. 
It will be argued, however, that this is really not a sufficient explanation. 
Given the tremendous growth of CDS markets globally, the lack of legal sources, 
whether statute or case law, is very surprising. The question is, Why is this so? Is 
it a mere coincidence or are there institutional factors pushing in that direction? 
The lack of specific legal sources implies that the question will have to be studied 
in terms of general sources and academic literature. The latter, as we have already 
seen, may be somewhat skewed when it comes to financial markets law. That 
raises the question of how that literature should be evaluated.  
It will be argued that there is a further reason for the confusing situation, 
namely that CDSs fall in the intersection of a range of transactions that are legally 
different but that economically resemble each other. This leads to the second 
research question: What are the principal potential legal categories, and what are 
the arguments in favour and against applying each category to credit default 
swaps? The categories examined here are gambling, securities, letters of credit, 
guarantees, insurance, and derivatives. The last two will receive more detailed 
attention, but the other alternatives are not without interest either (except 
gambling, which is easily excluded in most jurisdictions). The category of 
securities is especially interest insofar as that seems to be the preferred option in 
important circles, but it will be argued that this view is fundamentally mistaken; 
this conclusion follows from an examination of the way in which secondary-
market trading is conducted in CDS markets. In contrast, tripartite arrangements 
such as letters of credit and third-party guarantees cannot be easily excluded; the 
question here will focus on the distinction between two-party and three-party 
arrangements. 
The subsequent chapters focus on the two principal alternatives advocated in 
the existing literature: one is the insurance-based understanding of CDSs,204 
whereas the other is the derivatives-based understanding according to which CDSs 
are essentially options or swaps.205 The overall argument in the present study is 
that both views can be supported, but for different reasons. 
Therefore, the third set of questions concerns the application of insurance law 
to CDSs. What are the arguments for applying or not applying it, and what would 
the insurance recharacterization of CDSs imply? This is one of the biggest and 
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most complex questions, as it implies a range of smaller questions, as will be seen 
in due course (see chapter 3). These questions may be separated into two principal 
groups. On the one hand, there are questions concerning the application of 
general insurance law principles (general demarcation criteria, the doctrine of 
insurable interest, and loss indemnification) to credit default swaps. On the other 
hand, there are specific questions surrounding recent documents and 
interventions, including the influential Potts opinion and the fluctuating position 
of leading regulatory authorities (mainly the New York insurance regulators, but 
some statements by the UK Financial Services Authority are also of interest). 
The fourth set of questions concerns the derivatives-based view of CDSs 
(chapter 4). This view has attracted much attention in the US, which is where the 
most relevant legislative reforms have taken place. Nevertheless, it will be seen 
that there relevant legal sources are both scarce and conceptually confusing. In 
fact, the current legal and regulatory environment is a puzzling mixture of 
conflicting elements. In order to make more sense of the situation, attention is 
here given to the legislative history of derivatives regulation (mainly in the US, 
which has marked the pace globally). In addition to the legislative outcomes, one 
wishes to understand the principal factors that have shaped those outcomes. 
Among the various influence factors, the greatest attention here is given to the 
activities of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), which 
has been identified as the principal behind-the-scenes driver of the current 
legislative framework. The post-crisis Dodd-Frank legislation is also carefully 
examined, not only because it sets one of the main contexts for current policy 
evaluation, but also because it embodies intruiguing tensions concerning the legal 
classification of credit default swaps. It will also be seen that this question, which 
reflects a kind of political interpretation of the derivatives classification of CDSs, 
in a sense closes the circle of the legal-doctrinal perspective, as it sheds further 
light on the first question that was posed at the beginning, namely why there is 
such confusion surrounding this issue. 
1.3.1.2 Questions Concerning Regulatory Policy 
The questions regarding the regulation of credit default swaps are here grouped 
into two categories. There is firstly the preliminary question regarding the 
regulatory motive or justification of regulation, i.e. whether there is any need for 
regulating CDSs or changing the way in which they are regulated. This is a highly 
complex question, because it is connected to a range of broader issues 
surrounding corporate governance, financial markets and financial innovations. 
The present study seeks to identify and critically examine the principal regulatory 
concerns, which form as it were the necessary background material for the 
evaluation of different regulatory policy alternatives (see chapter 5). This 
question is given great attention here, because the issue of CDS regulation cannot 




consideration, including its weaknesses that go beyond the problems posed by 
CDSs. 
The second set of questions concerns specific regulatory approaches and 
alternatives (chapter 6). The present study focuses on the four following 
approaches: industry self-governance led by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA), disclosure and transparency regulation, 
compulsory central counterparty (CCP) clearing, and heavier interventions along 
the lines of insurance regulation. The first three of these are the principal 
governance regimes currently in place for CDS markets, and the last one is 
partially reflected in the European short selling regulation.  
More specifically, the section on ISDA-led self-regulation provides an 
introduction to the current ISDA architecture, and it seeks to identify its 
advantages and disadvantages. The latter can be distinguished into two types of 
disadvantages, namely doubts concerning the functionality of the architecture, 
and legitimacy problems. Possible reform avenues are also considered within the 
self-regulatory approach. The section on transparency regulation summarizes the 
principal post-crisis reforms in Europe and the US, and evaluates their sufficiency 
for resolving problems surrounding credit default swaps. The importance of 
transparency can hardly be overstated, but it will be argued that there are 
significant limits to what it can achieve. Central counterparty clearing forms the 
principal novel element in the post-crisis legislative framework, which is why it 
merits careful evaluation. It will however be criticized in light of the doubts 
concerning its applicability and safety for CDS markets. 
Special attention is given here to the possibility of insurance-based regulation 
of CDS protection selling, because, as we saw earlier, the existing literature has 
largely neglected this possibility even though it is a central issue from an 
economic point of view.206 The approach chosen here is to examine whether there 
is scope for a targeted regulatory scheme that would adapt the relevant insurance 
regulation principles to the peculiarities of credit default swaps (as is already 
done in some other insurance categories). It will also be asked whether these 
principles might be developed within the existing regulatory frameworks 
without the necessity of new legislative reforms. 
If we compare these regulatory approaches that form the core of this part of 
the study, we may observe a kind of progression between them, ranging from 
practically no regulation towards relatively intrusive intervention. They are also 
broadly related to the three archetypical regulatory strategies, namely self-
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regulation, co-regulation, and command-and-control regulation.207 This 
progression towards heavier intervention is analytically important, because the 
mode of analysis here is holistic and comparative; in other words, the question is 
not so much whether one or other strategy might be the perfect solution (which 
is highly unlikely) as what their advantages and disadvantages are. There is a 
great need for such comparative analysis, because each approach has its strengths 
and weaknesses, yet the existing literature has tended to focus on specific 
proposals without paying attention to the alternatives.208 
Importantly, the four regulatory strategies considered here must not be 
considered as mutually exclusive, because they may complement each other. For 
example, the first three of them are together currently applicable to most CDS 
contracts; moreover, if the contract references European sovereign debt, then the 
restrictions imposed by the European short selling regulation may be relevant. A 
possible exception to this cumulative logic would be the imposition of insurance-
like regulation on CDS protection selling—for example by way of compulsory loss 
reserving and large counterparty limits—but in fact even in that case the other 
regimes would not necessarily be excluded. Moreover, insurance-based 
principles might be employed to further develop the regulation of institutions 
acting as central counterparties for CDSs. 
1.3.2 Jurisdictional Choices 
The choice of jurisdictions has here been made in light of pragmatic 
considerations, so that both the practical importance and the theoretical interest 
implied in the choices has been taken into account. In the present study, there are 
a range of different factors and dimensions to consider. 
1.3.2.1 Legal-Doctrinal Questions: England and the United States 
With respect to the practical importance of different jurisdictions, the guiding 
principle here has been the fact that London and New York are by far the biggest 
centres of CDS transacting, and indeed the majority of CDS contracts are based 
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on either English or New York law.209 Therefore the legal-doctrinal aspect of the 
study is focused on English and United States law. 
The relative importance of England and the United States is not equal, 
however, when it comes to different dimensions of the legal question. In the ambit 
of insurance law generally, it is English law that is the most important context here, 
not only because it forms the basis of the greater part of United States insurance 
law principles, but also because the famous Potts opinion was written in the 
context of English law. United States insurance law is naturally also covered here 
in a limited manner insofar as it differs from the general common law insurance 
principles. 
On the question of financial derivatives law, on the other hand, it turns out that 
English law has relatively little of interest to say regarding credit default swaps 
specifically, whereas it is the United States that the most intriguing legislative 
developments have taken place. The question regarding the evolution of financial 
derivatives legislation, therefore, focuses largely on United States, because it was 
there that the novel category of largely unregulated swaps was created and later 
extended to these transactions which, since then, have been called credit default 
swaps. 
United States law, however, has the added complication that some of the 
issues—financial derivatives law in particular—pertain to the sphere of federal 
law, whereas others—including insurance law—are subject to state law. On the 
latter, then, the analysis is largely restricted to New York State law, because New 
York is the location of the leading CDS market and it is also the jurisdiction that 
offers the greatest amount of legal material on the question, whereas most of the 
other US states have not addresses the CDS question explicitly. 
There are some minor additions beyond English and United States. One of 
them is, in the context of the demarcation of the scope of insurance law, a brief 
discussion on Finnish law, which has been included for comparative purposes, 
naturally taking into account the institutional location of the research project. 
Another addition is a brief comment on Australian insurance law in the context of 
the question of the requirement of insurance interest; Australia has been included 
here, because the doctrine of insurable interest is one of the big questions raised 
by CDSs, and the audacious Australian reform in this field is widely cited. 
1.3.2.2 Regulatory Policy Analysis: United States and European Union 
On the normative question of regulatory policy, the jurisdictional choices have 
been made with some similarities and some differences, taking into account the 
different legislative reforms that took place after the global financial crisis. United 
States continues to be a focal point in this respect, especially due to the Dodd-
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Frank Act, which is of great importance for the development of CDS regulation 
and which has been widely commented in the academic literature. Some further 
material has been offered by the pre-Dodd Frank legislative project of the US state 
insurance legislators, which has the further advantage for research purposes that 
it was a common project of the coordinating body of US state insurance 
legislators. 
In Europe, on the other hand, the principal reforms of interest took place not 
in the UK but at the level of the European Union. These include the EMIR 
regulation, which broadly coincides with the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement of 
compulsory centralized clearing for most OTC derivatives, so that these two 
reforms are studied here as a unified policy strategy. The same is broadly true of 
new disclosure requirements. In Europe, however, there is an additional project 
of great interest for CDS policy analysis, namely the new short selling regulation, 
which is an entirely novel phenomenon in CDS regulation without precedent or 
comparison in other jurisdictions. 
Naturally the policy analysis pertaining to CDSs goes beyond specific 
jurisdictions. The analysis of policy issues raised by CDSs is here done with a 
view to the leading jurisdictions under study, but the results are broadly 
applicable to other jurisdictions. The policy evaluation of the self-regulatory 
governance mechanisms of ISDA is also independent of specific jurisdictions, 
although it remains in the power of different jurisdictions to determine whether 
and to what extent the ISDA architecture will be legally enforceable. 
1.3.3 Exclusions 
1.3.3.1 Other Regulatory Approaches  
There are many interesting and important questions that have not been included 
in the present study. Some of them merit a brief comment, including the 
perspective of consumer protection, which is one of the principal objectives of 
modern financial regulation. This perspective is not wholly missing in this study, 
because in a certain sense the regulation of CDS protection selling is also a form 
of consumer protection.210 What has been excluded entirely is the notion of 
unsuitability, which is an important issue in financial services law generally and 
may be relevant for the sale of derivatives, particularly as some financial products 
are so complicated that it may be difficult even for experts to understand them.211 
In practice, the courts (especially but not only in England) have usually taken the 
view that, where consumers are not involved, clients must bear the responsibility 
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for voluntarily entering into contracts carrying significant risks.212 Therefore, the 
issue is not of much legal-doctrinal relevance when it comes to products like 
CDSs; this can also be said of policy concerns for the most part.213 
Another issue that is here examined only partially is the new compulsory 
clearing regime in Europe, commonly known as the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). This Regulation is here discussed principally 
with respect to the policy issues, i.e. whether central clearing is a suitable and 
adequate mechanism for reducing problems associated with credit default swaps. 
Legal-doctrinal issues are, therefore, largely left aside, but they might be a fruitful 
field for future research.214  
Another field of recent European reforms that influence CDSs is the new 
Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). In its preparatory impact assessment, the 
European Commission explicitly noted that the earlier Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD) failed to cover OTC transactions, creating a significant regulatory 
loophole.215 It may be, though, that national rules in some cases were already 
more demanding.216 In any event, the new Regulation would merit its own, 
detailed examination, given the significant practical challenges involved in 
applying these principles to OTC transactions. 
1.3.3.2 The Problem of Collateralized Debt Obligations 
One topic that is closely related to credit default swaps and that has aroused 
heated debate is the product category known as collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs). These are discussed briefly here in connection with the role of CDSs in 
the financial crisis, but in large measure they are not given detailed attention 
because they involve entirely different issues. Some observations are opportune, 
                                                 
212 Benjamin 2007: paras. 5.115–5.118, discussing this logic in the cases of Bankers Trust v 
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214 As an example of potential research prospects, Ahokallio 2011: 60–61 discusses the 
application of EMIR rules to CDSs, noting that the mechanism for determining the application 
of the central clearing requirement to specific instruments is rather complicated, and that the 
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mentioned as one of the motivations for the Regulation: “CDS-sopimusten ottamista 
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215 European Commission 2011a: 19. 
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however, to show how these products are situated with respect to the present 
study. 
CDOs are notorious for creating complex and opaque risks.217 According to 
Partnoy and Skeel, CDOs share many of the problems associated with CDSs, but 
they also have some unique problems due to the exploitation of modern 
mathematical finance methods in order to artificially reduce the credit ratings of 
the relevant CDO tranches.218 Given that the creation of CDOs involves very high 
transaction costs,219 and that CDOs do not create new loans but merely repackage 
their risks among different parties, it is quite doubtful that the real net value 
outcome of this process could be positive.220 
In brief, then, the principal problem in the process of CDO creation is that 
these methods of mathematical finance are often based on flawed models that 
incorporate erroneous assumptions and fail to adequately reflect all the risks 
involved.221 In itself, the existence of such model imperfections is hardly 
surprising, not only because all modern finance is subject to imperfections, but 
also because the models for CDO valuation have been developed by investment 
banks (in collaboration with credit rating agencies) that are eager to sell these 
products and hence also to build them so as to make them as attractive as 
possible.222 
Economically, this critique of CDOs implies that these transactions are 
paradoxical, because instead of creating “arbitrage opportunities” by identifying 
and exploiting price imperfections found in the underlying credit markets, the 
CDOs themselves are incorrectly priced. In other words, the apparent arbitrage 
opportunities provided by CDOs are due to the underestimation of the real 
default probabilities embedded in these products. In terms of value added, CDOs 
are attractive only insofar as their buyers only care about (or only pay attention 
to) ratings and yields, and care less about real financial risks.223 But this means 
that, economically, CDOs do not help to correct existing price imperfections, but 
in contrast they are create price imperfections and thereby add confusion in the 
credit risk market. 
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In terms of law and regulation, in any event, the questions raised by CDOs are 
related to, on the one hand, to the use of mathematical modelling in the risk-
regulation of financial institutions (as, for example, in bank capital regulation), 
and on the other hand, the regulatory reliance on credit ratings. Both of these are 
practical issues of major ongoing concern: after the global financial crisis, these 
problems have been widely acknowledged, but only limited progress has been 
made in improving the regulatory system in this respect. Importantly, the 
problems associated with CDOs cannot be resolved merely by insisting on 
disclosures; as far as the purchase relationship is concerned, the limitations of 
CDO models are already widely known, and in terms of disclosure for corporate 
governance purposes, it is doubtful whether so complex risks can be effectively 
communicated.224 From a scholarly point of view, though, these problems have 
already been extensively discussed in the academic literature, so that the 
remaining questions are of a more practical and technical nature.225 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
The research objectives outlined in the previous section raise a range of 
methodological issues, which are now examined firstly in relation to legal-
doctrinal questions and then concerning regulatory-political questions. Both 
categories raise specific issues, so that in some respects it is possible to speak of 
different legal-doctrinal and regulatory-political methodologies. There is, 
however, also an issue that concerns the relationship between these ambits; this 
is here included in the discussion on legal doctrine. 
1.4.1 Legal-Doctrinal Issues 
The present study is situated methodologically within the common law tradition 
of legal thought in which law is predominantly studied as a social phenomenon 
that can only be fully understood in light of its broader context. The notion of legal 
doctrine, as it is used here, should not be fully identified with what Continental 
jurisprudence calls legal dogmatics, that is, the analysis and systematization of the 
existing system of legal norms and principles. Such a task forms part of this study, 
but principally as a preliminary stage for the evaluation of the present legal 
situation in terms of economic and regulatory concerns. It is not appropriate here 
to enter into the philosophical discussion concerning the nature of law, but it is 
necessary to confront certain underlying issues that influence the way this study 
has been formulated. 
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1.4.1.1 Is There One Right Answer? 
One of the issues that are always present, at least implicitly, in legal interpretation 
is whether or not there is an answer to every legal question that may be posed, or 
a correct solution to every legal problem that may arise. The approach taken to 
this issue obviously leads to further questions: if an answer always exists, 
whether there may be one only, or more; if an answer cannot sometimes (or 
indeed ever) be provided, what can be done, then. This methodological question 
concerning the existence of correct solutions is, for the present study, more than 
vain speculation, because the question concerning the legal characterization of 
the transaction known as a CDS in a given jurisdiction is confronted with two 
major challenges. First, there is a remarkable lack of normative legal material 
dealing with CDSs explicitly, and the norms and principles that may be relevant 
implicitly (general insurance law, for example) are at times ambiguous. Second, 
there are in some contexts more or less relevant norms that are in clear tension if 
not outright contradiction with each other. These two challenges correspond 
quite precisely to the two sources of legal incompleteness: gaps and ambiguity, on 
the one hand, and tensions and contradictions, on the other.226 
The general issue has obviously been debated for centuries. To mention just 
some representative positions, there is the tradition that defends the existence of 
a right legal answer, ranging from ancient Roman jurisprudence to the traditional 
English idea that judges find law not make it; it is equally found in the ideals of the 
Enlightenment philosophy that pictured courts as automatic enforcers of 
legislation, and more lately in the legal philosophy of Ronald Dworkin among 
others.227 Dworkin was however reacting to the growing current of sceptical 
views that dominated much of the 20th century; these views included American 
legal realism and critical legal studies as its extreme variants, but it can be said 
that there are today few who subscribe to the strong version of the one-right-
answer thesis, according to which there is always a unique correct answer and it 
is knowable to us.228 
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The view followed here is a middle position, which on the one hand 
acknowledges the insurmountable difficulties faced in the search for a unique 
right answer; specifically, these difficulties include both our epistemological 
limits (Dworkin’s Hercules is not to be found) as well as the genuine 
underdetermination of the legal order.229 On the other hand, this view defends the 
search for a right answer as something necessary and purposeful, because it 
expresses the fundamental sense of the principle of legality, understood as a 
dynamic aspiration for the ordering of society according to justice and reason, 
which also implies predictability and internal coherence.230 This view has certain 
important points of contact with the other issues discussed next.231 
1.4.1.2 Refutations and Paradigms 
The view adopted here is, in other words, that the search for correct answers to 
legal questions is theoretically sound, but at least in so-called hard cases it may be 
impossible to find a unique right answer. That does not mean, however, that in 
those cases nothing meaningful can be said. The matter can be clarified in two 
respects by way of reference to analogous categories in philosophy of science 
generally. 
The first category of relevance is the notion of falsification developed by Karl 
Popper.232 Without undue references to the complexity of the question, the point 
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here is the principle that although it will often be difficult to conclusively verify 
any specific theory, it will often be possible to advance our knowledge by ruling 
out certain other theories and thereby limit the scope of plausible ones. This 
ruling out of certain alternatives will implicitly strengthen (or corroborate) other 
theories even when their correctness cannot be irrefutably proven. Applying this 
perspective briefly to the legal arguments that follow, we can say that most of the 
arguments move at the level of falsification, that is, at the level of ruling out 
certain legal-doctrinal understandings of credit default swaps. In some cases, the 
refutation is conclusive (for example, in the case of the widely misquoted New 
York Insurance Law),233 whereas in other cases the conclusion is more nuanced 
but nevertheless highly probable (for example, with respect to the loss indemnity 
aspect of CDSs).234 These arguments are not sufficient for definitively establishing 
the correct legal doctrine of CDSs, but they are steps forward in a process in which 
we are advancing towards a correct understanding of the relevant legal issues. 
It is obvious, however, that no argument can be considered in isolation. 
Therefore, the second category that is of great relevance for the present study is 
Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigms, or Imre Lakatos’ related notion of scientific 
research programs.235 Again, the details and possible differences between these 
notions are not of great importance here; what matters is the recognition of the 
holistic nature of any scientific enterprise. This means that any argument must be 
considered as interconnected to other arguments, forming as it were broader 
paradigms or research programs, which should be assessed in a holistic manner. 
Applying these notions to the present study, it can be said that there are two 
principal paradigms regarding credit default swaps, the insurance paradigm and 
the derivatives paradigm. The main objective of the legal-doctrinal part of the 
study is precisely the study of these paradigms. The contribution of the 
arguments and findings is more accurate understood when considered in this 
light, as strengthening or weakening the broader paradigms. 
Importantly, these paradigms are not restricted to strictly legal questions, but 
also encompass views and attitudes concerning broader policy issues. In 
particular, the advocacy of one paradigm or the other is rarely detached from 
broader considerations of financial regulation. Thus, advocacy of the derivatives-
characterization of CDSs tends to coincide with a policy outlook that is sceptical 
of financial regulation, and that highlights the benefits of CDSs and the 
disadvantages of insurance law, favouring self-governance or (at most) central 
counterparty clearing of CDSs.236 In contrast, the insurance-based view is usually 
related to arguments in favour of reserves regulation and the insurable interest 
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requirement for CDSs.237 Thus the paradigm perspective enables us to situate the 
individual arguments in a broader context. It also reveals that there is an 
unavoidable connection between the is and ought of legal policy, which is 
considered next. 
1.4.1.3 The Is and Ought of Positive Law: Distinction and Interrelation 
In the search for answers to legal questions, hard cases can be divided into two 
broad categories: on the one hand, there are cases and situations in which the 
formal (positive) legal sources are ambiguous or incomplete; on the other hand, 
there are cases in which there is a tension or outright conflict between positive 
law and the requirements of justice. The latter category is traditionally known as 
the problem of unjust law, which implies a range of difficult questions such as 
how to conceptualize and how to meaningfully resolve the conflict. In the present 
study, such questions are not directly relevant, because it is difficult to argue that 
the doctrinal problems of CDSs would raise concerns of manifest injustice; what 
is of relevance, however, is the more modest challenge concerning the distinction 
and interrelation between what the positive law is and what it presumably ought 
to be. 
In the legal-doctrinal part of the study, the analysis starts with the 
presupposition that the positive legal order can be taken as a given, but as we 
proceed in the analysis, it will become clear that there are, quite naturally, other 
questions of great interest that must inquire beyond the lex lata. As was just 
mentioned, the contrasting insurance and derivatives paradigms of CDSs are 
connected to regulatory and economic views in ways that are by no means 
arbitrary. This also entails an important challenge, because one should see to what 
extent those broader paradigm connections are truly necessary. For analytic 
purposes it is helpful to distinguish between the legal-doctrinal and the 
regulatory-political issues. Even if one thinks that CDSs are to be classified as 
insurance as a matter of law, it does not logically follow that insurance law is 
necessarily the optimal way of regulating CDSs. It could be argued, for example, 
that insurance law is based on archaic principles that are not fully applicable in 
the context of modern financial markets, or that subsequent institutional 
evolution has more efficient forms of tackling problems such as moral hazard and 
counterparty risk. 
Let us illustrate this further by posing two different questions. The first 
question (the legal-doctrinal question) is: Are credit default swaps insurance 
contracts as a matter of legal doctrine? In other words, taking the state of financial 
regulation and insurance law as given, do CDSs fall within the scope of insurance 
regulation? The second question (the regulatory-political question) is: Should 
                                                 




credit default swaps be regulated as insurance? In principle, there are four possible 
answer combinations. The simplest ones are (a) yes to both: CDSs are essentially 
insurance contracts and should so be regulated; and (b) no to both: CDSs are 
distinct from insurance and should not be so regulated. But the other 
combinations are also plausible. One is that (c) as a matter of current law, CDSs 
fall within the legal category of insurance, but as a matter of policy, insurance 
regulation is not the best way of dealing with the issues; this may be so, for 
example, because insurance law has been designed for other concerns and would 
not deal with some of the problems specific to CDS contracts. The last option is 
the converse: (d) CDSs cannot be classified as insurance presently(for example 
because that have been expressly excluded), but insurance regulation would be a 
good way of tackling the problems created by CDSs. 
Each of these four answer combinations can be plausibly defended. On the 
one hand, the answer to the first question varies from one jurisdiction to another, 
and in many countries the question is entirely open to debate. On the other hand, 
there are strong arguments both ways to the policy question; ultimately the 
matter must be decided by considering the issue in light of all the policy options, 
because there may not be a perfect solution. 
Distinguishing these different but related questions is necessary for another 
reason. The complexity of the underlying issues is such that it is easy to confuse 
one question with the other, even to the point of mistaking the first question for 
the second. For example, it will be argued that, as a matter of current English law, 
CDSs cannot be meaningfully distinguished from insurance. A possible reaction 
to such a claim is that CDSs are valuable risk-management tools, and regulating 
them as insurance would be absurd. Perhaps so—but that must be investigated 
separately, because it is a different question. On the other hand, the two questions 
influence each another. A question of legal doctrine cannot always be addressed 
without considering the policy issue, especially if the first question yields an 
uncertain answer. 
There is a more subtle error, which is to mistake the latter question for the first. 
For example, one may hold that insurance regulation is appropriate for CDS 
contracts and, on that basis, conclude that CDSs must be legally defined as 
insurance contracts; but of course, that is a different issue. Further, it may be that 
something like insurance regulation is the appropriate way of dealing with CDS 
contracts, but it does not necessarily mean that insurance law in its entirety is the 
optimal solution, because the relevant regulatory objectives may be better 
achieved via targeted regulation that addresses the specific issues raised by CDSs. 
1.4.1.4 Formal and Substantive Legal Reasoning 
The relationship between is and ought merits a further clarification in the present 
study, because it turns out that the ought-dimension is sometimes present in 




notions of formal and substantive reasoning. It will be argued in later chapters 
that perhaps the best argument against recharacterizing CDSs as insurance is that 
insurance law should not apply for practical reasons. This should-not-argument has 
some defenders in the general theory of insurance law: the difficulties of 
determining the scope of insurance law have led some to suggest that the ultimate 
question ought to be “whether certain activity should be subject to regulation or 
not.”238 As a decisive legal test, this is far too vague and at least “there is no real 
support for it in the American cases,”239 but it remains a factor to consider in the 
practical application of insurance law.240 In the case of credit default swaps, the 
ought-dimension has obtained unusual prominence in legal debates, because the 
scarcity of statute and case law concerning CDSs has implied that the existing 
sources of positive law do not supply obvious and undisputed answers to all the 
questions, and greater importance must be attributed to general principles and 
regulatory motives. In other words, there is more scope for substantive as 
opposed to formal argumentation.  
This distinction merits a closer examination, because it is more complicated 
than it may seem. Its acceptability as a matter of legal principle varies between 
jurisdictions, and this must be taken into account if substantive arguments are 
advanced as a matter of positive law. The conceptual distinction between 
substantive and formal legal reasoning has been famously developed by Patrick 
Atiyah and Robert Summers, who explain it as follows: 
A substantive reason is a moral, economic, political, institutional, or other social 
consideration. Thus the fact that D has intentionally harmed P is a reason of substance for 
deciding that D ought to be required by law to pay damages to P. […] A formal reason is 
a legally authoritative reason on which judges and others are empowered or required to 
base a decision or action, and such a reason usually excludes from consideration, 
overrides, or at least diminishes the weight of, any countervailing substantive reason 
arising at the point of decision of action.241 
Each form of reasoning has its appeal. Substantive reasoning focuses on the 
merits of the parties and seeks fairness and justice in the particular case, but it can 
result in expensive evidentiary inquiries and unpredictable outcomes. Formal 
reasoning can be legalistic and foreign to common sense, but it guarantees quicker 
judgments and greater predictability. In their comparative study, Atiyah and 
Summers argue that “the American and the English legal systems, for all their 
superficial similarities, differ profoundly: the English legal system is highly 
‘formal’ and the American highly ‘substantive’.”242 This point is of great relevance 
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here, because the legal-doctrinal part of the study includes both English and 
American law. As a first impression, therefore, it would seem that substantive 
reasoning against the application of insurance law to CDSs should be more likely 
to succeed in the United States than in England. 
Yet that is not the whole story, because the conclusion of Atiyah and Summers 
is only a generalization concerning legal culture. It is true that English insurance 
law has some aspects that are highly formalistic, perhaps more than in other 
jurisdictions, but in some respects English law and legal reasoning is highly 
attentive to substantive arguments, even if sometimes in subtle ways. This can be 
seen at least in two ways that are relevant for the present study. The first is that 
English insurance law is insistent on the primacy of substance over form in the 
determination of whether insurance law applies.243 Of course, the notion of 
substance and form of a contract is not quite the same as the distinction between 
modes of legal reasoning, but they are closely related. This is clear in the famous 
English case of Fuji Finance v. Aetna Life Insurance,244 which on the surface seemed 
to reflect a strictly formal mode of reasoning even to the point of regarding the 
consequences of reclassification as irrelevant, but at the deeper level, the logic of 
the Court of Appeals was entirely substantive, in that the objective was precisely 
to obtain an equitable solution in a peculiar case that involved the masking of life 
insurance product as an investment transaction.245 The second example is the 
modus operandi of English judges in commercial and financial law cases, which, as 
will be seen later, is extremely attentive to the practical consequences of their 
decisions.246 
These two examples suggest an interesting tension. In general commercial and 
financial law, English courts tend to respect not only to the intentions of the 
transacting parties but also the pragmatic expectations of the wider commercial 
community, whereas in insurance law they are less hesitant to intervene and 
override the intentions of the parties. This is not a logical contradiction; it is a 
tension between competing principles, namely between the interests of 
international commerce, and the public interest in regulating certain activities 
including insurance. This tension is at the heart of the present study, because 
credit default swaps are found precisely at the interjection of insurance and 
international finance. This tension also reveals the inadequacy of simplistic 
arguments based on consequences, because those consequences are complicated 
and must be seen from many different viewpoints. 
                                                 
243 See further below, chapter 3.1.4.1. 
244 Fuji Finance Inc. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 608. 
245 See below, chapter 3.1.4.1. 




1.4.1.5 Political-Institutional Criticism and Legal Interpretation 
As was explained previously in the section on research objectives, the present 
study is not limited to the question of correctly interpreting and applying the 
existing legal norms, as it also seeks to understand the peculiarities of 
contemporary financial law through what might be termed a political-
institutional interpretation. This approach is connected to the ongoing discussion, 
however, because such an interpretation can be seen as having two distinct 
objectives: on the one hand, to improve our understanding of the underlying logic 
of the current law, and on the other hand, to provide tools for a critical evaluation 
of the law in terms of political and institutional legitimacy. The methodological 
question that follows is whether and to what extent this approach should 
influence legal interpretation itself. 
Conceptually, the possibility advanced here is precisely one type of substantive 
argument concerning the political and institutional circumstances surrounding 
the law. The extension of these considerations to the interpretation of legal 
doctrine should naturally be done with caution, because law making is never 
without imperfections. Yet these considerations cannot be excluded entirely, and 
what makes them particularly opportune here is the fact that the critical 
observations concerning the evolution of financial law pertain to the United 
States, which also happens to be the jurisdiction in which substantive legal 
reasoning is more widely permitted. 
The perspective here advanced should also be seen in terms of the broader 
paradigms, not as an isolated argument. It is not claimed that the clear meaning 
of a positive law can be set aside merely on the basis of concerns surrounding its 
drafting process. Rather, what is of interest here is the relationship between the 
two principal CDS paradigms, i.e. the insurance and derivatives paradigms, and 
the way in which these depend on the definition of the key terms and, further, on 
the way in which those terms have been influenced through legal-political 
activities. Regarding the derivatives paradigm, of particular significance is the 
United States Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), which not 
only advanced a novel concept of swaps but also was passed in circumstances 
that merit critical evaluation. It may then be argued that the credibility of the 
derivatives paradigm overall is weakened if it turns out that key pieces of 
legislation were passed in a way in which the authentic representatives of the 
legislative body most likely did not make a conscious decisions concerning the 
question at hand here, in the sense that it is unlikely that some of the legal 
implications of the legislation had been truly intended by the legislature.247 
                                                 
247 By legal implications I do not refer to subsequent economic consequences such as the 
financial crisis, which in itself cannot be the proper object of a legislative act. Rather I refer to 
the legal consequence that a fundamentally insurance-like product, which involves a range of 
regulatory concerns, was defined by the United States Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act of 2000 as a strictly unregulated financial transaction, and this happened through a 
technical definition the full meaning of which was probably unclear even to many corporate 
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1.4.2 Regulatory-Political Issues 
The regulatory-political research questions are framed in this study in such a way 
as to focus on the future development of financial regulation. The previous 
discussion shows that these questions are in certain ways connected to the legal 
questions, but the analysis is here distinguished, reflecting the idea that the notion 
of regulatory policy refers to the choice of general legal solutions—principally by 
legislators, but in limited degree by judiciaries and regulatory bodies—in 
response to specifically identified social problems, which turn are not questions 
of justice in the strict sense but mainly of convenience and suitability.248 
1.4.2.1 Economic Analysis of Law: The Principal Approaches 
The social context of the regulatory concerned raised by credit default swaps is 
constituted by financial markets, which means that the general analytical 
viewpoint and theoretical framework adopted here is economic analysis of law 
(also called Law and Economics).249 This is however a complex framework, so that 
some clarifications are needed. Firstly, the notion of economic analysis of law can 
mean many different things as regards its formal object. Anthony Ogus has made 
a helpful distinction between three types of economic analysis of law:250 (a) 
positive law and economics, which is “the application of economic methodology to 
predict the impact of law and legal institutions on behavior”;251 (b) normative law 
and economics, which gives guidelines for the improvement of law and legal 
institutions, following the criterion of allocative efficiency; and (c) “interpretive” 
or “explanatory” law and economics, which examines the prediction that the law—
in particular, the common law—has an economic function, i.e. that many legal 
rules can be interpreted as promoting allocative efficiency even if economic 
terminology is not explicitly used in legal language. 
This last type of analysis is what Richard Posner has, somewhat confusingly, 
called “positive law and economics”.252 In short, the prediction of Posnerian law 
and economics is that the law almost always reflects considerations of economic 
efficiency. This hypothesis is interesting as far as it goes, but it is not of further 
relevance in the present study. The first two approaches are, instead, both 
relevant, and they both raise their own methodological issues. In what follows, 
                                                 
law experts at the time, because the CDS market only really took off as a consequence of this 
legislation and because the text of the relevant section of the act is obscure even in retrospect: 
see below, chapter 4.2.4.2. 
248 On this notion of regulation, as distinct from law in the traditional sense, see for example 
Baldwin and Cave 1999: chapter 1. 
249 See for example Cooter and Ulen 2007. 
250 Ogus 2004: 383–385. 
251 Ibid. 384. 




we will first look at the challenges of positive analysis particularly in light of 
behavioral economics; we will then examine the challenges of normative analysis 
especially in terms of the application of efficiency criteria for financial stability 
issues. 
1.4.2.2 Positive Analysis: Models and Empirics 
Positive economic analysis is of primary importance for the policy analysis of 
credit default swaps, because it is necessary to carefully examine the ways in 
which CDSs influence financial markets and also the likely impact of different 
regulatory alternatives on the uses and effects of CDSs. The first challenge that 
arises is the fact that these influences and impacts are only imperfectly 
perceptible; to speak more accurately, they are not directly perceptible at all, as 
their cognition must be mediated by models and theories, whether simple and 
informal or complex and formalized ones.253 
The challenge is that the epistemological value of economic models has always 
been subject to debate, and is even more so after the financial crisis; one might 
almost say that the financial crisis ushered in a crisis of economic models. Many 
commentators argued that the crisis had been caused by bad economics, even if 
others defended the role of economics and attacked faulty government regulation 
and monetary policy instead. It may be that both were partly right, as one 
argument does not necessarily exclude the other. More concretely, some argued 
that the leading macroeconomic theories were unsound and needed to be 
replaced by better ones.254 Others pointed their finger at microeconomics; the 
followers of behavioral economics particularly argued out that the crisis had 
proven their claims of investor irrationality.255 Still others critiqued the 
                                                 
253 The word model is sometimes restricted to mathematically represented models, but in 
principle it is also applicable to abstract, conceptual or graphical models. One of the classical 
problems of the philosophy of science is precisely what role models play in science and how 
they relate to reality: on this, see generally Frigg and Hartmann 2009. The distinction between 
models and theories is not fundamental for present purposes, but it may be helpful to think that 
theory should refer to broader totalities, whereas models form part of theories. In this I concur 
with Mäki 2005: n.1: “The linguistic practice of economists often does not distinguish between 
‘theory’ and ‘model’ but for many purposes it is useful to think of models not only are 
representing the world but also as representing theories, as their reduced or enlarged 
representatives. Models in this sense ‘mediate’ between theories and the world or the data.” 
254 See for example White, 2006, 2008, 2009 (challenging the standard model of price 
stability). 
255 For example Akerlof and Shiller 2009: xi. Their expression animal spirits comes from the 
famous saying, attributed to J.M. Keynes, that the markets are moved by animal spirits, and not by 
reason. The original quotation is much longer, but it accurately expresses the way in which 
many commentators interpreted the recent financial crisis: “Even apart from the instability 
due to speculation, there is the instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a 
large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a 
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simplifying assumptions of modern financial theory that they held to be 
dangerously misleading and a root cause of faulty regulations.256 
Examining these claims has turned out to be a difficult task. John Kay wrote 
jokingly that “the lesson most people have learnt is that they were right all 
along.”257 This is not only due to professional pride; it is genuinely difficult to 
establish the truth concerning such general claims. Indeed, it may be asked 
whether there is any universally accepted philosophy of science—and philosophy 
of the economic science in particular—that could offer a sufficient basis for 
theory-evaluation.258 The evaluation of empirically-based claims is further 
rendered difficult by the traditional preference in economics for a deductive 
approach based on logical and consistent (even if unrealistic) axioms, as opposed 
to an inductive approach that seeks to reflect and explain what we see happening 
around us but that cannot be formalized into a self-contained model.259  
That is not to say that there is no agreement at all on what sort of criteria 
should be used to evaluate models and theories: most research relies on a set of 
commonsensical criteria, so that one asks whether facts are correctly stated; 
whether other facts are omitted; whether the generalizations are subject to 
counter-examples; whether one can find competing models or theories that will 
fit the facts, and so on.260 Following these broad criteria, the methodological 
approach adopted in the present study seeks to combine abstract theory and 
empirical observation in a way that takes standard economic models as a starting 
point but is willing to question them when there seems to be a reasonable basis 
for doing so. It thus rejects both extremes of anti-theoretical empiricism and anti-
empirical apriorism, as the former needs reasonable assumptions about economic 
behaviour in order to avoid becoming useless historicism, whereas the latter must 
                                                 
mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our 
decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over 
many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal spirits — of a spontaneous urge 
to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative 
benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.” (Keynes 1936: 161–62).  
256 This is a key theme throughout Hutchinson and Dowd 2010. 
257 Kay, 2011a: 7. 
258 In his famous Methodology of Economics, Mark Blaug discusses the near-impossibility of 
finding a universally accepted philosophy of science today: whereas a certain type of logical 
positivism was broadly accepted in the early 20th century and classical physics was seen as 
“the prototype science to which all other disciplines must sooner or later conform”, today 
things are difference, because “the works of Popper, Polanyi, Hanson, Toulmin, Kuhn, 
Lakatos, and Feyerabend […] have largely destroyed this received view without, however, 
putting any generally accepted alternative conception in its place” (Blaug 1992: 3).  
259 See Kay 2011b (advocating the latter approach against the traditional formalism). For a 
synthesis of the methodology of present-day mainstream economics, see Blaug 1992: 110–111. 




rely on empirical input in order to be truly applicable to real-world situation.261 
Empirical input is particularly important in the present study for the reason that 
the policy questions that concern us are rooted in a range of empirically contingent 
factors, which cannot be fully captured by general theory alone. 
We could say, following the insight of John Kay, that the question here is that 
of choosing the method to fit the question, and not the other way around: 
“Economic models are no more, or less, than potentially illuminating 
abstractions. [...] Economics is not a technique in search of problems but a set of 
problems in need of solution. Such problems are varied and the solutions will 
inevitably be eclectic.”262 Importantly, this means that the further evaluation of 
the claims made in this study should be done in accordance with the nature of 
those claims; when they are limited by temporal and other conditions, they 
cannot pretend to provide universally valid assertions and therefore are always 
open to re-examination in different conditions. 
1.4.2.3 Positive Analysis: Rationality and Behaviour 
Among the post-crisis methodological debates mentioned previously, the one 
concerning macroeconomic theories cannot be considered here, and the one on 
modern financial theory will be examined later in detail, but what merits special 
discussion is the one on rationality and economic behaviour. This critique is of 
great practical importance for the present study, but it is also particularly 
challenging for at least two reasons: firstly, because it touches the heart of most 
of modern economic theory, and secondly, because its implications for regulation 
are complicated. 
Regarding the first point, it can be said that the rationality postulate is among 
the principal assumptions in modern neoclassical economics.263 The exact 
meaning of this postulate is not always clearly or similarly formulated, but in its 
essentials, rational choice theory postulates that people always act according to 
personal utility maximization, given a set of stable and unambiguous preferences, 
exploiting and accumulating all the available information in an optimal 
manner.264 To be sure, many economists are reluctant to extend the rational choice 
                                                 
261 By the latter I refer principally to British 19th century economics and some of the later 
Austrian economics: for a critical overview, see Blaug 1992: 51–82. 
262 2011b: 7. 
263 See generally Sen 1977, 2008 (critically discussing the rationality postulate). 
264 Gary Becker, one of the leading exponents of the rational choice theory, has 
summarized it thus: “The heart of my argument is that human behavior is not 
compartmentalized, sometimes based on maximizing, sometimes not, sometimes motivated 
by stable preferences, sometimes by volatile ones, sometimes resulting in an optimal 
accumulation of information, sometimes not. Rather, all human behavior can be viewed as 
involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and 
accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.” 
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model beyond the realm of material production and exchange in a market 
setting,265 but such boundary-line disputes are irrelevant for present purposes, as 
the policy questions here are limited to financial markets. We must likewise 
largely ignore the thorny question of self-interest, a vague concept that in practice 
is often reduced to selfishness;266 it is true that altruistic and ethical motives may 
be present in financial markets also (and certainly the problems with CDSs are 
related to their absence!), but there is as of yet no satisfactory framework for the 
economic analysis of law along those lines.267 
                                                 
(Becker 1976: 14). See also Becker 1976: 5: “The combined assumptions of maximizing 
behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, 
form the heart of the economic approach as I see it.” 
265 For example, Coase 1994, who argues that, in different settings, people follow a 
different logic. See Becker 1993: 3–4 for other references and criticism of this kind of behavioral 
compartmentalization. 
266 The leading critic of the notion of economic self-interest is Amartya Sen, who has 
summarized its importance as follows: “In his Mathematical Psychics, published in 1881, 
Edgeworth asserted that ‘the first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only 
by self-interest.’ This view of man has been a persistent one in economic models, and the 
nature of economic theory seems to have been much influenced by this basic premise.” (Sen 
1977: 317). In another work, Sen 1987: 15 highlights the way in which this has led to an 
exclusion of ethical discourse in economics: “The self-interest view of rationality involves 
inter alia a firm rejection of the ‘ethics-related’ view of motivation. […] To see any departure 
from self-interest maximization as evidence of irrationality must imply a rejection of the role 
of ethics in actual decision taking.” What Sen finds especially inappropriate in this approach 
is that, in addition to treating an implausible assumption as fact, it defines rationality as equal 
to self-interested utility maximization: “Indeed, it may not be quite as absurd to argue that 
people always actually do maximize their self-interest, as it is to argue that rationality must 
invariably demand maximization of self-interest. Universal selfishness as actuality may well 
be false, but universal selfishness as a requirement of rationality is patently absurd.” (Sen, 
1987: 16). 
267 Stout 2010 develops ideas in this direction. More generally, it may be noted that, in 
theory, rational-choice theorists admit a certain complexity in the notion of preferences; even 
Becker 1976: 5 writes that preferences “do not refer to market goods and services”, but to 
“fundamental aspects of life, such as health, prestige, sensual pleasure, benevolence, or envy.” 
More recently, Becker 1992: 1 states: “The analysis assumes that individuals maximize welfare 
as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic.” However, 
Stigler and Becker 1977: 76 stick to the idea that “tastes [i.e. preferences] neither change 
capriciously nor differ importantly between people. [Tastes] are there, will be there next year, 
too, and are the same to all men.” There is a growing literature that seeks to map out the 
complexity of preferences, but it is not without difficulties: Robert Frank, a leading scholar in 
this field, argues that it is hardly workable to extend preferences to such a wide range and yet 
claim that they are stable and unambiguous; but the leading approach towards incorporating 
morality into economics (implicitly present in the quotes from Becker) takes the cue from 
Adam Smith’s classic work on moral sentiments (see Smith [1759] 1976), which is insufficient, 
because it ignores the role of moral intelligence and free will in the process of moving from 




What does interest us here is the assumption that economic actors are always 
rational in the sense of always making optimal choices with the given information 
and other resources. It is true that few economists take this to be literally true; 
rather, like the other axioms of the rational choice model, it is seen as a useful 
simplification, which facilitates complex, deductive analysis and renders it 
formally robust. Taking this view to an extreme, Milton Friedman famously 
argued: “Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have 
‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, 
and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the 
assumptions”.268  
Despite the incredible success of this philosophy, it must be admitted that it is 
quite insufficient.269 Firstly, even though simplifying assumptions are necessary 
for science, their realism and conformity to the object of study is one factor in the 
evaluation of the plausibility of the theory.270 Secondly, unrealistic assumptions 
often fail to yield good predictions about the empirical world.271 Thirdly, as 
Ronald Coase has insightfully pointed out, the methodological importance of 
predictive power depends on the nature of the research and the type of knowledge 
one is aiming at.272 Applying this to the economic analysis of law, Heico 
Kerkmeester notes: 
If [the goal of research] is only prediction and control, the use of unrealistic assumptions 
is fine, as long as they indeed predict well. If, however, the goal is explanation, an 
approach based on unrealistic assumptions is not really helpful in providing insight in 
what really moves a person and in how legal rules really have effects.273 
Now, it has been demonstrated that the simplistic rationality postulate does 
not adequately reflect real human decision-making. Summarizing this research, 
Douglass North writes that the rational choice model  
has come under severe attack […] from experimental economic methods, research by 
psychologists, and other empirical work, all of which have revealed major empirical 
                                                 
268 Friedman 1953: 14. A further defense of rational choice theory is that, although it is not 
true of everyone’s behavior, it may be true generally, because competitive conditions force 
people to adapt and those who fail to maximize their preferences will fail: see North 1990: 19, 
24 for a summary and critique of this kind of argument 
269 See Blaug 1986: 273-278, and Blaug 1992: 91–99, for a critique of Friedman’s irrelevance-
of-assumptions thesis. 
270 Kerkmeester 2000: 394. In the words of Paul Samuelson, who jokingly dubbed 
Friedman’s approach the F-twist: “[Friedman] is fundamentally wrong in thinking that 
unrealism in the sense of factual inaccuracy even to a tolerable degree of approximation is 
anything but a demerit for a theory or hypothesis.” (Samuelson, 1966: 1774; cited in Blaug, 
1992: 97). 
271 Kerkmeester 2000: 392. 
272 See Coase 1994. 
273 Kerkmeester 2000: 394. 
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anomalies associated with this approach. Briefly, these fall into the following categories: 
violations of the transitivity assumptions, framing effect, where alternative means of 
representing the same choice problem can yield different choices; preference reversals, 
where the ordering of objects on the basis of their reported valuations contradicts the 
ordering implied in direct choice situations; and problems in the formulation, 
manipulation, and processing of subjective probabilities in uncertain choices.274 
There is today a growing literature known as behavioral economics, which seeks 
to enrich conventional economic theory by incorporating insights of behavioral 
sciences, particularly experimental psychology.275 Although there is strictly 
speaking no single behavioral theory, the unifying principles of behavioral 
economics can be summarized in the following two propositions: (1) there are 
proven and empirically significant departures from the simplistic rational choice 
model, and (2) these departures are systematic in the sense that they are non-
arbitrary and hence (to some extent, at least) predictable and conformable to 
economic analysis.276  
1.4.2.4 Behavioral Economics: Legal and Regulatory Implications 
What these principles imply for law and regulation is, however, a surprisingly 
complex question, which is studied by the growing literature known as behavioral 
law and economics.277 A common perception is that, whereas the neoclassical 
economic paradigm emphasizes the rationality of economic actors and values 
competition and free markets, the behavioral paradigm highlights the limits of 
human rationality and willpower, and favours paternalism and 
interventionism.278 Proponents of regulatory intervention into financial markets 
have often invoked investor irrationality as a basis for existing and further 
regulation.279 Indeed, the debate on the worth behavioral law and economics 
generally has been excessively marked by a simplistic division along political 
lines, so that the advocates of the behavioral paradigm have principally advanced 
                                                 
274 North 1990: 18. 
275 The seminal contributions in the early development of behavioral economics are Simon 
1947, 1955, and Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 1974. 
276 For an overview, see Rabin 1998. An excellent collection of more detailed studies is 
Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin 2004. Shiller 2002 and Shleifer 2000 apply these insights to 
financial markets, developing the approach known as behavioral finance. 
277 For programmatic overviews, see Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 1998; Langevoort 1998; 
Sunstein 1997. See also Sunstein 2001 (a collection of leading articles in this field). 
278 See Frerichs 2011: 305 (comparing different economic paradigms) and Rischkowsky 
and Döring 2008 (discussing the policy implications of different economic paradigms). 
279 See Prentice 2001 (defending securities regulation against proposals for deregulation); 
Cunningham 2002: 770–71 (proposing more regulation); Langevoort 2002: 138–39 (proposing 
more regulation). Choi and Pritchard 2003: 4–5 argue more generally that the behavioral 




pro-regulation arguments and advocates of the neoclassical paradigm have 
responded with anti-regulation critiques.280 
This is evidently not an adequate method for evaluating such complex 
phenomena. The more important difficulties are, moreover, subtler. There is, 
firstly, the theoretical problem that our knowledge concerning the real-life effects 
of bounded rationality and limited will power is highly imperfect, and the 
empirical observations are subject to a range of interpretations.281 The mere 
existence of systematic anomalies and biases is not a sufficient basis for policy-
making, because their practical impact may be too marginal to make any 
difference, and they may not affect everyone equally.282 For example, there is 
empirical evidence suggesting that experienced professionals do not fall into 
certain behavioral anomalies that are common among the population at large.283 
In consequence, paternalistic interventions would seem to be more justified in 
markets like home loans and credit cards, and less justified in relation to financial 
market professionals.284 More generally, the behavioral motive for regulatory 
intervention must always be empirically verified and critically examined. 
Secondly, the legal and regulatory implications of behavioral economics are 
complicated. There is naturally a relationship between limited rationality and 
regulatory interventionism, but there are also exceptions. One is that it is possible 
to develop light-touch regulations, which reduce suboptimal behaviour and may 
even replace certain heavier regulations.285 Moreover, certain effects of bounded 
rationality may be attenuated by freer markets; for example, permitting short 
selling in financial markets is commonly seen as reducing asset price bubbles, 
which in part are due to bounded rationality.286 Robert Shiller, a leading advocate 
of behavioral finance and critic of the efficient markets hypothesis, concludes that 
instead of increasing regulation, “most of the thrust of our national policies to 
deal with speculative bubbles should take the form of facilitating more free trade, 
                                                 
280 See for example the debate between the fiercely pro-regulation Oren Bar-Gill 2008 
(advocating behavioral law and economics) and the anti-regulation Richard Epstein 2008 
(defending neoclassical law and economics). See also Epstein 2006, who admits that people 
make mistakes but prefers the neoclassical approach and argues that competitive markets and 
the common law are enough to deal with human errors.  
281 See Choi and Pritchard 2003: 9–10 (reviewing the literature). 
282 Mitchell 2002: 67 notes that “people are not equally irrational and that situational 
variables exert an important influence on the rationality of behavior.” Etzioni 2011: 280 
likewise points out that behavioral economists often fail to clearly delineate how universal or 
particular the anomalies are. 
283 See List 2003; Gneezy and List 2006.  
284 Juurikkala 2013: 57–59. 
285 See Camerer et al. 2003 (introducing the notion of asmmetric paternalism); Jolls and 
Sunstein 2006 (developing the idea of debiasing); Juurikkala 2012b: 51–59 (proposing examples 
in financial regulation). 
286 See Juurikkala 2012b: 69–73. 
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as well as greater opportunities for people to take positions in more and freer 
markets.”287 Naturally, the question must be examined in specific markets. 
Finally, the behavioral paradigm should, paradoxically, lead us to be more 
sceptical of regulatory interventions, for at least two reasons. One is that it 
highlights the error-prone tendencies of lawmakers and regulators;288 more 
specifically, the findings of behavioral sciences imply that regulators tend to give 
too much importance to recent and noticeable events such as scandals and crises.289 
It is necessary to take distance from recent events in order to acquire a balanced 
view. Furthermore, the search for regulatory solutions tends to suffer from 
bounded search or even tunnel vision.290 This explains in part the way in which the 
regulation of CDSs has been discussed principally in terms of traditional 
categories of derivatives regulation, which however may be inadequate for these 
instruments. 
Another behavioral motive for regulatory scepticism is that reactive 
interventionism tends to create a complex patchwork of rules, which reflect many 
different needs, contexts and regulatory philosophies. This can give rise to 
conflicting principles and regulatory gaps, as in fact has happened in financial 
regulation. In light of the behavioral paradigm, such regulatory complexity is not 
only a cause of greater compliance costs, but also a cause of regulatory failure; 
seemingly tight regulation in some areas and aspects of financial markets may 
encourage imprudence on the part of market participants, so that “some investors 
may come to believe (overoptimistically) that regulatory protections fully insulate 
them from investment risks. When this is not true […] investors with 
overconfidence in the power of regulation will then take even less care and may 
face a greater risk of facing large financial losses as a result.”291 Regulations 
should therefore be consistent across markets and products, and they should 
especially ensure that market signalling mechanisms are not distorted.292 
                                                 
287 Shiller 2005: 230. 
288 McDonnell and Schwarcz 2011: 1636–1642; Tasic 2010.  
289 Choi and Pritchard 2003: 25. Hirshleifer 2008: 3 writes that “regulatory debates are 
influenced heavily by extreme events, and by heart-rending personal stories.” 
290 Choi and Pritchard 2003: 21–24. 
291 Choi and Pritchard 2003: 59. Davies and Green 2008: 27 think likewise: “They [financial 
supervisors] should also be cautious in describing the limits of their ambitions, both in terms 
of the degree of security they can offer to those who transact with financial institutions, and 
in terms of the scale or scope of the supervision they undertake. A regulator which claims too 
much will weaken market discipline, which can often be a more effective tool than regulatory 
intervention.” 
292 See also Booth 2009: 162: “Market signalling mechanisms can also be crowded out by 
regulation and government guarantees: why does it matter if a bank is trustworthy or has a 
high level of capital if the regulator exists to look after such things and the government will 




1.4.2.5 Normative Analysis: Efficiency or Justice? Efficiency as Justice? 
Normative policy analysis implies a different set of methodological challenges, 
which in theory are even more complicated than those of positive analysis, but in 
practice there is something of a shortcut, as will be seen shortly. It is necessary, 
first of all, to clarify that the notion of normative analysis here does not exactly 
coincide with what it conventionally means in economic analysis of law. In 
general terms, normative economic analysis of law may refer to the analysis of 
legal policy based on the economic analysis of the issues, but more specifically, it 
tends to mean policy analysis based on the notion of efficiency, and in particular, 
allocative efficiency.293 This seemingly simple and intuitive term is, however, filled 
with ambiguity, which is why there have been endless discussions on different 
efficiency concepts, principally Pareto efficiency and the corresponding Pareto 
optimality (a state in which no one can be made better off without making 
someone else worse off) and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (an outcome in which those 
that are made better off could in theory pay compensation to those that are made 
worse off). 
These notions are not entirely useless, but their insufficiency is today widely 
acknowledged, because among other things Pareto-improving policy changes are 
practically non-existent, because all (or almost all) policy changes imply some 
disadvantage to someone somewhere; and because Kaldor-Hicks improvements 
do not require real compensation for those who lose, which implies that they may 
be manifestly unjust. Further, there is the more fundamental difficulty that both 
notions of efficiency rely on interpersonal utility-comparisons, even though such 
utilities cannot be observed and their interpersonal comparability is in any case 
doubtful.294 One simple proposal to resolve the endless efficiency debates is the 
principle of wealth maximization adopted by Richard Posner.295 According to this 
approach, preferences are manifested by willingness to pay, so that the normative 
objective of legal policy would be the promotion of wealth maximization. 
However, the philosophical problems with Posner’s solution have been all-too-
well exposed.296  
The normative principles followed in the present study are somewhat 
different, and can be explained in two steps, that is, first generally and then 
specifically concerning financial regulation. At the general level, the guiding idea 
is the classic principle that the primary goal of law is not efficiency, but justice. 
The notion of justice includes many different dimensions, which in classical 
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296 See for example Dworkin 1980. For my part, I think that both “maximization” and 
“utility” are problematic notions in the context of human choosing and acting. Moreover, I 
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philosophy are categorized as commutative, distributive and general justice.297 
From the viewpoint of law and legislation, the principal objective is general 
justice, also called “legal” justice by Aristotle, which essentially boils down to 
favouring and fostering the common good of the political community.298 The 
common good is not as some kind of collectivized good, but the set of conditions that 
enables the members of a community to lead good and fulfilling human lives both 
individually and in collaboration and communion with others.299 What these 
conditions are in practice is a vast question, but at the most basic level they 
certainly include such factors as a functioning market, access to justice, 
transparent political institutions, a healthy natural environment, respect for life 
and bodily integrity, right to private property, freedom of association, a positive 
moral ecology, and so on. It is the common good, not mere private interests, 
which forms the principal normative objective of both the general legal 
institutions and specific regulatory policies, even if these may in fact also advance 
private interests. 
According this understanding of law and justice, considerations of efficiency 
do in fact form part of the common good and therefore of general justice; the 
economic perspective is therefore not outside the realm of justice, but is included 
within in. This means, on the one hand, that Pareto optimality is too restrictive as a 
universal criterion of law and justice, because it treats all established private 
interests as trumps, i.e. as overriding rights. On the other hand, efficiency is not 
an absolute value, but is subject to the wider considerations of justice, including 
certain fundamental rights of individual persons;300 therefore, the notion of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is too expansive as a universal criterion of law and justice, 
because it gives efficiency undue importance to the exclusion of other values. 
Now, as far the present study is concerned, the normative issues are limited 
to financial markets regulation, which means that these general principles must 
be specified in that context. This is what, in fact, renders the normative task less 
controversial, because there is a well-established body of common policy 
objectives in financial regulation, particularly systemic protection (including 
financial stability) and consumer protection.301 These objectives can, therefore, be 
taken more or less as given, because they do not involve any major controversies. 
The notion of economic efficiency, which also includes efficient risk allocation, can 
be seen as a broad objective that must be included but only insofar as the 
consumer and systemic protection functions are not compromised. 
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1.4.2.6 The Challenge of Evaluating Financial Crisis Policies 
The challenge of normative analysis is not so much theoretical as practical: it is 
easy to state the policy objectives at a general level, but it is difficult to evaluate 
specific policy alternatives, because their efficacy and their dynamic costs are not 
easy to determine. It is unlikely that any real-world policy alternative could 
achieve absolute systemic and consumer protection; if such policies exist, they 
will probably imply unacceptable costs. It is necessary to make some 
compromises, but which ones? Subsequent chapters will discuss these challenges 
in more detail, but it is opportune to point out two broader considerations that 
have influenced the normative analysis of the present study. 
The first of these broad considerations is the idea that even though financial 
markets and financial innovations are generally good things, we should be aware 
of the very substantial economic and social costs of large-scale financial crises, so 
that it is correct to seek every reasonably possible means to avoid them. This has 
been well expressed by Raghuram Rajan: 
Unfortunately since we do not know the probability of a potentially catastrophic 
meltdown of the financial sector […], it is hard to do a precise cost-benefit analysis. […] 
Nevertheless, I would argue that given the potential costs of the concerns I raise, if we can 
find low-cost ways of nudging excessive risk taking down, and making it less procyclical, 
we should use them.302 
This implies the rejection of naive cost-benefit policy analyses and arguments 
that seek to maximize the benefits of financial innovation relying on complex 
models the outcome of which is uncertain and dependent on the underlying 
assumptions. This perspective is especially relevant for credit default swaps, 
which are intimately connected to the banking system and which influence the 
risk-taking and lending-behaviour of banks in profound ways. Banking crises are 
particularly costly to deal with, and studies show that their “economic costs go 
far beyond the direct costs associated with rescuing failed banks.”303 For example, 
according to Reinhart and Rogoff, in average terms “government debt rises by 86 
per cent during the three years following a banking crisis.”304 It would therefore 
                                                 
302 Rajan 2005: 350. 
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be highly unreasonable to seek marginal efficiency benefits from financial 
activities that can threaten the stability of the banking sector at large. 
The other broad consideration is one that may at first sight seem opposed to 
the first one, although there is harmony at a deeper level: it is the idea that it is 
not practically possible to eliminate the possibility of financial crises, and we 
should probably not even seek to do so. The reason is that seeking to make the 
system absolutely crisis-proof may only create an illusion of security, thereby 
encouraging reckless risk-taking. 
Paradoxically, it may be better to have small problems frequently than huge 
crises every one or two decades. This is supported by behavioral theory: crises 
that took place in the more distant past tend to be forgotten by most people; their 
positive effect on behaviour wares away over time, so that people become more 
careless and even tend to repeat the mistakes of the past.305 In contrast, smaller 
but more frequently occurring crises would uphold the caution and prudence that 
should always form part of financial market activity, and there would be faster 
learning from mistakes on both personal and institutional levels.306 The famous 
financial risk-management expert Nassim Taleb has expressed this as follows: 
the idea is not to correct mistakes and eliminate randomness from social and economic 
life through monetary policy, subsidies, and so on. The idea is simply to let human mistakes 
and miscalculations remain confined, and to prevent their spreading through the system […]. 
Reducing volatility and ordinary randomness increases exposure to Black Swans—it 
creates an artificial quiet.307 
Similarly, behavioral theory suggests that it might be better to have many 
different regulatory systems and policies—not only because that would reduce 
the harmful effect of behavioral biases among regulators, but also because of 
positive learning effects. Regulatory variation would promote trial and error, and 
it would make it easier for boundedly rational people to discover what works and 
what does not. 
It follows, then, that the principal objective of financial stability regulation is 
not to eliminate all possible error, but to increase the robustness of the financial 
architecture so that large-scale crises can be avoided. The avoidance of those crises 
must, moreover, accept the moral and cognitive imperfections of both public and 
private actors. This was one of the insights of Peter Nyberg in his report on the 
recent Irish banking disaster: 
In designing the constraints and rules for banking in the future, full account will need to 
be taken of the failure of private and public institutions to appreciate the emerging risks 
and to take action. If responsible authorities are affected by the prevailing paradigms, they 
cannot be expected to uncover its risks and weak points. Financial systems should, in that 
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case, be designed to be as stable as possible even in the absence of unfailingly vigilant and 
prescient regulators and central banks.308 
This perspective has major implications for the normative analysis of credit 
default swaps. At the general level, it means that we should not be too quick to 
accept the alleged risk-management benefits of CDSs insofar as they rely on 
complex risk models, and particularly insofar as the use of CDSs creates complex 
inter-institutional structures the risks of which are difficult for both private and 
public actors to understand. The level specific level of policy alternatives, we 
should be especially critical of policies that will contribute to large risk 
concentrations, which may prevent small crises from happening but which can 
create large-scale crises when something goes wrong. 
1.5 STRUCTURE 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Chapters 2–4 examine the legal-
doctrinal aspects of credit default swaps. First, chapter 2 considers general and 
preliminary questions, including the reasons that complicate the legal 
characterization of financial derivatives. It also looks at some of the alternative 
characterizations that can be easily excluded. Chapter 3 scrutinizes the 
characterization of credit default swaps as insurance contracts. It summarizes the 
consequences of insurance regulation, discusses the different ways of 
demarcating insurance law, and examines the arguments that CDSs are not 
insurance. In addition to clarifying and correcting misinterpretations of insurance 
law, this chapter sheds further light on the economic functioning of CDSs. Finally, 
it analyzes the evolution of US state insurance regulators’ thinking on this matter. 
Chapter 4, finally, analyzes the derivatives characterization CDSs, exploring 
the way in which CDSs came to be considered deregulated swap transactions. 
Tracing the history and evolution of derivatives law, the chapter pays special 
attention to the legal and political influence activities of the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), demonstrating how ISDA skilfully obtained 
exemptions to the regulations and manipulated key concepts such as swaps in 
order to widen the space of unregulated activities. Finally, it critically 
summarizes the Dodd-Frank Act reforms, showing that they paradoxically 
consolidated ISDA’s regime of deregulated derivatives. 
The second main part of the study consists of chapters 5–6, which cover the 
regulatory-policy aspects of credit default swaps. Chapter 5 provides an 
overview of the regulatory issues of CDSs, highlighting first then overall 
challenges of financial regulation that provide the framework for CDS activities, 
and then critically examining the specific regulatory issues posed by these 
transactions. Chapter 6 studies the principal regulatory strategies for tackling 
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CDSs, namely self-regulation based on the ISDA architecture, transparency 
regulation, compulsory central counterparty clearing, and insurance-type 
regulation of protection selling and protection buying. Within each main section, 
the current situation and recent reforms are explained and critically evaluated, 
after which some proposal for development are presented. Chapter 7 closes the 
study by summarizing the principal findings and contributions. It also evaluates 
the limitations of the study and proposes avenues for further research.
  THE LEGAL CHARACTERIZATION OF 
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
2.1 THE CHALLENGE 
Credit default swaps are frequently described as derivatives, but a closer look 
reveals that their legal characterization has never been very clear. For one thing, 
the notion of financial derivatives is based on finance theory instead of law, and 
even in that context its demarcation is filled with difficulties. Moreover, 
commentators have actually proposed a range of legal characterizations for credit 
default swaps, which reveals that there has never been a consensus on the 
question. In terms of legal sources, the question has been largely open to debate, 
because legislation touching upon the question has been scarce and subject to 
misinterpretation; case law on the matter has also been very limited indeed. 
This chapter examines these preliminary problems associated with the legal 
characterization of CDSs. It first looks at the notion of financial derivatives in 
terms of modern financial theory, and then evaluates the lack of case law and the 
consequent implications that it may or may not have for the legal status of CDSs. 
The second section looks at the principal alternative legal categories for CDSs, 
including gambling, securities, letters of credit, third party guarantees, and 
insurance. Several general issues are also examined, including the notion of CDS 
trading, the distinction between two-party and tripartite relationships, and the 
limits of existing legislation with respect to insurance law. 
2.1.1 Modern Finance and Legal Categories 
According to Frank Partnoy, “the pace and breadth of financial innovation have 
been so extraordinary that they require a fundamental rethinking of basic 
corporate law concepts.”1 The question we are addressing here—the legal 
definition of credit default swaps—forms part of a broader problem, which is that 
modern finance has revolutionized not only the practical reality of corporate 
governance but also the conceptual framework of corporate and financial law. 
2.1.1.1 The Notion of Derivatives 
There is substantial terminological ambiguity in the field: terms like derivatives, 
swaps, and insurance are frequently used without accuracy and specification. The 
linguistic challenge has its roots in the fact that modern finance and financial 
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institutions—often ignorant of legal nuances2—have developed a peculiar 
terminology that does not necessarily match the legal characterization of the 
transactions. 
In the wake of the 1994 derivatives scandals, Henry Hu joked that derivatives 
were “metastasizing to refer to any complex financial product that causes a loss”.3 
This was an exaggeration, of course, but it may nevertheless come as a surprise 
that there really is no satisfactory way of accurately defining financial derivatives. 
The conventional definition is that derivatives are contracts, the value of which is 
derived from another asset; but this is unworkable or entirely useless: 
“conceptually, all derivatives are redundant because they can be replicated with a 
bundle of straightforward basic operations. […] [A]ny contingent claim, such as 
a bond, share or guarantee, can be looked upon as an option”.4 
2.1.1.2 Options, Forwards, and Swaps 
Some scholars have sought to clarify the question by distinguishing between 
different types of derivatives, which can functionally be brought down to three 
fundamental types: options, forwards, and swaps.5 Basically, “an option is the 
right to buy or sell something in the future, a forward is the obligation to buy or 
sell something in the future, and a swap is an exchange of periodic payment 
obligations in the future.”6 More complex derivatives are combinations of these 
basic categories. However, this categorization has its limits: according to some 
scholars, swaps should not be seen as a fundamental category, because they can 
be reduced to combinations of forward transactions.7 Ultimately, even forward 
transaction can be functionally reduced to combinations of put and call options.8 
If a swap is an exchange of periodic payment obligations, it may be asked 
whether CDSs can be meaningfully described as “swaps.”9 In the language of 
finance, CDSs are more like put options.10 But legally, this does not suffice to prove 
that they are not insurance transactions: in financial theory, insurance 
transactions are reducible to options, and “non-lawyers regularly liken options to 
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insurance.”11 The lesson is that the language of finance is useful for its own 
purposes, but not for settling legal questions; otherwise we would even have to 
give up the notion of shares, because they too are “options.”12 Legal and financial 
terminologies have different origins and functions, and legal categories are based 
on political and regulatory reasons, which tend to be more complicated than the 
abstract notions of finance.13 
2.1.2 Scarcity of Case Law 
Legal uncertainty and confusion has been further fuelled by the surprising lack 
of case law on derivatives, particularly of case law dealing with the legal 
characterization of CDSs. We will see later some institutional reasons for this 
situation, but it is also a fact that legal disputes on financial derivatives are almost 
always settled out of court.14 Analyzing the situation in 2001, Partnoy lamented: 
Although the OTC derivatives market is among the largest markets in the world and is 
chock full of disputes, judges only rarely have decided even narrow issues in derivatives 
disputes, and they almost never write detailed opinions. The vast majority of cases settle 
before trial in most areas of law, but the derivatives area is striking for the near total 
absence of judicial opinions and decided cases on important issues.15 
The situation has changed little thereafter; if anything, the extrajudicial 
dispute resolution mechanisms of ISDA have only been reinforced, as will be seen 
later. There have been some filed (and fewer decided) CDS cases over the years, 
but they “have typically involved issues of contract interpretation (e.g., a dispute 
over whether a credit event has occurred or not) and related allegations (e.g., 
breach of obligation of good faith and fraud).”16  
2.1.2.1 Tacit Acceptance of Market Consensus? 
This situation merits some reflection. One consequence is that, in order to 
determine the legal nature of CDSs correctly and adequately, it is necessary to go 
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back to principles. Another is that the argument might be made this should be 
interpreted as tacit acceptance of the derivatives-based view advanced by the 
market. This argument is not entirely mistaken, because in Anglo-American 
financial law there is a principle of deference towards market practices.17 
However, there are limits to this, because silence is not legally binding, and 
customary business practices are rarely enforced beyond the realm of contractual 
freedom. 
2.1.2.2 Institutional Reasons for the Lack of Case Law 
Moreover, the silence of the courts on CDS characterization is less impressive 
when it is seen in proper context. In fact, the scarcity of cases is so closely linked 
to financial interests that one cannot take it at face value. Firstly, lack of case law 
is in large part due to the standardized ISDA documentation, which has 
specifically sought to keep the cases out of courts.18 Secondly, many derivatives 
disputes are settled out of court precisely because financial institutions wish to 
avoid uncertainty, negative publicity, and the risk of court rulings finding their 
activities legally dubious.19 Thirdly and perhaps most interestingly, it has been 
argued that “the pool of accountants, lawyers and bankers who truly understood 
how [the credit derivatives world] worked was always extremely small,” so that 
it has been hard for investors to find financiers who could offer independent advice on 
products since they were usually working for the banks. It has also been hard for investors 
to find good lawyers if they wanted to sue a large investment bank over, say, a CDO. […] 
When investors have tried to contact top law firms in London, to launch litigation, the 
lawyers have often refused to act due to “conflicts” (that is, they were already working 
for the banks.) It is little wonder, then, that there have been so few successful lawsuits. 
The near-stranglehold of banks over the legal world has been impressive.20 
This view is supported by the experience of Satyajit Das, who, describing his 
involvement as expert witness in a derivatives dispute, points out that the big law 
firms “had all declined to act on [the client’s] behalf, claiming a conflict of 
interest” which, in many cases, was a merely potential conflict: “they would not at 
against a major investment bank as it might prejudice future opportunities for 
lucrative work.”21 
If this is a correct assessment of the situation, it is a grave institutional 
challenge for the development of financial law. Certainly, it implies that one 
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should at least be sceptical about according legal authority to the silence of the 
courts. Indeed, one group of credit derivatives experts notes that judges are afraid 
to touch upon the question, because the “consequences of a recharacterisation 
would simply be too far-reaching for any court to contemplate.”22 
That does not preclude academic analysis, fortunately. It is to be noted, 
moreover, that the practical difficulties of recharacterization can always be 
overcome by settling the matter through legislation with adequate provisions on 
the coming into force of the new rules. 
2.2 CLASSIFYING CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: 
PRINCIPAL ALTERNATIVES 
A broad derivatives-based view was advanced by the Potts opinion of 1997, 
which argued that these transactions were not insurance in English law.23 That 
view will be examined carefully later, but even supposing it to be correct, it did 
not really explain what CDSs are, then. In order to obtain a balanced and complete 
view of the characterization problem, therefore, let us briefly analyze the 
principal alternatives suggested by legislation, case law and scholarly literature. 
It will be seen that some of the alternatives are easily excluded, whereas others 
leave scope for debate. It will also be show that not only has the legal question 
been subject to uncertainty, but also that there have been persistent myths 
circulating in the literature that must to be rectified. 
2.2.1 Gambling 
There have been passing comments that likened CDSs to gambling.24 However, 
this has not been advanced as a legal argument, because the potential 
characterization of financial contracts as gambling (and therefore illegal or 
unenforceable) is mainly one of historical curiosity. From the 1980s onwards, 
gambling and wagering laws have been systematically liberalized.25 In the UK, 
the Gambling Act 2005 did a drastic liberalization, but even earlier, it was held 
that bona fide commercial or financial transactions would not be classified as 
wagering contracts.26 
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2.2.2 Securities 
According to one US attorney, “[u]ntil December 2000, the prevailing opinion 
among practitioners was that CDSs were securities under the Securities Act” 
because “a CDS was viewed as a put on an evidence of indebtedness.”27 That 
expression is not entirely accurate, because economically a CDS is definitely not 
a put on an evidence of indebtedness.28 Moreover, many CDSs were probably 
transacted as unregulated swaps rather than securities.29 Nevertheless, the view 
in question merits attention, because securities are a fundamental category of 
financial regulation that covers a very wide range of transaction, and “[t]here is 
substantial uncertainty surrounding the definition of ‘security.’”30 
2.2.2.1 Novations: Are CDSs Tradeable?  
There are fundamental reasons why CDSs should not be treated as securities. The 
key feature of financial securities is their tradeability in secondary markets, and 
this feature is generally not found in CDSs.31 It might be argued, though, that in 
practice CDSs are highly standardized and furthermore traded in secondary 
markets. The question is whether it is legally correct to speak of trade in CDSs. In 
strictly legal terms, the rights and obligations of CDSs cannot be transferred to 
third parties without the consent of the remaining counterparty. In practice, 
concerns have been expressed that “secondary trading of CDS positions was 
being undertaken by assignments without the consent of the remaining party.”32 
However, the legal validity of these assignments requires the novation of the 
agreement, i.e. that a new contract is made to replace the original contract.33 
Since 2005, secondary market “trading” in CDSs has been facilitated by the 
ISDA Novation Protocol.34 But this only confirms that, technically and legally, 
CDSs are strictly bilateral agreements rather than securities. The matter has been 
explained with precision by ISDA’s David Mengle, who expressly distinguishes 
these contracts from financial securities: 
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OTC derivatives do not trade in the same way as securities, that is, by means of transfer 
of ownership. Instead, they trade “synthetically” by three different means, each of which 
involves payment by one party to the other of a transaction’s mark-to-market value. First, 
the parties can agree to a termination (or tear-up), under which they agree to extinguish 
the original obligation following payment. Second, one party can enter into an offsetting 
transaction, which leaves the original transaction in place but effectively cancels out its 
economic effect. Finally, a party can enter into a novation, also known as an assignment, 
under which the party (transferor) transfers its rights and obligations under the 
transaction to a third party (transferee) in exchange for a payment. Following the 
novation, the parties to the transaction are the transferee and the remaining party. The 
ISDA Master Agreement requires a transferor to obtain prior written consent from the 
remaining party before a novation takes place.35 
It follows that CDSs clearly should not be characterized as financial securities, 
and that it is inaccurate to speak of CDS trade in secondary markets. 
2.2.2.2 Extension of Securities Regulation to Non-Security Derivatives 
That does not exclude the possibility of some influence of securities regulation. 
At least with respect to Finnish law, Ahokallio notes that the Finnish Securities 
Markets Act regulates financial derivative agreements even if they do not conform 
to the definition of “securities”.36 The legal consequences for transaction 
counterparties include, among others, rules on misleading marketing, conduct 
with clients, reporting requirements, certain rules on market abuse, etc.37 
According to Ahokallio, these apply to CDS counterparties.38 
This conclusion can be problematized, however, because the argument relies 
on defining CDSs as derivatives. As has been noted earlier, the notion of 
derivatives is not at all clear, and if, as will be shown later, CDSs rather fall within 
the scope of insurance law, it is unlikely that they should be regulated as 
derivatives at the same time. 
2.2.2.3 Exclusion in the US: Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
With respect to United States federal law, the securities question has been 
clarified by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000, which 
is the first piece of US legislation touching explicitly upon CDSs and which will 
be examined later more carefully. For present purpose, it is only necessary to note 
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that it determined that swap agreements, which were expressly extended to credit 
default swaps, are not securities under United States federal securities laws.39 
2.2.3 Letter of Credit and Third Party Guarantee 
2.2.3.1 The Two-Party Nature of CDSs 
Another view, advanced by Schuyler Henderson in terms of English law, is that 
CDSs are analogous to letters of credit or third party guarantees.40 However, even 
if some similarity cannot be denied, this is not an accurate classification. The 
fundamental difference is that letters of credit and third party guarantees are 
fundamentally tripartite relationships, whereas CDSs are structured as two-party 
relationships where payment depends on external and flexibly negotiable credit 
events.41 In this respect, CDSs are clearly more like insurance than tripartite credit 
enhancement: 
At its heart, the insurance business concerns the relationship between two parties, and not 
a relationship involving three parties. It is radically different from the tripartite guaranty 
and letter of credit relationships [...]. The insurer, through the issuance of an insurance 
policy, promises to pay the insured for losses that the insured incurs for a covered risk. In 
return for this protection, the insured pays a premium to the insurer. Note that no third 
party lies at the core of the insurance relationship.42 
This is rendered graphically clear with the figures below. 
 
Figure 2 A traditional (two-party) insurance policy.43 
                                                 
39 Sjostrom 2009: 984–985; Wynkoop 2008: 3099. 
40 See Henderson 2009b: 481–482. 
41 See Aicher, Cotton and Khan 2004: 899–900 (describing letters of credit), 910–911 
(guaranties), 954–956 (CDSs). 
42 Aicher, Cotton and Khan 2004: 921. 
43 Adapted from Aicher, Cotton and Khan 2004: 921. 
 




Figure 3 The tripartite letter of credit relationship.44 
 
Figure 4 The traditional guaranty triangle.45 
The difference is not merely terminological, but it is rooted in the economic 
structure of the contract obligations. The credit events of CDSs may include a 
wide range of events— including “a rating downgrade of the reference entity”46—
that are not covered by letters of credit or third party guarantees, and that do not 
imply a three-party relationship.47 Moreover, the compensation under CDSs is, in 
principle, not based on the value of non-payment as such, but on the consequent loss 
of value of the reference assets following a credit event (which may be other than 
                                                 
44 Aicher, Cotton and Khan 2004: 900. 
45 Aicher, Cotton and Khan 2004: 911. 
46 Ayadi and Behr 2009: 181. 
47 See Ayadi and Behr 2009: 184 (describing different credit event possibilities). Shadab 
2012: 1045 writes: “CDSs that reference asset-backed securities, including CDOs, define credit 
events, such as default and failure to pay, differently than corporate CDSs by including a 
distressed ratings downgrade.” 
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non-payment). Structurally, CDS compensation more resembles damage to 
property in property insurance. 
2.2.3.2 Credit Enhancement and the Independence Principle 
The question merits further clarification, however, because there is long-standing 
confusion regarding the legal differentiation of different forms of credit 
enhancement.48 There are a range of forms, but insurance and non-insurance, 
which have developed in different circumstances and with a view to responding 
to different needs. One factor that merits particular attention is the independence 
principle, which is applied to letters of credit, whereas third party guaranties are 
strictly secondary obligations: 
This is the essential characteristic of the letter of credit, the so-called “independence 
principle.” The letter of credit is a primary obligation of the issuer to honor the 
beneficiary’s demand for payment separate from the terms and satisfaction of the 
underlying transaction for which the credit was issued.  This independence principle 
distinguishes the letter of credit, even the so-called “standby letter of credit,” from a 
guaranty, which is a secondary obligation by the guarantor.49 
For present purposes, it is important to see that this different between letters 
of credit and guarantees is not a different between two-party and three-party 
arrangements, because they are both three-party arrangements. In other words, 
the difference is one internal to tripartite agreements, however with the difference 
that a letter of credit is structured so as to exclude defences such as 
unenforceability, illegality or invalidity of the underlying obligation. It could be 
argued that in this respect a letter of credit is somewhere between third party 
guarantees and credit default swaps; yet it remains a fact that it is structured as 
part of a tripartite relationship, whereas CDSs are structured to compensate for 
flexible negotiable credit events beyond non-payment in another credit 
relationship. 
2.2.3.3 Tripartite Arrangements in Finnish Law: Reimburssi and takaus 
The question has been analyzed similarly by Ahokallio with respect to Finnish 
law. He distinguishes between CDSs and property securities (esinevakuudet)50 and 
what Finnish law calls personal securities (henkilövakuudet), such as third-party 
guarantees (takaus) and letters of credit (reimburssi).51 According to Ahokallio, a 
credit default swap is not a takaus in Finnish law, because this is a non-
                                                 
48 See Aicher, Cotton and Khan 2004: 898–899. 
49 Aicher, Cotton and Khan 2004: 902. 
50 Ahokallio 2011: 73. 
51 Ibid. 73–82. 
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independent, secondary obligation, and it includes the guarantor’s right to 
reclaim the money from the principal debtor (regressioikeus).52 These key features 
that are absent in CDSs.53 
2.2.4 CDS and Insurance Law: Preliminary Clarifications 
Before a detailed examination of insurance law principles in the next chapter, it is 
helpful to clear the ground with some general clarifications. One issue is that there 
are categories of insurance that have been proposed as appropriate for CDSs, but 
in fact present some difficulties. Another issue is whether and to what extent the 
application of insurance law to CDSs may have been already excluded by case 
law or legislation. 
2.2.4.1 Credit Insurance and Financial Guaranty Insurance 
According to one representative of United States insurance legislators, credit 
default swaps are a form of financial guaranty insurance.54 The evolving attitude 
of insurance regulators will be examined later, and it will be argued that this view 
is broadly sound; it is nevertheless opportune to clarify the issue already at this 
stage, because financial guaranty insurance is a novel and peculiar form of 
insurance. 
Financial guaranty insurance is related to credit insurance, but it is, in the 
United States, a separately regulated activity that must be conceptually 
distinguished from ordinary credit insurance.55 According to the Geneva 
Association, credit insurance refers to agreements that form part of tradition or 
core insurance activities and that are generally based on small amounts such as 
trade insurance (similar to trade finance offered by banks).56 In regulatory terms, 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 74–75. 
53 “Tiivistetysti CDS-sopimuksista siis puuttuu kaksi keskeistä takaukselle tunnusomaista 
piirrettä: liitännäisyys päävelkaan sekä takaajan regressioikeus.” Ibid. 77. Ahokallio notes 
(ibid. 93–94) that in Finnish law credit insurance (luottovakuutus) may also include 
regressioikeus, highlighting however that this is not automatic right but, in Finnish law, is 
either due to a separate agreement or to intention or reckless negligence in the causation of 
the insurance event (vakuutustapahtuman aiheuttaminen tahallisesti tai törkeästä 
huolimattomuudesta: see VakSopL, § 75.1). 
54 Morelle 2009: 4.  
55 New York Insurance Law (2010 New York Code), for example, has a separate regulatory 
regime for financial guaranty insurance (New York Insurance Law, Article 69) as opposed to 
normal credit insurance (New York Insurance Law, § 1113(a)(17)). The distinction is discussed 
in the NYSID document New York Department of Insurance General Counsel, Re: Credit 
Insurance Policy Issued to Financial Institution, Opinion No. 00-06-61 (June 16, 2000), 
available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2000/rg006161.htm. 
56 Geneva Association 2010: 58–59. 
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traditional credit insurance does not imply major systemic risks, because the 
connections to the banking and financial sector at large are small.57 Financial 
guarantees or guaranty insurance, in contrast, is principally offered as a means of 
providing credit enhancement to bond issuers. This implies larger amounts and 
significant connections to the financial sector and banks (also because bank 
capital regulation gives importance to the insurers’ credit ratings).58 These 
regulatory concerns are the main reason why financial guaranty insurance is 
regulated separately, and insurance companies offering this type of insurance are 
called “monolines” or “monoliners” because regulations require that they 
specialize in this activity in order to reduce linkages to other types of insurance. 
Importantly, however, financial guaranty insurance is (at least normally) a 
tripartite arrangement, akin to a letter of credit written by an insurer.59 
Analogously to what was argued earlier, therefore, it seems inaccurate to try to 
fit all CDSs into the category of financial guaranty insurance (see also Figure 5). 
To be sure, the statutory definitions of financial guaranty insurance are quite 
broad,60 so some CDSs might be caught. 
 
Figure 5 The financial guaranty insurance triangle.61 
2.2.4.2 The Limits of United States Case Law 
Regarding the possible exclusion of insurance recharacterization of credit default 
swaps, let us first briefly examine existing case law. Even in the United States, 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 59–60. 
59 See Aicher, Cotton and Khan 2004: 930–932. 
60 Ibid. 934–935 (describing the NAIC Financial Guaranty Insurance Model Act and the 
relevant New York legislation). 
61 Aicher, Cotton and Khan 2004: 932. 
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where most decided CDS cases are based, there are few judicial pronouncements 
on the matter, but there are some obiter dicta on the nature of CDSs. In one case, 
Judge Jed Rakoff described credit default swaps as essentially an insurance 
contract, and employed the language of insurance repeatedly: “A credit default 
swap is an arrangement similar to an insurance contract. The buyer of protection 
[…] pays a periodic fee, like an insurance premium, to the seller of protection […], 
in exchange for compensation in the event that the insured security experiences 
default.”62  
In another case, the court in contrast sought to differentiate CDSs from 
insurance, claiming that “CDS agreements are thus significantly different from 
insurance contracts.”63 However, neither decision was concerned with the 
classification issue, but like most CDS cases, they were concerned with whether a 
credit event had occurred within the meaning of the terms of the contract.64 
The latter case nevertheless included some interesting details. Namely, the 
court cited an ISDA amicus curiae brief, which claimed that CDSs “do not, and are 
not meant to, indemnify the buyer of protection against loss. Rather, CDS 
contracts allow parties to ‘hedge’ risk by buying and selling risks at different 
prices and with varying degrees of correlation.”65 However, this generic 
description evades the question of how CDSs are structured, and it does not 
actually differentiate them from insurance. Moreover, the court adopted a 
different definition of CDS, which was rather plainer: “Credit default swaps are 
a method by which one party (the protection buyer) transfers risk to another party 
(the protection seller).”66 This definition is more akin to an insurance 
characterization. 
2.2.4.3 New York Insurance Law: The Misquoted Article 69 
Regarding United States legislation, there is a surprisingly common but 
erroneous belief that the insurance classification of CDSs was excluded in New 
York State in 2004, when Article 69 of the New York Insurance Law (dealing with 
financial guaranty insurance) was amended to define some aspects of credit 
default swaps.67 Several commentators have claimed that the amendment 
definitively excluded CDSs from insurance regulation, citing the following 
                                                 
62 Merrill Lynch International v. XL Capital Assurance et al., 08 Civ. 2893 (JSR), (S.D.N.Y. 
July 15, 2008), at 2. 
63 AON Financial Products, Inc. v. Societe Generale, 476 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2007). 
64 Mugasha 2011b: 557–558, who is opposed to the insurance-characterization of CDSs, 
seems to incorrectly rely on the AON case as having decided the matter, ignoring the fact that 
it was an obiter dicta that did not form part of the legal decision proper. 
65 AON Financial Products v. Societe Generale, at 96. 
66 Ibid. 
67 New York Insurance Law, § 6901 (2010 New York Code). 
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sentence in § 6901(j-1): “the making of [a] credit default swap does not constitute 
the doing of an insurance business.”68 Thus Shadab writes that New York “in 2004 
codified that position [that CDSs do not qualify as insurance contracts] in Article 
69 of the New York Insurance Law.”69 Schwartz states that “New York updated 
its insurance laws to exclude CDS in 2004”70 and that this “permanently quelled 
the worries of those who feared insurance treatment for CDS.”71 Kimball-Stanley 
comments: “The statute is hardly a convincing analysis of the legal issues 
involved in such a statement; but it is effective nonetheless.”72 
But this is all a gross misunderstanding, because the statutory sentence has 
been taken out of context. The original paragraph defines the meaning of “credit 
default swaps” for the purposes of New York Insurance Law, and adds a caveat to 
highlight that the definition only applies on the condition that the agreement is not 
recharacterized as an insurance contract: 
“Credit default swap” means an agreement referencing the credit derivative definitions 
published from time to time by the International Swap and Derivatives Association, Inc. 
or otherwise acceptable to the superintendent, pursuant to which a party agrees to 
compensate another party in the event of a payment default by, insolvency of, or other 
adverse credit event in respect of, an issuer of a specified security or other obligation; 
provided that such agreement does not constitute an insurance contract and the making of 
such credit default swap does not constitute the doing of an insurance business.73 
The underlying logic of this statutory definition is that products knows as 
“credit default swaps” were being used by New York-based financial guaranty 
insurers and the legislature sought to add some legal clarity, without however 
wishing to definitively determine the problem of insurance demarcation, because 
these novel products functionally resembled insurance. The purpose of the often-
partially quoted last sentence was to warn that the application of insurance law to 
CDSs had not been settled. This interpretation has been emphasized by Insurance 
Superintendent Eric R. Dinallo, who clarified the meaning of the paragraph in 
September 2008: 
Thus, provided that the making of the CDS itself “does not constitute the doing of an 
insurance business,” Insurance Law […] permits FGIs [financial guaranty insurance 
                                                 
68 Kimball-Stanley 2008: 252 (citing exactly this). 
69 Shadab 2010: 429.  
70 Schwartz 2007: 173. Relying on this, Sjostrom 2009: 988 asserts: “This [that CDSs have 
not been subject to insurance regulations] was made crystal clear by the state of New York in 
2004 when it amended its insurance laws specifically to exclude CDSs from coverage.” 
71 Schwartz 2007: 183. See also Whitehead 2010: 34 (“In York New […] most of AIGFP’s 
[credit default] swaps were expressly excluded from insurance regulation.”) 
72 Kimball-Stanley 2008: 252. 
73 New York Insurance Law, § 6901(j-1) (emphasis added). 
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companies] to issue insurance policies that guarantee payments by transformers or other 
parties pursuant to such a CDS.74 
In other words, Article 69 stated that insurers could sell financial guaranty 
insurance guaranteeing non-insurance CDSs (supposing, of course, that there are 
such things), which implies that some CDSs could be insurance and their 
differentiation would have to be determined independently. 
2.2.4.4 US Federal Derivatives Legislation: CFMA and the Dodd-Frank Act 
The United States is also the jurisdiction that most attention has given to CDSs in 
federal legislation. It was mentioned above that the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) expressly excluded their regulation as 
securities. It also excluded their regulation as commodity derivatives, treating 
them as exempted swap transactions for this purpose.75 Importantly, however, 
the CFMA did not exclude the application of state insurance laws if and when the 
transactions resemble insurance.76 The underlying principle here is that the 
CFMA was not concerned with the insurance question, but with the question of 
whether certain financial products (mainly other OTC derivatives, to which CDSs 
were added) would be caught by the existing federal regulatory schemes. 
Insurance law, in contrast, is a state matter in the United States, and the legislation 
in question did not address it. 
In contrast, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 expressly excluded the 
characterization and regulation of CDSs as insurance under state law.77 The 
Dodd-Frank reform will be examined later in detail, but even regarding the 
insurance law issue it must be noted that, apart from failing to satisfy policy 
concerns, the Dodd-Frank insurance pre-emption is legally confusing, because it 
depends on a paradoxical concept of “swap” that departs from financial 
definitions and may end up covering many insurance contracts.78 Moreover, it 
does not determine the question in other jurisdictions. 
                                                 
74 Dinallo 2008a: 7. See likewise Venokur, Magidson and Singer 2008: 5, writing that “if 
the CDS itself does not constitute an insurance contract or the doing of an insurance business, 
then an FGI is permitted to issue an insurance policy that guarantees payments by a 
transformer or other party pursuant to such CDS.” 
75 Sjostrom 2009: 986; Wynkoop 2008: 3100. 
76 Dinallo 2008b: 4 explains the effects of CFMA and highlights that the insurance issue 
was left open. Schwartz 2007: 173 also notes that “the state of insurance regulation remains 
unsettled in many places”. 
77 See below, chapter 4.3.3. 
78 See further below, chapter 4.3.3. 
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2.2.4.5 European Union Legislation: The Limits of EMIR and MiFID 
In contrast to the United States, the legal characterization of CDSs, particularly 
with respect to insurance law, has received little legislative attention in Europe. 
To be sure it is commonly assumed that CDSs are derivatives, but the legal 
foundation for this assumption is rarely or never clarified. 
For example, the new EU regulation imposing mandatory clearing for many 
OTC derivatives—commonly known as the European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation or EMIR—is normally assumed to cover CDSs, but in fact it makes no 
explicit reference to credit default swaps. In fact, it defines “derivative” or 
“derivative contract” by referring back to a list of instruments attached to the 
MiFID Directive.79 This list, however, does not mention credit default swaps, but 
simply refers generically to “Derivative instruments for the transfer of credit 
risk”.80 If this is the legal basis for holding that CDSs are not insurance, on 
reflection it is frankly quite inadequate: the non-specific expression in MiFID does 
not provide any demarcation criteria, and it simply presupposes prior legal 
classification as a derivative; invoking it as a statutory classification would 
therefore be circular. 
Naturally, to say this is not to deny that it is probably very common to suppose 
that CDS are “financial derivatives” and that the notion of financial derivatives is 
legally and economically clear and uncontroversial, so that the application of 
MiFID, EMIR and so on to credit default swaps would also be uncontroversial.81 
It is precisely in order to problematize this assumption that I have sought to 
highlight the conceptual difficulties underlying the notion of financial 
derivatives. For the same reason, the following chapters will carefully analyze not 
only the problem of demarcating insurance law, but also to the issue of how the 
notion of financial derivatives, and more specifically, the notion of “swaps”, has 
arisen and evolved in financial regulation. 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis has sought to demonstrate that certain legal categories are 
quite inappropriate for credit default swaps. There are two broad alternatives that 
seem more appropriate: on the one hand, insurance, and on the other hand, 
financial derivatives. These are both relatively broad notions, and the underlying 
legal principles are also complex. Both alternatives will therefore be analyzed 
carefully in the next two chapters.
                                                 
79 EMIR, Art. 2(5).  
80 MiFID, Annex 1, Section C(8). This remains unchanged in MiFID II. 
81 See for example Ahokallio 2011: 57. 
  CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AS 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
Credit default swaps seem very much like insurance, as many credit derivatives 
experts also admit: “This type of swap may be properly classified as credit 
insurance”.1 In the words of another: “Credit default swaps […] are actually 
default insurance.”2 The question here is whether they are legally so. This chapter 
starts with an outline of the practical implications of insurance regulation. It then 
proceeds to a detailed analysis of insurance law principles and a critical 
examination of the diverse arguments advanced in the literature with respect to 
CDSs and insurance law. The chapter ends with an assessment of the evolution 
of the thinking of United States insurance regulators on the matter, and a brief 
analysis of the question in terms of Finnish insurance law. 
3.1 CDS IN LIGHT OF INSURANCE LAW PRINCIPLES 
3.1.1 The Legal and Economic Implications of Insurance Regulation 
Insurance regulation is of major practical significance. Firstly, selling insurance 
without a proper license may render protection sellers civilly and criminally 
liable.3 The rules vary between jurisdictions, but generally, “if credit default 
swaps are deemed insurance by an insurance regulator, a protection seller could 
be subject to criminal prosecution, substantial fines, and forfeiture of its corporate 
charter unless it maintained the requisite licenses.”4 The protection buyer may 
also be able to recover the money paid or any loss sustained.5 
Secondly, authorization to sell insurance implies a range of regulatory burdens 
including loss reserves, capitalization, compulsory disclosures, and investment 
restrictions.6 Therefore firms may wish to avoid the application of insurance law.7 
                                                 
1 Anson 1999: 44. 
2 Skinner 2005: 280. 
3 Nirenberg and Hoffman 2001: 8. 
4 Ibid. See for example New York Insurance Law, § 1101(a)(2). In the UK, the regime of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is complicated, because a person may be authorized 
by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), but the permission does not extend to insurance, in 
which case the breach is only subject to FSA sanctions which though include criminal 
penalties: see Benjamin 2007: paras 10.17–10.20. 
5 Clarke 2007: 60 (describing UK rules); Benjamin 2007: para. 10.18. 
6 See for example Jerry 2002: 112–123 (describing statutory controls in the United States); 
Clarke 2007: 61–65 (describing a range of duties falling upon insurers in the UK). 
7 Hellner 1963: 494. 
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Thirdly, insurance law limits the freedom of protection buyers by imposing, in 
most jurisdictions, the requirement of insurable interest, which limits speculative 
risk-taking. Fourthly, insurance contracts are normally subject to the principle of 
utmost good faith, which requires both parties to disclose all information that 
would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer.8 In practice, the application 
of this principle varies greatly between jurisdiction and types of insurance.9 In the 
United States in particular, there is “a substantial consumer protection element of 
the law governing insurance.”10 
3.1.2 Demarcating Insurance 
3.1.2.1 Legal Definitions 
The scope of insurance law cannot be definitively demarcated by definitions, but 
they are necessary as a matter of first impression. Although there is some 
variation among the conventional legal definitions of insurance, two things are 
without doubt: the definitions agree on the fundamentals, and those fundamental 
elements embrace all or many credit default swaps.11 In the United States, a 
standard definition by Black’s Law Dictionary states that insurance is a “contract 
by which one party (the insurer) undertakes to indemnify another party (the 
insured) against risk of loss, damage, or liability arising from the occurrence of 
some specified contingency.”12 A more elaborate definition is provided by New 
York State Insurance Law: 
“Insurance contract” means any agreement or other transaction whereby one party, the 
“insurer,” is obligated to confer benefit of pecuniary value upon another party, the 
“insured” or “beneficiary,” dependent upon the happening of a fortuitous event in which 
the insured or beneficiary has, or is expected to have at the time of such happening, a 
material interest which will be adversely affected by the happening of such event.13 
A fortuitous event means, according to the New York statute, “any occurrence 
or failure to occur which is, or is assumed by the parties to be, to a substantial 
extent beyond the control of either party.”14 
                                                 
8 See Clarke 2007: 98–116 (discussing this principle critically). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Hazen 2005: 431–432 (2005). 
11 This discussion is largely limited to United States and English law, which are the leading 
jurisdictions for CDS markets; the demarcation of insurance law does not appear 
fundamentally different in other jurisdictions, although there are differences in the details of 
insurance regulation. 
12 Black’s Law Dictionary 2009: 870 (9th ed. 2009). 
13 New York Insurance Law, § 1101(a)(1). 
14 New York Insurance Law, § 1101(a)(2). 
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In the UK, there are some statutes dealing with insurance law, but the 
demarcation of insurance continues to be determined by common law and the 
regulators’ interpretation thereof.15 In the landmark case of Prudential v IRC, 
Channell J described insurance as follows: 
A contract of insurance, then, must be a contract for the payment of a sum of money, or 
for some corresponding benefit such as the rebuilding of a house or the repairing of a ship, 
to become due on the happening of an event, which event must have [...] some degree of 
uncertainty about it and must be of a character more or less adverse to the interest of the 
person effecting the insurance.16 
In summary, there are three fundamental elements of insurance contracts: 
payment, uncertainty and adverseness (interest).17 It is evident that the broad 
definitions would include CDSs, at least in some cases, as many commentators 
acknowledge: “A CDS certainly appears to fall within this definition [of Black’s 
Law Dictionary].”18 Even Schwartz, who is critical of insurance law, agrees: 
“Viewed on their face, these [New York] statutes define insurance contracts such 
that CDS—at least those with exogenous credit events—could be subject to 
insurance regulation.”19 He also notes that guidelines issues by the United States 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners “defined insurance in such a 
way that CDS clearly qualify as insurance contracts.”20 
Some have attempted to downplay the issue by referring to non-legal 
definitions of insurance, such as those highlighting the risk-pooling aspect of 
insurance.21 But, while risk pooling is an important aspect of the economic logic 
of ordinary insurance business, it is not a legal criterion for demarcating 
insurance law. 
                                                 
15 See FSA 2012: para. 6.3.2, 6.5.2; Clarke 2007: 349 (explaining that the Regulated Activities 
Order “does not attempt an exhaustive definition of contracts of insurance” and that the “FSA 
will still consider each case on its merits, in the light of the FSA’s interpretation of the common 
law.”). In fact, many countries do not have statutory definitions of insurance; for example, 
Australia’s Insurance Contracts Act 1984, s. 10(1), simply refers to what “would ordinarily be 
regarded as a contract of insurance”. 
16 Prudential Insurance Company v IRC [1904] 2 KB 658, 663. According to FSA 2012: para. 
6.5.1, Prudential is the best statement of the common law. 
17 English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: para. 7.19. For similar definitions, see for 
example Ivamy 1993:  3–4; Leigh-Jones, Birds and Owen 2003: para. 1–1. 
18 Sjostrom 2009: 987. 
19 Schwartz 2007: 181. 
20 Ibid. 174. 
21 For example Henderson 2009a: 16. 
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3.1.2.2 Borderline Cases 
Definitions are not the final word: demarcations must be determined by courts 
and regulators, which are sceptical of generic definitions, “because definitions 
tend sometimes to obscure and occasionally to exclude that which ought to be 
included.”22 Even when a definition is provided by statute, it should not be 
blindly relied upon, as “the approach through formal definition leads to 
innumerable difficulties and, if taken seriously, unfortunate results.”23 
There is no simple way of determining borderline cases.24 Courts at common 
law have developed a range of criteria based on the peculiarities of new cases.25 
These seem to have little to add to the present discussion, as many of these criteria 
are trivial and easily fulfilled in CDSs.26 There are only two criteria that raise 
questions with respect to CDSs. One is that “the insured event must be one that 
is adverse to the policyholder”;27 but this is only relevant for some (so-called 
uncovered or “naked”) CDSs, and will be discussed later in detail. 
Another potentially relevant criterion is the “major or primary purpose test” 
developed in some United States cases, according to which “where the major 
purpose of a contract is other than to indemnify the promise, there is no 
insurance.”28 However, the validity of this test is doubtful, as it is contradicted by 
some cases and “cannot prevail as a general test”.29 In the UK, the regulators have 
expressly abolished it: “The contract must be characterised as a whole and not 
according to its ‘dominant purpose’ or the relative weight of its ‘insurance 
content’.”30 Moreover, in any case this test might not matter for CDSs, because it 
can be argued that the purpose—in fact, the only purpose—of CDSs is precisely 
                                                 
22 Department of Trade and Industry v St. Christopher Motorists Association [1974] 1 All ER 395, 
396–397. See also Clarke 2007: 347–352 (discussing the limits of definitions). 
23 Hellner 1963: 495. 
24 Hellner 1963: 495–504 (discussing various tests and their limits). 
25 See Clarke 2007: 350 (describing features highlighted by English courts); Hellner 1963: 
500–512 (discussing United States cases). 
26 For example, Clarke 2007: 350 lists the following criteria: the provision of insurance must 
be a business of a certain degree of regularity (even if insurance is just one part of its business); 
the insurer’s promise to pay must be “in money or in kind”; “the alleged insurer must be 
legally (i.e., contractually) bound to pay the money or provide the benefit in kind […] and the 
beneficiary must have a legally enforceable right to receive it”; and “the benefit is due only if 
a specified insured event occurs. Moreover, at the time of contracting, it must be uncertain 
whether the specified event will occur.” 
27 Ibid. 
28 Hellner 1963: 502. 
29 Ibid. 
30 FSA 2012: para. 6.5.4(3) (citing Fuji Finance Inc. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. Ltd [1997] Ch. 
173 (C.A.)). See also FSA 2012: para. 6.6.7.(2). 
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to indemnify, or to recover the loss of reference asset value due to default or other 
credit event.31 
Some authors have argued that “attempts at evasion of insurance regulation 
should not be tolerated,” giving rise to a kind of positive presumption in favour 
of regulation.32 This is relevant with respect to CDSs, because the very language 
of “swaps” may be interpreted as a camouflage. 
3.1.2.3 UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) Guidelines 
In the UK, the difficulty of delineating the boundaries of insurance law has 
prompted the Financial Services Authority (FSA)—which supervised both 
securities and insurance industries—to provide further guidance.33 This guidance 
is not conclusive and does not explicitly discuss CDSs, but it corroborates the 
impression that English insurance law covers CDSs. 
Firstly, the FSA lists transactions that are unlikely to be regarded as insurance: 
these include contracts which appear to be “pre-payment for services to be 
rendered in response to a future contingency”;34 contracts of “periodic 
maintenance of goods or facilities”;35 and contracts under which “the provider 
stands ready to provide services on the occurrence of a future contingency, on 
condition that the services actually provided are paid for by the recipient at a 
commercial rate”.36 CDSs resemble none of these transactions.  
Secondly, in terms of affirmative criteria, the FSA highlights the “assumption 
of risk” by the insurer as “an important descriptive feature of all contracts of 
insurance.”37 For the FSA, the assumption of risk has the same meaning as the 
“transfer of risk”.38 This is precisely the fundamental element of CDSs. Note that 
it does not matter if the provider “trades without any risk”,39 as may be the case 
with an investment bank acting as a CDS intermediary. 
With respect to borderline cases, the FSA notes that insurance law is more 
likely to apply “if the amount payable by the recipient under the contract is 
                                                 
31 This will be discussed in detail below, chapter 3.1.6.1. The point of the major purpose 
test is not to scrutinize the motivations of the insured party (which in CDS transactions may be 
speculative), but to distinguish contracts which have only a marginal insurance element: see 
Hellner 1963: 502–503. 
32 See Hellner 1963: 503–504 (discussing this argument). 
33 The original document is FSA 2004, which has been published in updated form in FSA 
2012: chapter 6. 
34 FSA 2012: para. 6.6.3. 
35 Ibid. para. 6.6.4. 
36 Ibid. para. 6.6.5. 
37 Ibid. para. 6.6.2. 
38 Ibid. para. 6.6.2(1). 
39 Ibid. para. 6.6.2(3). 
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calculated by reference to either or both of the probability of occurrence or likely 
severity of the uncertain event.”40 With CDSs, this is the case, at least in practice, 
because CDS premiums or spreads reflect expectations of probability and severity 
of credit events.41 Also, the FSA states that a contract is less likely to be insurance 
“if it requires the provider to assume a speculative risk (ie a risk carrying the 
possibility of either profit or loss) rather than a pure risk (ie a risk of loss only).”42 
CDSs transfer the risk of loss only, because credit events are always downside 
risks in terms of reference asset value. 
In the FSA guidance, the only factor against the insurance characterization of 
CDSs is that a contract is more likely to be insurance if it “is described as insurance 
and contains terms that are consistent with its classification as a contract of 
insurance, for example, obligations of the utmost good faith”43 (which is not the 
case with CDSs). However, the guidance goes on to note that what matters is the 
substance, and the contract “does not cease to be a contract of insurance simply 
because the terms included are not usual insurance terms.”44 This is a 
fundamental point of principle, which Jan Hellner clarifies as follows: 
Although there are good reasons for submitting anything that is frankly called insurance 
to insurance regulation, since the public might otherwise be misled, the test is clearly 
unsuitable when applied to business which is not called insurance for then an easy way 
to avoid the burden of regulation would be to use another name.45 
It may be concluded that the characterization issue is asymmetric in nature. The 
use of insurance language renders insurance characterization more likely, but its 
avoidance does not, in and of itself, make insurance characterization unlikely. 
3.1.3 The Argument against Insurance 
3.1.3.1 The Potts Opinion 
The argument for insurance recharacterization seems strong, then, but there is a 
persistent belief that CDSs are not insurance. This belief goes back to a legal 
                                                 
40 Ibid. para. 6.6.8(1). 
41 Banks, Glantz and Siegel 2007: 34 (“The premium is a function of various factors, 
including time to maturity, probability of reference credit default, expected recovery rate 
given default” etc.). 
42 FSA 2012: para. 6.6.8(2). 
43 Ibid. para. 6.6.8(3). 
44 Ibid. para. 6.6.8(4). 
45 Hellner 1963: 500. 
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opinion on credit derivatives penned in 1997 by Robin Potts QC in London for 
ISDA.46 After examining the principles, Potts concluded: 
I think that credit default options [sic] plainly differ from contracts of insurance in the 
following critical respects:- 
(a) the payment obligation is not conditional on the payee’s sustaining a loss or having a 
risk of loss; 
(b) the contract is thus not one which seeks to protect an insurable interest on the part of 
the payee. His rights do not depend on the existence of any insurable interest.47 
Potts went on to admit that “the economic effect of certain credit derivatives 
can be similar to” insurance, but argued that “economic effect is not the test to be 
applied to the characterisation of the transaction.”48 Instead, the question depends 
on the intended rights and obligations specified in the contract.49 Potts also 
recommended that the contract include a clause insisting that the parties wish the 
obligations to exist regardless of whether the protection buyer suffers or is 
exposed to a loss, and “therefore this transaction is not a contract of insurance”.50 
3.1.3.2 The Importance of the Potts Opinion 
Before analyzing Potts’ reasoning critically, it is worth highlighting its practical 
importance. In the words of an anonymous ISDA representative, “there would 
have been no market at all” in CDSs in the absence of the Potts opinion.51 The core 
of Potts’s argument has also been repeated on numerous occasions by ISDA.52 The 
rhetorical weight of the Potts opinion has been so impressive that in a 2006 letter 
to the English Law Commission, ISDA Senior Policy Director Richard Metcalfe 
                                                 
46 Potts 1997: 1 (para. 1). 
47 Ibid. 7 (para. 5).  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 8 (para. 6). 
51 Cited in interview by Huault and Rainelli-Le Montagner 2009: 560. 
52 See for example Pickel 2004 (arguing on similar grounds that weather derivatives are 
not insurance). See likewise Strupp and Darras 2009: 2, which is a joint letter by ISDA and 
SIFMA and asserts among other things the following: “Whereas insurance requires an 
insurable interest, credit default swaps are often purchased by protection buyers that are not 
hedging a specific underlying risk. Insurance contracts generally are purchased and held by 
the buyer, whereas CDS are frequently bought and sold. And finally, insurance contracts only 
pay out when the insured party actually incurs a loss. CDS provide for payments to protection 
buyers upon the occurrence of a credit event, which frequently occurs before any loss is 
incurred. We believe each of these factors marks a significant difference between CDS and 
insurance.” 
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invoked the authority of the “widespread acceptance of the so-called ‘Potts 
opinion’” which had come to represent “current market consensus.”53 
In reality, though, such “widespread acceptance” was driven by a group of 
London-based banking lawyers repeating the Potts opinion in a range of 
publications. For example, a group of Allen & Overy solicitors—connected with 
the Potts opinion itself—made the same argument in 1997.54 In 2001, Norton Rose 
lawyers advanced essentially the same argument,55 and in 2003, ISDA 
documentation expert Paul Harding referred to the Potts opinion as definitive.56 
3.1.3.3 Mixed Reception 
Yet there are obvious problems with the Potts opinion. This subsection highlights 
some general issues, which will be followed by a detailed analysis of the legally 
more complex issues—form and substance, insurable interest, and loss 
indemnification—in separate sections below. The Potts opinion is famous, but 
legally it is only a private opinion. Its acceptance by the market—that is, a market 
keen to be freed from the shackles of regulation—is hardly surprising, and 
certainly does not render it legally binding. Its repetition by many a bank counsel 
must also be read in context, as the literature on credit derivatives law is sparse 
and dominated by banking interests. 
Moreover, the acceptance of the Potts opinion has been hugely exaggerated. 
Joanna Benjamin in 2007 wrote—while expressing doubts about the accuracy of 
Potts’ analysis—that “given the degree of authority commanded by the Potts 
opinion in the financial markets, and given also the importance of commercial 
expectations in characterising financial contracts, the opinion may now be 
regarded as conclusive.”57 But in fact, already in 1998 Professor Hudson wrote 
that credit derivatives basically provide “a form of insurance policy for the 
buyer”58 and that they imply “a number of areas of potential liability where 
dealers are, in terms, providing insurance to their clients”.59 In 2000, John 
Jakeways also advanced a more nuanced position on the insurance question.60 In 
his view, there was no definite answer to the question, as it depended on the 
specific terms of each contract; he felt that most of the time credit derivatives were 
                                                 
53 Metcalfe 2006. 
54 Benton, Devine and Jarvis 1997: 30–31. Benton was one of the two Allen & Overy 
Instructing Solicitors acting for ISDA in requesting the Potts opinion: see Allen & Overy 1997: 
10. 
55 Ross and Davies 2001. 
56 Harding 2004: 18–19. 
57 Benjamin 2007: 142 (para. 5.142) n.426. 
58 Hudson 1998: 5. 
59 Ibid. 14. 
60 See Jakeways 1999. 
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probably not insurance, but nothing certain could be said.61 In his opinion, the 
basis for avoiding the application of insurance law is that the principal object of 
the transaction is other than to insure.62 Ali and de Vries Robbé in 2005 likewise 
highlighted the continuing risk that credit derivatives might be recharacterized 
as insurance.63 Finally, Benjamin Saunders in 2010 argued that at least some 
CDSs—“for example a bank entering a CDS to protect against borrower 
default”—are “a form of indemnity insurance.”64 
If, in reality, the academic opinion has diverged from Potts on many points, 
the reception of the Potts opinion by regulators has been even more sceptical.65 In 
the UK, the Potts opinion was explicitly discussed by the FSA in a 2002 study on 
cross-sector risk transfers, and was found incorrect in several respects (although 
the FSA refrained from pronouncing expressly on whether it considered CDSs to 
be insurance).66 The FSA listed four reasons why the Potts opinion should not be 
heavily relied upon: (i) some contracts may not have “no intention to insure” 
clauses; (ii) the reference event may have been defined in such a way that it is 
conceptually impossible for the event to occur without the protection buyer 
suffering a loss; (iii) there are also contracts of insurance that do not provide 
indemnity against actual loss; and (iv) “no intention to insure” clauses may not 
be definitive if there is evidence of a different true intention.67 
The Potts opinion was also discussed by the English and Scottish Law 
Commissions’ 2008 study on insurable interest, and not without scepticism.68 
Paradoxically, the authors of the report seemed bent on avoiding the conclusion 
that CDSs are insurance, but nowhere did they give clear reasons for this 
objective.69 The only explanation offered was industry pressure: “In response to 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 51–53. 
62 Ibid. 54–55. But this seems mistaken, because the major or dominant purpose test has 
been shown to be incorrect. With respect to speculative intent using insurance-like 
transactions, these are limited by the doctrine of insurable interest. 
63 Ali 2005: 308 (“Notwithstanding the tremendous growth of the global credit derivatives 
market, there remains a critical legal risk […] that a court will treat the assumption of credit 
risk by a Protection Seller under a credit derivative as tantamount to the (illegal) provision of 
insurance by the party.”). Ali and de Vries Robbé 2005: 181 (”In the absence of a statutory safe 
harbour for credit derivatives and synthetic securitisations from the insurance laws, those 
products remain subject to the risk that a regulator or court may characterise them as 
insurance contracts.”). 
64 Saunders 2010: 435. 
65 In addition to the sources cited here, see the discussion on United States insurance 
regulators below. 
66 FSA 2002: Annex B, p. 2. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: paras 7.10–7.17 (mainly citing the FSA 
publications). 
69 See id. summary paras 1.20, 1.40; main text paras 7.3, 7.5. 
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our scoping paper, the ISDA wrote to us describing Robin Potts QC’s opinion and 
said that ‘any review of the boundary between contracts of insurance and other 
types of contract risks damaging [market] consensus and undermining 
confidence in these economically significant products’.”70 In the United States, as 
will be seen later in detail, insurance regulators initially accepted ISDA’s Potts-
like argumentation, but it was scrutinized more carefully after the financial crisis, 
and rejected. 
3.1.4 Form and Substance in Insurance Law and CDSs 
Let us now examine the arguments of Potts and other critics of insurance 
recharacterization in detail. The easiest issue to tackle concerns the relationship 
between the legal form of a transaction and its so-called substance. Given that 
CDSs are functionally very much like insurance, the question is whether their 
legal recharacterization can be avoided by shunning the language of insurance, 
or by inserting “no intention to insure” clauses. The brief answer is negative, but 
the matter merits a closer look, as it reveals some fundamental points about 
insurance law and CDSs. 
3.1.4.1 The Primacy of Substance over Form 
Insurance regulation is not voluntary, and it cannot be avoided simply because 
the parties wish to do so. This is why form—contracting language and terms—is 
not the final word in insurance law, as Hellner has aptly summarized:  
Although there are good reasons for submitting anything that is frankly called insurance 
to insurance regulation, since the public might otherwise be misled, the test is clearly 
unsuitable when applied to business which is not called insurance for then an easy way 
to avoid the burden of regulation would be to use another name.71 
It is therefore generally established that, in insurance law, substance matters 
more than form. Summarizing the position of US states, Hellner writes: “Directly 
or indirectly this [formal] test is rejected almost universally. It is not the term 
used, but the characteristic features of the activity that are held decisive.”72 In 
England, the FSA guidelines state explicitly: “more weight attaches to the 
substance of the contract, than to the form of the contract.”73 
Of course, the question that arises is what is meant by substance. In English 
law, the notion of substance refers fundamentally to the obligation(s) of the 
                                                 
70 Id. para. 7.11. 
71 Hellner 1963: 500. 
72 Hellner 1963: 500. 
73 FSA 2012: para. 6.5.4(1). 
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insurance provider.74 In CDS transactions, the obligation of the protection seller is 
to compensate for the loss of reference asset value following a credit event: a CDS 
effects precisely the assumption, by the protection seller, of credit risk in return 
for periodic consideration.  
Substance, therefore, does not mean merely the “economic effect” of the 
contract. For example, a farmer may enter into a commodity futures transaction 
for hedging purposes, but the agreement does not thereby become an insurance 
contract.75 Contrary to Potts and his instructing solicitors,76 the substance of the 
transaction does not refer to the intentions, motivations or investment strategies 
of the parties; the FSA specifically states that it “is unlikely to treat the provider’s 
or the customer’s intention or purpose in entering into a contract as relevant to its 
classification.”77 
The case law in the United States and England reveals that insurance law has 
been applied to many transactions in which the parties may have been unaware 
of effecting insurance, but the rights and obligations were essentially those of 
insurance.78 Of special interest for present purposes is the English case of Fuji 
Finance v. Aetna Life Insurance.79 The case concerned the legal nature of a financial 
transaction, which consisted of a single premium capital investment bond that 
was used as a form of life insurance.80 At first instance, the court ruled that the 
contract was not insurance, because there was no sufficiently close connection 
between the benefit and the adverse event.81 However, the Court of Appeals 
                                                 
74 FSA 2012: para. 6.5.4(2) (citing In re Sentinel Securities [1996] 1 WLR 316). 
75 Henderson 2009a: 4. 
76 See Allen & Overy 1997: 8 (referring to prior discussions in which, according to Potts, 
the construction of a contract depends on “the rights, obligations and intentions of the parties” 
at the time of contracting); Potts 1997: 6 (para. 4) (arguing that construction must depend on 
“the object of both parties” because “otherwise some non-disclosed desire” by one party 
might turn the transaction into an insurance contract). 
77 FSA 2012: para. 6.5.4(2). 
78 In the United States, consider for example the numerous burial contract cases: see 
Hellner 1963: 509–510. In England, an amusing example is Department of Trade and Industry v. 
St. Christopher Motorists’ Association Ltd. [1974] 1 All ER 395, where a motorists’ association 
promised to provide chauffeur services to its members if they lost their driving licence as a 
result of being convicted of having too much alcohol in the blood; this was considered 
insurance. 
79 Fuji Finance Inc. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. Ltd. [1996] 4 All ER 608. 
80 See English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: para. 7.25 n.21 (summarizing the case 
and its history). 
81 Fuji Finance Inc. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 1025. According to English 
and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: para. 7.25 n.21, “there was uncertainty about when the 
money would become payable and it did not chiefly depend on the length of the insured life.” 
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reversed the ruling and held that the transaction constituted insurance, following 
a broad definition of life insurance.82 
Care should be exercised when drawing analogies from Fuji, because the facts 
of the case were peculiar and it involved life insurance. It is clear, however, that 
the earlier Fuji decision cannot be relied upon to argue that a contract cannot be 
insurance simply because it has an investment element.83 In fact, it has been 
suggested that the logic of the Court of Appeals was that “the contract was both 
an investment product and a life insurance”.84 Now, it might be suggested that 
CDSs should be construed as a similar combination of insurance and investment 
products; but this would be inaccurate, because CDSs are like insurance in a 
simpler way: in Fuji, the transaction that was basically an investment product that 
was structured in a particular way so as to function as life insurance; in CDSs, in 
contrast, the transaction is structurally just like an insurance contract, but it may 
be used for speculative purposes by persons not having insurable interest in the 
covered assets. 
3.1.4.2 Transformers: Insurance and CDSs 
In order to perceive more clearly that the rights and obligations in CDS 
transactions are essentially those of insurance, it is useful to consider so-called 
transformer arrangements, whereby CDSs are sometimes explicitly transformed 
into insurance contracts in order to exploit differences between regulatory 
regimes in banking and insurance (e.g. regulatory capital, tax and accounting 
differences).85 In a typical arrangement, a transformer company would first write 
the original CDS, and an authorized insurer would then insure the transformer 
company by way of traditional insurance or financial guaranty insurance (see 
Figure 6).86 
This arrangement is especially revealing when the insurance leg incorporates 
the CDS terms “back to back”.87 Some lawyers have discouraged the 
incorporation of ISDA’s CDS documentation into the insurance contract, because 
it risks a court holding that the insurance policy written through the transformer 
                                                 
82 Fuji Finance Inc. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 608, at 618 (finding that the 
essence of life insurance is that “the right to benefits is related to life or death”). 
83 See Allen & Overy 1997: 8 (arguing this). The interpretation of the Fuji cases is more 
nuanced in Potts 1997: 6 (para. 4). 
84 Benjamin 2007: 139. 
85 See FSA 2002: paras 3.25–3.29, 3.67, 3.107, 3.116; Ibid. Annex A, and Annex B, p. 3–4 
(discussing the structure, logic and implications of transformers); Ross and Davies 2001: 4–5 
(describing transformers). 
86 FSA 2002: Annex B, p. 3. 
87 FSA 2002: Annex B, p. 3 
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AS INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
 
106 
was a sham.88 However, writing independent terms and different provisions 
creates unwanted risks, and the FSA in 2002 estimated that the standard approach 
had been to incorporate ISDA documentation.89 
The existence of transformers—and the incorporation of CDS terms—
highlights the difficulty of claiming that CDSs differ from insurance in terms of 
the rights and obligations. Such a claim would imply that two contracts, that have 
exactly the same terms, are governed by entirely different legal rules and regulatory 
regimes, even though insurance law is supposed to be determined by substance 
rather than form. 
There is also another paradox: the prudent lawyers argued that the insurance 
leg of the transformer arrangement might be construed as a sham, i.e. an illicit 
derivatives transaction (which an insurance company would be prohibited from 
entering) masked as an insurance contract. Yet it could be argued that it is the 
CDS leg that is a sham, i.e. an illicit insurance contract masked as a derivative. 
These two prospects cannot both be true at the same time, and it is submitted that 
the latter view is better. 
 
Figure 6 A CDS–insurance transformer arrangement. 
3.1.4.3 Where Is the Swap in a Credit Default Swap? 
The confusing distinction between insurance and derivatives leads us back to the 
fundamental problem that, over time and in different contexts, different 
terminology has developed to describe activities that are at least partially 
overlapping. The hard question is what legal effect should be given to this 
linguistic confusion. On one hand, it was already mentioned that the FSA is a 
more likely treat a contract as insurance if it uses terms and obligations typical of 
insurance, but different terminology does not suffice to prove it is not insurance. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that the deliberate avoidance of insurance-
                                                 
88 Ross and Davies 2001: 4–5; FSA 2002: Annex B, p. 4, and para. 3.108. 
89 FSA 2002: Annex B, p. 4, and para. 3.77. 
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type language might be interpreted in the opposite manner if there is evidence 
that it is motivated by the evasion of insurance regulation. 
It is important to understand that the likeness between insurance and CDSs is 
not merely one of economic effect, as seems to have been assumed by Potts. He was 
certainly right that mere economic consequences are inconclusive; a farmer may 
enter into a commodity futures transaction for hedging purposes, but the 
agreement does not thereby become an insurance contract.90 Instead, as Potts 
correctly stated, legal construction depends on the rights and obligations 
specified in the contract. And a CDS effects precisely the assumption, by the 
protection seller, of credit risk in return for periodic consideration. 
The issue may be further clarified by asking: Where is the swap in a credit 
default swap? There may be disagreement on what derivatives are, but not so 
with swaps: it is widely agreed in finance that, in the words of Partnoy, “a swap 
is a private agreement between two parties to exchange cash flows at certain times 
according to a prearranged formula.”91 Feder writes similarly that a “swap is an 
exchange of cash flows. A cash flow is a series of future cash payments.”92 
In contrast to swaps, a CDS is not an exchange of cash flows—and it definitely 
is not an exchange of credit defaults (as the name literally suggests). It bears no 
functional resemblance to genuine swap agreements. This has been 
acknowledged by some commentators, including Banks and others: “Because the 
transaction is unilateral […], it does not take the form of a standard OTC swap 
contract, which is always bilateral.”93 Ayadi and Behr concur: “Unlike other types 
of derivatives such as interest rate swaps, the risks assumed by the protection 
buyer and the protection seller in a CDS transaction are not symmetrical.”94 
So there clearly is no swap in a CDS. In this respect, Potts was more accurate 
in writing about “credit default options”—as the products were called at the 
time—rather than credit default swaps. Others have made the same point: “it may 
be more accurate to think of credit default swaps as options”95 or “binary default 
                                                 
90 Henderson 2009a: 4. 
91 Partnoy 1997: 219 (emphasis added). 
92 Feder 2002: 701 (emphasis added). See likewise Henderson 1993: 349: “In broad terms, 
a swap is an exchange of cash flows between two parties, each of which cash flows is, in the 
eyes of the respective parties, equal to the other at the start of the agreement. Specifically, the 
standard swap is an agreement between two parties in which each party agrees to pay the 
other an amount of interest calculated on a principal amount over several specified periods 
of time. If the principal amount is the same for both parties, the rate bases of calculation will 
be different and it is called an interest rate swap. If the principal amounts are expressed in 
different currencies, it is called a currency swap and, in addition to cross-payment of interest 
in the different currencies, there is usually an exchange of the principal amounts at the 
beginning and end of the swap.” 
93 Banks, Glantz and Siegel 2007: 33.  
94 Ayadi and Behr 2009: 182. 
95 Feder 2002: 711. 
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options”.96 Naturally, this does not resolve the legal question, because all 
insurance contracts are, in modern financial theory, put options of a peculiar 
type.97 Yet it would be ludicrous to claim that insurance law has suddenly become 
inapplicable because finance theorists have defined insurance contracts as 
options. 
3.1.5 Insurable Interest 
Potts correctly stated that legal construction depends on the rights and 
obligations specified in the contract. Yet, if the parties specify that they wish the 
contract to be valid even if the buyer has no insurable interest, does the contract 
thereby become a non-insurance contract? In other words, the question to be 
addressed is how to assess those cases in which a CDS has not been bought with 
the intention of gaining protection against an adverse event; for example, when 
the “protection buyer” is really short-selling the reference entity, seeking to profit 
from its downfall. That implies the legally complex questions of insurable interest 
and loss indemnity, which are discussed in this and the following section. 
3.1.5.1 Insurable Interest as a Requirement of Validity 
There is much debate about the notion of insurable interest, but it is certain that, 
contrary to the Potts opinion and the claims of ISDA, insurable interest is not a 
demarcating factor of insurance law, but a requirement of validity in insurance 
law: “Every contract of insurance requires an insurable interest to support it; 
otherwise, it is invalid.”98 In other words, “insurable interest […] is a requirement 
for a valid contract of insurance and not itself a defining feature of the contract.”99 
The FSA writes explicitly against the Potts opinion on this point: 
For a contract of insurance to be valid, there must be an insurable interest, i.e. the insured 
must be able to show both an economic and a legal connection with the subject matter of 
the risk. In some credit default swaps it will be possible to show that the protection buyer 
has such an interest. However in, for example, a speculative swap, where the protection 
buyer has no connection with the reference entity the protection buyer is unlikely to have 
an insurable interest.100 
                                                 
96 Banks, Glantz and Siegel 2007: 43. See also Steinherr 2000: 165–166 (concluding that, 
financially, a CDS is really a “put option” or a credit “default put”). 
97 See Steinherr 2000: 17–18 (noting that “any contingent claim, such as a bond, share or 
guarantee, can be looked upon as an option” and that “[a] guarantee is nothing but a put 
option”). 
98 Ivamy 1993: 23. See also Clarke 2007: 26. 
99 FSA 2004: 8 (para. 2.10). 
100 FSA 2002: Annex B, p. 1. 
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The standard explanation for the doctrine of insurable interest is that it 
reduces the risk of contracts that tempt the insured to bring about the loss insured 
against.101 This rationale may be debated,102 but this much is clear: the 
requirement of insurable interest is imposed by law, not by the contracting parties; 
when the protection buyer has no insurable interest, the contract does not thereby 
become a non-insurance contract, but an invalid insurance contract.103 
3.1.5.2 The Relationship between Adverseness and Insurable Interest 
Perhaps the misunderstanding of Potts and others is due to the belief that 
insurable interest merely means that “an insurance contract must be a contract 
against the risk of loss.”104 This formulation would merge insurable interest with 
the notion of adverseness. There are some obiter dicta in support of this view,105 but 
they seem to be due to unintended inaccuracy.106 The normal view is that 
adverseness is a wider notion than the legal requirement of insurable interest: “If 
the insured has an insurable interest in the subject matter of the insurance, the 
event will indeed be adverse to him, but the reverse is not true.”107 
Yet, could it be argued that CDSs are not insurance when the default of the 
reference obligations is not adverse to the protection-buyers? The answer must 
be negative, because it would simply confuse adverseness with insurable interest. 
Although the notion of an uncertain and adverse event tends to be 
underdefined,108 it essentially refers to the nature of the event, which must 
constitute a risk of loss for there to be insurance, whereas insurable interest refers 
to legal restrictions on who is permitted to purchase insurance on that event.109 
In property insurance, the existence of a transferable risk can normally be 
determined objectively, and credit default is a risk of loss only, much like fire 
accident or other property damage. It is not insignificant that standard CDS 
                                                 
101 See Hazen 2005: 420–422 (describing the origin of the doctrine). 
102 See Clarke 2007: 36–37 (critically discussing the traditional doctrine). 
103 Kimball-Stanley 2008: 248–249. See also FSA 2002: Annex B, p. 1 (noting this and 
pointing out that some CDS buyers lack insurable interest). 
104 Potts 1997: 5 (para. 4). 
105 In the English case Medical Defence Union Ltd. v Department of Trade [1979] 2 All ER 421, 
423–424, Megarry VC used the notion of “insurable interest” as a defining element of 
insurance law. 
106 Megarry was referring to Prudential, where the third element was adverseness, not 
insurable interest. 
107 Clarke 2002: para. 1-1E. See also English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: paras 
7.20–7.23 (summarizing literature to this effect). 
108 See English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: paras 7.20–7.23 (citing different 
expressions). 
109 See ibid. para. 7.23. 
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terminology refers to “protection buyer” and “protection seller”. Of course, 
adverse events may be viewed positively by persons standing to benefit from 
their consequences (someone may benefit from a fire at a competitor’s premises), 
but that does not affect the point: a fire insurance policy taken by an arsonist is 
not a permitted non-insurance contract (for want of subjective adverseness) but as 
an invalid insurance contract (for want of insurable interest). Conflating 
adverseness and insurable interest would effectively abolish the requirement of 
insurable interest, and that cannot be the meaning of the law.110 
3.1.5.3 Applying the Doctrine to Credit Default Swaps 
Applying insurance law to CDSs implies that some contracts might be invalid for 
lack of insurable interest. Which ones? Leaving aside the difficulties related to 
insurable interest in life (they are not relevant here), the general rule in property 
insurance is that the insured must have an “economic interest” in the property, 
which broadly means a “‘factual expectation’ of loss.”111 Similar notions are found 
in several sources, including New York insurance law: 
No contract or policy of insurance on property made or issued in this state, or made or 
issued upon any property in this state, shall be enforceable except for the benefit of some 
person having an insurable interest in the property insured. In this article, “insurable 
interest” shall include any lawful and substantial economic interest in the safety or 
preservation of property from loss, destruction or pecuniary damage.112 
United States courts have applied the doctrine liberally: “Consistent with the 
general trend to deregulate gambling and to favour freedom of contract, courts 
generally have taken a broad view of insurable interest.”113 Thus, for example, 
“Missouri courts ‘make every effort to find an insurable interest and to sustain 
                                                 
110 Perhaps a contrary argument might be advanced by relying on accounting rules, such 
as the IFRS 4, in which “the insured party must be exposed to and not speculating on the 
insured risk, and the insured event specified in the contract must pertain directly to, not 
simply be correlated with, that exposure” (Acharya et al. 2010: 276). This definition clearly 
“encompasses various credit-risk-transfer products that are structured as derivatives or other 
financial instruments. […] For example, a written credit default swap that pays off in the event 
of default on a financial asset held by the purchaser of the CDS is an insurance policy under 
this definition.” However, Acharya et al. 2010: 276 argue that “[t]he same swap would not be 
an insurance policy if the purchaser did not hold the financial asset.” Yet, even supposing that 
this conclusion is correct as a matter of IFRS interpretation, it would only determine the 
accounting treatment of those transactions, and not how they would be characterized and 
regulated in insurance law. 
111 Clarke 2007: 31 (citing Lucena v Craufurd (1806) 2 Bos & Pul (NR) 269 (HL)). 
112 New York Insurance Law, § 3401. 
113 Hazen 2005: 425. 
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coverage’.”114 In most other common law countries, the only requirement is 
factual expectation of loss, or economic interest.115 In many other countries, the 
only requirement is proof of loss at the time of claim.116 
What this would mean for CDSs is not entirely clear. On the one hand, 
insurable interest is clearly wider than the notion of covered CDS transactions (in 
which protection buyers hold the underlying debt): there are many parties who 
may have an indirect economic interest without being legal creditors.117 On the 
other hand, the protection-buyer must demonstrate this interest, and purely 
speculative positions clearly do not satisfy the interest requirement. 
This question was, interestingly enough, explicitly discussed in an expert 
hearing during an early stage of the legislative process that led to the Dodd-Frank 
Act, because section 16 of the draft bill sought to prohibit speculative CDSs, 
causing fierce criticism from ISDA.118 In response, Joseph D. Morelle of National 
Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) proposed a change precisely along 
the lines of existing insurance law principles: 
Section 16 of the draft bill makes it a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act to enter 
into a “naked” credit default swap. The language establishes that a party could not enter 
into such a contract unless it has a direct exposure to financial loss should the referenced 
credit event occur. Furthermore, it defines the term “credit default swap” as a contract 
which insures a party to the contract against the risk that an entity may experience a loss 
of value as a result of an event specified in the contract, such as a default or credit 
downgrade. 
Again, NCOIL agrees that credit default swaps are insurance […] Speaking for myself, 
however, I would respectfully suggest a broadening of the definition of clothed or covered 
swaps to include those that provide a legitimate hedge against negative credit events. In 
the domain of naked swaps, there is a critical need to delineate between those that are 
purely speculative and those in which some “stream of commerce” ties the buyer to the 
insured [8] asset. In other words, if a CDS were used for hedging rather than speculative 
purposes, we should consider that the economic utility of such transactions as more than 
                                                 
114 Dimmitt v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 92 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo. banc 2003) (citing G.M. 
Battery & Boat Co. v. LKN Corp., 747 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo. banc 1988)). 
115 See Clarke 2007: 32 (citing Hayes v Milford Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 48 NE 754 (Sup Ct, Mass, 
1898) (United States), Constitution Ins. Co. v Kosmopoulos [1987] 1 SCR 2 (Canada), and 
Insurance Contracts Act 1984, Part III (Australia)). 
116 See Clarke 2007: 32 (citing Code d’assurances (c.ass.), Art. 121–1 (France) and VVG 1908, 
Art. 55 (Germany)). 
117 Juurikkala 2012a: 328–329. 
118 See Pickel 2009: 143, stating that “section 16 makes it unlawful to enter into a credit 
default swap unless the person entering into the transaction would experience a financial loss 
upon the occurrence of a credit event. This provision would effectively eliminate the credit 
default swap business in the United States. This provision would mean that a dealer could 
not hedge its risks. Therefore, the only participants in the CDS market would be 
counterparties which each had perfectly matched risk which they had sought to hedge. The 
number of such persons is likely to be extremely small.” 
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mere speculative activity. For example, an owner or investor of Ford dealerships may 
want to hedge their exposure to a negative credit event by purchasing a credit default 
swap on Ford. 
The point of demarcation, then, is not so much one of “clothed” v. “naked” swaps, but 
rather “speculative” v. “hedged.”119 
In England, courts have traditionally taken a narrow approach, requiring that 
the insured “stand in ‘a legal or equitable relation’ to the property insured.”120 
This has been criticized,121 and applying it to CDSs would significantly reduce the 
pool of potential protection buyers, because an indirect interest would not suffice. 
More recently, however, English courts have moved towards broader definitions 
of insurable interest.122 
There is a separate question about timing, because the application of the 
insurable interest requirement traditionally differs between indemnity and non-
indemnity insurance: in indemnity contracts, insurable interest must exist at the 
moment of actual loss, whereas for non-indemnity insurance, it must exist at the 
moment of contracting.123 Applying this distinction to CDSs presents some 
difficulty insofar as there is no agreement on whether they should be 
characterized as indemnity or non-indemnity contracts. However, it will be 
argued below that CDSs are normally indemnity transactions, and requiring 
insurable interest at the moment of actual default would be consistent with the 
intended incentive implications of the insurable interest doctrine. 
3.1.5.4 Should Insurable Interest Be Abolished? 
The doctrine of insurable interest has been criticized for exaggerating the moral 
hazard concern.124 The narrow English doctrine in particular has also been 
blamed for creating inordinate legal uncertainty.125 In one country—Australia—
                                                 
119 Ibid. 149. 
120 Clarke 2007: 31 (citing Macaura v Northern Assurance Co. [1925] AC 619. See also English 
and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: paras 5.12–5.15 (describing the early development of the 
doctrine); Benjamin 2007: para. 4.24 (“There is authority that a mere economic exposure is not 
sufficient […] There must also be a sufficient legal connection between the policyholder and 
the insured risk.”). 
121 Clarke 2007: 31–32. 
122 See English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: paras 5.16–5.19 (discussing Lord 
Justice Waller’s analysis in Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada [2003] EWCA Civ 885). 
123 Clarke 2007: 27. This distinction follows from the incentive issues inherent in indemnity 
and non-indemnity insurance. 
124 See Hazen 2005: 422–424 (arguing that the moral hazard or deterrence rationale for 
insurable interest is questionable). 
125 See Clarke 2007: 36–38 (arguing that “the impact of moral hazard can be overrated” and 
that the English doctrine is uncertain). See also English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: 
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the doctrine has been abolished in relation to non-life insurance in 1984 and life 
insurance in 1995.126 Abolition or reform has been debated elsewhere, but “few 
other countries have dared to be as bold as Australia.”127 
For the CDS market, the Australian approach means that uncovered CDSs are 
permitted even if they are recharacterized as insurance. However, the protection 
seller would still have to be an authorized insurer. Given the confusion about the 
role of insurable interest in defining insurance, the abolition might also make it 
easier to recharacterize CDSs as insurance.128 
Should the doctrine be abolished, then, either generally or for CDSs only? In 
the current law, legal uncertainty is a problem: even a liberal application must 
draw the line somewhere, but it cannot be done very precisely.129 As to the English 
doctrine, it should be noted that the insurance market has developed novel 
constructions such as “consequential loss (or business interruption) insurance” 
that have avoided the difficulties with an overly strict application of insurable 
interest in life insurance.130 This approach could be followed if CDSs were 
recharacterized as insurance. 
Moral hazard is a tougher question: the jury is still out on whether default-
betting using CDSs is socially desirable.131 It has been suggested that the generic 
“requirement of fortuitousness” in insurance law could be sufficient to rule out 
intentionally caused damages.132 However, that is not a workable solution with 
CDSs, because in this context, it is practically impossible to prove intentional 
causation. 
                                                 
paras 3.64–3.68 (noting significant uncertainties in the application of the insurable interest 
requirement to non-life, non-indemnity insurance). 
126 Sections 16 and 18 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984, and the Life Insurance 
(Consequential Amendments and Repeals) Act 1995; discussed in English and Scottish Law 
Commissions 2008: paras A.2–A.12 and A.28. 
127 English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: para. 7.39. 
128 The English and Scottish Law Commissions felt that it would be especially difficult to 
distinguish credit derivatives from insurance if the doctrine of insurable interest were 
abolished: English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: paras 3.68, 7.9, 7.14, 7.15, 8.25. 
129 See Juurikkala 2012a: 328–330 (discussing different approaches). 
130 Clarke 2007: 30. 
131 See Juurikkala 2012a: 325–328 (discussing empirical evidence). 
132 Hazen 2005: 423. 
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3.1.6 Loss Indemnification 
3.1.6.1 Does CDS Payment Require Actual Loss? 
A closely related source of confusion is the notion of loss indemnity. Several 
different issues can be distinguished here, one of which the factual question 
whether CDS payment requires actual loss. At least since the Potts opinion, a 
frequent argument of the anti-insurance view of CDSs has been that payments in 
these contracts are not conditional on an actual loss and therefore they are not 
insurance. 
This claim, however, does not really fit the facts; even a quick review of the 
literature reveals that commentators (many of them advocates of the anti-
insurance view) routinely describe CDS payments in terms such as actual loss, 
incurred loss, or compensation.133 Jonathan Macey notes that usually precisely 
“an actual loss of principal will result in payment”.134 Even ISDA writes to this 
effect: “If the reference entity defaults or declares bankruptcy or another credit 
event occurs, the protection seller is obligated to compensate the protection buyer for 
the loss by means of a specified settlement procedure.”135 It therefore seems to be 
a plain error of fact to claim that no actual loss is required in CDSs. 
3.1.6.2 Are CDSs Indemnity or Non-Indemnity Contracts? 
In law, the matter can be analyzed in more detail by asking whether CDSs are 
structured as indemnity or non-indemnity transactions. The difference between 
indemnity and non-indemnity (also called contingency) insurance refers to the 
way in which compensation is calculated: in indemnity insurance, payment is 
made according to “actual measurable loss”, whereas in non-indemnity insurance 
it is “a pre-determined sum”.136 The differentiation is determined by contract 
terms. Non-indemnity contracts are common in life and personal accident 
insurance, because in these cases is difficult to translate actual harm into 
                                                 
133 For example, Shadab 2012: 1034 writes: “If a credit event occurs, the party making the 
periodic payments (the risk seller) is entitled to receive a cash payment in an amount equal to 
the loss incurred due to the credit event, such as the diminished market value of the reference 
debt obligation” (emphasis added). See likewise Mugasha 2004: 215 (“The protection seller 
agrees, in exchange for the payment of a fee, to make a ‘compensatory’ payment if a credit 
event occurs.”); Chander and Costa 2010: 643 (“the seller commits to make the buyer whole on 
the notional value of the amount protected in the event of a credit event within that term.” 
Emphasis added.). 
134 Macey 2012: 598.  
135 ISDA 2014a (emphasis added). 
136 Clarke 2007: 27. 
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monetary terms, so a pre-determined compensation reduces costs and 
uncertainty.137 
Which type is a CDS? To some, it seems like non-indemnity insurance, because 
the payment amount is calculated without reference to personal loss.138 But this is 
inaccurate: the legal distinction is not based on the requirement of personal loss, 
but on whether compensation is determined ex ante or ex post; and CDS payments 
are calculated after the event, according to the loss of value of the reference 
obligations, not according to a pre-determined lump-sum amount.139 
It is true that CDSs make no reference to personal loss by the protection buyer, 
but they do require objective proof of loss, and the compensation amount 
depends on the loss of value of the reference assets. This is the case in both 
physical and cash settlement procedures: physical settlement implicitly provides 
full compensation, whereas cash settlement is based on an approximation of the 
loss of value.140 Therefore CDSs function like any indemnity transaction, and 
differ essentially from non-indemnity insurance.141 
A different interpretation has been proposed by Saunders, who claims that 
covered CDSs, which “are designed to indemnify the protection buyer against loss 
suffered due to default […] for example a bank entering a CDS to protect against 
borrower default […] are in essence a form of indemnity insurance.”142 In contrast, 
uncovered CDSs would be contingency transactions.143 But this analysis confuses 
two different questions: the distinction between covered and uncovered 
transactions refers to the risk position of the protection buyer, which depends on 
extra-contractual factors and is relevant for determining whether the purchaser 
has insurable interest; the distinction between indemnity and contingency 
insurance refers to the calculation of the payment amount, and depends on contract 
terms. Even covered CDSs are non-indemnity transactions if the payment amount 
is pre-determined rather than calculated after the fact; similarly, uncovered CDSs 
are indemnity transactions if the payment amount is calculated by reference to a 
loss of value. Therefore Saunders’ proposal must be rejected. 
                                                 
137 Ibid. 
138 See English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: para. 7.9 (“In essence they [credit 
derivatives] “fulfil many of the common law definitions of non-indemnity insurance.”). 
Unfortunately the reasons for that view are not elaborated. 
139 On the level of principle, there is agreement: Ibid. para. 7.14 (“non-indemnity contracts 
[…] pay a lump sum regardless of the amount […] that is lost.”). 
140 See Ayadi and Behr 2009: 184–185 (describing the payment determination in physical 
and cash settlement). 
141 See Medical Defence Union, at 422 (noting that in indemnity insurance, “the measure of 
the loss is the measure of the payment”, whereas in contingency insurance, “[t]he sum to be 
paid is not measured by the loss but is stated in the policy.”). 
142 Saunders 2010: 435. 
143 Ibid. 
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3.1.6.3 Non-Indemnity Insurance in Property 
There remains a third issue, which is whether it matters whether CDSs are 
characterized as indemnity or non-indemnity transactions. There seem to be 
certain practical implications, but they are not fundamental.144 There is confusion 
here, too, as some commentators have supposed that if CDSs are non-indemnity 
transactions, they cannot be recharacterized as insurance.145 
This is incorrect, because non-indemnity insurance is a recognized category of 
non-life insurance, too.146 In addition to personal accident insurance, there are 
non-indemnity contracts in property insurance, such as “insurance policies on 
land, buildings, ships, goods and merchandise” paying “a fixed sum on the 
destruction of these items”.147 These policies “do not require the policyholder to 
have suffered a loss.”148  
3.1.6.4 Deliberate Damage and the Indemnity Principle 
As an aside, insurance law principles might provide a solution to the empty credit 
problem. If CDSs are classified as indemnity insurance, they are subject to the 
indemnity principle, which is that the protection buyers can only recover what they 
have lost.149 This has important policy implications. As mentioned earlier, many 
observers have expressed concern that CDSs may distort incentives, because 
investors may over-protect their portfolio using CDSs and consequently “have an 
incentive to push debtors into default and even outright bankruptcy.”150 
This concern is not automatically resolved by the insurable interest 
requirement, because in these cases CDS holders have an economic interest: the 
perverse incentives are due to over-insurance. In contrast, the indemnity principle 
could be invoked to limit compensation beyond actual loss.151 However, the 
question arises whether it might be difficult to apply this to cash-settled CDSs, 
because their compensation is paid without delivery of the reference assets. In 
principle, this might be resolved by requiring physical settlement. 
                                                 
144 For example, the timing of the insurable interest requirement is different: see Clarke 
2007: 27. 
145 Saunders 2010: 435. (“As there is not generally recognised category of contingency 
insurance, and these types of CDS are not contracts of life insurance, they escape regulation 
as insurance products.”). 
146 See English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: paras 1.17, 3.64–3.68, 7.42 (discussing 
non-life, non-indemnity insurance). 
147 Ibid. para. 7.42. 
148 Ibid. para. 7.14. 
149 English and Scottish Law Commissions 2008: paras 5.4–5.10. 
150 Triana and Subrahmanyam 2012.  
151 See Clarke 2007: 219–220 (discussing recoverable loss and finding that “a contract of 
indemnity cannot […] promise policyholders more than their actual loss”). 
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If CDSs are deemed non-indemnity transactions, protection buyers may get 
more than actual loss.152 However, in some cases courts have invoked the 
insurable interest principle to limit compensation: “if the interest of the insured 
is less than the whole of the property, ‘[the insured’s] right is limited, not by the 
value of the property, but by the value of [the insured’s] interest.”153 But this does 
not seem to be an absolute or universal rule,154 and its application to CDSs needs 
elaboration. 
There is also a third possibility, name the rule against voluntary destruction.155 
This rule might in principle be applied to damaging shareholder activity. 
However, raising such a claim would imply major evidential difficulties. 
3.1.7 Substantive Arguments: Is There a Regulatory Motive? 
Perhaps the best argument against recharacterizing CDSs as insurance is that 
insurance law should not apply for practical or policy reasons. The policy 
question will be examined later in much more detail, but let us briefly address the 
issue here also, because critics of insurance law have advanced practical motives 
as reasons to oppose the recharacterization of CDSs. 
For example, it has been claimed that CDSs should not be subject to insurance 
law, because the “fundamental objectives of many CDS transactions set them 
apart from garden-variety insurance contracts”.156 However, the fundamental 
objective of covered CDSs is precisely an insurance objective.157 And the rest 
(uncovered CDSs) are speculative bets on borrower default, which raise 
important policy concerns similar to those that historically gave rise to the 
insurable interest requirement. 
According to another argument, the parties to CDSs are such that regulation 
is not needed: “virtually 100% of both the protection buyers and sellers are 
institutional investors, with the public having no exposure, or virtually none, to 
                                                 
152 Clarke 2007: 220 (stating that policyholders may get more than actual loss “in the case 
of the ‘valued policy’, where […] the policy fixes an agreed value”). 
153 Ann Burns v. California Fair Plan, 152 Cal. App. 4th 646, 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (citing 
Davis v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 111 Cal. 409, 415 (Cal. 1896)). 
154 See Delk v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 81 P.3d 629, 639 (Okla. 2003) (finding that the insured 
could recover more than the value of its interest, because under Oklahoma Statutes, title 36, § 
3605 (2001), “‘the measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which in insured 
might be damnified by the loss’ [and] indemnification is measured by the extent to which the 
insured has been economically impacted.”) 
155 See Clarke 2007: 255 (“generally, loss or damage inflicted deliberately by policyholders 
themselves is not [insurable]”). 
156 Schwartz 2007: 182. 
157 This is acknowledged even by Henderson 2009a: 4. 
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these contracts.”158 But the second part of this claim is manifestly untrue. In the 
words of Frank Partnoy: “The current crisis is proof that although most people 
do not trade derivatives, everyone is subject to their risks.”159 For one thing, the 
public has an interest in the stability of the financial system, which recent 
experience shows can be fundamentally devastated by sizable CDS contracts sold 
without sufficient loss reserves.160 For another, uncovered CDSs enable investors 
to take directional bets that otherwise would be prohibited and that can have an 
adverse effect on borrowing costs. 
A third argument is that CDSs have become so commonly treated as 
unregulated derivatives that it would be destabilizing for financial markets to 
recharacterize them. However, recharacterization could be accomplished without 
disrupting markets by legislative reform that includes a convenient transition 
period. 
A fourth argument is that insurance law would impose unnecessary costs 
without solving problems.161 That calls for further investigation, but for the time 
being, it is important to avoid exaggerations. For example, Todd Henderson seeks 
to undermine insurance regulation by declaring that “[c]redit derivatives help 
complete these [loan] markets by allowing the bank to offload the risk to investors 
who can more efficiently bear it”162; in reality, the risks are often sold to investors 
who are simply more lightly regulated, such as unregulated hedge funds.163 
Moreover, the suitability of insurance regulation could be improved by creating 
a targeted regulatory regime for CDSs.164 
                                                 
158 Nirenberg and Hoffman 2001: 15. See also Schwartz 2007: 182 (supporting this 
argument); Henderson 2009a: 45–46 (arguing that, with CDSs, there is no need for consumer 
protection). 
159 Partnoy 2009. 
160 See for example Saunders 2010: 445–447 (presenting reasons why CDSs create systemic 
risks). 
161 See Henderson 2009a: 46–55 (arguing to this effect). 
162 Ibid. 29. 
163 See Wynkoop 2008: 3105–3107 (explaining how hedge funds are involved in credit 
derivatives and create systemic risks). 
164 For example, see Saunders 2010: 441–442 (proposing CDS issuers be subject to 
prudential regulation, without subjecting CDSs to the regulation of insurance contracts 
generally). 
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3.2 THE EVOLVING POSITION OF UNITED STATES 
INSURANCE REGULATORS 
Insurance regulation in the United States is principally determined at state 
level.165 The discussion of US state insurance regulators has been proposed until 
now, because it has been far from consistent, having evolved over time from 
timidity in 2000 to a growing assertiveness after the financial crisis. This evolution 
also reveals the complex interplay of legal, financial and political forces at state 
and federal levels, as will be seen in what follows. 
3.2.1 The New York Opinion of 2000 
The question of credit derivatives was first touched upon by United States 
insurance regulators in 2000 when, responding to an inquiry from the banking 
industry, the General Counsel of the New York State Insurance Department 
(NYSID) took the opinion that credit default options are not insurance contracts if 
the contractual payment is not dependent upon the protection buyer’s having 
suffered a loss: “Indemnification of loss is an essential indicia of an insurance 
contract which courts have relied upon in the analysis of whether a particular 
agreement is an insurance contract under New York law. Absent such a 
contractual provision the instrument is not an insurance contract.”166 
Strictly speaking, the opinion was non-binding.167 Moreover, it did not 
necessarily reflect the thinking of other insurance regulators, and its 
generalizability was open to doubt.168 Nevertheless, it was heavily relied upon—
particularly as New York is one of the leading centres of CDS trade—and, as a 
matter of fact, New York insurance regulators did not interfere with the CDS 
market until 2008. Moreover, NYSID published in 2000 an essentially similar non-
                                                 
165 Based on the McCarran Ferguson Act of 1945, which has been criticized: see Macey and 
Miller 1993. 
166 General Counsel, New York State Insurance Department (NYSID), Re: Credit Default 
Option Facility, (unnumbered), June 16, 2000; cited in Kimball-Stanley 2008: 247. See also 
Campbell and Choi 2009: 20 (discussing the opinion and summarizing it as follows: “a CDS 
transaction is not an insurance contract where: (i) the reference obligation is a portfolio of 
corporate bonds; (ii) the Seller will make payment to the Buyer upon the happening of a 
negative credit event including bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation acceleration or 
restructuring; and (iii) such payment is not dependent upon the Buyer’s having suffered a 
loss”). 
167 Yeres 2007: 561–562 (“In 2000, the New York Insurance Department released a non-
binding opinion stating that derivatives that do not require a party to sustain actual losses are 
not insurance contracts.”). 
168 Bloink 2011: 618 (“The NYSID's first major action with respect to CDSs was to issue a 
private opinion letter excluding some CDSs from regulation as insurance contracts.”). See also 
Campbell and Choi 2009: 20 (providing details). 
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binding opinion on weather derivatives, so their position seemed to be clear and 
consistent.169 
3.2.2 The 2003 White Paper on Weather Derivatives 
The first signs that the opinion of NYSID General Counsel might not be shared 
by all appeared in 2003, when the United States National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) drafted a White Paper inquiry into weather derivatives.170 
The draft, entitled Weather Financial Instruments (Temperature): Insurance or Capital 
Markets Products?, took the view that weather derivatives 
appear to be disguised as “non-insurance” products to avoid being classified and 
regulated as insurance products. In fact, there is evidence that the promoters of these 
products go to great lengths to be sure that the energy companies involved do not use 
terms that naturally describe what is taking place—namely the transfer of risk from a 
business to another professional risk taker.171 
The draft White Paper thus argued that weather derivatives are insurance 
contracts and should so be regulated. Although it only covered weather 
derivatives, it has been noted that the position and reasoning of NAIC would 
have been “equally applicable to credit derivatives”.172 The derivatives industry 
was extremely worried about the White Paper, and commenced an intense 
lobbying effort headed by ISDA.173 It argued that the “Draft White Paper’s logic 
could extent to a broad array of derivatives and would create substantial and 
disruptive regulatory uncertainty.”174 Soon after, NAIC not only shelved the 
regulatory plans but also withdrew the White Paper from publication.175 
                                                 
169 General Counsel, New York State Insurance Department (NYSID), Re: Weather Financial 
Instruments (derivatives, hedges, etc.), Opinion No. 00-02-05, February 15, 2000, available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2000/rg000205.htm (“Neither the amount of the 
payment nor the trigger itself in the weather derivative bears a relationship to the purchaser’s 
loss. Absent such obligations, the instrument is not an insurance contract. However, it should 
be noted that there may be unique circumstances, not mentioned here, where the character of 
the specific financial instrument and/or the interest and obligations of the parties are such that 
the transaction would be an insurance contract.”). 
170 See Ali and de Vries Robbé 2005: 180–181; Kimball-Stanley 2008: 250. 
171 NAIC 2003, cited in Kimball-Stanley 2008: 250. 
172 Ali and de Vries Robbé 2005: 180. 
173 See Cohn 2004 (explaining that “ISDA is extremely concerned” about the draft white 
paper); Pickel 2004 (arguing that weather derivatives are not insurance). 
174 Pickel 2004: 2. 
175 ISDA 2004 (publicizing the success of the lobbying effort); Ali and de Vries Robbé 2005: 
180–181; Kimball-Stanley 2008: 250. 
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3.2.3 A Reconsideration: The Financial Crisis of 2008–09 
3.2.3.1 New York Insurance Regulators 
New interest in the matter was generated by the financial crisis. In September 
2008, New York Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo wrote a Circular Letter, 
essentially reversing the position of the NYSID: “the making of the CDS itself may 
constitute ‘the doing of an insurance business’ within the meaning of Insurance 
Law § 1101, [in which case] the protection seller should be licensed as an 
insurer”.176 
Dinallo’s argument was not entirely clear at this stage. Trying to avoid 
overruling the 2000 non-binding opinion, the Circular Letter reasoned that the 
opinion “did not grapple with whether […] a CDS is an insurance contract when 
it is purchased by a party who, at the time at which the agreement is entered into, 
holds, or reasonably expects to hold, a ‘material interest’ in the referenced 
obligation.”177 In a testimony before a Senate Committee, Dinallo also argued that 
the 2000 opinion had been given in response to “a very carefully crafted question” 
that did not cover the CDS market as a whole.178 Dinallo’s view was that covered 
CDSs were insurance contracts, but “naked” (uncovered) CDSs were not.179 Yet, 
as we have seen, this does not correspond to the conventional understanding of 
the insurable interest doctrine, according to which insurable interest is not a 
demarcating factor, but a requirement of validity. 
On the same day that the Circular Letter was published, New York Governor 
David A. Paterson announced that the state of New York would begin to regulate 
CDSs as insurance as of January 1, 2009.180 In a New York Times interview, 
Paterson called credit default swaps “gambling” and added that they were at the 
heart of the AIG fiasco.181 This caused a barrage of criticism from the financial 
                                                 
176 Dinallo 2008a: 7. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Dinallo 2008c: 5. The exact question was: “Does a credit default swap transaction, 
wherein the seller will make payment to the buyer upon the happening of a negative credit 
event and such payment is not dependent upon the buyer having suffered a loss, constitute a 
contract of insurance under the insurance law?” 
179 Ibid. 3 (”We believe that the first type of swap, let’s call it the covered or “sartorial” 
swap, is insurance.”). See also Dinallo 2008b: 5 (“Clearly, the question was framed to ask only 
about naked credit default swaps. Under the facts we were given, the swap was not insurance, 
because the buyer had no material interest and the filing of claim does not require a loss. But 
the entities involved were careful not to ask about covered credit default swaps. Nonetheless, 
the market took the Department’s opinion on a subset of credit default swaps as a ruling on 
all swaps.”). 
180 Hakim 2008. 
181 Ibid. (“When we peeled back the onion, we found out that A.I.G. had so many credit-
default swaps that we couldn’t calculate how much money they probably had wasted”). 
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lobby and its legal representatives, with one structured finance and derivatives 
partner stating: “Let’s hope this ill-considered proposal can be promptly 
squelched, allowing the Insurance Department to go back to regulating 
something it understands—insurance.”182 
The question, however, was not whether insurance supervisors understood 
derivatives, but whether CDSs were insurance—something that the supervisors 
presumably did understand. It turned out that state insurance legislators were 
increasingly prepared to answer the question in the affirmative.183 Thus Joseph D. 
Morelle, Chairman of the Financial Services and Investment Products Committee 
of the National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL), stated in February 
2009: “1) credit default swaps are a species of insurance; 2) naked swaps are more akin 
to gaming than insurance since they lack ‘insurable interest’; and 3) [...] the states 
are best suited to regulate this type of financial guaranty.”184 
3.2.3.2 Legislative Plans to Regulate CDSs as Insurance 
The banking industry wasted no time: criticism and lobbying must have been 
intense, given that already in November 2008 Superintendent Dinallo suddenly 
announced that “New York will delay indefinitely its application of New York 
Insurance Law to CDS” in anticipation of federal regulation.185 That seems to have 
been the last intervention of the NYSID in the matter. 
The insurance movement was not so easily thwarted, because, in the words of 
Joseph Morelle, there was a “rising conviction on the part of many observers that 
credit default swaps constitute a species of insurance, and should be regulated as 
such.”186 Therefore, steps were taken in 2009 by the National Conference of 
Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) to prepare legislation that would regulate covered 
CDSs—defined as those whose buyers have a material interest in the reference 
entity—as credit default insurance, and its providers would be subject to regulation 
by state insurance regulators as credit default insurance corporations; moreover, 
naked CDSs would be banned entirely.187 
                                                 
182 Glass 2008: 5. See also Kramer, Harris and Ansehl 2009: 23 (”The NYID’s claim of 
regulatory jurisdiction over covered CDSs was met with substantial skepticism and intense 
criticism.”). 
183 See Morelle 2009: 3 (describing the movement to regulate CDSs as insurance). 
184 Ibid. 4 (emphasis added). He added: “What is a credit default swap? Simply put, a 
credit default swap is a financial guaranty against a negative credit event. A negative credit 
event triggering a credit default swap payment certainly meets the definition of a ‘fortuitous’ 
event, one occurring by chance, under New York statute [New York Insurance Law, § 1101].” 
185 Dinallo 2008a. See also Bloink 2011: 619 (noting that the plan was dropped under 
pressure from the banking industry). 
186 Morelle 2009: 3. 
187 NCOIL 2009a (draft model legislation), 2009b (press release). See also Davis Polk & 
Wardwell 2009: 3 (providing an overview of the draft model legislation). 
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The NCOIL “Model Bill” was largely based on New York insurance laws 
regulating financial guaranty insurance, so that it “in most places simply 
substitutes the phrase, ‘credit default insurance’ for ‘financial guaranty 
insurance.’”188 The notion of “credit default insurance” was defined broadly,189 
and was potentially extensible to “substantially similar” transactions.190 There 
was debate on whether the notion of “material interest”191 should be defined more 
precisely, but this was rejected, just like the proposal to use the term “insurable 
interest” instead.192 
In the Model Bill, the capital requirements of credit default insurers were 
similar to those of financial guaranty insurers in New York law.193 There were 
likewise, among other things, rules on contingency, loss and unearned premium 
reserves,194 aggregate risk limits,195 and single risk limits.196 Moreover, licensed 
credit default insurers were only be allowed to transact—in addition to credit 
default insurance—residual value insurance, surety insurance, credit insurance, 
and financial guaranty insurance.197 
Although the NYSID had in November 2008 decided not to apply insurance 
law to CDSs, state legislators were determined to go ahead, so that in April 2010, 
New York State introduced a bill seeking to explicitly regulate CDSs as financial 
guaranty products under New York Insurance Law, and ban naked CDSs.198 The 
bill was essentially similar to the NCOIL Model Bill, except that it excluded 
certain types of insurance, such as traditional credit insurance, from the definition 
of credit default insurance and mortgage guaranty insurance, which are already 
subject to separate regulation.199 
                                                 
188 Davis Polk & Wardwell 2009: 2. 
189 NCOIL 2009a: § 1(a)(1). 
190 NCOIL 2009a: § 1(a)(2). 
191 See NCOIL 2009a: § 4(b)(1). 
192 Davis Polk & Wardwell 2009: 4. 
193 Ibid. 4.  
194 NCOIL 2009a: § 3. 
195 NCOIL 2009a: § 4(c). 
196 NCOIL 2009a: § 4(d). 
197 NCOIL 2009a: § 2(a)(1). See also Davis Polk & Wardwell 2009: 4–5 (discussing 
establishment as separate business). 
198 N.Y. Assem. A10783, 233rd Sess. (N.Y. 2010). See Sidley Austin 2010. 
199 Sidley Austin 2010: 1. Apart from those exclusions, the definition for credit default 
insurance in the New York Bill is broad: ““a surety bond or other contract, and any guarantee 
which is payable upon occurrence of financial loss, as a result of the failure of any obligor on 
or issuer of any debt instrument or other monetary obligation to pay when due to be paid by 
the obligor or scheduled at the time insured to be received by the holder of the obligation, 
principal, interest, premium, dividend, or purchase price of or on, or other amounts due or 
payable with respect to, such instrument or obligation, when such failure is the result of a 
financial default or insolvency, or other credit event, or provided that such payment source is 
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3.2.4 Counterattack: Federal Pre-emption 
The reaction of the banking lobby was—to say the least—critical.200 ISDA and the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) argued that CDSs 
provide useful functions,201 and claimed that “applying the capital regimes, 
concentration limits and the other specific requirements borrowed from the New 
York financial guaranty insurance law would create regulatory ambiguity and 
inconsistency with respect to other state and federal regulatory regimes,” and that 
it “might have unintended consequences such as applying to financial 
instruments or transactions that were not meant to be captured.”202 They also 
threatened that the proposed regulations “might cause financial institutions to 
move their CDS businesses out of state or offshore. These consequences are likely 
and they would harm local economies.”203 
Indeed, one of the weaknesses of the plans to regulate CDSs as insurance was 
the fact that insurance in the United States is regulated at state level. This implied 
uncertainty regarding jurisdictional reach, as it was unclear on what basis state 
regulators would enforce the proposed legislation: one option is to enforce it 
“based on the location of the credit default insurer or the situs of the credit default 
insurance contract,” but this “might lead to the relocation of CDS businesses to 
non-adopting states or offshore.”204 However, transaction location could 
alternatively be defined according to the location of the CDS buyer, in which case 
the legislation would be more powerful.205 
There was another problem, which definitively destroyed the plans of state 
legislators: federal pre-emption.206 Already before the passage of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, some argued that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the 
principal federal banking regulator, “could seek to preempt the Model Bill […] 
by arguing that credit derivatives are authorized banking products under its 
regulatory jurisdiction.”207 
But more importantly, it became increasingly clear that the Obama 
administration was determined to pass federal regulation of CDSs as derivatives 
                                                 
investment grade, any other failure to make payment, regardless of whether such obligation 
is incurred directly or as guarantor by or on behalf of another obligor that has also defaulted.” 
(See ibid.)  
200 See Strupp and Darras 2009. 
201 Ibid. 1–2. 
202 Ibid. 1. It is not clear why the NCOIL Model Bill definitions would have applied too 
broadly; in reality it would have removed the regulatory inconsistency currently existing 
between financial guaranty insurance and CDSs. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Davis Polk & Wardwell 2009: 5. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid. 6. 
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and pre-empt their regulation as insurance.208 There were some Senators who 
tried to get an insurable interest requirement into the Dodd-Frank Act itself, but 
this was rejected.209 
3.3 CDS AND INSURANCE LAW IN FINLAND 
With respect to the status of credit default swaps in terms of Finnish insurance 
law, I will mainly focus on the studies of Miki Kuusinen and Lauri Ahokallio, 
which are both excellent but merit some further comments.210 Kuusinen, who 
provides only a brief discussion of this question, seems to have a mixed opinion. 
On the one hand he thinks that CDSs are essentially like insurance, at least when 
the protection buyer retains ownership of the reference assets.211 On the other 
hand, he outlines the argument—treating it as working against the insurance 
characterization—that compensation under CDSs is usually not strictly 
dependent on actual loss: 
luottoriskisuojan myyjän ehdollinen sitoumus ei yleensä ole sidottu todelliseen 
vahinkotapahtumaan ja siitä aiheutuneeseen taloudelliseen vahinkoon vaan 
luottoriskisuojan ostaja saa ennalta sovitun ja usein kiinteämääräisen korvauksen, jota 
voisi verrata vaikkapa sopimussakkoon.212 
We have already seen that this is not quite precise, because practically all CDSs 
are objectively linked to the actual loss of reference asset value. Moreover, contrary 
to what Kuusinen writes, the amount of compensation is not pre-agreed and 
fixed, it is calculated according to the post-default asset value.213 In any event, 
Kuusinen himself goes on to note that this argument may fail because, in Finnish 
insurance law, the notion of actual loss is only the general rule, not a necessary 
condition of insurance: 
vakuutuskorvauksen saaminen pääsääntöisesti edellyttää todellisen vahingon 
ilmenemistä ja siitä aiheutunutta vahinkoa. Toisaalta voidaanpa todeta, että 
vakuustustapahtuman ei aina tarvitse olla vahinko tai edes muu epämiellyttävä sattumus. 
Oleellista lienee, että se on epävarmasti tulevaisuudessa ilmenevä.214 
                                                 
208 Ibid. 
209 See Orol 2010 (discussing the Senate's rejection of Senator Dorgan's amendment, which 
would have imposed an insurable interest requirement under the Act). 
210 See Kuusinen 2005: 57–61; Ahokallio 2011: 88–110. 
211 Kuusinen 2005: 59–60. 
212 Ibid. 59. 
213 See further below, chapter 3.1.6.1. 
214 Ibid. 59, citing Häyhä 1996: 77. In any case, it will be argued later that CDS 
compensation always requires actual loss, so the issue is not only legal but also factual. 
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Ahokallio provides a more extensive analysis of the question, and of special 
interest is his attempt to compare CDSs and insurance based on six characteristic 
features of insurance.215 This merits more detailed analysis. 
3.3.1 Yleiset tunnusmerkit: Demarcation or Common 
Characteristics? 
This list of common characteristics (yleiset tunnusmerkit) is based on legal 
scholarship, as Finnish insurance law (like insurance law in many other countries) 
does not offer a definition of insurance.216 In brief: 
Rantala ja Pentikäinen määrittelevät vakuutuksen keskeisimmiksi ominaisuuksiksi: (1) 
riskin sattumanvaraisuuden, (2) vakuutusmaksun ja riskin vastaavuuden, (3) 
vakuutuksenantajan riskin tasauksen suuren joukon kesken, (4) vakuutuksenantajan 
erillisyyden vakuutuksenottajasta, (5) itse riskin vakuuttamiskelpoisuuden sekä (6) 
vahingonmahdollisuuden.217 
Ahokallio correctly notes, however, that the list of common characteristics has 
its limits for the purpose of demarcating insurance law, because it is based on 
existing insurance contracts and has evolved over time—at least partly in reaction 
to practical problems presented by those contracts—so that one may ask whether 
some of the characteristics are more fundamental than others for delineation 
purposes.218 For example, the sixth characteristic has been interpreted by some 
commentators as a policy limitation on insurance agreements—motivated by 
moral hazard concerns—instead of a demarcating factor.219 
Indeed, my understanding is that the list of common characteristics, produced 
by Rantala and Pentikäinen, is not even intended to be an attempt to resolve the 
demarcation problem; for example, the third item in the list (risk pooling or 
diversification) is precisely a common characteristic due to the ordinary economic 
logic of insurance, but it does not follow that a “rogue insurer” selling isolated 
insurance contracts without properly diversifying or taking prudent measures 
can escape insurance law by claiming to sell non-insurance; indeed, there are 
cases showing that even a single agreement may be characterized as insurance, 
regardless of whether the protection seller was otherwise involved in insurance. 
The same could be said about the second criterion, i.e. the relationship 
between insurance premiums and risk. There will normally be a logical 
relationship, but an insurer that underprices its products is merely doing badly 
(or perhaps seeking to benefit from the externalization of the risk of failure). This 
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218 Ibid 96 n.309. 
219 Ibid. 107 n.365. 
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critique could be extended to Ahokallio’s argument that CDS premiums are not 
always based on credit default risk alone, potentially implying that in those cases 
CDSs differ from insurance.220 Such an argument seems to assume that the 
theoretically correct price of CDS premiums can be calculated with precision, 
when in reality there is substantial uncertainty in the relevant pricing models. 
Moreover, Ahokallio notes that there are other factors that influence CDS 
premiums—including counterparty default risk and liquidity risk—but 
somehow he seems to assume that they are not relevant for correctly pricing 
individual CDS contracts.221 Of course, one may also argue that CDS prices tend 
to be inefficient, but even then it does not follow that the premiums are unrelated 
to default risk. 
3.3.2 Rikastumiskielto: Scope and Application 
Perhaps the most interesting questions concern the last factor, which Ahokallio 
identifies with the principle of loss indemnity, which limits compensation to 
actual loss (in Finnish, the principle is literally called rikastumiskielto or 
“prohibition of enrichment”), and with the closely-related principle of insurable 
interest (vakuutuksellinen intressi).222 As we have seen, this is the central issue in 
English and United States discussions on the insurance character of CDSs. 
Ahokallio notes that the theme is complicated and requires further research on 
the exact meaning and current standing of the indemnity principle in Finnish 
law.223 Accepting that caveat, some comments are in order regarding his 
preliminary analysis, especially given that the question has received so little 
attention in Finnish scholarship. 
The first and most fundamental question is whether rikastumiskielto is a 
demarcating factor of insurance, or a legal restriction imposed by insurance law. 
At one point of the analysis, Ahokallio seems to opt for the latter view: 
Sinällään nimittäin ylivakuuttaminen on luvallista vakuutuksissa, kuten on edellä 
todettu, jolloin rikastumiskiellolla voidaan katsoa pelkästään rajoitettavan vakuutetun 
oikeutta saada korvauksia vakuutuksen perusteella. Tällöin vakuutettu on tosin 
maksanut liikaa vakuutuspreemioiden muodossa, mikä ei kuitenkaan tee vakuutetun 
tekemää sopimusta pätemättömäksi per se, eikä missään nimessä joksikin muuksi kuin 
vakuutussopimukseksi. Vakuutussopimuksen voi nimittäin katsoa olevan oikeustoimi, 
joka luo tietyn tunnusmerkistön, johon oikeusjärjestys liittää oikeusvaikutuksia.224 
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221 See ibid. 98 n.319. 
222 Ibid. 102–103. 
223 Ibid. 108. See also ibid. 105 n.353, citing Norio-Timonen 2008: 1187–1188 to the effect 
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On the other hand, he later seems to treat rikastumiskielto as a demarcating 
factor, suggesting that uncovered CDSs are probably not insurance at all.225 In my 
view, this would be incorrect, and that the matter is even plainer in Finnish law 
than in English law: rikastumiskielto—literally, prohibition of enrichment—is 
intended to function as a restriction imposed by law for policy purposes, and this 
function would be entirely lost if in over-insurance cases the contract would be 
automatically recharacterized as a non-insurance contract into which the 
prohibition of enrichment would not apply. 
Another question concerns the application of rikastumiskielto insofar as it is still 
a binding norm in Finnish insurance law. I wish to make two clarifications to 
Ahokallio’s analysis. One is that the relevant distinction is not between covered 
and uncovered CDSs (where covered means that the protection buyer holds the 
underlying reference debt),226 but between positions that have an economic 
exposure to the underlying debt. A protection buyer may be economically exposed 
to the default of the reference entity even without holding the reference debt of 
the CDS (for example due to close business ties and subsequent trade debt). In 
such situations, the principle of rikastumiskielto is probably not an obstacle to 
claiming the compensation, even if the actual losses of the protection buyer might 
not exactly mirror the CDS payments. 
The second clarification concerns the relevant calculations. Ahokallio notes 
that the general rule in Finnish rikastumiskielto is that overcompensation will be 
considered significant if it exceeds actual loss by more than 20%, so that over-
insurance would be permitted up to that level.227 The author then seems to 
interpret this as meaning that uncovered CDS holders (who presumably have no 
economic exposure to the risk) could be paid up to a 20% default on the 
underlying credit.228 This seems improbable, because if a CDS buyer is not 
exposed to any economic loss at all, then any compensation would be significant 
over-insurance (mathematically approaching infinity). The correct way of 
applying the principle seems to be that if a CDS protection buyer has an indirect 
exposure to the reference entity, he may validly claim compensation up to 20% 
excess with respect to actual loss. This rule of flexibility would be important for 
CDSs, because it is often difficult to exactly measure the actual loss if it has been 
caused by indirect economic exposure. Indeed, one could argue that this 
measurement uncertainty should be interpreted in favour of the protection buyer, 
so that undue legal uncertainty is avoided. 
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3.4 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has sought to advance several clarifications to our legal 
understanding of CDSs. It has carefully examined the principal demarcation 
criteria, particularly the notion of insurable interest, proposing how the doctrine 
should be applied to CDSs. Further, it has explained why the no-intention-to-
insure argument is defective both in law and in fact, also demonstrating that the 
term credit default swaps is quite misleading because they really are economically 
not swaps at all. 
With respect to the notion of loss indemnification, the chapter has cleared up 
several misunderstandings, showing that CDSs may be either indemnity or non-
indemnity insurance transactions. The correct characterization does not depend 
on whether the protection buyer is exposed to default risk or not, but on the 
specific terms of the contract, which normally are such that CDSs are indemnity 
transactions. It has also been demonstrated that statements claiming “CDSs are 
not conditional upon loss” are either untrue or misleading, and that both 
indemnity and non-indemnity CDSs can be insurance contracts. 
The section on the evolution of US state insurance regulation has revealed 
some of the practical reasons why insurance law was initially not applied to credit 
default swaps, and why doing so later turned out to be complicated. This strictly 
legal implications of this evolution are limited, but understanding this history 
helps us to grasp the political and institutional context of the legal issues. It also 
shows why some arguments invoking the opinion of insurance regulators must 
be excluded or at least put in context. 
The last section, dedicated to Finnish insurance law, concluded with 
essentially similar findings as in relation to English and US insurance law. The 
chapter mainly sought to advance the important findings made by Ahokallio in 
an earlier study, arguing that a correct interpretation of the demarcation criteria 
probably leads to the recharacterization of CDSs as insurance at least in many 
cases. Of special interest for further clarification is the notion of rikastumiskielto 
(literally meaning “prohibition of enrichment”), the status and application of 
which could be studied further. 
 
  CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AS 
DERIVATIVES 
The findings of the previous chapter raise many follow-up questions. How is it 
possible that the application of insurance law to some or all CDSs was so widely 
ignored and so easily avoided? How could CDSs be globally established as 
unregulated “swaps” if they are economically not swaps at all? Why did the 
Dodd-Frank Act pre-empt insurance regulation with so little public debate? One 
might suggest that it simply took time for insurance regulators to grasp what 
these transactions really consisted of, but such an answer is far from complete. 
It will be argued that the issue can only be understood in light of a longer 
historical evolution marked by two opposing forces: anti-speculation and pro-
regulation initiatives, on one hand, and anti-regulatory and regulation-evasive 
initiatives, on the other. This chapter provides, first, a brief outline of the historical 
background of more recent developments. It then describes the leading role 
played by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) in the 
creation of an unregulated space for OTC swaps. Finally, it analyzes the reforms 
introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act, finding that, while it seeks to rein in the 
excesses of modern finance, it paradoxically ends up consolidating ISDA’s largely 
unregulated swaps regime. 
4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: LAW VERSUS 
FINANCE 
According to Thomas Lee Hazen, there are four categories of financial products 
that in many cases overlap in substance but the regulation of which is increasingly 
disparate: securities, derivatives, gambling, and insurance.1 CDSs are at the heart 
of this intersection, and indeed different commentators have placed them in each 
of these categories.2 Now, it must be remembered that the terminology is far from 
exact, and there are major differences between the language of finance and the 
language of law; in fact, the four aforementioned categories are legal, not 
functional. Moreover, the language adopted by market participants may be 
deliberately misleading, as it arguably is in the case of credit default swaps, which 
are not swaps according to standard definitions in finance. 
                                                 
1 Hazen 2005. 
2 They have been mostly classified as either derivatives or insurance contracts, but as we 
saw earlier, some have defined them as securities, and still others have called them 
“gambling” (for example New York State Governor Paterson: see Hakim 2008). 
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4.1.1 Strategies for Influencing the Regulatory Environment 
The attitude of the law to different types of financial activity has been tense 
throughout history: legislators have placed various restrictions on financial 
activity, ranging from limits on interest taking to a marked hostility towards 
speculative activities.3 The attitude of the law to different types of financial 
activity has not, however, been stable over time. Securities regulation, for 
example, has been getting more stringent as legislatures have responded to 
perceived misconduct.4 In contrast—for good or ill—gambling and the market for 
derivatives have been increasingly liberalized.5 Insurance law alone has remained 
broadly similar over long periods of time, and—as we have seen—it is highly 
restrictive: the sell-side is subject to a demanding system of regulation and 
supervision, whereas the buy-side is limited by such doctrines insurable interest 
and loss indemnification. 
Within this complex framework, activities favouring financial liberalization 
have taken a variety of forms, ranging from lobbying for legal reform to subtle 
rule-avoidance strategies. For purposes of analysis, it is useful to distinguish 
between two generic strategies. One is that of changing the fundamental rules 
governing a legal category. An example would be the abolition of gambling 
restrictions in some jurisdictions. Normally, however, this is hard to achieve, 
because it involves large-scale legal reform. For example, the doctrine of insurable 
interest has been criticized, but it has proved difficult to abolish it. 
The other strategy is to influence the application of legal categories in concrete 
cases, seeking to reduce the application of restrictive categories (e.g. securities 
and insurance) and to widen the application of more permissive categories (e.g. 
derivatives). These activities are subtler and therefore more likely to succeed; for 
example, before gambling laws were liberalized, they were frequently 
sidestepped by avoiding their application. 
The rise of credit default swaps was heavily rooted in the second strategy. 
CDSs were appealing because they enabled market participants to take financial 
positions that were functionally similar to insurance but were (seemingly) not 
legally so restrictive. But the permissive regime was achieved precisely by subtly 
persuading the authorities not to apply insurance laws: firstly, by promoting a 
private legal opinion (the Potts opinion) that gained widespread acceptance 
through repetition, and secondly, by generalizing favourable responses from 
regulators to narrowly formulated questions.6 
                                                 
3 Stout 1999: 703. 
4 See Hazen 2005: 382–384 (discussing the United States Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
5 Ibid. 396. 
6 One might also speculate that the erroneous interpretation of New York Insurance Law 
may have been influenced by liberalizing objectives: in their respective articles, Shadab, 
Sjostrom and Schwartz are all firmly opposed to the application of insurance law to CDSs. 
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In the process of determining which set of legal principles should apply, an 
important role is played by definitions; and definitions are inherently imperfect. 
Therefore influencing the definitions has been a leading issue in the tension 
between finance and its regulators: for example, commentators favouring the 
non-application of insurance law to CDSs have proposed their own definitions or 
demarcations of insurance.7 
However, the influence strategy is not limited to definitions, as it includes the 
introduction of novel concepts in order to replace (at least partially) earlier concepts 
associated with unwanted legal consequences. This explains the sudden 
appearance of swaps in the 1980s and their extension to an increasing number of 
transactions, including CDSs: not only was it novel and therefore susceptible to 
redefinition, but it also acquired a special meaning in law, combined with a 
permissive regulatory regime, as will be seen shortly. 
Despite the success of the conceptual influence strategies, the matter of CDSs 
and insurance law continued to be a source of legal risk in the United States until 
the Dodd-Frank Act, and it potentially is still so elsewhere. The solution adopted 
in Dodd-Frank is hard to understand unless it is seen as part of a longer legal-
institutional evolution reaching back to the 19th century. What follows is a sketch 
of that evolution, followed by an analysis of the novelties of Dodd-Frank. 
4.1.2 Antispeculation Law and the Rise of Private Orderings 
The law of many countries traditionally viewed gambling as a socially 
undesirable activity, either prohibiting or heavily regulating it.8 The law’s disdain 
of gambling was not limited to cards and casino, but also “investing, hedging, 
and insurance have been compared with gambling and, to varying degrees, social 
distaste for gambling has been used as a rationale for regulation of these other 
activities.”9 Thus, for example, common law courts frequently refused to enforce 
commodity forward contracts—often called difference contracts—if they were 
perceived as speculative wagers instead of hedging transactions.10 In many 
                                                 
7 For example, Todd Henderson’s use of a non-legal definition. See also Juurikkala 2011 
(finding problems in Potts’ definition of insurance); Kimball-Stanley 2008: 262–266 (criticizing 
the distinctions made by Schwartz, and Nirenberg and Hoffman). 
8 See for example Stout 2011: 12–13 (discussing the traditional common law approach); 
Hazen 2005: 377 (“gambling is not generally viewed as a productive activity or one that 
provides any benefit to society beyond its entertainment value [which] is generally seen as 
outweighed by the social costs of gambling”). 
9 Hazen 2005: 377. 
10 See Stout 2011: 11–12 (discussing cases); Stout 1999: 712–734 (discussing a range of 
United States “antispeculation” laws, both in common law and statute). However, according 
Clarke 2007: 36, early common law opposition to gambling was to considering it as “nuisance” 
and “distraction” from worthier cases. 
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jurisdictions, the unenforceability of difference contracts was supplemented by 
laws prohibiting gambling.11 
Insofar as the only problem was the refusal to enforce, market participants 
found a way to avoid the restrictions by way of private orderings, i.e. by creating 
extra-legal arrangements for enforcing contracts without resort to courts.12 The 
leading example is the commodity exchanges founded since mid-19th century, 
developing mechanisms for not only trading physical commodities, but also 
speculating in changes in price in ways that could be enforced without courts.13 
Over time, the exchanges created a self-regulatory system consisting of 
“membership standards, collateral (‘margin’) posting requirements, capital 
requirements, and standardized contract terms”.14 
One interesting aspect of the legal evolution is that the success of respectable 
exchanges also attracted secondary business—so called “bucket shops”—that 
copied the betting opportunities without imposing membership requirements.15 
These contracts were in many ways analogous to what now are called “over-the-
counter” (OTC) derivatives.16 However, many US states criminalized these OTC 
activities with the so-called “antibucketshop” laws; the exchanges started their 
parallel attacks against price quotation stealing, and were backed by the courts.17 
In summary, speculative derivative contracts were permitted, but only within 
self-regulatory spaces. 
4.1.3 The 1930s Regulatory Regime and Its Erosion 
The self-regulatory regime for speculative contracts was shattered following the 
Great Crash of 1929, which reawakened the traditional antispeculative attitudes.18 
This led to a new wave of federal legislation that still forms the backbone of 
United States financial regulation.19 In relation to financial derivatives, the 1930s 
legislation had two principal effects. Firstly, in line with earlier common law and 
state antibucketshop statutes, it—particularly the Commodity Exchange Act of 
193620—reinforced the prohibition of OTC speculative activities by requiring that 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Gaming Act 1845 (c. 109) (UK); Gaming Act 1892 (c. 9) (UK). 
12 See the seminal paper by Bernstein 1992. 
13 See Stout 2011: 14–15 (describing this development). 
14 Stout 2011: 16. 
15 Ibid. 16–17. 
16 Ibid. 17. 
17 Ibid.16–17. 
18 See Hirshleifer 2008: 861 (noting how the Great Crash caused an attack on speculators). 
19 See for example Partnoy 2001: 429–433 (discussing the federal regime and its general 
problems with respect to derivatives). 
20 Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (as amended). 
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all transactions take place in regulated exchanged (called “contract markets”).21 
Secondly, it subjected the exchanges to public supervision under a hybrid 
regulatory system that combines elements of self-regulatory and command-and-
control regulation, headed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, for 
securities options) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC, for 
commodity futures and options).22 
Over time, however, this regime of contract-market monopoly was eroded by 
three principal factors. Firstly, market participants began to design novel 
contracts in order to fit them into exemptions to the regulated markets (a form of 
regulatory arbitrage).23 Secondly, turf battles between the two regulators tended 
to widen the regulatory gaps, as difficulties emerged in fitting new instruments 
into the traditional categories of “securities” and “futures.”24 Thirdly, especially 
from the 1980s onwards, the rule-book was increasingly liberalized: on one hand, 
many financial contracts were excluded from the ambit of gaming laws, and 
gambling itself was gradually legalized;25 on the other hand, OTC derivatives 
were expressly deregulated by way of a process that is next described in detail.26 
4.2 ISDA AND THE ROAD TO A SPECIAL OTC SWAPS 
REGIME 
Deregulated OTC derivatives have their roots in the 19th century, but their 
spectacular growth and global consolidation is a more recent phenomenon, which 
cannot be understood without reference to the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA).27 The role of one organization should not be 
                                                 
21 Stout 2011: 18 (“federal law, like state antibucketshop statutes, went beyond the 
common law by making off-exchange futures illegal as well as judicially unenforceable.”). 
22 See for example Johnson and Hazen 2004: § 2.02 (describing the system of contract 
market monopoly). 
23 Hazen 2005: 390. See also Johnson and Hazen 2004: § 1.02[8] (describing the 
deterioration of the exchange monopoly). 
24 Hazen 2005: 390; Partnoy 2001: 431–433 (describing turf battles). 
25 Hazen 2005: 396 (noting the liberalization of gambling laws). In the United States, many 
states continue to have restrictive gambling laws, whereas in the UK, gambling was 
drastically liberalized by the Gambling Act 2005 (UK). However, it had been emphasized 
earlier that bona fide commercial or financial transactions will not be held to be wagering 
contracts: Morgan Grenfell v Welwyn Hatfield District Council [1995] 1 All ER 1. 
26 On the process in the United States, see Stout 2011: 18–22; on the UK, see Scott and 
Biggins 2012: 318–319 (2012) (explaining that the enforceability of purely speculative OTC 
derivatives was guaranteed first by section 60 the Financial Services Act 1986 (UK), and then 
by section 8 the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK)). See also Biggins 2012: 1304–
1306. 
27 ISDA has only lately has attracted scholarly interest: see Braithwaite 2012a (discussing 
ISDA’s Master Agreement regime); Gelpern and Gulati 2012 (discussing ISDA’s dispute 
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exaggerated, but there is no reason to be dismissive about ISDA which, according 
Frank Partnoy, has been “the most powerful and effective lobbying force in the 
recent history of financial markets.”28 According to Scott and Biggins, “[t]he 
influence of ISDA is undoubtedly a key factor in the public deregulation of OTC 
derivatives trading by legislators in the latter 20th century, especially in the US.”29 
Flanagan agrees that “ISDA has played a key role in keeping the OTC derivatives 
industry self-regulated.30 This section describes ISDA’s origins and objectives, 
followed by a description of its lobbying victories as well as other activities 
influencing law and regulation. 
4.2.1 ISDA’s Origins and Activities 
In the 1980s, Wall Street investment banks began to develop a range of over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives transactions such as swaps.31 A leading motivation was 
regulatory arbitrage,32 as “swaps were unregulated and immune from most 
securities-law disclosure requirements.”33 They were also apparently subject to 
“off balance sheet” accounting treatment, which made their risks less transparent 
and enabled banks to offer products that are functionally equivalent to positions 
that client institutions were not permitted to take.34 Besides, as OTC transactions, 
many swaps were customized and therefore highly profitable to the dealers.35 
It seems that at first the investment banks largely ignored the fact that the new 
OTC derivatives may have been void under the common law and illegal under 
                                                 
resolution system); Scott and Biggins 2012 (discussing ISDA’s relations with nation states); 
Huault and Rainelli-Le Montagner 2009 (describing ISDA’s influence strategies); Morgan 
2010: 32–40 (discussing ISDA’s activities following the 2008 crisis); Biggins 2012 (analysing 
ISDA’s post-crisis dispute resolution regime); McKeen-Edwards and Porter 2013: 43–46 
(describing ISDA’s role in global finance). One of the early studies on ISDA’s activities is Sean 
M. Flanagan: see Flanagan 2001 (providing a pro-ISDA perspective to its history and 
activities). 
28 Partnoy 2003: 47. 
29 Scott and Biggins 2012: 323. 
30 Flanagan 2001: 246. 
31 See Partnoy 2003: 38–45 (describing early swaps and other derivatives transactions). 
32 Ibid. 47–48.  
33 Partnoy 2003: 48. Avoiding regulations was a motivating factor even before the 1980s: 
see Flanagan 2001: 223 (“Some simple swap-like agreements were developed in the late 
seventies to bypass certain United Kingdom currency restrictions”). 
34 Partnoy 2003: 45–46 (describing banks’ arguments and activities in favor of this 
accounting treatment of swaps, and noting that the arguments were dubious, because high 
value fluctuations would have legitimately concerned shareholders); Partnoy 2001: 426–428 
(describing regulatory arbitrage uses of early derivatives). 
35 Partnoy 2003: 49; Partnoy 2001: 427–428 (noting that customized swaps are more 
profitable than “plain vanilla” swaps); Flanagan 2001: 234 (“Banks [in the 1980s] received 
large fees and substantial spreads for arranging interest-rate and currency swaps”). 
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the Commodity Exchange Act.36 But the first source of worries was the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB, the United States accounting self-regulatory 
body), which in February 1985 started asking difficult questions about the new 
products.37 This lead, within weeks after the inquiry, to the formation of the 
International Swap Dealers’ Association, by the leading swap dealers.38 The name 
was changed into the International Swaps and Derivatives Association in 1993,39 
seemingly “in an attempt to show ISDA was more than just a lobbying vehicle for 
the top swap dealers.”40 
ISDA’s principal objectives were “to establish standardized documentation 
and practices, to lobby against new regulations, and to determine how big the 
swaps market really was.”41 In the words of one of the leading members, the goal 
was to “organize before any problems arise”,42 although ISDA’s first press release 
merely stated that it sought to “advance general market practices and to discuss 
issues of relevance to the financial community.”43 It has been claimed that 
“everyone involved understood that the primary role would be to lobby against 
regulation of swaps”,44 although it seems that a parallel motivation was to 
coordinate the ownership and development of the standard documentation that 
the leading swap dealers had developed informally since 1984.45 In practice, these 
two activities were mutually reinforcing, as “it could be argued that the ISDA 
Master Agreement project was highly successful in assuring public actors that the 
OTC derivatives industry was in fact capable of largely self-regulating.”46 
It is widely agreed that ISDA has gained a significant degree of power and 
influence.47 ISDA’s credibility as a lobbying organization and self-regulator rests 
on its substantial expertise, with over 800 member organizations in 2012 and 
offices with considerable staff in New York, Washington, London, Brussels, 
                                                 
36 Stout 2011: 19; Stout 1999: 780. 
37 Partnoy 2003: 46. 
38 Ibid. See also Flanagan 2001: 223 (”A group of these early swap dealers founded 
ISDA.”). 
39 Flanagan 2001: 222. 
40 Partnoy 2003: 152. See also Flanagan 2001: 238 n.136 (“Joe Bauman, who was chairman 
of the board in 1993, notes that the new name reflected a belief at the board level that ISDA's 
role was to represent the interests of the entire OTC derivatives industry, not just those of 
dealers.”). 
41 Partnoy 2003: 47. 
42 Forde 1985: 4 (citing Jonathan Berg, a vice president at Bankers Trust).  
43 Ibid. 
44 Partnoy 2003: 47. 
45 See Flanagan 2001: 234–238 (describing the standardization project). 
46 Scott and Biggins 2012: 323. 
47 See Scott and Biggins 2012: 323 (“ISDA's lobbying influence cannot be downplayed.”). 
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Tokyo, Singapore, and Hong Kong.48 It has numerous committees and task forces, 
and organizes high-profile conferences on topical issues;49 it is also well 
represented on expert panels,50 produces independent research,51 and actively 
cooperates with regulators and legislators around the world—often even drafting 
legislation.52 
Naturally, expertise does not guarantee non-partisanship, and ISDA does not 
represent the financial community as a whole, let alone the wider economy.53 
Neither is it correct to picture ISDA as merely an expert organization. ISDA has 
over the years acquired a reputation for its aggressive lobbying methods,54 which 
have been described as “both condescending (saying officials couldn’t possible 
understand derivatives) and reassuring (saying Wall Street had everything under 
control).”55 According to one testimony from the 1990s, “ISDA came to 
Washington telling everyone they’re stupid. Their message was that everything 
is okey [in derivatives]—a blanket statement, boom.”56 This rhetoric has been 
backed up by threats that campaign donations would suffer, as financial firms 
spend large amounts of money in political contributions and lobbying, and 
“ISDA’s members were major political contributors.” 57 
                                                 
48 Scott and Biggins 2012: 342; see also Flanagan 2001: 228–229 (describing the earlier 
situation). 
49 See Flanagan 2001: 229 (describing activities). 
50 See for example P.R.I.M.E. Finance, http://www.primefinancedisputes.org, a mediation, 
arbitration and training body established in 2012, in which ISDA is extensively represented 
among the Finance Experts. See Biggins 2012: 1326–1327. 
51 See Mengle 2007 (ISDA’s head of research explaining CDS markets and defending them 
against critics). 
52 See for example ISDA 2009: 31 (“ISDA’s Accounting Committee was actively involved 
throughout the consultation process” of FASB); ibid. 39–40 (describing ISDA’s legislative 
involvement in Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, and Mauritius; in Mauritius, “a new draft bill 
on insolvency […] includes a chapter drafted by ISDA.”). See also Scott and Biggins 2012: 329–
332 (describing ISDA’s role in the 1995 financial netting law reform in Ireland); Riles 2000: 29-
30 (describing the assistance of ISDA’s Japanese associates in the drafting of the 1998 law 
reform in Japan). 
53 See Huault and Rainelli-Le Montagner 2009: 562–564 (arguing that, in the CDS market, 
ISDA has represented the interests of investment banks). 
54 See Partnoy 2003: 142 (describing Mark C. Brickell, vice president at J.P. Morgan and 
ISDA’s “top lobbyist” in the 1990s). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Tett 2009: 38 (citing Christopher Whalen). 
57 Ibid. 
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4.2.2 Lobbying Victories: Widening the Regulatory Exemptions 
If the dealers and investment banks were at first dismissive of legal risks, this did 
not last long: before the end of the 1980s, they were actively trying to change the 
rules.58 Indeed, throughout the 1990s a key input for legal reform came from the 
banking industry.59 ISDA played a lead role in this activity.60 The rhetorical 
keyword was legal certainty.61 What this meant was certainty that the regulators 
would not apply the rules—especially the exchange-trading requirement of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)—to the new OTC transactions, which clearly 
had been made in violation the rules.62 
4.2.2.1 The 1989 CFTC Safe Harbor 
The modest victory was gained already in 1989, with the CFTC issuing a “safe 
harbor” policy statement, “declaring that [it] would not attempt to regulate swap 
transactions.”63 However, this had at least two limitations. One was that the CFTC 
policy statement listed five criteria for applying the safe harbor: “(1) individually 
tailored terms; (2) absence of exchange-style offset; (3) absence of clearing 
organization or margin system; (4) the transaction is undertaken in conjunction 
with a line of business; and (5) prohibition against marketing to the public.”64 
Partnoy has argued that “[f]or many swaps at least one of the criteria—often 
several—were not satisfied.”65 
The second limitation of the 1989 safe harbor was that it did not change the 
fundamental rules, because the CFTC had no authority to re-write the rule-book; 
however, following intense lobbying, Congress in 1992 passed the Futures 
Trading Practices Act,66 granting the CFTC authority to exempt derivatives from 
the application of the CEA, and determining that “federal law now preempted 
any state laws that made OTC derivatives unenforceable, whether as gambling 
contracts or otherwise.”67 This was promptly followed by the CFTC in 1993 
formally exempting OTC swaps from the ambit of the CEA, as well as from state 
                                                 
58 Stout 2011: 19; Stout 1999: 780. 
59 Stout 2011: 18–20 (describing banking industry initiatives in the 1990s). 
60 See Flanagan 2001: 245–246 (highlighting ISDA’s growing involvement in politics in the 
1990s). 
61 See Stout 2011: 19. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. See CFTC, Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 
(July 21, 1989). See also Partnoy 2001: 435–436 (describing the Policy Statement). 
64 Partnoy 2001: 436; see CFTC, Policy Statement, 30,696–97. 
65 Partnoy 2001: 438; see ibid. 439–442 (providing a detailed analysis). 
66 Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590. 
67 Stout 2011: 19. See Futures Trading Practices Act, §§ 502(a) (amending 7 U.S.C. 6), 502(c) 
(amending 7 U.S.C. 16(e)(2)(A)). 
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gambling and antibucketshop laws.68 However, the 1993 exemption “did not 
provide nearly the certainty it could have.”69 In particular, it must be noted that 
the exempted “swap agreements” did not include “credit default swaps”,70 and 
given that CDSs are financially very unlike other swaps, there is no reason to 
suppose that they were covered by the exemption. 
4.2.3 Managing the Image: Derivatives Scandals 
4.2.3.1 The 1994 Derivatives Debacle 
Ironically, the granting of some “legal certainty” to OTC swaps was almost 
immediately followed by a series of major losses and scandals involving OTC 
derivatives.71 While these events are open to a range of interpretations,72 they 
certainly caused a political backlash, which had already been brewing for some 
time.73 A year earlier, Representative Jim Leach had begun “asking some 
uncomfortable questions of Mark Brickell and the ISDA lobby.”74 This led to the 
publication, by House Banking Committee staff, of a 900-page report on 
derivatives in November 1993, condemning the unregulated market.75 When the 
crisis hit the market in 1994, new debates were fuelled, as the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) produced a report highly critical of the lack of derivatives 
regulation,76 and Leach introduced a derivatives bill based on his staff report.77 
                                                 
68 Regulation of Hybrid Instruments, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,581 (Jan. 22, 1993) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 35). See Stout 2011: 19–20; Partnoy 2003: 147; Partnoy 2001: 436–437 (describing it and 
pointing out it “was described as [Wendy] Gramm's ‘farewell gift’ to the swaps industry.”). 
69 Partnoy 2001: 437. 
70 See ibid. (describing the exemption). 
71 See Stout 2011: 20 (“Just as a nineteenth century judge might have predicted, the near-
immediate result was a series of swapsfueled speculative disasters.”); Partnoy 2003: 112–138 
(describing the events leading to the derivatives scandals of 1994); FCIC Report 2011: 46–47 
(discussing swaps scandals after 1993). 
72 See Flanagan 2001: 226–227 (presenting a pro-dealer view of some of the cases). 
73 See Partnoy 2003: 147 (describing growing skepticism already in 1992, including a 
Congress request to the Government Accounting Office to consider the necessity of regulating 
derivatives). 
74 Ibid. Partnoy speculates that one possible reason for Leach’s activism was he “did not 
receive financial support from Wall Street and members of the ISDA” (ibid. 147–148). 
75 Ibid. 148. 
76 GAO 1994. See Partnoy 2003: 150 (describing the report). 
77 See Partnoy 2003: 152. There were also three other bills: see for example Tett 2009: 38. 
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ISDA’s response was highly effective.78 Among other things, ISDA skilfully 
influenced the media, persuading journalists to use the word “securities” instead 
of “derivatives” when reporting derivatives scandals.79 Brickell also attacked 
Leach in the media resorting to “serious misstatements of fact”,80 claiming for 
example that Leach’s bill would impose a suitability standard “not applied to any 
other area of finance”, when in fact it was similar to the already-existing 
suitability standards in other areas.81 He also “complained about the Leach bill’s 
supposed capital standards for swaps, when in fact the bill contained no such 
provisions.”82 
ISDA was not fighting alone, as it was backed up by high-profile figures 
including Gerald Corrigan (former head of New York Fed, then at Goldman 
Sachs) and Wendy Gramm (former CFTC chair, then board member at Enron).83 
In the end, the public lost interest in these complicated issues, and all the 
legislative initiatives died down; the result was a surprise even to industry 
members, according to the Institutional Investor magazine, which “gave the credit 
to ISDA”.84 
4.2.3.2 The Collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998  
Another publicity challenge came in 1998, when the massive hedge fund Long 
Term Capital Management nearly collapsed, threatening the stability of the entire 
banking sector and leading to an almost-$4 billion bailout.85 Only weeks before, 
the CFTC—now headed by derivatives-critical Brooksley Born—had suggested it 
would reconsider OTC derivatives regulation.86 However, having learned from 
                                                 
78 According to Tett 2009: 38, “behind the scenes, Brickell and other ISDA officials 
furiously leapt into lobbying action, determined to block the bills before Congress. Brickell 
paid a frenetic series of visits to Republican and Democratic congressmen. He also relentlessly 
called journalists, trying to persuade them to stop writing about derivatives in such a negative 
light. He then met regulators around the world, preaching the gospel that the industry was 
capable of cleaning up its act on its own”. 
79 Partnoy 2003: 151 (providing examples and citations from personal correspondence 
between ISDA and Byron E. Calame, then-deputy managing editor of the Wall Street Journal). 
80 Ibid. 152 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. According to Partnoy, on July 12, 1994, at hearing on the bill, Leach “lost his 
patience with Brickell […], accusing him of lying about provisions of the derivatives bill” 
(ibid., citing Hume 1994: 6). 
83 Partnoy 2003: 153–154. 
84 Ibid. 154 (citing Michael Peltz, Congress’s Lame Assault on Derivatives, INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR, Dec. 1994, at 65). See also Tett 2009: 39–40 (describing ISDA’s victory). 
85 See FCIC Report 2011: 57 (discussing the LTCM case); Stout 2011: 20. 
86 CFTC 1998. See Scott and Biggins 2012: 319; Stout 2011: 20 (noting that “[t]his a dramatic 
shift in policy, as it implied OTC derivatives might be treated as illegal off-exchange futures.”) 
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the previous crisis, the derivatives industry was well prepared, and “besieged 
Congress with appeals to stop any federal regulatory effort.”87 Now the industry 
was strongly represented in key government organizations, which reacted the 
very same day of CFTC’s pronouncements to prevent any changes to the 
rulebook.88 In fact, new laws were enacted, this time only limiting the powers of 
CFTC to determine OTC derivatives rules.89 
4.2.4 The Silent Revolution: The CFMA of 2000 
If the 1990s derivatives debacles did not lead to re-regulation, they made the 
banking lobby increasingly aware of the precarious status of OTC derivatives. 
Therefore, in 1999, a Presidential Working Group of high-profile figures in the 
administration with close ties to the investment-banking lobby was formed in 
order to “modernize” derivatives regulation.90 The Working Group complained 
about the “cloud of legal uncertainty [that] has hung over the OTC derivatives 
markets in the United States in recent years [and] could discourage innovation 
and growth of these important markets.”91 Instead of re-examining the need to 
regulate OTC derivatives, the objective was to provide legal certainty to the 
enforceability of off-exchange derivatives.92 
This was duly accomplished the following year with the passage of the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000, which “faced intense 
opposition”93 as it drastically expanded the scope of largely unregulated 
derivatives markets.94 As a piece of legislation, it is “long, complex, technical, and 
difficult to understand,” which may explain why its “passage went relatively 
unnoticed and unremarked by anyone outside the derivatives industry.”95 Yet its 
significance can hardly be overstated: according to Hazen, “[t]he increased 
regulation of the securities markets in the wake of the late 1990’s corporate 
governance scandals […] stands in sharp contrast to the massive deregulation of 
the commodities and non-securities derivatives markets that was ushered in by 
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act”.96 Moreover, it has been claimed that 
ISDA was heavily involved in the drafting process: “Instead of seeing members 
                                                 
87 Stout 2011: 20. 
88 See US Treasury 1998. See also Scott and Biggins 2012: 319 (describing the backlash). 
89 Stout 2011: 21. See also Stout 1999: 768. 
90 Stout 2011: 21; see PWG Report 1999. 
91 PWG Report 1999: 1. 
92 Stout 2011: 21.  
93 Partnoy 2001: 444. 
94 For a detailed overview of the CFMA, see for example Johnson and Hazen 2004: § 1.18; 
Hazen 2005: 388–395. 
95 Stout 2011: 21. 
96 Hazen 2005: 382.  
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of Congress at work, you would have seen Mark Brickell, the lobbyist from ISDA, 
writing important pieces of the legislation.”97 
4.2.4.1 Restriction of Regulatory Jurisdiction 
Whatever the details of the process may have been, the CFMA had at least two 
important consequences. One, it “restricted the capacity of the SEC and CFTC to 
directly intervene in OTC trading between sophisticated market participants.”98 
In terms of the CFTC and the CEA, the CFMA excluded OTC derivatives made 
between eligible contract participants and subject to individual negotiation.99 
Thus it “granted OTC derivatives contracts, including purely speculative 
instruments, an enforceability guarantee in the courts.”100 With respect to the SEC, 
the CFMA ensured that the notion of “securities” would not include any 
“security-based swap agreement.”101 It also reduced the powers of the SEC to 
investigate fraud, manipulation or insider trading in security-based swap 
agreements.102 
4.2.4.2 A Wider Definition of Swap Agreements 
The second important point is that these exclusions along would have been 
insufficient for CDSs, so the CFMA extended the notion of swap agreements to 
explicitly include credit default swaps.103 The CFMA definition of swap 
agreements is complex, but what makes it interesting is that it departs radically 
from standard financial definitions of swaps: instead of referring to an exchange 
of cash-flows, it extends swaps to an agreement that “transfers […] the financial 
risk associated with a future change in any […] value or level [of securities or 
other financial or economic interests] […] known as […] credit default swap.”104 
This definition suggests that the drafters were aware of the awkward status of 
CDSs as swaps, but they were determined to exploit the fact that OTC swaps had 
                                                 
97 Partnoy 2003: 295. 
98 Scott and Biggins 2012: 320.  
99 Stout 2011: 21 (citing CFMA, §§ 103, 120 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(h), 25(a)(4) (2001)); 
Sjostrom 2009: 986; Wynkoop 2008: 3100. 
100 Scott and Biggins 2012: 320. 
101 See CFMA, § 302(a), § 303(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1, § 78c-1 (2006)); Sjostrom 2009: 
984. A “security-based swap agreement” is a swap “of which a material term is based on the 
price, yield, value, or volatility of any security […]” (15 U.S.C. 78c note (2006)), so that it is not 
regulated as a security (Sjostrom 2009: 985)—supposing that it is a swap agreement in the first 
place. 
102 Sjostrom 2009: 985. 
103 See ibid. 984–985 (discussing the definition of “swap agreement” in CFMA). 
104 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006). 
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become the least regulated legal category, so that the most effective strategy was to 
widen its application. 
4.2.4.3 The Paradox of Legal Certainty 
Another paradox of the CFMA is that its official objectives included “reduc[ing] 
systemic risk by enhancing legal certainty.”105 The apparent justification for this 
claim was that the uncertain enforceability of OTC derivatives might cause 
disruptions.106 This reasoning was optimistic in retrospect, as the passage of 
CFMA was followed by a spectacular growth of OTC derivatives trading—
especially of a speculative nature—as anyone could have predicted.107 Stout has 
gone so far as to argue that “the [2008] credit crisis was not primarily due to 
‘innovations’ in the markets or the legal system’s failure to ‘keep pace’ with 
finance. The crisis was caused, first and foremost, by changes in the law.”108 
4.2.5 Beyond Politics: A Friend of the Legal Profession 
4.2.5.1 Fostering Consensus 
ISDA’s law-shaping activities have not been limited to lobbying. From the 
beginning, it has worked closely with leading law firms, and over the years it has 
developed a network of cooperating lawyers around the world.109 The leading 
example of ISDA’s influence among lawyers is the Potts opinion, which “was 
unanimously acknowledged as one of the great successes of the organization.”110 
Moreover, as the recharacterization of CDSs as insurance continued to be a major 
risk, ISDA and its allies skilfully created the appearance of a legal consensus. One 
reason for this was that, even though some commentators have doubted the 
accuracy of the Potts opinion, ISDA has firmly repeated to the same argument as 
the established position. It also has been backed by law firms, which have 
                                                 
105 CFMA § 2(6). See also PWG Report 1999: 6 (noting the same objective). 
106 Stout 2011: 22. 
107 See Stout 2011: 22–29 (describing the developments); Stout 1999: 772–73 (arguing, in 
1999, that enabling speculation would increase systemic risks). 
108 Stout 2011: 3. 
109 See for example Flanagan 2001: 233 (“ISDA has hired law firms around the world to 
research the potential enforceability of close-out netting in their jurisdictions”), 235 
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several key ISDA figures came from Cravath). Later, Adam W. Glass of Linklaters has been 
an active collaborator with ISDA. 
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appeared in the discussion without disclosing their ties to ISDA.111 Given the links 
between ISDA and investment banks, it has been natural for ISDA to harness the 
support of leading financial lawyers. 
4.2.5.2 Judicial Parallelism 
Another factor supporting the ISDA-dominated legal consensus has been the 
logic of courts in international finance disputes, particularly in London and New 
York. As Mugasha has explained, courts resolving international finance disputes 
are highly sensible to the practical consequences of their decisions, applying 
“laws or ideas from several different jurisdictions in order to reach a 
commercially sensible result” and attempting to “make decisions that will 
facilitate international finance.”112 This decision-making is shaped by judicial 
parallelism,113 whereby courts are reluctant to break an apparent consensus among 
leading jurisdictions; or as one English judge put it: 
It would be highly regrettable if the English courts were to refuse to give effect to such 
prevalent provisions while the courts of New York are prepared to enforce them. For there 
to be a disparity between the law applicable in London and New York on this point would 
be of great disservice to international banking.114 
This implies in the present case that, as soon as an appearance of consensus is 
obtained, courts are unlikely to challenge it. 
4.2.6 ISDA Architecture: Governing Contracts and Disputes 
4.2.6.1 From Standardization to an Industry Constitution 
There is still another factor, which is that ISDA has created a skilful infrastructure 
for not only influencing legal opinion, but also for governing derivatives contracts 
and avoiding disputes reaching the courts. If ISDA’s original mission included 
both political lobbying and contract standardization, this latter aspect has 
implications that are only beginning to be recognized by legal scholars. In the 
absence of specific regulation, any market is essentially governed by private 
                                                 
111 For example, Flanagan 2001: 233, reveals that “Allen & Overy functions as ISDA's 
primary European counsel.” Allen & Overy was involved in the Potts opinion (see Allen & 
Overy 1997); their associates subsequently published a seemingly independent article on the 
question (see Benton, Devine and Jarvis 1997); Robert Schwartz also turns out to be an Allen 
& Overy Associate at the time of writing his article (Schwartz 2007: 167). 
112 Mugasha 2011a: 392. 
113 Goode 1998: 92. 
114 Lordsvale Finance Plc v Bank of Zambia [1996] 3 All ER 156 (per Coleman J.), cited in 
Mugasha 2011a: 443. 
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contracting,115 and in the OTC derivatives market, private contractual governance 
has been heavily dominated by ISDA through an intricate system of contractual 
governance that has come to be called the “ISDA architecture”.116 
ISDA’s project of contractual self-governance started with ordinary contract 
standardization, but over time it has become increasingly difficult for others to 
provide competing contractual governance, given ISDA’s “first mover 
advantage” as well as the network effects and scale-economies of widely-used 
standard forms.117 According to Braithwaite, today ISDA’s “standard form 
documentation enjoys a near-monopoly in the vast ‘over-the-counter’ derivatives 
markets”,118 governing “an estimated 90 per cent of all OTC derivatives”.119 
Although each derivatives contract is in theory bilateral, the nearly universal use 
of the ISDA architecture implies that “in some respects it resembles an industry-
wide constitution.”120 
4.2.6.2 The ISDA Master Agreements 
The principal aspect of the ISDA architecture is the system of standardized 
documentation. The first ISDA Master Agreement related to swaps was 
published in 1987, and generic OTC derivatives Master Agreements have been 
published in 1992 and 2002.121 The Master Agreements are, however, only the tip 
of the iceberg, as the ISDA architecture of standardized documentation includes 
confirmations, definitions, credit support documentation, annexes, protocols, 
bridges, netting and collateral opinion, novation agreements, and user’s guides.122 
4.2.6.3 Amicus Curiae Briefs 
ISDA has not merely sought to befriend the legal profession; it has also assumed 
an active relationship with the courts through its amicus curiae briefs in OTC 
derivatives litigation.123 These interventions form an important part of ISDA’s 
project of contractual self-governance, as they seek to persuade courts of “ISDA’s 
                                                 
115 Partnoy 2007: 187. 
116 Benjamin 2007: para. 5.77.  
117 Partnoy 2002: 9. On the dynamics of standard forms generally, see for example Kahan 
and Klausner 1997; Choi and Gulati 2006. 
118 Braithwaite 2012a: 779. 
119 Ibid. 784. 
120 Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 357. 
121 Braithwaite 2012a: 787. On the development of the ISDA Master Agreements, see 
Flanagan 2001: 243–245. 
122 See Benjamin 2007: para. 5.77; Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 357–358 (describing different 
parts and the contract-making procedure). 
123 See http://www.isda.org/speeches/amicusbriefs.html. 
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preferences” regarding the interpretation of the standardized documents.124 
Given ISDA’s expertise and its role as the originator of the contracting scheme, it 
is likely to yield significant interpretative power in courts. 
The dominance of ISDA’s standardized documentation has been facilitated by 
the importance of English and New York law in international financial 
transactions.125 In fact, another aspect of ISDA’s relationship with courts is the 
choice of law and jurisdiction, as the Master Agreement of 1992 and 2002 do not 
include arbitration clauses, but instead propose exclusive jurisdiction to either 
English or New York courts.126 This is not accidental: these courts are famed for 
“even-handed adjudication of disputes in the interests of global commerce and 
finance” and “recognizing and facilitating financial innovation”.127 The choice-of-
law rules can be sidestepped, but parties are warned that “extreme care should 
be exercised in doing so since the ISDA master agreement has not been prepared 
with a view to enforceability under other legal systems.”128 This warning is 
important, because choice of law and jurisdiction is an important technique for 
managing legal risk related to “conflicting views as to the true nature, the 
contractual obligations, or the consequences of the financial transaction.”129 
4.2.6.4 Dispute Resolution and Dispute Reduction 
Naturally, the attractiveness of the ISDA architecture would be limited if disputes 
could only be resolved in London or New York. Therefore, one of ISDA’s key 
lobbying activities around the world has been to seek “supporting legislation and 
regulatory opinions confirming the enforceability of certain provisions.”130 
According to Scott and Biggins, numerous national governments have, perhaps 
unwittingly, supported ISDA’s self-governance system, “taking it beyond a 
merely private regulatory regime and affording it a strong public dimension.”131 
In spite of ISDA’s prestige, courts may not always yield to its preferences: even 
in England there have recently been some decisions refusing to uphold expected 
interpretations of ISDA documents.132 However, it seems that this was principally 
because “the contractual language left room for disagreement”133 and the relevant 
                                                 
124 Scott and Biggins 2012: 326. 
125 Mugasha 2011a: 443. 
126 Braithwaite 2012a: 789; Partnoy 2002: 11. 
127 Mugasha 2011a: 397. 
128 Henderson 2010: 838. 
129 Mugasha 2011a: 393; see also ibid. 408–409. 
130 Partnoy 2002: 5. 
131 Scott and Biggins 2012: 311. 
132 See Braithwaite 2012a: 799–800 (discussing these cases). 
133 Ibid. 800. 
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portions of the Master Agreement will be amended accordingly.134 Moreover, the 
courts expressly recognized “the status of the ISDA documents”.135 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that ISDA’s preference is for as few disputes as 
possible, and the ISDA architecture has been astonishingly successful in reducing 
litigation.136 According to one count, “trials involving the ISDA documentation 
occurred no more that once a year in the English courts” before 2009.137 This is 
good news for market participants, and advocates of CDSs have praised the fact 
that they are “virtually unsullied by the foul touch of litigation”, as ISDA’s 
standardized documentation has reduced the incidence of disputes, “keeping the 
market ‘pure as the wind-driven snow.’”138 
This is not wholly unproblematic: dispute-avoidance relies heavily on netting 
provisions, which enable counterparties to terminate all mutual transactions 
quickly,139 but they also violate normal priority rules in bankruptcy law, which is 
why ISDA has been keen to get its privileged netting provisions accepted around 
the world.140 Since 2009, dispute-avoidance has been enhanced by the Big Bang 
Protocol, which is an auction settlement procedure for determining whether a 
credit event has occurred;141 this increases efficiency, but for regulation it 
represents self-governance at the fringes of the legal system. 
4.2.6.5 Criticism of the ISDA Architecture 
The ISDA architecture has benefits, but its leading criticism is opacity, as “ISDA 
has actively resisted disclosure of credit default swap documentation, insisting 
that this information is proprietary.”142 Regulators also complain that “banks 
keep their ‘secret of fabrication’ close to their chest.”143 Others point out that ISDA 
is not an impartial body, as its power is used to advance the interests of major 
                                                 
134 Ibid. 803. 
135 Ibid. 801. 
136 Kimball-Stanley 2008: 251 (“ISDA has been highly successful in standardizing 
derivative contracts and managing potential disputes that arise between parties to a trade.”); 
see similarly Flanagan 2001: 229–234. 
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138 Schwartz 2007: 173. 
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banks,144 and “[i]n providing information, ISDA strongly favors its dealer 
members over the public and end users.”145 Some United States court decisions 
may also be interpreted as finding “that ISDA's approach benefited dealers to the 
detriment of their customers.”146 It may likewise be asked whether it is sensible 
to accept the privileged position of derivatives dealers in counterparty 
bankruptcy, as the close-out netting provisions benefits dealers at the expense of 
other creditors.147 In spite of these criticisms, the ISDA standard forms and the 
contractual architecture created around them continue to dominate CDS markets 
globally. We will return to evaluate them more carefully later in terms of specific 
regulatory policy issues. 
4.3 THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE DODD-
FRANK ACT 
The lack of regulation was challenged at least temporarily by the global financial 
crisis, and in addition to the steps taken by state insurance regulators, bills were 
introduced at federal level to prohibit uncovered CDSs or all CDS trading.148 But 
the industry, led by ISDA, fought back.149 At first it denied any problems, but soon 
a cooperative mode was adopted that would prove to be highly effective.150 
Although the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 takes a step in the direction of more 
regulation, a closer look reveals a mixed picture with respect to OTC 
derivatives.151 
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4.3.1 New Restrictions and Requirements 
For CDSs, the Dodd-Frank Act increases regulation at least in four ways. Firstly, 
it abolishes the CFMA prohibition of regulating OTC derivatives by affirming the 
jurisdiction of CFTC over “swaps” and SEC over “security-based swaps”.152 With 
respect to CDSs, this leads to a dual regime in which single-name CDSs are 
security-based swaps under SEC oversight, whereas CDS indices come under 
CFTC jurisdiction.153 Secondly, the Dodd-Frank Act subjects “swap dealers” and 
“major swap participants” to SEC and CFTC registration and swap transaction 
reporting to these regulators.154 Thirdly, it prohibits federal bailouts of these so-
called “swaps entities”.155 Fourth, it imposes a clearing requirement for most 
speculative swaps.156 
The definition of “swap entities” is rather complicated.157 An entity is qualified 
as a swap dealer according to subjective tests if it “(a) holds itself out as a dealer in 
swaps; (b) makes a market in swaps; (c) regularly enters into swaps for its own 
account; or (d) engages in activities causing it to be commonly known as a dealer 
or market maker in swaps.”158 The Dodd-Frank Act however provides exclusions 
including “entities that enter into swaps on their own account ‘either individually 
or in a fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of [its] regular business’” as well as 
“entities that have engaged only in a ‘de minimis quantity’ of swap dealing over 
the preceding twelve months.”159 
The definition of major swap participants is in contrast based on objective 
criteria that seek to identify “systemically important buy-side users.”160 Swap 
market participants are included in this category if they “maintain a substantial 
position in any of the major swap categories, excluding positions held for hedging 
or mitigating commercial risk” as well as if their swap activities create 
“substantial counterparty exposure that could have serious adverse effects on the 
financial stability of the U.S. banking system or financial markets.”161 The 
principal interest seems to be that of targeting speculative positions, but the 
definition can be extended to highly leveraged non-bank institutions if they have 
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78c(a)(71)(A)). 
159 Ibid. (citing the codified 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(49)(C); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(71)(C) and 7 
U.S.C.A. § 1a(49)(D); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(71)(D)). 
160 Ibid. 517. 
161 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(33)(A)(i)-(ii); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(67)(A) (cited in O’Loughlin 2012: 517). 
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AS DERIVATIVES 
 
150 
“a substantial position in any major swap category even if its positions are held 
for hedging or mitigating commercial risk.”162 Although the underlying criteria 
are objective, it is evident that there is plenty of discretionary scope here for the 
regulatory bodies to engage in prudential judgment.  
The inclusion of a financial entity into these definitions of swap dealer and 
major swap participant is important for regulatory purposes, because in addition 
to the aforementioned requirements of registration and transaction reporting, the 
Dodd-Frank reforms dictate that “swap entities will be subject to new minimum 
capital standards and will be required to post and maintain margin on all 
uncleared swaps.”163 The idea is to encourage the centralized clearing of swaps, 
given that the requirement of compulsory clearing is subject to important 
exceptions, as will be seen later in detail. It remains to be seen how these margin 
and capital standards will be set; if the swap entity is a bank, these standards will 
be set by its prudential regulators, whereas if it is an entity not subject to 
prudential regulation, they will be established by the SEC or the CFTC.164 
4.3.2 Limitations of the New Regulations 
There are, however, several reasons why the outcome is far from onerous for 
market participants. For one thing, SEC and CFTC jurisdiction is limited to what 
is expressly admitted.165 Similarly, the bailout prohibition—known as the “swap 
pushout rule”166—is watered down in various ways: it does not apply to insured 
depository institutions,167 and does not prevent them from establishing affiliates 
that function as swaps entities.168 Thus it has been estimated that the “exceptions 
to the general prohibition threaten to swallow the rule, and the exposure of many 
financial institutions to CDS risk will continue.”169 
The principal regulatory solution offered by the Dodd-Frank Act for the 
problems of OTC derivatives is the imposition of a mandatory central 
counterparty-clearing requirement for many of these transactions.170 The 
principle is the same as in the old Commodity Exchange Act, which required 
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“that speculative commodity futures be traded only on organized exchanges.”171 
The objective is to promote transparency and reduce counterparty risks.172 
However, the question is how much will be achieved. For one thing, it turns 
out that there will be important exceptions to the requirement of mandatory 
clearing. One of them applies when swaps are used by a non-financial entity “to 
hedge or mitigate commercial risk.”173 Other transactions may also be exempted 
from clearing, because this is ultimately subject to SEC and CFTC 
determinations.174 Some commentators have been worried that the regulators 
might yield to the enormous pressure of the financial industry.175 This concern is 
especially pertinent in relation to customized CDSs, which cannot be cleared so 
easily. 
The second concern is that “the clearinghouse requirement might 
inadvertently concentrate systemic risk in the clearinghouses themselves.”176 
According to one expert, “it is plausible that central clearing would raise systemic 
risks greatly when another crisis occurred and perhaps even raise the likelihood 
of a crisis.”177 While it is true that clearinghouses have rarely failed, one should 
not rely too much on history.178 Recent decades have witnesses several 
clearinghouse failures, and there is a danger that complex OTC derivatives would 
create substantial difficulties, especially if clearinghouses are forced to accept 
them.179 It has also been argued that the current resolution system is highly 
vulnerable to systemic risk in derivatives clearinghouses.180 These issues will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 0.181 
4.3.3 Pre-emption of Insurance Regulation  
For the present study, one of the key aspects of Dodd-Frank is that the derivatives 
industry obtained an exclusion of insurance regulation.182 This was a surprise, 
because the original draft did not address the question of CDSs and insurance, 
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and in fact sought to impose an insurable interest rule on uncovered CDSs.183 The 
banking lobby was able not only to block this but also to obtain an express 
exclusion of insurance law, which was added to the final version of the law 
seemingly without careful examination.184 Thus Section 722 (amending the 
Commodity Exchange Act) states laconically: “A swap—(1) shall not be 
considered to be insurance; and (2) may not be regulated as an insurance contract 
under the law of any State.”185 Similarly, Section 767 adds (amending the 
Securities Exchange Act): “A security-based swap may not be regulated as an 
insurance contract under any provision of State law.”186 
One might question the applicability of these exclusions to CDSs, given that it 
is difficult to see how CDSs could be functionally labelled swaps. Therefore the 
definition of “swaps” in Section 721 has been rendered so broad that it is almost 
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another label for any derivative.187 It also expressly includes a “transaction 
commonly known as […] a credit default swap”.188 
As an ironic consequence of this anti-functionalist approach to classifying 
financial products, concerns have subsequently been raised that the new rules are 
creating legal uncertainty to insurers, because such contracts as financial 
guaranty insurance might come under the regulation of swaps (which insurers 
are not permitted to trade).189 This absurdity is the logical consequence of 
artificially creating different regulatory regimes for transactions that have exactly 
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the same content, and legal uncertainty can only be avoided by giving strict 
primacy to form over substance, in contradiction with insurance law tradition. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
In order to explain the derivatives-characterization of CDSs, this chapter has 
argued that the financial sector has skilfully exploited the increasingly disparate 
treatment of functionally similar transactions. On one hand, the restrictive regime 
of insurance regulation was avoided in subtle ways such as by promoting a 
private legal opinion (the Potts opinion) to this effect, obtaining favourable 
responses from regulators to narrowly formulated questions, and proposing 
novel definitions or demarcation criteria of insurance. On the other hand, the 
banking lobby introduced the novel concept of swap, which was first used to 
exploit regulatory exemptions, and later extended to an increasing range of 
transactions, including CDSs. 
It is certainly a simplification to describe the derivatives-based view as anti-
regulation and the insurance-based view as pro-regulation, but it is a useful 
simplification that sheds light on some of the thinking behind the rhetoric. The 
powerful yet imprecise notions of swaps and derivatives have played a major role 
as a rhetorical device in the highly successful attempt of the financial industry to 
sidestep what it considered primitive and old-fashioned prejudices against 
speculation in financial risk. 
The fittingness of this result as a matter of policy must be discussed separately. 
In terms of legal doctrine, however, the situation has become increasingly 
confusing. The current regulatory landscape present tremendous inconsistencies, 
particularly as securities regulation is being more and more heavily regulated, 
while financial derivatives have been systematically deregulated.190 According to 
Thomas Lee Hazen, “It is difficult to point to anything other than political 
pressure to account for this divergence in regulation.”191 
The arguments presented here imply several questions for scholars and 
policymakers. In terms of legal doctrine, the present situation is uncomfortable, 
as it moreover remains unclear on what basis CDSs can be meaningfully 
described as swaps. This raises the question of whether the terminology was but 
a trick for avoiding regulation. In consequence, functionally identical transactions 
may now be insurance, derivatives, or even both. In the United States, the 
confusion is only exacerbated by Dodd-Frank Act’s pre-emption of insurance law, 
which is coupled with an all-encompassing notion of swaps that extends this 
deregulated category to CDSs on a purely formalistic basis. There is no synthesis 
or compromise between the different views, which merely seem to co-exist side 
by side, at best agreeing to disagree. 
                                                 
190 Hazen 2005: 382. 
191 Ibid. 411–412. 
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In terms of financial regulation, the recent reforms are a modest step 
forward—but very modest indeed, as they are also filled with problems. Firstly, 
the Dodd-Frank compulsory clearing rule is likely to apply only to some CDSs, 
leaving others largely unregulated. Secondly, there are serious worries regarding 
the concentration of systemic risks in derivatives clearinghouses, which may sow 
the seeds of a new crisis. Thirdly, many concerns associated with CDSs remain 
largely unaddressed. Thus there is an urgent need for critical investigation on the 
real costs and benefits of CDSs and their regulatory options.  
 
  TOWARDS CDS REGULATION: ISSUES 
AND CHALLENGES 
This chapter provides an extensive discussion of the issues concerning the 
regulation of credit default swaps. It serves as a basis for a detailed examination 
of the various regulatory alternatives in the following chapters. As was already 
emphasized earlier, it is fundamental to approach the regulation of CDSs in a 
holistic and comparative manner, because there are advantages and 
disadvantages in all the different regulatory alternatives. Moreover, the 
complexity of the financial regulatory architectures in the principal jurisdictions 
implies that there is a danger of getting losing sight of the big picture. 
The chapter is divided into two principal parts: a general and a specific one. 
The general part provides a discussion on the challenges of financial regulation 
generally, focussing especially on risk management and risk allocation in the 
global financial markets of today. This forms the broader framework within 
which the specific regulatory concerns posed by credit default swaps must be 
analyzed. The specific part, then, seeks to identify and critically evaluate the 
various regulatory issues concerning CDSs.  
5.1 THE CHALLENGE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
According to some scholars, there are two fundamental objectives of financial 
regulation: systemic protection and consumer protection.1 Naturally, this is a 
simplification, but precisely as a simplification it serves for the purpose of 
clarifying the analysis when the practical reality of financial regulation is so 
complex. It will be seen later that CDSs pose some other concerns, too, but almost 
all the concerns can be reduced to these two: the stability of the financial system 
as a whole, and the protection of financial market participants including 
investors. This section provides an overview of these challenges, focussing on risk 
management issues, because CDSs are functionally credit risk transfer 
agreements so that their impact has always to do with risk management, broadly 
understood. 
                                                 
1 Davies and Green 2008: 191. See generally Taylor 1995 (defending this model). 
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5.1.1 Managing and Mitigating Financial Risk 
5.1.1.1 Risk, Uncertainty, and Risk Aversion 
Risk and uncertainty are pervasive in economic life.2 In ordinary language, risk 
refers to any possibility of some harm or loss, while in finance it is usually 
understood as any quantifiable uncertainty, whether negative (downside risk) or 
positive (upside risk).3 Often a distinction is made between risk proper 
(understood as measurable uncertainty, with an observable probability 
distribution) and pure uncertainty.4 
Most people are risk-averse, although they may also enjoy specific types of 
uncertainty for its own sake (e.g. in gambling). The common explanation for risk-
aversion is the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, although there may be 
additional explanations also. The general assumption of risk-aversion only holds 
for individual persons. As will be seen later, organizations may operate as if they 
were risk-neutral or risk-loving, depending among other things on how their 
profits and losses will in practice influence their stakeholders. 
5.1.1.2 Ways to Reduce Risk and Uncertainty 
There are two principal ways to manage risk and uncertainty so as to reduce their 
negative effects.5 One is to transfer risks to a person or organization that is less 
risk-averse than the original risk-holder, so that the welfare loss due to the risk is 
diminished. This happens in insurance if the insurer is a risk-neutral party, or 
more generally in risk spreading among a sufficiently large group of persons so 
that the overall effect approaches risk-neutrality even if the participants are risk-
averse. This potential effect of risk spreading is known as the Arrow-Lind 
Theorem .6 
The other and more important way is to reduce the aggregate risk by risk pooling 
and diversification. Technically, pooling refers to situations where two or more 
individuals come together to combine their risks, whereas diversification means 
                                                 
2 On this section, see any microeconomics textbook discussing risk and uncertainty, for 
example Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch 2005: chapter 13. A more extensive treatment is, for 
example, Gollier 2004 and Seog 2010. 
3 See for example McNeil, Frey and Embrechts 2005: 2–3. 
4 This “Knightian” distinction goes back to Frank Knight 1921: chapter 7. However, some 
have questioned the workability of the distinction, on grounds that real-life measurement of 
risk is itself subject to a range of uncertainties: see Taleb 2010: 122–134. 
5 See for example Gravelle and Rees 2004: chapter 19, for a detailed discussion. I am using 
the expression risk management in a broad sense that encompasses any activity aimed at 
minimizing the welfare-reducing effects of risk and uncertainty. 
6 See Arrow and Lind 1970. 
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the same done by an individual actor .7 The principle in both risk pooling and 
diversification is essentially the same, and is summarized by the old adage: 
“Don’t put all your eggs in one basket.” Aggregate risk is reduced by pooling or 
diversification if the different risks are independent (or at least not strongly 
positively correlated). In insurance business, aggregate risks are usually reduced 
by pooling and diversification, and the condition of non-correlation is a basic 
requirement of insurability. 
5.1.1.3 Hedging, Speculation and Risk Management 
It is not infrequently assumed that, in terms of social welfare, hedging is good and 
speculation is bad. Lynn Stout, for example, writes that “insurance [i.e. hedging] 
can leave both the insurance buyer and the insurance seller better off. In contrast, 
betting for speculation is not a mutually beneficial exchange [because] betting 
reduces risk-averse speculators’ welfare”.8 In another article, she argues that this 
view is reflected in both the public square and the legal norms: “The public 
disapproves of speculators. So, traditionally, does the law.”9 
This view is not entirely accurate, however, because it essentially assumes that 
hedging means reducing risks and speculation means accumulating risks. The 
reality is more complicated and the efficiency consequences are more varied.10 
From a social point of view, the transfer of a risk from one party to another cannot 
make that individual risk disappear, so that every hedging transaction implies a 
corresponding speculative transaction by someone else. However, the risk-
transfer increases the efficiency of risk allocation (in the sense of reducing the 
negative welfare effects of risk) if one of the following conditions holds: (a) the 
risk-acquirer is less risk-averse due to a better ability or willingness to bear the risk, 
or (b) it is able to pool or diversify the risk with other risks, so as to reduce the 
aggregate risk.11 
For credit default swaps, this has a range of implications. If we seek only to 
highlight some key points at this stage, one is that both of these conditions are 
normally present when risks are transferred to insurance companies. However, 
even a seemingly speculative transaction by a non-insurer may be efficiency-
enhancing in terms of risk allocation, because some risks are not merely 
independent, but in fact are negatively correlated with each other. The ideal 
example is that of the speculator in forward markets who is able to match each 
buy with a corresponding sell, so that there is practically no residual risk. This 
                                                 
7 See Gravelle and Rees 2004: chapter 19. 
8 See for example Stout 2011: 8. 
9 Stout 1999: 703. 
10 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see for example Lynch 2011. 
11 See for example Gravell and Rees 2004: 507–530 (discussing insurance, risk spreading 
and risk pooling). 
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seems to be quite common in highly liquid forward and futures markets, as is 
demonstrated by the fact that the risk premiums of the intermediaries are 
minimal, covering basically just the administrative costs.12 
In theoretical terms, this kind of perfectly closed position of a speculator 
represents the special case of risk diversification, one in which the different risks 
cancel each other out completely. It must be understood, however, that this kind 
of perfect matching is highly unlikely in CDS markets, because the discontinuous 
nature of credit defaults is such that there is usually no perfectly offsetting 
transaction available: “default is a one-off, often unanticipated event, for which 
there is no correlated, offsetting position with which to hedge”.13 Nevertheless, 
the benefits of portfolio diversification imply that the seemingly speculative use 
of CDSs may be risk-reducing if CDSs are combined with other risks that correlate 
negatively with those speculative risks. 
A second important point to consider is that being less risk-averse is not 
always a good thing from a social point of view, because it may be due to perverse 
incentives. Market participants may be risk-loving because they anticipate that if 
everything goes wrong, the society will come to rescue and bear some share of 
the costs. This is a form of negative externality, which will be discussed shortly in 
more detail, can have the effect of encouraging speculative transactions that are 
not socially welfare-enhancing. 
It is to be noted, finally, that while every hedging transaction implies a 
corresponding speculative transaction, the converse is not necessarily the case. 
Gambling is a purely speculative activity, which represents the artificial creation of 
a new kind of risk, as opposed to the transfer of a pre-existing risk. This may also 
happen with derivatives such as CDSs, because trade in derivatives is not tied to 
the ownership of the underlying asset or risk. Therefore, a CDS transaction is not 
necessarily a form of risk-transfer at all, but it can also be pure risk creation, when 
neither party was originally in possession of the underlying risk. 
5.1.1.4 Limits of Markets 
Financial markets play a fundamental role in facilitating the management and 
reduction of risk and uncertainty, not only by providing opportunities for 
transferring risks between market participants, but also by supplying information 
that transforms uncertainties into identifiable risks, and by increasing trading 
liquidity that reduces uncertainty concerning the sale and purchase of financial 
instruments. Indeed, in a world of perfect markets, the wide range of services 
provided by financial markets, including insurance, derivatives and other 
methods of risk management, is always socially beneficial. Assuming perfect 
                                                 
12 See Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch 2005: chapter 13. 
13 Steinherr 2000: 166. 
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informational symmetries, unlimited brainpower and no transaction costs, 
market-based solutions will yield an optimal allocation of risks.14 
But of course we do not live in such a world. Informational asymmetries 
abound, no human being is capable of making perfect choices with the 
information available, and transaction costs are pervasive. These real-world 
constraints of risk management have numerous practical consequences. Many 
risks are not efficiently transferrable due to transaction costs, and even when risk 
transfer is possible, it may give rise to indirect costs due to informational 
asymmetries and principal-agent problems.15 
This implies, among other things, that the optimal allocation of risks is not 
necessarily one that reduces risks to a minimum, because each risk-reallocating 
transaction gives rise to costs.16 As is widely acknowledged in insurance 
economics, the pervasive problems of hidden action and hidden information 
impose limits to economically feasible insurance. Due to hidden action problems, 
it is not socially optimal to provide insurance for all possible risks, because many 
risks can be better controlled and avoided by the insured than the insurer, and 
insurance tends to reduce incentives to reduce primary risks, giving rise to moral 
hazard problems.17 Similarly, due to hidden information, insurance tends to create 
adverse selection, rendering insurance unfeasible for some market participants and 
creating additional costs.18 
Another limit of markets is that the risk-management failures that happen in 
financial markets tend to have wider economic and social ramifications. When 
there is excessive build-up of financial risk for one reason or another, in theory it 
could be rewound without influencing the real economy, but in practice, this 
tends to be more difficult. Uncertainties and transaction costs lead into lengthy 
bankruptcy procedures, shutdowns and forced liquidations, which destroy real 
economic resources. Most importantly, the search for new employment is time-
consuming and uncertain, giving rise to a significant loss of productive capacity 
and often tremendous human suffering. 
                                                 
14 This follows from the so-called First Theorem of Welfare Economics, which states that 
if there are markets for all goods (and, by implication, all kinds of risks) and all markets are 
competitive, then the equilibrium of the economy is Pareto efficient. See for example Gravelle 
and Rees 2004: chapter 13. 
15 For an extensive treatment of these issues, see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005. 
16 This is analogous to the idea in Law and Economics that the optimal level of crime is not 
necessarily zero: for purposes of legal policy, the supply of criminal activity is determined 
exogenously, so that legal policy can only decide measures to combat it, and given that crime-
prevention activity is costly, there is a limit to how much of it is worthwhile. 
17 See, for example, Seog 2010: chapters 9–10, and Shavell 2004: chapter 11. 
18 See for example Seog 2010: chapters 7–8. 
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5.1.2 Corporate Governance and Its Breakdown 
One of the principal challenges in modern financial markets is the often 
staggering distance between those who make the actual decisions and those who 
are influenced by those decisions. This is essentially the common principal-agent 
problem writ large. The challenge of corporate governance in today’s financial 
markets is arguably one of the key issues for understanding both the present state 
of finance and the challenges of regulating credit default swaps. 
Corporate governance in the broadest terms refers to the “the reconciliation of 
conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders and the resolution of 
collection action problems among dispersed investors.”19 It follows from the 
principal-agent problems of hidden action and hidden information, which are 
widely accepted in business and company law scholarship.20 It is important to 
understand why the problem is especially serious in today’s financial markets, 
particularly in large financial institutions, as this problem has a major impact on 
the practical implications of credit default swaps. 
5.1.2.1 The Opaqueness of Financial Firms 
There are several reasons why corporate governance is especially difficult in the 
world of financial firms. One of them is that banks and other financial institutions 
are highly opaque, which results in greater informational asymmetries than in 
most industries. Ross Levine explains this as follows:  
When outcomes are difficult to measure and easy to influence in the short-run, managers 
will find it easier to manipulate pay-offs from “compensation” packages. Bankers who are 
interested in boosting their compensation in the short run can give a high interest loan to 
a borrower in trouble, thereby boosting interest income. And by controlling significant 
pools of resources, bankers can move asset prices that trigger payments to themselves 
under incentive contracts.21 
One reason for the substantial informational asymmetries is that financial 
assets are intangible in nature and that financial market outcomes are subject to a 
pervasive inference problem. In other words, the measurement and valuation of 
financial assets is subject to significant uncertainty, and the short-term volatility 
of market prices makes it difficult to ascertain whether success and failure were 
due to endogenous or exogenous causes (i.e. skill or sheer luck).22 This makes it 
difficult to correctly judge the competence and integrity of managers based on 
their past performance. 
                                                 
19 Becht, Bolton and Röell 2007: 831. See Gravelle and Rees 2004: chapter 20. 
20 The academic literature goes back at least to the notion of separation of ownership and 
control, identified by Berle and Means 1932. 
21 Levine 2004: 7–8. 
22 See Taleb 2001 for an extensive discussion of this problem and its consequences. 
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5.1.2.2 The Impact of Financial Innovation 
The second reason exacerbates the first one: financial innovations, especially 
financial derivatives, have made it increasingly difficult for outsiders (including 
shareholders and debtors) to know what is really happening inside financial 
institutions. Traditional financial reporting was designed for an entirely different 
context, and financial derivatives cannot be fully measured and reported using 
the traditional concepts of cash flows and assets. It is also widely noted that the 
financial models that are commonly used for valuing derivative positions are too 
simplistic, failing to incorporate systemic risks and so-called tail risks, which can 
be substantial.23 
Apart from opaqueness, derivatives have magnified the problems resulting 
from weak corporate governance. They provide previously inexistent 
opportunities for leverage, enabling individual employees to engage in 
significant risk-taking, which is often hidden even from senior management (and, 
sometimes, incomprehensible to them). All of this provoked the famous investor 
Warren Buffett to write in his famous 2008 letter to shareholders: 
Derivatives are dangerous. They have dramatically increased the leverage and risks in our 
financial system. They have made it almost impossible for investors to understand and 
analyze our largest commercial banks and investment banks. They allowed Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac to engage in massive misstatements of earnings for years. So 
indecipherable were Freddie and Fannie that their federal regulator, OFHEO, whose more 
than 100 employees had no job except the oversight of these two institutions, totally 
missed their cooking of the books.24 
Naturally, there are also useful financial innovations, and the question that 
must be studied carefully is to what extent these problems are actualized in 
concrete cases. Nevertheless, these are serious problems that deeply challenge the 
social efficacy of corporate governance and that cannot be ignored. 
5.1.2.3 Unintended Consequences of Regulation 
Thirdly, greater government regulation of financial institutions (for example, the 
prudential regulation of banks) seems to exacerbate the failure of corporate 
governance.25 Certainly, that regulation may be justified for other reasons, but it 
has the negative effect of reducing incentives to monitor (especially for depositors 
due to deposit insurance), and it creates a false sense of safety that induces 
investors to rely on public oversight, which is often quite superficial and less 
effective than it appears to the public.26 
                                                 
23 See generally Dowd and Hutchinson 2010, and Rajan 2005. 
24 Buffett 2009: 16–17. 
25 See Levine 2004: 9–11. 
26 See for example Levine 2004: 10–11. 
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5.1.2.4 Risk-Loving Behaviour 
The weakened corporate governance of financial firms increases the danger of 
risk-loving behaviour by individual employees, who have a limited downside risk 
and a significant upside risk, especially when a generous bonus scheme is in 
place. Raghuram Rajan points out that the way bankers are compensated—
combined with the fact that their performance is usually evaluated relative to 
their peers—induces “a variety of perverse behavior”: 
One is the incentive to take risk that is concealed from investors—since risk and return 
are related, the manager then looks as if he outperforms peers given the risk he takes. 
Typically, the kind of risks that can be concealed most easily, given the requirement of 
periodic reporting, are risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small 
probability but, in return, off generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are 
knows as tail risks.27 
Rajan’s point about tail risks is of fundamental importance for understanding 
the nature and corporate governance implications of CDSs and other credit 
derivatives. Investment strategies involving credit derivatives and other products 
with large tail risks 
have the appearance of producing very high alphas (high returns for low risk), so 
managers have an incentive to load up on them. Every once in a while, however, they will 
blow up. Since true performance can be estimated only over a long period, far exceeding 
the horizon set by the average manager’s incentives, managers will take these risks if they 
can.28 
To understand the seriousness of the problem, it is helpful to bear in mind the 
fact that, although corporate governance scholarship normally focuses on the 
conflicts of interest between owners and top management, in large financial 
institutions there are numerous levels of principal-agent problems. These go all 
the way from top executive level through middle-level managers to traders and 
other ordinary employees. 
5.1.2.5 Imperfect Risk Models 
It is also important to understand that despite the mathematical and statistical 
sophistication of modern risk management, mainstream risk-modelling methods 
are highly imperfect and subject to important caveats that can become critical in 
times of crisis, so that risk management transactions like credit default swaps may 
fail to behave in the expected manner precisely when they are needed. There is a 
famous earlier case, the colossal failure of the giant hedge fund Long-Term 
                                                 
27 Rajan 2005: 316; see also ibid. 334–339. 
28 Rajan 2005: 337 (emphasis added). 
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Capital Management, which reveals how historical correlations may change 
dramatically when the underlying market conditions change.29  
The LTCM risk is not a mere isolated historical curiosity. According to 
Raguram Rajan, there is a dangerous parallel between LTCM risk arbitrage failure 
and the later use of credit derivatives: 
If firms today implicitly are selling various kinds of default insurance to goose up returns, 
what happens if catastrophe strikes? […] [T]he lessons of summer 1998 following the 
default on Russian government debt is that correlations that are zero or negative in normal 
times can turn overnight to one […]. A hedged position can become unhedged at the worst 
times, inflicting substantial losses on those who mistakenly believe they are protected.30 
That, in fact, is precisely what happened to numerous counterparties of AIG 
during the 2008–09 crisis.31 More generally, one hopes that the difficulties of 
corporate governance in large financial institutions would attract wider scholarly 
attention.32 Unfortunately, the general genre of risk management literature takes 
good governance for granted, simply going through abstract theories, structures 
and measures that take no account of the practical challenges related to their 
implementation, supervision, and functioning in moments of crisis.33 This is to 
the detriment of developing risk management methods and procedures that are 
genuinely workable in the real world—both in normal times and in times of crisis. 
For it is during crises that the value of risk management techniques is tested. 
5.1.2.6 Failure of Corporate Governance, or Externalization of Risk? 
Financial crises in recent years and decades have brought to light numerous cases 
of corporate governance failure in large financial institutions. Not surprisingly, 
in most of the cases, financial derivatives played a key role. Famous examples 
include scandals involving such institutions and individuals as Bankers Trust 
(Andy Krieger), Orange County (Robert Citron), Piper Jaffray (Worth Bruntjen), 
David Askin, Kidder Peabody (Joseph Jett), Barings Bank (Nick Leeson), Long-
Term Capital Management, Enron and World.com (which were heavily involved 
                                                 
29 See Lowenstein 2000. 
30 Rajan 2005: 338. See also Chan et al. 2005. 
31 See further below, chapter 5.2.3.2. 
32 Much of the evidence for the failure of corporate governance in modern finance is 
anecdotal in nature. That does not mean, of course, that anecdotal evidence is without 
importance. Indeed, in the world of finance one might suppose that investors, ex-bankers and 
other practitioners are often better equipped than ivory-tower academics for understanding 
the nature of the game. Excellent general-audience books include Bogle 2008, Bookstaber 2007, 
Das 2006, Dowd and Hutchinson 2010, Lewis 2011, Partnoy 2003 and Steinherr 2000. 
33 I am grateful to Kevin Dowd for pointing this out. See generally Dowd and Hutchinson 
2010 and Hubbard 2009. 
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in financial derivatives), and a vast array of more recent cases such as AIG, Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Northern Rock, HBOS etc.34 
In some cases, the blame has been directed to an individual “rogue trader”, 
but it seems likely that they only account for a small part of the problem. 
According to one group of experts, “the most difficult and intractable institutional 
problem […] is the fact that risk managers report to senior management and, in 
most modern financial institutions, senior managers have an interest in risks 
being underestimated.”35 In other words, top management is often complicit in 
the dubious risk-taking, and may active encourage it. 
There is now an on-going debate on the extent to which excessive risk-taking 
by financial institutions has been driven by short-term gain seeking by corporate 
executives, traders and other decision makers.36 The standard view, represented 
by authors such as Lucian Bebchuk, highlights the intra-institutional moral 
hazard problem.37 This is supported by empirical evidence that executives in 
firms like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers made significant personal profits 
even when shareholders lost everything.38 
However, a simplistic interpretation of these facts—picturing shareholders as 
victim—has been challenged by a competing view, led by Rene Stulz, arguing 
that shareholders actively encouraged excessive leverage and risk-taking by 
financial institution executives, presumably because they also stood to benefit 
from it.39 This would be explained by the fact that, even if risk-taking benefits 
executives disproportionately, it also benefits shareholders disproportionately 
relative to the broader public if an important part of the social cost of risk-taking 
is externalized. Thus, what we have is (at least) a two-level moral hazard problem 
due to risk-taking externalities, and on both levels disproportionate risk-taking is 
encouraged. 
This view is supported by Andy Haldane, Bank of England’s Director for 
Financial Stability, who in the wake of the global financial crisis told the following 
story, which is worth quoting at length: 
A few years ago, ahead of the present crisis, the Bank of England and the FSA commenced 
a series of seminars with financial firms, exploring their stress-testing practices. The first 
meeting of that group sticks in my mind. We had asked firms to tell us the sorts of stress 
which they routinely used for their stress-tests. A quick survey suggested these were very 
                                                 
34 Partnoy 2003 is an entertaining yet well-documented account of these and many other 
cases, going back to the early 1980s and finishing with a warning concerning the growing 
credit derivatives market; see also Steinherr 2000: chapter 3. Lewis 2011 is a celebrated insider 
story of the subprime mortgage fiasco and the role played by credit derivatives in almost 
destroying the banking sector. 
35 Dowd et al. 2011: 18. 
36 See Coffee 2011: 809–813 (summarizing research). 
37 Bebchuk and Spamann 2010: 249–50. 
38 Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann 2010: 261. 
39 Beltratti and Stulz 2009; Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2009. 
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modest stresses. We asked why. Perhaps disaster myopia—disappointing, but perhaps 
unsurprising? Or network externalities—we understood how difficult these were to 
capture? 
No. There was a much simpler explanation according to one of those present. There was 
absolutely no incentive for individuals or teams to run severe stress tests and show these 
to management. First, because if there were such a severe shock, they would very likely 
lose their bonus and possibly their jobs. Second, because in that event the authorities 
would have to step-in anyway to save a bank and others suffering a similar plight. 
All of the other assembled bankers began subjecting their shoes to intense scrutiny. The 
unspoken words had been spoken. The officials in the room were aghast.40 
There are probably numerous cases of corporate governance breakdown that 
will never become public. Many cases are known, however, including the 
following story reported by Kevin Dowd and others, which reveals the failure of 
both internal and external risk management: 
The weakness of [the regulatory] system was highlighted by the FSA’s handling of the big 
bank, HBOS. In the years before the crisis, its head of regulatory risk, Paul Moore, had 
warned his bosses—including then-CEO James Crosby—that the bank was heading for 
problems. The bank, he said, was “going too fast, had a cultural indisposition to challenge, 
and was a serious risk to economic stability and consumer protection.” He subsequently 
likened his experience to being “like a man in a rowing boat trying to slow down an oil 
tanker.” His superiors dismissed his concerns, although they turned out to be amply 
justified. He also raised his concerns with the FSA, but they apparently wanted an easy 
life and did nothing. HBOS senior management eventually decided that Mr. Moore 
“didn’t fit in”—he clearly didn’t—and fired him; for his part, Crosby was subsequently 
rewarded with a knighthood for his services to the finance industry and became a key 
financial adviser to the government.41 
These anecdotes may seem incredible in retrospect, and one might be tempted 
to suppose that they are merely rare exceptions rather than the rule. However, 
the famous Nyberg Inquiry into the causes of the systemic banking crisis in 
Ireland suggests the opposite: it seems to be that weak governance is the rule, 
while good governance is very much the exception.42 Peter Nyberg is scathing in 
his criticism of both the banking sector and the regulatory authorities, 
highlighting numerous examples of bad governance, herding behaviour, 
groupthink, uncontrolled risk-growth and failure to properly implement effective 
risk management procedures.43 Summing up the reckless behaviour of 
management in several Irish banks, Nyberg writes: “It appears now, with 
                                                 
40 Haldane 2009a: 12. 
41 Dowd et al. 2011: 26. 
42 See Nyberg Inquiry 2011. 
43 See ibid., especially 26–29 (“2.5 Governance and Procedures”) and 44–47 (“2.9 Risk 
Management”). 
THE CHALLENGE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
167 
hindsight, to be almost unbelievable that intelligent professionals in the banking 
sector appear not to have been aware of the size of the risks they were taking.”44 
5.1.2.7 Externalities and the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem 
The tragedy is that there seems to be no sign of significant learning from past 
failures. The first famous financial derivative debacles took place in the early 
1980s, but the number of derivatives scandals has only been increasing, especially 
in the run-up to the most recent crisis. Some institutions did react to the early 
cases by adopting some forms of risk management, but the evidence suggests that 
the overall problem has been growing, not diminishing, over time. This suggests 
that the breakdown of effective corporate governance is not due to the absence of 
risk management, but to the lack of genuinely effective risk management and 
supervision. 
Further, it is not only about corporate governance. There is also the problem 
that the size and systemic connectivity of many banks has made them “too big to 
fail.” This is an issue of negative externalities and credible commitments, and the 
behaviour of governments around the world in recent years has proved that it is 
much more than a theoretical hypothesis. This goes far beyond corporate 
governance, as Marco Becht points out: “Corporate governance was never 
designed to internalize contributions to systemic risk.”45 
On the other hand, the externality problem of modern financial markets 
exacerbates the failure of corporate governance, creating a vicious circle. Given 
the expectation—confirmed by recent experience—that public authorities will 
provide generous support to financial institutions that are systemically 
important, moral hazard problems are increased and top management may even 
feel pressured to take on more risks so as not to be run over by competitors. Thus 
investors, particularly shareholders, may not have incentives to restrain 
managers who focus on generating short-term returns at the expense of long-term 
risks.46 
The serious problems of systemic externalities in banking—at least given its 
general operating framework today—have led some commentators to conclude 
that banking is a special kind of business in which fierce competition is not always 
socially optimal, because competition seems to cause lower standards of 
screening and monitoring, and a large part of the cost of failure is borne by 
taxpayers.47 In the oft-repeated words, “Banking should be boring.”48 
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45 Becht 2009: 166. 
46 See Rajan 2005: 348–350. 
47 For technical models on bank competition and credit standards, see for example 
Kanniainen and Stenbacka 1998, and Ruckes 2004. 
48 See for example Bhidé 2010, 2012, and Krugman 2009. 
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5.1.3 The Dilemma of Financial Innovation 
These challenges of financial regulation and risk management at financial firms 
led to the famous question of Raghuram Rajan (then Professor of finance at 
Chicago University): “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?”49 
Rajan pointed out in his famous article that many factors in recent decades have 
increased financial risk taking, which in his view was likely to translate into real 
economic risks: “excessive risk tolerance leads to an excessive willingness to 
finance real investment, with the potential for overcapacity and a waste of real 
resources to society.”50 
Since then, and especially after the global financial crisis, Rajan has not been 
alone among prestigious economists taking a critical view of financial innovation. 
In another famous paper, Simon Johnson and James Kwak asked whether 
financial innovation is good for the economy, finding that there is little 
convincing evidence that recent financial innovation has contributed to real 
economic growth, particularly as much of it has merely facilitate excessive 
leverage and opaque risk transfers by financial institutions.51 Others have taken 
an even more critical stance, among the ex-chairman of the US Federal Reserve, 
Paul Volcker: 
We hear about these wonderful innovations in the financial markets, and they sure as hell 
need a lot of innovation. I can tell you of two—credit-default swaps and collateralized 
debt obligations—which took us right to the brink of disaster. Were they wonderful 
innovations that we want to create more of? [...] I mean: Wake up, gentlemen. I can only 
say that your response is inadequate. I wish that somebody would give me some shred of 
neutral evidence about the relationship between financial innovation recently and the 
growth of the economy, just one shred of information.52 
In itself, this statement is perhaps not surprising; what makes it significant is 
its source. The same is true of a similar critique expressed by Satyajit Das, a 
leading derivatives expert since the 1970s and a long-time advocate of credit 
derivatives,53 at least until recently: 
The unpalatable reality that very few, self interested industry participants are prepared 
to admit is that much of what passed for financial innovation was specifically designed to 
conceal risk, obfuscate investors and reduce transparency. The process was entirely 
deliberate. Efficiency and transparency are not consistent with the high profit margins 
                                                 
49 Rajan 2005. 
50 Ibid. 342. 
51 Johnson and Kwak 2012. See similarly Hill and Painter 2010: 1198, arguing that “in the 
financial services area, perhaps we have had enough innovation for the time being. We do not 
need more new products that investors do not understand, particularly when so many 
investors are institutions run by bankers who respond not by shunning unfamiliar products 
but instead by succumbing to a herd mentality of doing whatever other investors do.” 
52 Volcker 2009. 
53 See Das 2005, which was a leading practitioner’s manual from a financial point of view. 
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that are much sought after on Wall Street. Financial products need to be opaque and 
priced inefficiently to produce excessive profits or economic rents.54 
Naturally, there are also those who defend financial innovation. A balanced 
view in this direction can be found, for example, in Robert Litan, who has sought 
to demonstrate that “there has been more socially useful financial innovation over 
the past several decades” than socially harmful innovation, even if there have also 
been abuses.55 The jury is still out on the issue (probably there is no unequivocal 
answer), but there certainly has been a change in the general climate of opinion, 
particularly in comparison with earlier times when prestigious economists touted 
the benefits of financial innovation on the grounds that it enabled financial firms 
to avoid burdensome regulations.56 
For present purposes, it is however essential to distinguish between 
thoughtful criticism of financial innovation and the proposition of regulatory 
solutions. There are a range of obstacles to purposeful and effective regulation, 
including the dynamics of democratic decision-making, as highlighted by public 
choice theory,57 and the bounded rationality of lawmakers and regulators.58 It is 
therefore essential not to jump directly from criticism to regulation without a 
careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
solutions. These questions will be discussed carefully later, before which it is 
however necessary to take a closer look at the regulatory issues surrounding 
credit default swaps. 
5.2 SPECIFIC POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY CREDIT 
DEFAULT SWAPS 
5.2.1 The Peculiarities of Credit Default Swaps 
It has been repeatedly emphasized that although CDSs are often classified as 
over-the-counter derivatives, they are essentially different. CDSs therefore may 
raise regulatory concerns related to other OTC derivatives, but they also raise 
different concerns, precisely because economically they are credit default 
insurance. 
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5.2.1.1 The Dynamics of Credit Risk 
What credit default swaps transfer is credit risk, i.e. “the risk that a creditor will 
not be repaid in whole, in part, or on time.”59 Understanding the peculiarities of 
credit risk is essential for understanding CDSs, because what makes them 
complicated in practice is not the structure of CDSs (which is quite simple), but 
the fact that credit risk is complicated. 
One peculiarity of credit risk is that it subject to somewhat unusual properties 
at the level of individual contracts. This has been clearly explained by Shadab 
(who, nevertheless, firmly defends a relatively free market for CDSs), who 
emphasizes the difference between credit risk and other types of financial risk: 
Credit risk has unique properties that differentiate it from market risk and other types of 
financial risk. First, the typical credit risk payoff distribution is asymmetric and often 
reflects a binary “default” or “no default” outcome, which leads to losses from credit risk 
having the potential to be large relative to other risks. In addition, changes in credit risk 
and the correlation between different credit risks are generally difficult to measure, 
observe, and hence predict.60 
As a consequence, credit risk transfers imply generally larger and more 
unexpected risks than other forms of financial risk. This inherent characteristic is 
exacerbated by contractual uncertainties and insufficient data: 
Credit losses depend upon relatively infrequent data about defaults, the value of 
collateral, contractual support mechanisms such as third party guarantees, and 
uncertainties relating to legal enforcement of creditors’ rights. Credit risk relationships 
are also often intended to last several years, which results in credit instruments being 
relatively illiquid and requires credit risk models to attempt to predict cash flows over a 
long period of time.61 
In addition to these challenges at the level of individual contracts, credit risk 
has other problematic characteristics at the macroeconomic or systemic level. It is 
observed, for example, that during a stable macroeconomic environment, 
financial markets tend to underestimate credit risks, particularly in relation to 
dynamic risks such as the knock-on effects of liquidity erosion.62 In large part, 
these estimation errors are rooted in insufficient long-term data, and in the 
difficulty of modelling macroeconomic dynamics. 
The systemic or macroeconomic dynamics are further amplified in credit 
default swaps, which tend to be systematically correlated with each other, 
because they “pay off rarely, but when they pay off, they pay off in a highly 
correlated fashion, since they are tied to the same or similar indexes.”63 In terms 
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61 Ibid. 1021. 
62 Ayadi and Behr 2009: 190–191. 
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of policy, this is a major concern, because it means that CDS protection sellers are 
relatively likely to fail when a macroeconomic crisis hits: not only are CDS 
compensations large, but protection sellers will be subject to correlated payment 
calls, and their internal risk models will—at least according to our present 
knowledge—tend to underestimate these systemic risks. 
5.2.1.2 The Social Costs of Default 
Credit risk is also special in that it is inherently linked to costly economic and 
social processes. For example, consumer mortgage defaults (which were the basis 
of many problematic index CDSs) do not merely imply losses to lenders; they also 
mean that people lose their homes, often with devastating consequences for 
individuals and families. Similarly, company bankruptcies and restructurings are 
more than investment losses: large numbers of people lose their jobs, causing 
social insecurity, rising social assistance expenses, and falling tax revenues. 
Bankruptcies also lead to the liquidation of relationship-specific investments, 
causing deadweight economic losses. Sovereign (i.e. government) default is 
especially problematic socially, often leading to disruptions in public finances 
and dramatic cuts to social services such as including health and education. 
Credit risk is furthermore inherently connected to the banking system, which 
is inherently fragile and crisis-prone.64 To be sure, commodity and stock market 
crashes hurt investors and should be avoided, too, but they do not compare with 
the public and social costs of banking crises, which, according to one estimate, 
cause an average 86% increase in government debt in the following three years.65 
For these reasons, regulation should use all means available to reduce the 
probability of banking crises, just as it should be wary of activities that may 
increase credit defaults. Both concerns are discussed next in detail. 
5.2.2 Credit Default Swaps and Financial Stability 
5.2.2.1 Synthetic Securitization 
It is widely believed that CDSs contribute to systemic risk in financial markets, 
which “is in truth but one form of the classic externality problem.”66 In the 
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simplest terms, it is argued that CDSs fails to internalize their contribution to 
systemic risk.67 Systemic risk concerns are especially important for CDSs, because 
they are inherently connected to fundamental credit markets where shocks will 
be easily transmitted to the wider economy.68 
A leading motivation is that CDSs enable banks to lay off risk from their 
balance sheet, thereby freeing up regulatory capital.69 This activity, called 
synthetic securitization, may in theory be socially beneficial: for one thing, it 
facilitates access to capital, like mortgage securitizations, which have increased 
home mortgage lending.70 For example, pre-crisis research has found that banks, 
which adopted advanced credit risk management techniques, experienced 
around 50% permanent increase in their target loan levels.71 
For another thing, it has been claimed by ISDA that “CDS strengthen the 
financial system”.72 This is because they enable markets to disperse default risk 
more widely, thereby softening the costs of default, as Alan Greenspan argued 
already in 2002: 
[These episodes] suggest a marked increase over the two or three decades in the ability of 
modern economies to absorb unanticipated shocks […]. [T]his has doubtless been 
materially assisted by the recent financial innovations that have afforded lenders the 
opportunity to become considerably more diversified and borrowers to become far less 
dependent on specific institutions or markets for funds.73 
In reality, these benefits are subject to significant caveats, including the 
presence of less-rigorously regulated entities, the limits of diversification, and the 
existence of liquidity shocks. These caveats will be discussed next. 
5.2.2.2 Shifting Risks to Less Regulated Entities 
One problem with CDS risk transfers is that they normally imply that risks are 
being shifted from tightly regulated entities such as banks to lightly regulated 
                                                 
CDS markets with traditional “commons” situations, which give rise to a tragedy of 
commons). 
67 See Johnson 2011: 212–216. 
68 On this, see also King and Maier 2009: 289 (noting that some markets are systemically 
more important than others due to their interconnections). 
69 Shadab 2010: 411; ECB 2004: 17 (describing motivations for banks to engage in credit 
risk transfer activities). 
70 Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1024–1025. 
71 Goderis et al. 2007. 
72 ISDA 2014c. 
73 Greenspan 2002. 
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entities such as insurers and hedge funds.74 Hedge funds in particular have been 
identified as a problematic participant in CDSs.75 There is no reason to judge 
hedge funds en masse, but they do raise a number of regulatory concerns, because 
they are essentially less-regulated or unregulated financial entities that are subject 
to limited disclosure requirements and may engage in more aggressive trading 
strategies.76 Unsurprisingly, “the rate of hedge fund failure is considerably 
higher” than that of other financial actors,77 and their size and leverage raise 
systemic concerns.78 
Insurers selling CDS protection may appear less alarming, but in practice they 
often seem to act in conjunction with hedge funds: according Shadab, what has 
normally happened is that CDSs were “written on mortgage-related securities by 
[the] unregulated affiliates” of monoline insurance companies, which in turn 
wrote financial guaranty insurance on the CDSs.79 In fact, the disastrous CDS 
business of the insurance giant AIG was conducted by “a financial products 
division which was very lightly regulated” and was “a hedge fund basically that 
was attached to a large and stable insurance company”.80 One should therefore 
not be too naive about insurer participation in CDSs. Moreover, it is unclear 
whether traditional insurance regulation adequately addresses concerns related 
to credit risk.81 
Shifting risks from tightly regulated to less regulated entities is a form of 
regulatory arbitrage, and it may be the principal reason why precisely CDSs have 
become so popular in recent years, far beyond traditional credit insurance or 
financial guaranties. This creates externality costs, because financial entities (and 
their employees) have a limited downside risk in the event that things goes bad. 
In consequence, “a protection seller has an incentive to sell too much 
protection”.82 
                                                 
74 Whitehead 2010: 4–5, for example, points out that “banks relied on new instruments—
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This is not socially helpful. Already in 2002 Howard Davies, then-director of 
the UK Financial Services Authority, argued that with credit derivatives, “we 
may be creating, not reducing market instability.”83 Whether the issues can be 
reduced by better hedge fund regulation raises questions that exceed the scope of 
this study,84 but it is clear that merely shifting risks to less regulated entities is 
likely to create social costs. According to Viral Acharya and Matthew Richardson, 
the use of CDS for regulatory capital relief was also an important contributor to 
the increasing leverage of regulated financial institutions before the crisis.85 
5.2.2.3 Risk Diversification: More Robust—or Less? 
The picture gets more complicated when there is the possibility of risk 
diversification, which CDSs presumably facilitate. According to standard 
insurance theory, better diversification reduces overall risks.86 Pre-crisis research 
seemed to confirm this view, suggesting “that risk diversification had been 
pushed so far as to reduce systemic risk to a negligible level.”87 It has also been 
argued that transferring credit risk from banks to the non-banking sector may 
increase financial stability, because banks are relatively fragile institutions.88 
Subsequent events revealed that something fundamental had been ignored.89 
There are several interacting factors, one of which is that credit risk transfers may 
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86 Battiston et al. 2012: 138. 
87 Ibid. 139. 
88 Wagner and Marsh 2006 (arguing this with a formal model). 
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reduce each institution’s individual probability of failure, but make systemic 
crises more likely due to interconnectedness.90 According to John Coffee, “although 
it is commonly said that major financial institutions are ‘too big to fail,’ it is more 
accurate to say that they are ‘too correlated to fail.’”91 This is a fundamental point, 
that has not received sufficient attention in public policy: it is not size but 
interconnectedness that is the fundamental problem, so that regulation that 
merely targets large financial institutions is unlikely to be effective and may even 
encourage risk-shifting towards smaller but highly interconnected institutions 
that are more difficult to observe and supervise. 
A second problem is that when banks face idiosyncratic liquidity risk, credit 
risk transfer increases contagion problems between banking and non-banking 
sectors.92 This danger was identified already in 2006 by Francis Allen and Elena 
Carletti: “Although credit risk transfer may not pose a systemic problem at the 
moment, it may do in the future as it continues to grow in importance. […] Hedge 
funds have become increasingly important in many markets. They potentially 
provide a conduit for contagion across many illiquid markets.”93 
CDS markets also foster instability because of their size: it has been noted that 
in 2005, the downgrading of General Motors’ credit rating “sent shock waves 
through the credit derivative market because of the huge volume of General 
Motors credit derivatives.”94 This suggests that widespread participation in CDS 
markets may, paradoxically, be destabilizing in times of tension, because major 
defaults will affect a larger number of market participants in ways that are 
difficult to anticipate. Investor Warren Buffett understood this as early as in 2003: 
Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic problems, in that participants who 
can’t bear certain risks are able to transfer them to stronger hands. […] [O]n a micro level, 
what they say is often true. [… We] believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous 
and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become 
concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade 
extensively with one other. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others. On top of 
that, these dealers are owed huge amounts by non-dealer counterparties. […] Linkage, 
when it suddenly surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems.95 
ISDA has nevertheless argued that CDSs reduce systemic risk because they 
“prevent large concentrations of risk that otherwise would occur.”96 This view 
seems to erroneously treat risk concentration—that is, size—as the key problem, 
                                                 
90 See Wagner 2010 (demonstrating this with a formal model); Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 
1040 (raising this concern with CDSs). 
91 Coffee 2011: 801 n.18. 
92 Allen and Carletti 2006 (demonstrating this formally). 
93 Allen and Carletti 2006: 110. 
94 Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1034. 
95 Buffett 2003: 14. 
96 ISDA 2014c. 
TOWARDS CDS REGULATION: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
176 
whereas it ignores the issue of interconnections: “Instead of redistributing credit 
risks, CDS have actually contributed to intensifying systemic risk by 
concentrating exposure on a handful of highly interconnected players that are 
simultaneously buyers, sellers and underliers.”97 Moreover, ISDA’s claim may be 
empirically mistaken, because it has not in fact reduced large concentrations of 
risk, as happened not only among dealers, but also among some protection sellers 
such as AIG. 
5.2.2.4 Funding Liquidity Shocks and the Limits of Collateral 
One dynamic whereby risk diversification leads to systemic failure is that there 
may be liquidity shocks due to so-called runs on short-term lenders, causing 
default cascades in financial networks.98 To avoid misunderstandings here, it is 
necessary to distinguish between two different forms of liquidity. One is market 
(or asset) liquidity, which “refers to the ability to sell or unwind positions quickly 
without affecting their price”.99 The other is funding liquidity, meaning “the ability 
of an investor to raise cash to meet its financial obligations.”100 The issue of 
interest here is not the market liquidity of CDSs, but the funding liquidity of CDS 
dealers and protection sellers. 
The collapse of hedge funds and investment banks is, in fact, typically due to 
funding liquidity rather than insolvency.101 Like the problems mentioned in the 
previous section, funding liquidity is also potentially common to other OTC 
markets, but in the case of CDSs they are amplified by the unpredictable 
dynamics of credit risk. Counterparty risk in financial markets is normally 
controlled through contractual margin or collateral, which is a form of loss 
reserving, functionally similar to regulatory capital, but based on private 
agreement.102 
One concern with CDSs is that collateral practices are incomplete and uneven, 
and many transactions are made without collateral.103 But that is not the main 
concern: the bigger issue how the peculiarities of credit risk affect the dynamics 
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of CDS collateral.104 To understand how this happens, it is convenient to 
distinguish between initial margin, which is “collected at the onset of the swap,”105 
and variation margin (or mark-to-market margin), which is determined “to reflect 
current exposure, or ongoing changes in market value.”106 
The problem is that the latter is poorly equipped to deal with credit risk: 
“because a default is a discrete event, it can lead to large jumps in the value of 
these contracts. […] With such jumps to default, collateral will not be enough to 
protect buyers of protection in the event of a counterparty default”.107 According 
to Hakenes and Schnabel, insufficient collateral and “funding liquidity risk” can 
lead to a “liquidity spiral”.108 All of this implies that bilateral margin 
arrangements have systematically procyclical effects, which are especially 
unpredictable in the case of credit defaults. 
A closely related problem is that, for traders functioning as intermediaries 
(including centralized counterparties!), it is difficult to neutralize CDS risks: 
Unlike interest rate swaps, in which the various risks of a customized transaction can be 
isolated by traders and offset in liquid underlying money and currency markets, credit 
default swaps involve “lumpy” credit risks that do not lend themselves to 
decomposition.109 
This moreover implies that large and concentrated dealer positions can cause 
systemic problems even if they are apparently hedged by offsetting CDSs.110 As 
Acharya and others correctly point out, these destructive dynamic are really just 
peculiar manifestations of negative risk externalities: 
The main reason for systemic risk in these [OTC derivative] markets is that bilaterally set 
collateral and margin requirements in OTC trading do not incorporate the counterparty 
risk externality that concentration of trades with specific counterparties with insufficient 
liquidity and capital to absorb the potential losses imposes on the rest of the financial 
system.111 
It seems, therefore, necessary to rethink CDS regulation specifically in terms 
of internalizing these negative externalities. 
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5.2.3 CDS and the Global Financial Crisis 
Due to the aforementioned problems, CDSs have been widely accused for 
contributing to, and exacerbating, the global financial crisis (GFC) that started in 
2007 and caused significant private and public costs.112 Not all agree, though; at 
the other extreme, ISDA for example has claimed that “CDS had nothing to do 
with the crisis.”113 Who is right? 
No doubt, the causes of the crisis were complex and it is necessary to avoid 
simplistic reductionisms. Colin Scott and John Biggins have expressed this 
complexity thus: “The ultimate roots of the GFC are multifaceted and traceable to 
a multitude of festering structural and cognitive deficiencies in the international 
financial system which eventually fused into a catastrophic chain reaction of 
events.”114 This is probably true, and the resulting question is what role was 
played by credit default swaps in the catastrophic chain reaction of events. 
5.2.3.1 Sub-Prime Lending and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
It is probably accurate to say that the sudden collapse of the United States 
mortgage markets, particularly its sub-prime sector, was the key or at least one of 
the keys that triggered the global crisis. In the words of Scott and Biggins:  
the GFC owes its immediate trigger to accelerating mortgage defaults in the US. This, in 
turn, led to a collapse of the speculation-dominated market for securitised mortgage 
products and contingent derivatives. Systemically important institutions such as Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers and American International Group (AIG) began to realise losses 
on securities and derivatives portfolios, resulting in a slew of credit ratings downgrades, 
in turn triggering a crisis of market confidence and freeze in inter-bank lending. This 
generated a self-reinforcing liquidity crisis which interplayed with a solvency crisis at 
major institutions, resulting in a full-blown financial crisis.115  
There is probably no denying that a major role was played by mortgages and 
a range of arrangements built around them. This is important, because the 
relationship between mortgages and CDSs is not absolutely evident. In 
consequence, “[d]efenders of CDSs maintain that it was sub-prime lending and 
securitised products that caused the credit crisis.”116 
There are at least two problems with this, however. One problem is that, as is 
widely agreed, CDSs “facilitated the boom in subprime lending that occurred 
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after 2000”.117 According to Shadab, they did this in two ways: they “helped to 
facilitate the growth of mortgage-related securitization by providing banks with 
protection from the risks involved with securitization. In addition, CDSs enabled 
the creation of mortgage-related securities by allowing for the creation of 
synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).”118 In addition, CDSs played an 
important role in the end-game phase of the subprime scramble, as they enabled 
investors to bet against the subprime mortgage market.119 
The infamous CDOs no doubt raise additional concerns of their own,120 but 
they cannot be separated from CDSs, which play an essential role in most 
CDOs.121 According to McIlroy, “CDSs were often used as part of the 
enhancement of a collateralised debt obligation (CDO)” and “portfolio CDSs were 
used to achieve the same economic effect as a CDO in synthetic securitisations.”122 
Another problem is that blaming the crisis on sub-prime mortgages only begs 
the question of how the collapse of a relatively small mortgage market could have 
such dramatic consequences. This was only possible due to crisis-prone 
interconnections between high-risk lending and the rest of the financial system. 
Morgan argues that CDSs were at the heart of the contagion: 
Once the value of the sub-prime mortgage-based assets in CDOs began to decline, this 
triggered a range of changes in the CDS contracts built on and around them. In particular, 
collateral demands which had been relatively low suddenly rose massively as underlying 
CDOs began to look more vulnerable to default. Sellers of CDS contracts found 
themselves unexpectedly having to put up large sums of collateral which they did not 
have available.123 
This concurs with the description of CDS dynamics explained earlier. 
Therefore, to blame the crisis on sub-prime lending is what detective literature 
traditionally calls a red herring, something that diverts attention from the real 
culprit. Sub-prime lending and other economically dubious practices only 
reflected the perverse incentives created by regulatory arbitrage that enabled 
market participants to avoid traditional lending regulation. Moreover, the 
systemic consequences of the mortgage fallout were triggered precisely by the 
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destructive dynamics of CDSs, as their collateral agreements could not cope with 
the large and highly correlated losses that are typical of credit default. 
5.2.3.2 The AIG Fiasco 
The failure and bailout of the insurance giant American International Group 
(AIG) in 2008 has been amply documented elsewhere,124 so here the question is 
simply what it reveals about CDSs. The events lend themselves to different 
interpretations. On one hand, New York State Governor David A. Paterson, in a 
2008 interview, called CDSs “gambling” and claimed that they were at the heart 
of the AIG fiasco.125 In contrast, ISDA maintained after the crisis that “AIG doesn’t 
prove anything” about CDSs.126 A total denial is hardly credible, and ISDA has 
subsequently toned down its rhetoric, stating that “AIG’s Financial Products unit 
was clearly an outlier in many of its business practices and policies, and its 
situation reflects failure on many levels. This includes how AIG managed its 
mortgage risks and exposure, as well as how it managed its collateral and 
liquidity.”127 That of course is true, but it avoids the question why it all happened, 
and assumes that AIG’s mistakes were purely internal, unrelated to the dynamics 
of CDSs. 
ISDA also admits that AIG—along with Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and 
others—took on too much risk, but ISDA denies that this had something to do 
with CDSs: “Whether they took on the risk by making loans, buying mortgage 
backed securities, or guaranteeing loans held by others, the risks—and the 
results—were the same.”128 But that is clearly untrue: as explained earlier, the 
reckless growth of mortgage lending was linked to regulatory arbitrage whereby 
risks where shifted from tightly regulated to lightly regulated entities, so that 
CDSs contributed to more risk being taken and borne by entities unprepared to 
manage it. 
In reality, the failure of AIG illustrates many of the problems discussed earlier. 
Importantly, it sold CDS protection not as an insurer, but through “AIG Financial 
Products (AIGFP), a largely unregulated financial services subsidiary of AIG.”129 
It therefore “was not required to hold capital or reserves against its potential CDS 
payouts”,130 and as a matter of fact it posted minimal collateral, because 
counterparties relied on the parent company AIG that provided guaranties on the 
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CDSs.131 The resulting arrangement was highly fragile, but this was not visible, 
because “[i]nsurers are not forced to disclose volume of these subsidiaries’ CDS 
positions”.132 It is also worth noting that AIG’s CDS positions were “accounted 
for as derivatives, not insurance policies”.133 This made them appear less risky 
than otherwise would have been the case, given that insurance accounting is 
generally more conservative as it seeks to discourage excessive growth that can 
threaten insurers’ solvency.134 
AIG’s bailout raises further questions.135 The conventional view is that, given 
AIG’s size and interconnectedness with the broader world of finance, its failure 
was seen as threatening financial markets at large.136 In strict terms, however, the 
CDS losses of AIGFP did not threaten AIG’s normal insurance business, which 
was not legally responsible for the losses of the unregulated subsidiary.137 No 
doubt, the matter was complicated, and authorities had to act quickly with 
limited information.138 Nevertheless, the cynical view, advanced by New York 
Times in 2008, is that public money was really being used to bail out AIGFP’s CDS 
counterparties such as Goldman Sachs, which according to the paper stood to lose 
“as much as $20 billion” from the collapse.139 Goldman quickly denied this, 
claiming to have hedged its AIG exposure and calling the report “seriously 
misleading.”140 Subsequent evidence, however, belies Goldman’s denial, as 
“[s]ettlements made to AIG counterparties after its bail-out show how 
interconnected it was with other major CDS dealers,” with a total payout of $49.5 
billion including $11 billion to Société Générale, $8.1 billion to Goldman Sachs, 
$5.4 billion to Deutsche Bank, and so on.141 Influential scholars such as Jonathan 
Macey have adopted this interpretation of the events: “Goldman received even 
more solace when the US Treasury ensured a further windfall to Goldman when 
it awarded Goldman 100% of what it was owed on these CDSs despite AIG’s 
financial collapse.”142 
If the cynical view of the AIG bailout is correct, the implication is not merely 
that it was an indirect way of subsidizing the leading investment banks that had 
made billions as CDS intermediaries; it also means that many problems 
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associated with CDSs were effectively concealed by the bailout, because the AIG 
rescue package effectively rescued the investment banks that otherwise would 
have suffered huge losses, possibly leading to much more serious problems due 
to interconnections. In consequence, the problems were attributed to the reckless 
AIG alone, when in reality, its numerous counterparties—the world’s leading 
investment banks—had acted equally irresponsibly, and the failure of their CDS 
positions would have had devastating systemic consequences in the absence of 
the bailout. Thus, the bailout may have been justified, but it implies that the CDSs 
were at the heart of the crisis and almost caused a total collapse of global financial 
markets. 
5.2.3.3 Investment Banks, Especially Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers 
Despite the bailouts, some institutions were allowed to fail and the failure of two 
investment banks in 2008—Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers—has been partly 
associated with CDSs.143 ISDA, however, has argued that Bear Stearns’ failure was 
due to “a classic liquidity squeeze” and that “CDS did not in any way cause the 
failure of the firm.”144 In an earlier statement, it even claimed that “Lehman had 
no CDS problems.”145 In fact, ISDA and others assert that Lehman’s orderly 
failure only proved the resilience of CDS markets.146 It is certainly true that Bear 
Stearns failed as a result of a huge liquidity squeeze, but that only begs the 
question why it suffered such a sudden and unprecedented liquidity squeeze. As 
we have already seen, this was only the logical consequence of the fact that Bear 
Stearns was one of the biggest players in CDSs, in addition to being also “a 
leading prime broker for hedge funds.”147 
The argument about Lehman Brothers and CDS resilience is more 
complicated. On one hand, it is correct that Lehman’s failure did not devastate 
financial markets, although one should not ignore “the severe market disruptions 
that followed its bankruptcy in mid-September 2008.”148 CDS markets also 
momentarily “froze, as Lehman was believed to be counterparty to around $5 
trillion of CDS contracts.”149 The case was, moreover, “the largest bankruptcy in 
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history.”150 If, in the end, Lehman’s net exposure was smaller than expected, the 
case only demonstrates the degree of artificial uncertainty created by opaque CDS 
transactions. On the other hand, if Lehman truly was less exposed to CDS risks 
than expected, it is unclear what its collapse can prove about CDS markets. King 
and Maier note that “the Fed’s decision to intervene in the rescue of Bear Stearns” 
was due to “concerns that the failure of Bear Stearns posed for the OTC credit 
default swap (CDS) market.”151 In contrast, Lehman was allowed to fail, because 
it had a smaller derivatives portfolio, and was less connected to hedge funds.152 
We do not know what would have happened if Bear Stearns had been allowed 
to collapse freely. The standard view seems to be that, without the intervention 
of the New York Fed in 2008, “the unwinding of Bear Stearns’ derivatives 
portfolio could have been extremely dangerous.”153 The probable conclusion is 
the same as in the AIG case: if the alleged resilience of unregulated CDS markets 
during times of crisis fundamentally depends on public rescue packages, then 
this is hardly a well-designed regulatory regime.154 
5.2.4 Perverse Incentives of CDS Hedging 
So far, the analysis here has focused on problems associated with CDS protection 
sellers. They are not the only source of policy concern, because it seems that the 
protection buying of credit default swaps also influences the incentives and 
behaviour of credit market participants. The compensation under CDSs is 
determined objectively regardless of what connection, if any, the CDS protection 
buyer had to the underlying debt, and critics have argued that this can create 
incentives “to affirmatively destroy value”.155 In what follows, the policy concerns 
related to CDS protection buying are first discussed in relation to hedging 
positions, including ordinary hedging and over-hedging. In the subsequent 
section, the discussion proceeds to purely speculative CDS buying, that is, where 
there is no hedging function. 
5.2.4.1 Lending and Hedging: Distorting Signalling and Monitoring 
Already before the crisis, several authors pointed out that loan securitization and 
CDSs may destroy the signalling value of bank debt,156 and reduce monitoring 
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quality.157 In terms of economic efficiency, this is counterproductive: “since banks 
are often particularly well-positioned to monitor—due, among other things, to 
their sophistication and the access they have to the details of a debtor’s finances—
the use of credit default swaps can neutralize a very good monitor.”158 
Indeed, responding to Alan Greenspan’s argument that the relatively 
contained collapse of Enron demonstrated the benefits of CDSs, Partnoy and 
Skeel speculated that it may have been precisely the fact that Enron’s bankers had 
largely shifted their risks to others that made them so careless about Enron’s 
dubious activities that led to its demise.159 Whether this was the case is difficult to 
confirm, however, and there is generally a lack of empirical data on the broader 
question. Moreover, traditional insurance will have the same incentive effect, so 
it is not restricted to CDSs. Probably the main issue is whether the hedging 
transactions are sufficiently transparent so that other market participants can take 
this into account. 
Other proposals have been made to mitigate the monitoring issue. One 
possibility is that CDS protection sellers might take an active monitoring role in 
order to control abuse. However, insurance companies and pension funds are 
unlikely to provide effective monitoring, because “they have no relationship with 
the borrower and are less skilled and experienced in evaluating risk.”160 Hedge 
funds, in contrast, might emerge as active monitors.161 Yet hedge fund 
participation in CDSs involves a range of concerns, including the lack of sufficient 
loss reserving and the use of significant leverage. Moreover, there is a danger that, 
insofar as an active monitoring role enables hedge funds to acquire more sensitive 
information about a company’s financial situation, it also provides them with 
new opportunities to reverse their net CDS position and to profit by attacking the 
troubled borrower; in the words of some commentators, the result is “a Darth 
Vader monitor”.162 
5.2.4.2 Over-Hedging: The Empty Creditor Problem 
The incentive problem goes beyond signalling and monitoring, however. The 
empty credit problem is a term developed to refer to the issue that, if bondholders 
buy CDS protection beyond their level of ownership, their over-hedged position 
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makes them benefit from pushing distressed debtors into bankruptcy.163 
Moreover, even without over-hedging, CDSs will reduce incentives to find a 
cooperative solution and render creditor negotiations more difficult.164 Hedge 
fund representatives respond that “their stern stance instills financial discipline 
and doesn't reward unnecessary profligacy.”165 But this is socially costly because 
of the wider social and economic ramifications of company restructuring and 
bankruptcy. 
The problem should not be exaggerated, given that CDS holders do not 
necessarily have destructive incentives and they cannot always cause a default.166 
The opaque and OTC nature of CDSs however makes it difficult to debate the 
problem for lack of clear empirical evidence.167 This serves to highlight the 
importance of improving transparency. Indirect and anecdotal evidence is not 
lacking, though. Partnoy and Skeel, for example, cite the Tower Automotive case 
of 2004 as evidence that hedge funds participating in credit and CDS markets tend 
to take a more short-term and aggressive approach that renders it more difficult 
to save ailing companies.168 Many CDS and CDO investors also admit “that they 
have no workout expertise and no intention of participation in any [corporate] 
restructurings.”169  
To resolve the empty creditor problem, one proposal is to require physical 
instead of cash settlement as this might improve incentives to negotiate with the 
debtor.170 However, it is still unclear how much this would help.171 It would 
moreover effectively dismantle ISDA’s dispute resolution regime, which avoids 
physical settlement. Another proposal is to require more position disclosure so as 
to warn the market.172 In other words, this is a transparency policy. A longer-term 
possibility is that “bond covenants may be designed to adjust downwards the 
voting rights of bondholders who may become empty creditors.”173 
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5.2.5 Purely Speculative CDS Buying 
One of the most heated criticisms of CDSs is that they enable purely speculative 
positions that negatively influence the underlying debt. For example, the 
European sovereign debt crisis that started in 2010 brought the accusation that 
aggressive CDS speculation had aggravated the situation of troubled states.174 
5.2.5.1 Uncovered or Naked Short Selling with CDSs 
The distinction between covered and uncovered (also known as “naked”) CDSs 
merits a clarification. This terminology is known from other areas of finance, but 
the meaning is different. In stock markets, this distinction refers to two different 
types of short selling, so that a covered position is one where the short seller has 
borrowed the relevant shares before selling them, whereas in a “naked” position 
the seller has not set aside any shares to settle the transaction.175 Covered short 
selling incurs borrowing fees, but uncovered positions may cause settlement 
problems, which is why regulators often limit the availability of naked short 
selling.176 In contrast, in the CDS ambit the distinction refers to fundamentally 
different investment positions—namely, hedging and speculating—so that in a 
covered CDS the protection buyer has an interest in the reference credit, whereas 
in an uncovered CDS this is not the case and the protection buyer is betting on 
the debtor’s default.177 
Uncovered CDSs are of great practical relevance: it has been “estimated that 
as much as 80 per cent of the CDS market is traded by companies that do not own 
the underlying debt.”178 It is possible that some of these positions have an indirect 
hedging motive, but still a majority of CDSs may be used to create risks that did 
not exist before, and CDS markets are literally filled with speculators hoping for 
default. 
5.2.5.2 The Economics of Short Selling 
Is purely speculative short selling desirable from a social point of view? Perhaps 
surprisingly, there is no simple answer. In financial economics, short selling is 
generally seen as efficiency enhancing, although both theory and empirical 
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evidence are more nuanced.179 On the one hand, short selling is seen as 
contributing to pricing efficiency, because it transmits contrarian views into market 
prices and reduces asset overvaluation.180 There is some evidence that short 
sellers are relatively well informed about fundamentals, implying that they help 
price discovery.181 On the other hand, it is found that short selling aggravates 
market crashes and price declines.182 For opaque and fragile firms like banks that 
depend on short-term financing, short selling may also trigger self-fulfilling 
prophecies, for example due to funding liquidity problems.183 Finally, there is 
evidence that insider information may be used by short-sellers to provoke 
disorderly price movements.184 
Similar benefits and worries have been expressed with respect to uncovered 
CDSs.185 They may potentially reveal new information about borrowers, thereby 
reducing informational premiums on bonds and bank lending.186 In opaque and 
illiquid credit markets, however, negative price spirals may ensue, and 
“boundedly rational and liquidity-constrained investors may fall into pricing 
errors, particularly in turbulent times.”187 
There is, fortunately, a growing body of empirical research on the effects of 
CDSs on the underlying credit markets, but the results are mixed.188 For example, 
some studies suggest that CDS trading in normal times is associated with slightly 
lower borrowing costs and more liquidity, although it unclear whether there is a 
causal link or mere correlation.189 However, the same data set shows that, during 
crisis, firms included in CDS indices faced higher spreads than their peers, 
suggesting that CDSs tend to intensify price shocks.190 
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5.2.5.3 Price Discovery or Destabilization? 
The as-of-yet unanswered question is whether and under what circumstances 
CDSs contribute to price discovery as opposed to price destabilization. In favour 
of the discovery thesis, there is research suggesting that CDS prices are more 
informationally efficient than stock markets, possibly due to lack of restrictions 
on insider trading.191 However, these results are limited to earnings surprises; in 
contrast, another study found that CDS spreads were significantly overpriced 
relative to economic fundamentals.192 
It has further been observed that CDS prices were efficient in terms of 
fundamentals before the crisis of 2007–08, but they underreacted to earnings 
announcements during the crisis, and overreacted after the crisis.193 Moreover, it 
is a common view that the contractual characteristics of CDSs render them 
informationally inefficient: “They are often demonstrably unrelated to default 
probabilities […]. Many highly variable factors influence the CDS-bond spread: 
liquidity premia, compensation for volatility, accumulating counterparty risk in 
chains of CDS contracts.”194 
Perhaps the balanced view is that CDSs do react more quickly and thus 
contribute to price discovery, but they also tend to overshoot in times of crisis and 
exacerbate debtor distress.195 Thus, for example, CDSs are observed to move 
before bond spreads in less-developed markets,196 whereas in developed 
economies, CDS spreads dominate only in times of distress.197 Some of this effect 
may be due to faster price discovery, but it is also argued that, during market 
distress, high-leverage CDSs can be used to “exert a downward pressure on the 
underlying bond prices.”198 More generally, it is probably that, in informationally 
imperfect markets, uncovered and opaque CDSs can generate destabilizing 
signals.199 
                                                 
191 Alexopoulou, Andersson and Georgescu 2009; Zhang and Zhang 2013. 
192 Aizenman, Hutchison and Jinjarak 2011. 
193 Jenkins, Kimbrough and Wang 2011. 
194 Porters 2012. 
195 Delatte, Gex and López-Villavicencio 2012: 490–492 (analyzing evidence that CDS 
speculation influences bond markets during distress). 
196 Ibid. 482 (citing studies to this effect in emerging economies, but noting that in low-
yield countries bond markets move first or contemporaneously). 
197 Ibid.483. 
198 Ibid. 490. 
199 Amadei et al. 2011: 32–33; Juurikkala 2012a: 328; Delatte, Gex and López-Villavicencio 
2012; Porters 2012. 
SPECIFIC POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
189 
5.2.5.4 Overshooting Upwards and Downwards 
There is thus clearly a need for more empirical research, but in policy terms, the 
current evidence supports at least a moderate case for restricting uncovered CDS 
positions.200 Assuming that CDSs have a positive effect on underlying credit 
markets in normal times, that is probably due to hedging positions that facilitate 
risk management. In contrast, the destabilizing effect is due to the growth of 
speculative short positions in bad times.201 Therefore, if there is a workable way 
of restricting purely speculative CDS positions, that should reduce the harm 
without removing the benefits. Naturally, we will have to investigate in due 
course whether such restrictions are really workable. 
It has been argued against this view that uncovered CDSs have enabled astute 
investors to profit from market imperfections, for example by short selling the 
housing market.202 That is correct, but such bets have no clear social benefit, 
because they do not help to prevent those imperfections. Instead, the current state 
of CDS regulation facilitates overshooting both ways, that is, upwards and 
downwards: it facilitates credit bubbles by enabling reckless risk-taking, as 
explained earlier, and it exacerbates the collapse when things go bad. 
5.2.6 Opacity 
5.2.6.1 Its Implications for Financial Stability 
The opacity, i.e. lack of transparency, of recent financial innovations such as credit 
default swaps is a widely cited problem.203 A European Commission working 
paper in July 2009 identified opacity as the principal reason for the financial crisis, 
and explicitly mentioned credit default swaps as a particular problem: 
The opaqueness of the market prevented, on the one hand, other market participants from 
knowing exactly what the exposures of their counterparties were to these three entities 
[Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG], which resulted in mistrust and in the sudden 
drying up of liquidity. On the other hand, it also prevented regulators from being able to 
identify early the risks building up in the system, the extent to which risks were being 
concentrated and consequently the effects that their default would have for financial 
stability [...] the crisis has highlighted how derivatives in general and CDS in particular 
created a web of mutual dependence that was difficult to understand, disentangle and 
contain in the immediate aftermath of a default. Therefore, the crisis has clearly shown 
that the characteristics of OTC derivative markets—the private nature of contracting with 
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limited public information, the complex web of mutual dependence, the difficulties of 
understanding the nature and level of risks—increases uncertainty in times of market 
stress and accordingly poses risks to financial stability.204 
The Bank for International Settlements likewise wrote that, due to the opacity 
of CDSs, “the identity of who bears the credit risk that has been transferred out 
of the banking system is not always clear. It can be difficult even to quantify the 
amount of risk that has been transferred.”205 In consequence, other market 
participants “cannot adjust their behavior accordingly.”206 
5.2.6.2 Opacity and Market Abuse 
Lack of transparency has also enabled insider trading and facilitated market 
manipulation. For example, concerns were raised in 2008 that the CDS market 
was being manipulated, but it was and still is difficult to know whether this was 
truly the case, because regulators had insufficient information on the deals.207 
There is, moreover, significant evidence that CDSs have been used for insider 
trading in markets and instruments that otherwise are subject to insider dealing 
restrictions.208 This is a major problem—assuming, of course, that insider trading 
is harmful.209 
5.2.7 CDS Benefits: A Reassessment 
The ongoing discussion has focused on the problems and concerns created by 
credit default swaps. Naturally, these contracts may also have benefits, which 
should not be ignored. But how real are those benefits? This section offers a 
critical evaluation of the principal alleged advantages of CDSs, namely risk 
management, liquidity, and risk pricing information. The objective is not to deny 
that these benefits may obtain, but to seek a more balanced assessment of their 
extent and applicability. 
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5.2.7.1 Risk Management 
For the reasons discussed earlier, it is of great social importance that credit risk 
be properly managed and allocated. In theory, CDSs may contribute to better 
credit risk allocation, because they enable firms and other risk-takers to better 
manage certain risks as well as to obtain efficiency-enhancing investment 
positions.210 Some claim that CDSs are more flexible than conventional guarantees 
or credit insurance, because they can be more easily tailor-made to suit particular 
risk profiles regardless of asset ownership.211 In efficient financial markets, more 
efficient risk allocation should also reduce borrowing costs for firms.212 
We should not be excessively naïve, however, about the risk-management 
enhancement provided by products such as credit default swaps. There are firstly 
principal-agent problems within institutions, as already discussed extensively, 
which imply that complex financial arrangements will not always be employed 
unequivocally for the benefit of the principals. Secondly, even supposing the 
absence of corporate governance difficulties, CDSs may be transacted without 
fully understanding and correctly estimating the risks involved, as Mugasha (a 
CDS advocate) points out: 
The dramatic growth of credit derivatives in recent years has stretched the ability of the 
market participants to monitor and control the attendant risks. Financial institutions may 
not fully comprehend the instruments or risk involved, or have the systems in place to 
mitigate the risk of loss. The specific risks that have been identified include inadequate 
strategic planning; lack of management accountability and understanding; poor controls 
over information technology infrastructure; inadequate risk management systems; 
outdated systems, controls, and procedures; inadequate definition of responsibility; and 
deficient system selection procedures.213  
It is worth noting that selling CDS protection is functionally equivalent to 
selling insurance, which is highly risky business. Traders and entire units in 
financial institutions may get carried away by the attraction of quick profits that 
are later converted into extreme losses, as in fact happened in the events that led 
to the global financial crisis.214 These problems have been exacerbated by the 
opaqueness of these transactions, but it has also been argued that there are more 
fundamental difficulties related to the modelling of complex credit risk. In some 
cases firms have imprudently relied on inadequate computer models: “AIG 
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senior executives, relying on quantitative risk models, concluded that losses on 
credit default swap transactions were unlikely and, as a result, viewed the 
protection buyers' periodic payments as ‘gold’ or ‘free money.’”215 
According to Whitehead, the seemingly sophisticated quantitative risk 
models of AIG and its subsidiary AIGFP failed to incorporate the dynamic 
consequences of “a downgrade in AIG’s credit rating, which was particularly 
important since AIG was a guarantor of AIGFP’s obligations.”216 This led to 
negative spiral: “As AIGFP’s swap contracts moved ‘in the money,’ reflecting the 
drop in value of the underlying CDOs, AIG was forced—due to its credit 
downgrade—to post billions of dollars in collateral against the unrealized paper 
losses, weighing down its credit rating even further.”217 The apparent 
sophistication of the computerized model may have even rendered it more 
difficult for the executives to realize the limits of the model. 
One might, again, presume that the problem is limited to a few imprudent 
operators, but others argue that, in addition to such extreme cases, many market 
participants are not equipped to personally assess the limits of the methods used 
in modern financial engineering, or indeed the reliability of the financial advice 
they receive.218 This is, first of all, a problem for end-users, who frequently do not 
have the necessary competence and equipment for making state-of-the-art 
valuation models, or for understanding their results.219 Moreover, the results of 
complex statistical models are often used for forecasting purposes—after all, what 
truly interests market participants is not the past but the future—but this does not 
correspond to the way the models are built.220 This has caused numerous mistakes 
in recent years: 
Ignorance of statistical pricing methods and of how they underlie derivative trading 
values has exposed numerous town hall treasurers to some highly unfavourable deals. 
Instruments that were variously presented as “techniques for optimising interest rate 
payments” and “modern debt management” were, in fact, no more than badly priced 
wagers on the yield curve. Losses were considerable […].221 
The situation is obviously not helped by the fact that the dealer banks, which 
dominate the valuation process, frequently seem to provide insufficient or even 
misleading information to the end-users, as recent cases have once again 
revealed.222 
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Rene Stulz takes a more optimistic view, arguing that firms now have good 
methods for understanding risks, such as value-at-risk (VaR) and stress tests.223 
But in fact, both of these methods have been widely discredited in the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis, if not earlier.224 
In fact, all of this should lead us to ask a simple question: what exactly is the 
risk-management contribution of credit default swaps when compared with 
earlier products such as guaranties and traditional credit insurance? It seems 
surprisingly common merely to assume that there is a notable difference, but if in 
fact the real difference is that the selling and purchase of CDSs has been relatively 
free from regulation, so that they could be sold by hedge funds and other lightly 
regulated entities, then it is unlikely that we are dealing with a financial 
innovation that can add value to the society at large. 
5.2.7.2 Liquidity 
Advocates of CDSs also argue that these products bring indirect benefits, the 
principal of which is increased liquidity.225 When plans were revealed to reduce 
the scope for short-selling sovereign debt through CDSs in Europe, the standard 
criticism was precisely that banning uncovered CDS positions would reduce 
market liquidity.226 We will have to return to the liquidity debate in the context of 
the new European regulation, but the question also merits a more general 
assessment. 
It is first necessary to clarify what is meant by liquidity in this context. As was 
noted earlier, there is a distinction between market liquidity and funding liquidity, 
terms that refer to entirely different issues. If earlier the issue or problem 
associated with CDSs was the latter (funding liquidity), here the argument is that 
the benefit of unregulated CDS markets is the former (market liquidity).227  
There are at least two reasons why the alleged liquidity benefits of 
unregulated CDSs should not be given undue importance. One is that, as Lynn 
Stout argues, “the economic value of providing greater marginal liquidity in the 
spot market for equities has not been empirically established and is easily 
exaggerated.”228 The authors of the UK Turner Review are equally sceptical, 
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pointing out furthermore that liquidity often comes with other costs: “Beyond a 
certain degree of liquidity and market completion, the additional allocative 
efficiency benefits of further liquidity and market completion may be relatively 
slight, and therefore easily outweighed by additional instability risks which 
increasing liquidity or complexity might itself create.”229 
The other reason is that one should always ask who is supposed to benefit 
from further market liquidity. David McIlroy argues concerning liquidity: “Its 
contribution to the public good is only indirect. The public good is not directly 
advanced by the increase of liquidity on the financial markets tout court nor by a 
multiplication of financial markets.”230 Theodore Margellos advances a view that 
is more openly critical: “The fundamental question is: liquidity for whom? 
Liquidity has a legitimate meaning only for the owner or the issuer of the bond. 
Buying CDS without owning the underlying security actually decreases liquidity 
for the owner of the bond.”231 
We will return to the factual debate shortly, but the issue raised by McIlroy 
and Margellos is fundamental: if unregulated CDS markets merely improve the 
liquidity of those CDS markets themselves, potentially even damaging primary 
lending markets, one can legitimately ask whether this sort of liquidity is worth 
pursuing. 
5.2.7.3 Risk Pricing Information 
Nevertheless, and in spite of the limits to the liquidity argument, there remains 
another potential indirect benefit of CDSs, namely their positive informational 
externalities. Naturally, this connects with the market liquidity argument in that 
if CDS markets have positive externalities by providing valuable price 
information, then there are a public benefit flowing from liquidity and pricing 
efficiency in those very CDS markets. 
The alleged informational benefit has been expressed by ISDA as follows: 
“CDS serve a valuable signaling function—CDS prices produce better and more 
timely information.”232 Moreover, ISDA argues, “CDS provide important 
information about credit conditions, helping bankers and policymakers to 
supervise traditional banking activities.”233 The extent to which this CDS 
information is better may be debated, but as Partnoy and Skeel note, it is in any 
event “an additional source of marketbased information about a company's 
                                                 
gets reflected into stock prices hours or minutes faster than it would otherwise may be modest 
at best.” For more details, see Stout 1988: 695; Stout 1995: 683–88. 
229 Turner Review 2009: 41.  
230 McIlroy 2010: 305. 
231 Margellos 2010. 
232 ISDA 2014c. 
233 Ibid. 
SPECIFIC POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
195 
financial health.”234 They further argue that the market-based nature of CDS price 
information renders it an interesting alternative to the “notoriously flawed” 
system of credit ratings.235 Flannery, Houston and Frank Partnoy have indeed 
developed a detailed, albeit initial, proposal for replacing credit ratings with CDS 
spreads at least in some cases. 236 
There are numerous doubts, however. Principally, there is the issue of 
whether and to what extent CDS prices produce better and timelier information. 
On the one hand, there is a study by Szu-Lang Liao and Jui-Jane Chang arguing 
that, using credit derivative prices, it was possible to predict the approaching 
credit crisis already towards the end of 2006.237 On the other hand, the UK Turner 
Review is more reserved: “Bank CDS prices before the crash of 2007 did not 
provide forewarning of the scale of problems ahead.”238 
Of course, both statements may be true in that CDS spreads did anticipate 
some of the problems, and probably did so better than public stock market prices 
(possible in part due to the relatively easiness of using insider information in CDS 
markets, which would be illegal in stock markets), but the pre-crisis CDS spreads 
were nevertheless an imperfect estimate of the future events. This is supported 
by the view of the Turner Review, which is that “CDS prices, far from providing 
a useful market-based measure of fundamental credit risk, systematically 
understate risk in the upswing and overstate it in the downswing, in a fashion 
well familiar in the insurance markets.”239 
This tendency to understate and overstate risk is supported by many empirical 
findings. For example, Jenkins, Kimbrough and Wang found that CDS prices 
underreacted to earnings announcements during the credit crisis of 2007–08 
(implying that the implied risk estimates were probably too high), and 
overreacted to earnings announcements after the crisis (probably implying too 
low risk estimates).240 Alessandro Fontana and Martin Scheicher also found that, 
in European sovereign bond and CDS markets, CDS spreads since September 
2008 on average exceeded bond spreads.241 The Bank of England likewise has 
claimed that index CDSs “overreacted to the troubles of the subprime market.”242 
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Insofar as a similar tendency for cyclical underestimation and overestimation 
is found in insurance markets, too, this may be due to a range of reasons including 
the limits of dynamic risk modelling, as discussed earlier. In addition, there are 
additional reasons why CDSs may be ill suited for providing efficient credit risk 
information. One is market concentration, as not a long ago the 10 largest dealers 
accounted for 90% of CDS trading volume in terms of gross notional amounts,243 
which can contribute to pricing inefficiency and short-term volatility in turbulent 
times.244 
Another problem is that it is always difficult to accurate price derivative 
products.245 If this is difficult for any derivatives, it is even more so when the 
contract concerns credit risk, which has peculiar characteristics as noted earlier. 
Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that the calculation of the correct CDS price 
has been especially difficult in relation to subprime mortgages.246 
There are, therefore, many reasons to be sceptical about the positive 
externalities of CDS prices. Over and above these concerns, the proposal for using 
CDS spreads as a substitute for credit ratings has met with scepticism, not only 
because CDS prices may be inefficient in themselves, but also because those prices 
do not in fact provide a reliable estimate of default probabilities: the calculation 
of implied default probabilities from CDS spreads is not an automatic process, 
but it requires many further assumptions that render the process complex and 
subject to significant inaccuracies.247 
5.3 CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF CDS ON RISK 
ALLOCATION 
In theory, economic risks will be allocated more efficiently when there are 
suitable instruments for “a broader range of risk–return combinations and a 
wider pool of underlying risks.”248 Assuming that financial market participants 
are acting efficiently to trade risks, more flexible risk-transfer products will 
therefore benefit the society as a whole. The question is whether this assumption 
is always valid.249 
The present chapter has advanced a range of perspectives and arguments that 
challenge an excessively naïve view about the economic and societal 
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consequences of CDSs, showing that these transactions create a range of 
behaviours that may weaken and threaten the stability of financial markets. 
Before an evaluation of the principal regulatory alternatives in what follows, this 
concluding section will briefly revisit the big picture in terms of socially efficient 
risk allocation. 
5.3.1 Are Credit Default Swaps Socially Value-Adding? 
One question that should be asked is what exactly is the value-adding innovation 
that renders credit default swaps beneficial for purposes of risk management and 
risk allocation. It is well known that banks have managed credit risk long before 
CDSs through such contracts as third party guarantees and letters of credit.250 
While those contracts may raise separate regulatory issues, too, the key point to 
consider here is that if CDSs have now caused a significant growth in credit risk 
transfers, this can only be the case if credit risk transfers have become much 
cheaper than in the past. This in turn can only be explained if (a) the transaction 
costs of CDSs are much lower than those of functionally equivalent transactions, 
and/or (b) the risks are being transferred to parties that are willing to take on those 
risks at a lower price. 
The first explanation (lower transaction costs) seems unlikely, because CDSs 
are, or have been, over-the-counter products and hence highly profitable to 
dealers, which implies that they are relatively costly for end-users in terms of 
intermediary fees. The latter explanation is more probable, which raises the 
question of what might explain the willingness of some parties to sell credit 
default insurance through CDSs. In this respect, it might be the case that, before 
the advent of CDSs, the market for credit risk transfers was artificially expensive 
and inefficient, but there seems to be no evidence to support this. Therefore, the 
willingness of CDS protection sellers to provide this protection at relatively low 
prices probably implies that (i) they estimate the real economic risks at incorrectly 
low levels, and/or (ii) they do not in fact take on all the economic risks. 
As has been argued, both of these reasons may obtain in CDS markets. This is 
also admitted by scholars that take an optimistic view of CDSs, including 
Houman Shadab, who notes that at present “a protection seller has an incentive 
to sell too much protection”.251 Rene Stulz admits likewise, adding that there is 
evidence that this has been happening: 
because of their built-in leverage, credit default swaps may make it possible for investors 
to take riskier positions than they could otherwise. To the extent that the most optimistic 
and least risk-averse investors may be those whose investment opportunities are 
expanded by the availability of these instruments, these instruments may lead to price 
distortions where risk is underpriced. Before the credit crisis, the compensation required 
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by investors to bear the risk of high yield debt (so-called “junk bonds”) was at historic 
lows.252 
If we analyze the situation from a value-addition viewpoint, CDS trading due 
to incorrect estimation of real economic risks is not necessarily value adding, 
because it implies mispricing of credit risk.253 In the second case, where protection 
buyers do not take on all the risk, the transaction may be positively harmful for 
social risk allocation, because it means that the risks are being transferred to 
parties less capable of bearing them. This coincides with the fact that the leading 
protection buyers have been hedge funds (which are largely unregulated) and 
insurance companies (which are less heavily regulated than banks).254 The 
spectacular collapse—and the subsequent public bailout—of AIG and of 
numerous banks involved in CDSs confirm the fears that these arrangements 
imply an externalization of credit risks. 
Naturally, the role played by CDSs in the recent financial crises should not be 
exaggerated so as to claim that they automatically cause problems. This does not 
mean, however, that the problem with CDSs is merely their misuse, as some 
commentators suggest.255 To speak of misuse implies that problems will be 
avoided if market participants use CDSs correctly. But what is the correct use of 
CDSs? If they, or any other financial transactions, provide legally permitted 
opportunities for avoiding reasonable regulatory restrictions and externalizing 
their business risks to the rest of society, it is necessary to clarify in what sense 
that is a misuse of the product. It will be a moral abuse, not an economic misuse. 
To be sure, certain moral principles are fundamental for the functioning of the 
economy, but a regulatory policy that creates a glaring opposition between 
morality and profitability is hardly a constructive proposition for encouraging 
morally upright behaviour. 
5.3.2 Increasing Intermediation and Interconnections 
In addition to the foregoing, credit default swaps raise another general problem 
from the viewpoint of efficient risk allocation, which is that they contribute to the 
complexity of the financial system as a whole. This is problematic in light of the 
corporate governance problems as well as the cognitive limitations discussed 
earlier. In other words, CDSs not only provide opportunities for shifting risks to 
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less regulated parties, but they also increase the likelihood of systemic 
consequences of a failure in some part of the financial system. 
In the words of Ayadi and Behr, ”the multiplication of layers of intermediation 
between borrowers and lenders that has characterised the financial system for the 
past few decades may create new channels for the transmission of shocks within 
the financial markets and into the economy at a global scale, therewith 
exacerbating contagion risks.”256 CDSs thus make it more difficult to identify and 
locate risks in the financial system.  
This is a key issue for CDSs, and one that fundamentally hinges on our 
assumptions concerning the limits of rationality in economic decision-making. 
The assumption here is not that investors are inherently irrational; it is that there 
are limits to the way in which human beings can and do correctly obtain and 
process complex information. The argument is that, even with the best of modern 
financial mathematics, many aspects of complex economic risk cannot be 
meaningfully modelled, so that good risk management will ordinarily require not 
ever more sophisticated risk transfer instruments, but simple and transparent 
structures that make it relatively easy to tell who is holding the risks and how 
large those risks are. 
5.3.3 CDS and the Transformation of Banking 
The effect of CDSs on financial risk allocation may be further illustrated by 
considering the way in which it has changed the traditional model of banking 
business. As has been mentioned several times, CDSs have often been seen as 
facilitating access to capital, and in that sense they have among other things caused 
an increase in home mortgage lending.257 Importantly, however, the new 
availability of capital is not due to the accumulation of more capital in the 
economy, as that can only be achieved through savings; nor is it due to better 
information on potential borrowers—in fact, the informational links between 
borrowers and risk-bearers are weakened in consequence. 
Therefore, it seems that this increased availability of capital (or access to 
capital) is achieved through the relaxation of lending standards and/or greater 
leveraging of investment capital. In both cases, the practical effect is that lenders 
are taking more risks than before. In theory that is not necessarily a bad thing, but 
the relaxation of lending standards makes future crises more probable, and 
greater leveraging makes them more costly. 
We have seen, though, that one of the effects of CDSs is that credit risks are 
being shifted away from banks and other primary lenders to non-bank financial 
institutions such as insurance companies and hedge funds. This may mean that, 
at least formally, the leverage of banks is not being increased. It is, in fact, tied to 
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regulatory limits anyway, which is precisely one of the reasons why there is an 
economic interest in shifting the risks to less tightly regulated institutions. But if 
it is not necessarily the banks that are becoming more leveraged, it is the financial 
system as a whole that is becoming more leveraged, as lending risks are being 
pushed to less regulated, more leveraged institutions. 
At the same time, this process of shifting the principal economic risks away 
from the ordinary lending relationship implies that the incentives to scrutinize and 
monitor the borrowers will be detached from the interest in scrutinizing and 
monitoring. It is therefore to be expected that, even if banks do not self-
consciously relax their lending standards, nevertheless those standards will be 
relaxed in fact, given the intense market and workplace pressure to obtain deals 
and make more business. The problem was well expressed by the Nyberg Inquiry 
on the Irish banking crisis: 
It could be argued that bank management in Ireland, like many banks elsewhere in the 
world, had forgotten the very nature of credit. Providing credit is not a sale of bank 
services; it is the acquisition of a risky asset. […] This apparent inability, some might say 
unwillingness, of Irish banks to remember this basic principle of banking was a major 
cause of the banking crisis in Ireland. This problem was further exacerbated as many 
banks appear to have emphasised and valued loan sales skills above risk and credit 
analysis skills.258 
The point is that such forgetfulness was not a mere psychological problem; it 
was the result of the way in which transactions like credit default swaps have 
effected a hidden but fundamental transformation of the banking business. 
 
                                                 
258 Nyberg Inquiry 2011: 50. 
  CDS REGULATION: THE PRINCIPAL 
STRATEGIES 
The previous chapter sought to evaluate the general and specific issues that may 
justify regulatory intervention with respect to credit default swaps. The existence 
of problems is of course only the starting point of regulatory analysis, because 
regulation has its limits and it tends to have unintended consequences. This 
chapter therefore examines the four leading regulatory approaches: self-
regulatory mechanisms, informational regulatory, compulsory central 
counterparty clearing, and insurance regulation. These approaches should be 
seen as complementary, and indeed the current regulatory setup embodies some 
aspects of them all. The analysis proceeds by an overview of the present situation 
under each regulatory strategy, followed by a critical analysis of its setbacks and 
finishing with proposals for the future. 
6.1 SELF-GOVERNANCE BY ISDA 
The most important governance regime in CDS markets globally is the 
sophisticated contractual architecture developed by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA), as was seen earlier.1 Commentators agree that 
the practical significance of the ISDA regime “cannot be underestimated.”2 Even 
after recent reforms, this self-regulatory regime continues to determine numerous 
aspects of CDS markets. It is therefore essential to inquire to what extent self-
regulation is adequate and appropriate, and what could be done to remedy its 
weaknesses. 
Financial self-regulation is hotly debated, both generally3 and with respect to 
CDSs.4 After the financial crisis, scepticism has increased,5 but some continue to 
argue that CDS self-regulation is sufficient and optimal.6 No doubt, self-
regulation has notable benefits. This section explains how ISDA’s CDS regime 
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functions, critically examines its advantages and disadvantages, and evaluates 
proposals for light-touch intervention that would respect the self-regulatory 
regime in its essentials. 
6.1.1 The ISDA Architecture 
The history and principal features of the ISDA architecture has been explained 
earlier, so that what interests us here is to critically analyze its practical 
functioning in light of regulatory issues.  
6.1.1.1 The Building Blocks 
In their excellent study of the ISDA regime, Gelpern and Gulati summarize the 
role of the ISDA Master Agreement thus: 
The Master Agreement is at the centre of the ISDA framework. [...] the Master operates 
bilaterally between the parties that adopt it; however, in some respects it resembles an 
industry-wide constitution. This is because the core terms (representations, covenants, 
events of default, early termination procedures) apply across the derivatives industry and 
across all product categories.7 
The Master Agreement therefore does not make up the entire architecture, but 
is a kind of a skeleton around which the other elements are put together. 
Regarding the principal building blocks of the ISDA architecture, there are firstly 
the so-called Schedules, which are negotiated and may be used to vary or tailor the 
standard terms. There are secondly Protocols, “which effect industry-wide 
changes to the Master; market participants that accede to a protocol are bound by 
its terms vis-à-vis others that do the same.”8 Through the protocols, participants 
in the ISDA architecture not only obtain contracting efficiencies but also are 
enabled to update the framework across a range of transactions in a standardized 
fashion. 
There is thirdly Credit Support documentation, which “establishes the terms on 
which the contracting parties may obtain collateral from each other to mitigate 
counterparty credit risk.”9 This documentation is relationship-specific, so that it 
may cover a range of contracts between two counterparties. It also varies between 
jurisdictions. At the product-specific level, fourthly, there are Definitions, which 
“are incorporated by reference in individual transactions. Like the Master, these 
apply market-wide; unlike the Master, they are limited to particular derivatives 
products, such as equity, credit, or commodities swaps, and over a dozen 
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others.”10 Finally, there is the Confirmation, “the only transaction-specific 
document in the suite, which sets out the economic terms of a trade and 
incorporates the relevant Definitions.”11 
6.1.1.2 Avoiding Disputes: Contract Termination and Close-Out Netting 
Financial markets dislike legal disputes, and the ISDA architecture has been 
astonishingly successful in reducing litigation.12 One of the secrets behind this 
phenomenon is that the Master Agreements provides efficient self-help remedies, 
such as terms stipulating quick transaction termination in the event of 
counterparty default or other specific Termination Events such as a change of law 
rendering the contract illegal.13 
In order to terminate transactions neatly, the Master Agreements include 
detailed close-out netting provisions, whereby all the outstanding transactions 
between the parties are summed up to calculate “a single net sum [that] will 
terminate all the transactions subject to the process.”14 This is far quicker and 
more precise than the application of general contract law.15 As Joanne Braithwaite 
explains: 
Under English contract law, remedies are only available in limited circumstances, such as 
on misrepresentation or breach of a contractual term. By contrast, the MA provides parties 
with a remedy in a far more extensive and finely tuned range of circumstances, which 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Kimball-Stanley 2008: 251; Flanagan 2001: 229–234. 
13 See Braithwaite 2012a: 787–788 (describing these mechanisms). The Master Agreement 
makes a subtle distinction into two different contract termination bases: “The first stage of the 
MA ‘self-help’ remedies classifies events that may disrupt the parties’ dealings as either 
Events of Default (for example, failure to pay or deliver, or ‘Bankruptcy’) or as Termination 
Events (for example, the contract becoming illegal because of a change of law in an applicable 
jurisdiction).” (ibid 787). Distinction has to do with the idea that “Events of Default reflect 
undesirable behaviour on the part of one party, while Termination Events are beyond the 
parties’ control.” (ibid). Consequently, the termination mechanism is different: “if an Event of 
Default occurs, the outstanding transactions between the parties will either terminate 
automatically (if the parties have provided for this), or the Non-defaulting Party may elect to 
terminate them by serving notice on the Defaulting Party. By contrast, the consequences of a 
Termination Event are more nuanced. For example, some Termination Events trigger a 
Waiting Period, while others require the Affected Party to make reasonable efforts to transfer 
the contract to avoid the Termination Event. However, a Termination Event can, ultimately, 
also lead to the contract being terminated early.” (ibid 788). 
14 Ibid. 788. 
15 Ibid. 789.  
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reflect the industry’s collective wisdom about the possible types of disruption in these 
markets.16 
To be sure, some aspects of these mechanisms rely on concessions from 
national legal rules, as will be seen shortly. 
6.1.1.3 Resolving Disputes: Auction Settlement and the Big Bang Protocol 
Another key feature of the ISDA architecture is the mechanism for resolving 
dispute when they do arise. The background to this mechanism is that the early 
growth of CDSs caused practical problems, when the unregulated market 
attracted protection buyers that did not hold the underlying debt, rendering 
physical settlement difficult and disorderly.17 In some cases, the outstanding CDS 
amount “was in some cases reported to be as much as ten times the amount of 
bonds actually available to settle trades”.18 This caused the CDS fiasco of 2005 
related to a series of corporate bankruptcies, producing a short squeeze on the 
underlying bonds.19 Cash settlement was possible, but subject to a costly 
determination by each dealer.20  
The solution was developed in two steps. The first was to introduce in 2005 an 
auction settlement mechanism, so that cash-settlement obligations would be 
determined by a market-wide auction.21 This was vital for index CDSs, and 
facilitated the explosive growth of CDS markets.22 The second step was the Big 
Bang Protocol adopted in 2009, which is a private procedure for determining 
whether a credit event has occurred.23 The objective is to establish uniform 
interpretation of credit events (a frequent source of disagreements) as well as to 
avoid physical settlement.24 
The Big Bang Protocol is especially interesting, as instead of taking credit-
event disputes to court, CDS parties submit cases to Determination Committees 
(DCs) consisting of ten dealers and five end-users, with ISDA serving as 
secretariat.25 Decisions require an 80% supermajority, “designed to signal 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Mengle 2007: 20–21. 
18 Ibid. 21. 
19 See ibid., as well as Pollack 2012a (describing the Delphi case). 
20 Mengle 2007: 21. 
21 Ibid. See also Pollack 2012c (describing in detail the stages of CDS settlement). 
22 See Pollack 2012b (providing a range of data). 
23 See Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 362–365 (describing Big Bang Protocol). 
24 See Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 362. 
25 Ibid. 363. 
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consensus and non-dealer inclusion. If no supermajority is reached, the question 
is referred to External Review, which is more like traditional arbitration”.26 
In general, however, this is not ordinary arbitration, because Determination 
Committees only decide upon a limited number of questions, specifically whether 
a credit event has occurred, without hearing broader contractual disputes.27 
Moreover, DC decisions are not issued to individual counterparties, but represent 
“interpretive rulings at the request of industry members to the industry as a 
whole.”28 Yet they are contractually binding on parties subscribing to the Big 
Bang Protocol; parties can opt out, but in practice the Protocol is nearly 
universally adopted.29 
6.1.2 Advantages of ISDA Self-Regulation 
6.1.2.1 Efficiency Benefits 
ISDA’s self-regulatory system has undeniable benefits. It has created a high 
degree of standardization, reducing transaction costs.30 The Novation Protocol 
adopted 2005 has enabled relatively functional secondary markets in agreements 
that in principle are strictly bilateral.31 Like all good self-regulation, the ISDA 
regime is also “more market sensitive and more flexible,” and “designed by 
people more familiar with market practices”.32 For example, the close-out netting 
regime reflects “the industry’s collective wisdom about the possible types of 
disruption in these markets” and provides a wider range of remedies than general 
contract law.33 
Likewise, the auction settlement mechanism is fast and done by industry 
practitioners, “pre-empting uninformed contextualism on the part of the lay 
judiciary”.34 Evidence of its efficiency is that by mid-2012, “unanimous decisions 
were reached for 96% of the 900 questions referred to [Determination 
Committees]; only one case was referred to External Review.”35 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 350. 
29 Ibid. 364. 
30 Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1025–1026. 
31 See Mengle 2007: 18–20 (explaining that CDSs cannot be traded like securities, and how 
novations or assignments function). 
32 Davies and Green 2008: 210–211 (noting these as arguments for self-regulation). 
33 Braithwaite 2012a: 789. 
34 Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 365. 
35 Ibid. 363. 
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6.1.2.2 Systemic Risk Reduction? 
ISDA also argues that its self-regulation improves financial stability, because the 
close-out netting mechanism provides quick resolution of intertwined positions, 
which otherwise could cause domino effects among interconnected financial 
institutions.36 Other netting practices like trade compression help to display this 
reduced gross exposure before bankruptcy.37 
The Big Bang settlement mechanism may also reduce systemic risk. This is 
because one way in which dealers control exposure is by entering into offsetting 
trades,38 but this strategy is limited by “basis risk,” i.e. the prospect that hedging 
transactions might turn out differently in practice, so that a dealer “might find 
itself paying out on some CDS but unable to collect on the offsetting ones.”39 Big 
Bang does not remove all basis risk, but it reduces it by ensuring uniform 
interpretation of specific credit event.40 
On the other hand, some aspects of ISDA architecture may also create new 
types of systemic risk. One is the Credit Support Annex, a standard-form 
contractual annex for counterparty collateral management.41 Standardization 
reduces transaction costs,42 but it also creates an artificial uniformity that 
exacerbates market-wide collateral crises that force institutions to sell assets in 
unison.43 
6.1.3 Doubts 
6.1.3.1 Confirmation Backlogs 
Even from an efficiency viewpoint, however, the ISDA architecture has its flaws.44 
A frequent complaint is confirmation backlogs causing confusion in documentary 
records, particularly in relation to novations.45 ISDA has sought to address the 
problem,46 but still during the financial crisis, “after Bear Stearns was acquired by 
JP Morgan Chase, its new owners discovered a large amount of unconfirmed 
                                                 
36 See Mengle 2010; Scott and Biggins 2012: 328. 
37 Shadab 2012: 1041. 
38 Shadab 2012: 1040–1041. 
39 Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 362. 
40 Ibid.  
41 See Whitehead 2011: 335, 353–356 (describing the ISDA Credit Support Annex). 
42 Ibid. 354. 
43 Ibid. 355–356. 
44 See Johnson 2011: 210–212 (describing operational problems in CDS markets). 
45 See Mengle 2007: 19–20. 
46 Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 359. 
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credit default swaps.”47 Some also argue that the development of electronic trade 
processing may fail to ensure “that the confirmation captures the true agreement 
between the parties” especially in relation to CDSs, where “not all commercially 
relevant issues may be dealt with in the documentation.”48 
6.1.3.2 Auction Settlement: Is the Price Reliable? 
A second concern is that auction settlement may create uncertainty, at least for 
CDS buyers that are seeking to hedge existing positions.49 In earlier physical 
settlement, bond-holding CDS buyers automatically obtained the full face value 
of the debt, whereas in auction settlement, the agreed-upon payment has 
sometimes been significantly below actual loss.50 
One reason for the discrepancy is that standardized, market-wide CDS 
auctions require simplifying assumptions that fail to reflect some of the 
complexities of real-world credit agreements: “debts have a lot of different 
features, including but not limited to maturity, coupons, currency, embedded 
derivatives, and rankings.”51 Standardization has benefits, but it comes with the 
cost of sometimes forcing different realities into the same model. 
There is, moreover, evidence that the auction settlement mechanism may 
produce systemically biased results in terms of the settlement amount (biased either 
upward or downward, depending on the case).52 In theory, the CDS auctions are 
supposed to “discover what loss a bondholder in the defaulted entity would have 
suffered.”53 This is done by a kind of artificial bond trading session between CDS 
dealers that provides an estimate of the expected recovery value of the underlying 
debt.54 Without going into too much detail, the key problem seems to be that these 
CDS dealers have their own CDS positions, and it is their participation in the bond 
auctions that determines the subsequent CDS payments.55 
                                                 
47 Stulz 2010: 87. See also Tett 2009: 224 (providing details). 
48 Benjamin 2007: para. 5.77. 
49 See Pollack 2012a. 
50 Id. (citing Satyajit Das). 
51 Pollack 2012b. For more details, see Pollack 2012c. 
52 See Pollack 2012e (describing reasons and citing empirical evidence). The study cited by 
Pollack has been updated in Du and Zhu 2013. 
53 Pollack 2012e. 
54 Pollack 2012e (“To summarise, a bunch of dealers get together for the auction to trade 
some bonds to determine a clearing price for them, which then goes on to dictate cash 
payments under CDS.”). 
55 Pollack 2012e summarizes the key point thus: “conditional on there being a net open 
interest to sell in the first stage of the auction, the second stage will see an upward bias in the 
clearing price. The bias is driven by the CDS protection sellers, in whose interest it is to ensure 
that the final price is high so that they pay out less. It works in the other direction too, of 
course: conditional on there being a net open interest to buy in the first stage of the auction, 
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The auction rules dictate that the dealers must have open CDS positions and 
furthermore that they can only submit requests in the opposite direction of their 
position, but the details of how this happens are not enforced and the empirical 
evidence reveals that the participating dealer banks have been highly successful 
in distorting the auction price.56 Of course, ISDA has expressed determination to 
alleviate the bias by improving the auction mechanism, but it remains to be seen 
how successful those reform will be.57  
6.1.3.3 Big Bang: Is It Suitable for All CDSs? 
A third criticism concerns the Big Bang Protocol’s mechanism for deciding upon 
credit events. The notion of credit event tends to cause interpretational problems, 
because creditors often seek a compromise with troubled debtors so as to avoid 
outright non-payment.58 Compromises imply losses for lenders, but CDS buyers 
will be compensated only if there is a credit event within the meaning of the 
agreement, as interpreted by the Determinations Committee. Uniform, market-
wide interpretations are good for CDS dealers, but end-users are more 
vulnerable: a decision one way or another “can move billions among parties to 
standard-form contracts in an instant.”59 
In order to reduce uncertainty, ISDA’s CDS Definitions have since 2003 tended 
towards a narrow textualist interpretation, so that there is no credit event without 
a decision that legally binds all creditors.60 This implies problems for compromise 
arrangements, which are especially common in sovereign-debt troubles that often 
“end in restructuring operations usually described by oxymoronic euphemisms 
like ‘quasi-voluntary’, ‘moral suasion’, and ‘Private Sector Involvement’”.61 
Paradoxically, textualist interpretation increases uncertainty for sovereign-debt 
CDS holders, which in consequence have an incentive to adopt a hard-line 
attitude towards troubled borrowers. 
A recent test case was the Greek restructuring in March 2012, which triggered 
the CDS payments, but only after much hassle and uncertainty.62 According to 
                                                 
the second stage will see a downward bias in the clearing price. The bias is driven by the CDS 
protection buyers, in whose interest it is to ensure that the final price is low so that they get 
paid more.” 
56 Pollack 2012f. 
57 Pollack 2012f notes critically that “the whole CDS edifice is built on a litany of 
modifications, due to the disconnect that naturally exists between the complexities of debt 
and a standardised derivative contract. We don’t expect this to be any different.” 
58 Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 362. 
59 Ibid. 349.  
60 Ibid. 367–369. 
61 Ibid. 366. 
62 See Pollack 2012d (describing the Determinations Committee decision on Greece). 
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critics, future sovereign-debt CDS buyers “are left exposed to most kinds of 
sovereign credit risk. […] And sovereigns can structure their debt relief 
operations to affect triggers and payouts on CDS.”63 One might suppose that this 
is a marginal concern, because sovereign-debt CDSs constitutes a minority of the 
market; however, it is precisely these CDSs that tend to cause the greater number 
of disputes.64 
6.1.3.4 How Impartial Are the Determination Committees? 
The Big Bang mechanism has raised a further criticism, which is that the 
Determination Committees (DCs) tend to be biased.65 For example, when an ISDA 
DC voted on an ambiguous default of the Italian company Seat Pagine Gialle, 
evidence appeared “of committee members voting in a way that would 
financially benefit their institutions, rather than objectively”.66 
One of the paradoxes of the Determination Committees is that, according to 
ISDA rules, the dealer participation is based on their notional trade volume in the 
relevant CDSs (buy-side members are chosen differently, but criteria include 
assets under management and volume of CDS deals).67 Thus instead of 
impartiality, the mechanism “insures maximum conflicted-ness.”68 At the same 
time, the rules provide extensive disclaimers,69 making the ISDA architecture an 
insulated regime that cannot be challenged at court. 
ISDA has responded to the criticism, saying it is developing “some kind of 
best-practice policy to ensure proper Chinese walls are in place, because there can 
be a perception that sometimes people are voting their book.”70 But according to 
market participants, this “was an admission that the current process was not 
independent.”71  
                                                 
63 Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 349. 
64 Ibid. 365–366. 
65 See Pollack 2011 (arguing that ISDA DCs are not impartial referees). 
66 Ibid. 
67 See ibid. (providing details). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. (citing rules). 
70 Ibid. (citing David Geen, ISDA General Counsel). 
71 Ibid. 
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6.1.4 Legitimacy Problems 
6.1.4.1 Dealers versus End-Users and Other Creditors 
The accusation of partiality can be extended, as critics argue that ISDA uses its 
power to advance the interests of major investment banks.72 ISDA membership 
was extended in the late 1980s to diverse professional organizations (e.g. law 
firms) as Associate Members and end-users as Subscribers,73 but Primary 
Membership is restricted to derivatives dealers, and they alone can vote in 
elections.74 
This is not necessarily wrong, but it can be if their interests conflict with those 
of the society at large.75 For example, ISDA does not necessarily seek the efficiency 
of the market as a whole, and dealers have opposed transparency, “as this would 
imply a loss of their informational advantage.”76  Problems related to settlement 
mechanisms likewise reflect the fact that the ISDA architecture seems to have 
been “constructed to advantage dealers in dealer-to-end-user contracts.”77 
Another conflict of interests concerns creditors in counterparty insolvency, as 
ISDA’s close-out netting mechanism crucially depends on privileges vis-à-vis 
ordinary creditors.78 The argument is that normal bankruptcy process might 
cause contagion in financial markets, but this has been questioned.79 Critics argue 
that by yielding to ISDA’s demands, numerous national governments have been 
“taking it beyond a merely private regulatory regime and affording it a strong 
public dimension.”80  
6.1.4.2 Negative Externalities: Bankers vs. Society 
There may also be a broader conflict of interests, as financial derivatives 
constitute “an island of private governance in a financial industry heavily 
regulated by the state.”81 This is problematic, because CDSs seem to have the 
                                                 
72 See Partnoy and Skeel 2007: at 1037; Wynkoop 2008: 3122–3123. 
73 Flanagan 2001: 241. 
74 Ibid. 239 n.143; Scott and Biggins 2012: 234. 
75 Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1037. 
76 Ayadi and Behr 2009: 195. See also Partnoy 2007: 187 (“In providing information, ISDA 
strongly favors its dealer members over the public and end users.”); Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 
1036 (“ISDA has actively resisted disclosure of credit default swap documentation, insisting 
that this information is proprietary.”). 
77 Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1039. See also Ayadi and Behr 2009: 195. 
78 Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1048–1050; Ayadi and Behr 2009: 194. 
79 See Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1049; Edwards and Morrison 2005: 107–109. 
80 Scott and Biggins 2012: 311. 
81 Gelpern and Gulati 2012: 350. 
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potential to cause confusion and damage in financial markets, with serious 
repercussion for economy and society. Thus the ISDA architecture would be a 
classic case of self-regulation that increases transactional efficiency but fails to 
address wider concerns, including the negative externalities and systemic risk 
concerns.82 
According to some critics, the creation of the ISDA architecture was in part 
motivated by the desire to avoid regulation.83 Its success has been partial only, 
but one thing has rarely been noted: the Big Bang Protocol provides binding 
decisions to key sources of disagreement, reducing the likelihood that CDS 
disputes might reach national courts. Thus it represents self-governance at the 
fringes of the legal system. Crucial questions about the contractual 
characterization and interpretation of CDSs will not be answered according to 
ordinary legal determinations, and the ISDA architecture will increasingly 
become a supranational legal system, governed by leading derivatives dealers. 
6.1.4.3 The Lehman Brothers Litigation 
The possibility remains that the ISDA regime may be challenged at national 
courts in some respects. This was seen in some of the cases following the 
bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment bank, especially the United States 
bankruptcy case known as Metavante.84 In the words of Agasha Mugasha, “in a 
global setting the decision has opened up a debate on some provisions of the 
ISDA Master Agreement.”85 This is because the key legal issue here was the 
tension between the US Bankruptcy Code and the provisions of the ISDA Master 
Agreement. 
The dispute, between Metavante Corporation and Lehman Brothers Special 
Financing, Inc. (LBSF, a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers Holdings International, 
Inc.), was based on a simple interest rate swap, which included the standard ISDA 
term that a non-defaulting party might demand early termination or withhold 
performance.86 The problem was the literal terms enabled Metavante to 
seemingly maintain a profitable position as ongoing for months even after its 
counterparty’s bankruptcy filing. This was ultimately seen as incompatible with 
the bankruptcy rules by the court, which “expressly limited the ‘enforceability of 
section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement and the scope of the US 
                                                 
82 See Johnson 2011: 228–233. 
83 Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1025. 
84 In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Case No. 08-13555 et seq. (JMP) (jointly 
administered) (2010). For a description, see Mugasha 2011b: 561–567. On post-crisis Lehman 
litigation and ISDA, see also Biggins 2012: 1322–1323. 
85 Mugasha 2011b: 555 
86 Ibid. 561 
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Bankruptcy Code protections for non-defaulting parties to derivative 
contracts.’”87 
According  Mugasha, the “initial reaction in the media was to say that it was 
unsafe to do business in the United States.”88 This was probably exaggerated, as 
this was a first-instance decision, and in general terms, “in the minority” on this 
question of principle, although even Mugasha accepted that it may have been the 
right decision on the peculiar facts of the dispute.89 In other words, the case is 
authority that the United States bankruptcy law may impose limits on the 
enforceability of the ISDA Master Agreement even if the literal text of the 
Bankruptcy Code does not state this; but the exact legal basis and extension of 
such limits is unclear. 
Indeed, it is a different question how similar cases would be decided in other 
jurisdictions. Comparing the United States and the UK, Mugasha notes that in 
this respect US bankruptcy law differs fundamentally from English bankruptcy 
law, which “is largely procreditor and ordinarily upholds commercial contracts” 
whereas the US regime “is largely pro-debtor.”90 The UK approach, which is more 
favourable towards the ISDA architecture, was in fact indirectly supported by 
another Lehman case that took place in England.91 This case involved the rights 
of the litigating parties following the bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers Holdings 
International (LBHI) and Lehman Brothers Special Financing (LBSF); they were 
both parties to a special purpose vehicle—also dealing in CDSs—set up by 
Lehman Brothers International Europe (LBIE).92 The facts of the highly complex 
case are not of major importance here; what is interesting is the decision of the 
English Court of Appeals, which insisted on the principle of party autonomy, i.e. 
freedom of contract, which the court considered relevant also in the application 
of insolvency (or bankruptcy) law. In the lead decision, Lord Neuberger M.R. 
argued that in “complex and sophisticated contractual arrangements the parties 
should be expected to know what they were doing, and the courts should be slow 
to take away their right to freely contract on terms as they see fit.”93 More 
specifically, in the field of insolvency and financial markets: 
It is important that, so far as possible, judicial decisions in the insolvency field ensure that 
the law is clear and consistent. That has always been true, but the need for consistency 
and clarity is all the greater now that commercial contracts are becoming increasingly 
complex both in their underlying nature and in their detailed provisions, as is well 
                                                 
87 Ibid. 563. 
88 Ibid. 565. 
89 Ibid. 566. 
90 Mugasha 2011b: 576. 
91 Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd. [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1160. 
See Mugasha 2011b: 567–571. 
92 See Mugasha 2011b: 568–569. 
93 Cited in Mugasha 2011b: 570. 
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demonstrated by the contracts in the instant cases. [...] It is also desirable that, if possible, 
the courts give effect to contractual terms which the parties have agreed. Indeed, there is 
a particularly strong case for party autonomy in cases of complex financial instruments 
[...] and in arrangements involving large corporate groups [...]; in such cases, the parties 
are likely to have been commercially sophisticated and expertly advised.94 
Of course, this obiter dictum has no binding force, but it expresses the dominant 
attitude of English courts today when faced with sophisticated finance. One 
might, to be sure, problematize the reasoning of the learned judge on a number 
of grounds that have already been considered in detail earlier in the present 
study. Moreover, the argument for party autonomy is hardly a sufficient basis for 
dealing with potential conflicts of interest between contracting parties and third 
parties whose rights the law of insolvency must also protect. 
In the end, one wonders whether there is any consistency of principle in the 
insistence on party autonomy in extremely complex transactions; after all, one 
would suppose that it is in simple transactions that the parties are more likely to 
adequately understand all the aspects of the agreement. If a sceptical 
interpretation is permitted, it will be submitted that what is really behind the 
reasoning of the court here is not confidence in the parties’ understanding, but 
lack of confidence in the court’s own understanding of the transactions. 
6.1.5 From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation 
Some proposals have been made to improve regulation while maintaining the 
best aspects of the ISDA regime.95 This is an important area that merits more 
research, because the ISDA regime continues to influence most aspects of CDSs 
globally, and deeper reforms will meet with fierce resistance. Perhaps the most 
interesting idea is to develop new forms of co-regulation, whereby self-regulation 
would be subject to governmental registration and oversight, including authority 
to alter self-regulatory rules.96 The Dodd-Frank central clearing regime is based 
on the same idea,97 and extending it to organizations like ISDA would enable 
light-touch interventions even when central clearing does not apply.98 
                                                 
94 Cited in ibid. 571. 
95 See for example Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1047 (“ISDA should make all credit derivatives 
documentation available for free on the Internet.”), 1048–1050 (proposing changes to 
bankruptcy privileges). The practicability of these proposals is doubtful, because the 
documents are protected by copyright, and the bankruptcy privileges are so central to the 
ISDA architecture that their abolition would imply radical changes to the regime itself. 
96 See Johnson 2011: 242–256 (proposing a community governance model along the lines 
of federally registered self-regulatory organizations); Baker 2010: 1369–1376 (proposing 
public-private partnerships for regulating OTC derivatives). 
97 Johnson 2011: 250–251. 
98 Johnson 2011: 253. 
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Co-regulation could be developed to address some of the issues mentioned 
above, for example by requiring changes to Determination Committee 
participation rules, and empowering non-dealer members in ISDA’s decision-
making processes. Light-touch interventions could also be employed to provide 
more variety in the architecture, for example by requiring ISDA to introduce an 
alternative regime that is more sensitive to ambiguous credit events. Such variety 
would help to improve the regime on a trial-and-error basis, leaving the ultimate 
choices for the market. 
The big question is to what extent co-regulation could be used to address the 
fundamental problems with credit default swaps. It is not immediately evident 
how this approach could be harnessed to resolve the problems with CDSs. Kristin 
Johnson, for example, in her argument in favour of this approach, claims that “the 
successes of capital market SROs [self-regulatory organizations] is well 
established,”99 but the only evidence that she offers is limited to operational 
issues, which is not the main concern with CDSs. Perhaps the public regulators 
could intervene to tweak some details of the ISDA architecture, for example to 
reduce the power of dealers, but from a social point of view, those are still 
marginal issues. 
6.2 TRANSPARENCY REGULATION 
Let us next look at the two strategies that have had the leading role in the post-
crisis reform legislation, namely regulations seeking to improve the transparency 
of OTC derivatives, and the imposition of compulsory clearing by a central 
counterparty (CCP). 
Transparency plays a central role in all financial regulation.100 In Judge Louis 
Brandeis’ famous words: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social 
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric 
light the most efficient policeman.”101 Braindeis’ analysis is hardly sufficient if 
taken literally, but it has been influential, and some go so far as to claim that 
“[i]nformation problems […] are the root of most every financial crisis known to 
history.”102 Thus it is understandable that attempts to increase the transparency 
of OTC derivatives have been among the leading post-crisis reform strategies, 
which also affects credit default swaps. 
                                                 
99 Johnson 2011: 255. 
100 Kaufmann and Weber 2010: 779. 
101 Brandeis 1914: 92. 
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6.2.1 Post-Crisis Reforms 
6.2.1.1 Transaction Reporting and Aggregate Market Data 
Before the crisis, Partnoy and Skeel among others proposed compulsory 
disclosures for credit default swaps, including the registration of transactions, a 
centralized pricing service, and more details in company financial reporting.103 
These ideas are in some respects already reality.104 At least since 2002, CDS dealers 
themselves have promoted modest price transparency in order to attract more 
business,105 and most CDSs are now reported to the Depository Trust Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC) data warehouse, which “also makes comprehensive trade-
level data available to regulators on-demand”.106 
Regulatory intervention has been necessary, however, because at least in 2008 
the DTCC data on subprime mortgage-related CDSs was incomplete.107 The 
European Commission in 2010 also found that there was no source of complete 
market information and even the combined use of different sources did not 
suffice to provide a full picture.108 Market-based information services have 
moreover been criticized for being frequently subject to expensive subscription 
fees, which decreases their efficacy for public policy purposes.109 
After the crisis there has been some progress in the transparency issue. There 
are firstly more disclosures to regulators: CDS protection sellers in the United 
States have had to provide “substantial qualitative and quantitative disclosures” 
since 2008.110 The Dodd-Frank reforms, in concrete, require swap entities to 
                                                 
103 Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1046–1048. 
104 See Dømler 2013: 50, discussing some CDS market services that provide both pre-trade 
and post-trade price information. 
105 See Huault and Rainelli-Le Montagner 2009: 563–564 (describing initiatives by banks). 
106 Shadab 2012: 1043. See also Shadab 2010: 439–440 (describing DTCC’s CDS-related 
services). 
107 Stulz 2010: 74 n.1. 
108 European Commission 2010a: 14 states that “regulators literally do not know the exact 
size of any of the segments of the OTC derivatives market as none of the sources mentioned 
earlier provides a comprehensive picture of the various segments of the OTC derivatives 
market. The only one that comes close to full coverage of a market segment is the Warehouse 
Trust, which contains information on almost all outstanding CDS contracts. Regulators could 
not gain a full picture by piecing together the data from the various sources either, as the data 
published by those sources are not comparable.” Ibid. n.48 adds: “Even surveys with similar 
market coverage lead to different results due to different samples and methodologies used.” 
109 See Shadab 2012: 1042–1043. 
110 Shadab 2012: 1026 (citing lower-level regulatory rules). 
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“report all swaps to either the SEC or the CFTC.”111 Importantly, even non-cleared 
swaps must be reported to a registered swap data repository.112 
In Europe, the post-crisis legislation has likewise sought to provide more 
transparency, as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) creates a 
general obligation to report any derivative transaction to a registered trade 
repository.113 This information is mainly available for the various financial 
regulators, but it should also be used to publish aggregate data to the market by 
derivatives class.114 Naturally, this public data must not reveal the identity of any 
counterparty.115 Interestingly, the subsequent delegated regulations have 
determined that transaction reports must include information on the type and 
amount of collateral, although this information is obviously available to the 
regulatory bodies only.116 
The more recent MiFID II continues along the same lines, seeking to provide 
a more general framework that is not limited to OTC. It for the first time 
establishes a principle of transparency for non-equity instruments such as bonds 
and derivatives, setting out the principles for the creation of a pre- and post-trade 
transparency regime calibrated for different types of instruments.117 The precise 
requirements of MiFID II nevertheless depend on the implementing legislation.118 
Thus it remains to be seen how demanding and effective this regime will be with 
respect to CDS transparency.119 
                                                 
111 O’Loughlin 2012: 513 (citing the subsequently codified 7 U.S.C.A. § 6s(a)(1)-(2) and 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78o-10(a)(1)-(2)). 
112 Dodd Frank Act, §§ 727, 729, 766; Bloink 2011: 608; Cadmus 2010: 214–215. 
113 EMIR, Art. 9. 
114 EMIR, Art. 81. ESMA 2012a: 65 (paras. 343–344) provides further details on this 
requirement of aggregate public data.  
115 ESMA 2012a: 65 (para. 344). 
116 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 148/2013 of 19 December 2012 
supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories with regard to regulatory 
technical standards on the minimum details of the data to be reported to trade repositories 
[2013] OJ L 52/1, Art. 3. The proposal for this is in ESMA 2012a: 59 (para. 320). 
117 European Commission 2014: 2. See also European Commission 2011b: 39–42 (overall 
analysis of the chosen measures to improve trade transparency for market participants), 46–
48 (overall analysis of the chosen measures to reinforce transparency towards regulators). 
118 European Commission 2014: 8. 
119 One reason for skepticism is the statement in European Commission 2014: 8 that 
“[w]aivers will be available for [...] derivatives that are not subject to the trading obligation 
and for non–equity instruments for which there is not a liquid market.” 
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6.2.1.2 The European Short Selling Regulation 
In Europe, there is also a targeted post-crisis Short Selling Regulation that 
imposes mandatory disclosures of significant net short positions in shares, 
sovereign debt, and sovereign-debt related CDSs.120 The principal objective of the 
new requirements is, according to the European Commission, to enable 
regulators to better detect market abuse and position build-up, as well as to 
provide some harmonization across countries given the diversity of national rules 
on short selling.121 This Regulation merits special attention, because unlike EMIR 
and MiFID II, it specifically addresses certain issues in CDSs, and also because in 
some respect it is more elaborate and demanding. 
The EU Short Selling Regulation has its limits but also its strengths.122 It 
requires notification of major short positions in shares not only to regulators but 
also their publication to the markets when the relevant thresholds are reached.123 
In contrast, however, short positions in debt and CDSs only need to be disclosed 
to the regulators, not to the market, and this requirement is limited to instruments 
involving sovereign debt, not corporate debt.124 A 2013 report by the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) moreover found that, between 1 
November 2012 and 28 February 2013, there had been very few notifications of 
short positions in sovereign debt or uncovered positions in sovereign CDSs.125 
This may be due to a notification threshold that was set too low or other 
measurement issues.126 
                                                 
120 Short Selling Regulation, Art. 5–8. 
121 European Commission 2010b: 28. 
122 For a detailed analysis, see Juurikkala 2012a: 314–322. 
123 The thresholds are as follows: Art. 5(2): “A relevant notification threshold is a 
percentage that equals 0,2 % of the issued share capital of the company concerned and each 
0,1 % above that.” Art. 6(2): “A relevant publication threshold is a percentage that equals 0,5 
% of the issued share capital of the company concerned and each 0,1 % above that.” 
124 See Short Selling Regulation, Art. 7 (Notification to competent authorities of significant 
net short positions in sovereign debt) and Art 8 (Notification to competent authorities of 
uncovered positions in sovereign credit default swaps). 
125 See ESMA 2013a: paras. 50–51. 
126 See ibid. paras. 52, 57–59. The calculation of net short positions in sovereign debt is 
highly complicated and has been further specified in the Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) No 918/2012 of 5 July 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps with 
regard to definitions, the calculation of net short positions, covered sovereign credit default 
swaps, notification thresholds, liquidity thresholds for suspending restrictions, significant 
falls in the value of financial instruments and adverse events [2012] OJ L 274/1 [Short Selling 
Supplement], Art. 8–11, as well as Art. 21, which specifies the rather complicated notification 
thresholds for net short positions relating to sovereign debt. ESMA has proposed lowering 
the notification thresholds and making other adjustments, but the Commission in its 
subsequent report decided to wait and gather more experience: see European Commission 
2013: 3. 
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The question of publication to the market will be critically examined shortly. 
Regarding the exclusion of disclosure of corporate debt and CDS short positions, 
it is difficult to find a justification for this regulatory inconsistency.127 In its impact 
assessment, the European Commission merely observed that the public 
consultation “showed very limited support for the inclusion of corporate bonds 
and their derivatives in a disclosure regime.”128 However, the Parliamentary 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs rightly noted that “it would be 
appropriate to extend to corporate debt and corporate CDS the notification 
regime [in order to] ensure to the issuers that there is no price manipulation on 
these instruments.”129 
To be sure, there remains the possibility of requiring generic disclosures of 
CDS positions at national level, but these reporting requirements tend to be less 
demanding and there is scope for further development.130 Moreover, the Short 
Selling Regulation empowers national and EU regulators to demand more 
extensive disclosures of short positions in exceptional circumstances.131 These 
exceptional disclosures may extend to non-sovereign debt related credit default 
swaps, and they may include both notification to the regulators and publication to 
                                                 
127 See Juurikkala 2012a: 318–319. It must be noted, though, that the Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 918/2012 (Short Selling Supplement), Art. 11(1), states as a 
general principle that “net short positions in sovereign debt shall be calculated by taking into 
account transactions in all financial instruments that confer a financial advantage in the event 
of a change in the price or yield of the sovereign debt.” This means that sovereign-debt CDSs 
will also be included in the calculation of net short positions in sovereign debt; in fact, 
corporate and index CDSs will also be included insofar as the general principle applies. See 
also specifically Art. 9(3) of the Short Selling Supplement: “Any sovereign credit default swap 
referenced to a sovereign issuer shall be included in the calculation of net short positions in 
that sovereign debt. Sales of sovereign credit default swaps shall be considered to be long 
positions and purchases of sovereign credit default swaps shall be considered to be short 
positions.” Art. 9(4) adds: “If a sovereign credit default swap position is hedging a risk other 
than the referenced sovereign debt, the value of the hedged risk cannot be treated as a long 
position for the purposes of calculating whether a natural or legal person has a net short 
position in the issued sovereign debt of a sovereign issuer.” All of this means that in some 
cases non-sovereign CDSs will fall within the notification requirements. 
128 European Commission 2010b: 64. 
129 European Parliament 2010: 78. 
130 MiFID Recitals 45 and 46 mention the prospect of developing mandatory reporting of 
some OTC derivatives transactions (including corporate CDSs) in member state rules. In the 
UK, for example, FSA Handbook, SUP17.1.4 R(2), covers the reporting of transactions in “any 
OTC derivative the value of which is derived from, or which is otherwise dependent upon, 
an equity or debt-related financial instrument which is admitted to trading on a regulated 
market or on a prescribed market.” According to European Commission 2010b: 19, such 
national rules were underdeveloped in most member states. 
131 See Juurikkala 2012a: 319–322. 
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the market.132 The Recitals of the Regulation explicitly mention the legitimacy of 
demanding information on CDS positions:  
Because of the specific risks which can arise from the use of credit default swaps, such 
transactions require close monitoring by competent authorities. In particular, competent 
authorities should, in exceptional cases, have the power to require information from 
natural or legal persons entering into such transactions about the purpose for which the 
transaction is entered into.133 
Paradoxically, though, the way in which the rules are formulated implies that 
publication to the market could be extended for non-sovereign CDSs, but not to 
sovereign-debt CDSs.134 
There are two broad conditions for the employment of these special disclosure 
requirements:  
(a) there are adverse events or developments which constitute a serious threat to financial 
stability or to market confidence in the Member State concerned or in one or more other 
Member States; and 
(b) the measure is necessary to address the threat and will not have a detrimental effect 
on the efficiency of financial markets which is disproportionate to its benefits.135 
The generic nature of these conditions gives significant scope for discretion in 
the use of these powers, although the question has been further specified by 
delegated acts of the Commission.136 In its technical advice to the Commission, 
ESMA has stated that, even though the literal wording of the Regulation suggests 
that there must be a market-wide stability concern, in fact any serious concern 
related to either EU member states or systematically important financial 
                                                 
132 Short Selling Regulation, Art. 18(1) states that “a competent authority may require 
natural or legal persons who have net short positions in relation to a specific financial 
instrument or class of financial instruments to notify it or to disclose to the public details of 
the position where the position reaches or falls below a notification threshold fixed by the 
competent authority”. 
133 Short Selling Regulation, Recital 37. 
134 Juurikkala 2012a: 320. This is because Art. 18(2) determines that “this Article shall not 
apply to financial instruments in respect of which transparency is already required under 
Articles 5 to 8”, and Art. 8 states that “[w]here a competent authority suspends restrictions in 
accordance with Article 14(2), a natural or legal person who has an uncovered position in a 
sovereign credit default swap shall notify the relevant competent authority where such a 
position reaches or falls below the relevant notification thresholds for the sovereign issuer”. 
Given that Art. 18(2) is formulated in terms of the type of financial instrument, and not in 
terms of the type of disclosure already required, it follows that disclosure to the public under 
Art. 18(1) cannot be applied to sovereign CDSs. 
135 These conditions are found equally in Art. 18(1), 19(1) and 20(1). 
136 This is based on Short Selling Regulation, Art. 30. See the subsequent Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 918/2012 of 5 July 2012 (Short Selling Supplement). 
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institutions would constitute the relevant adverse event or development.137 
ESMA has also felt that these “powers need to be flexible enough to enable 
competent authorities to deal with a range of different exceptional situations.”138 
The Commission’s supplementary Delegated Regulation has adopted this 
approach.139 
Uncertainty surrounding the use of the exceptional disclosures is increased by 
the fact that the rules on the relevant competent authority are rather 
complicated.140 The basic rule is that the powers are determined according to the 
financial instrument in question, so that if the intervention involves the sovereign 
debt of an EU member state, or related CDSs, the relevant competent authority is 
that of the member state;141 if it involves corporate debt and related CDSs (or non-
EU sovereign CDSs), the relevant competent authority is the national regulator in 
whose jurisdiction is the most relevant market in terms of liquidity for the 
                                                 
137 See ESMA 2012b: 65–67 (providing a preliminary non-exhaustive list of qualitative 
events). 
138 Ibid. 66 (para. 194). 
139 See Short Selling Supplement, Art. 24(1), which provides that such adverse events or 
developments “include any act, result, fact, or event that is or could reasonably be expected 
to lead to the following: (a) serious financial, monetary or budgetary problems which may 
lead to financial instability concerning a Member State or a bank and other financial 
institutions deemed important to the global financial system such as insurance companies, 
market infrastructure providers and asset management companies operating within the 
Union when this may threaten the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or 
the stability of the financial system in the Union; (b) a rating action or a default by any Member 
State or banks and other financial institutions deemed important to the global financial system 
such as insurance companies, market infrastructure providers and asset management 
companies operating within the Union that causes or could reasonably be expected to cause 
severe uncertainty about their solvency; (c) substantial selling pressures or unusual volatility 
causing significant downward spirals in any financial instrument related to any banks and 
other financial institutions deemed important to the global financial system such as insurance 
companies, market infrastructure providers and asset management companies operating 
within the Union and sovereign issuers as the case may be; (d) any relevant damage to the 
physical structures of important financial issuers, market infrastructures, clearing and 
settlement systems, and supervisors which may adversely affect markets in particular where 
such damage results from a natural disaster or terrorist attack; (e) any relevant disruption in 
any payment system or settlement process, in particular when it is related to interbank 
operations, that causes or may cause significant payments or settlement failures or delays 
within the Union payment systems, especially when these may lead to the propagation of 
financial or economic stress in a bank and other financial institutions deemed important to 
the global financial system such as insurance companies, market infrastructure providers and 
asset management companies or in a Member State.” 
140 See Juurikkala 2012a: 321–322. 
141 Short Selling Regulation, Art. 2(1)(j)(i): “in relation to sovereign debt of a Member State, 
or, in the case of a federal Member State, in relation to sovereign debt of a member of the 
federation, or a credit default swap relating to a Member State or a member of a federation, 
the competent authority of that Member State”. 
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financial instrument in question, which for CDSs will almost always be London.142 
However, other national regulators may also use the intervention powers, but 
only with the consent of the relevant competent authority.143 Finally, the EU 
regulator ESMA may also intervene on its own authority if it deems that the 
relevant national regulators have failed to act so as to adequately address any 
“threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or to the 
stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union.”144 
In addition to these interventions, the Regulation empowers ESMA to 
separately conduct “an inquiry into a particular issue or practice relating to short 
selling or relating to the use of credit default swaps to assess whether that issue 
or practice poses any potential threat to financial stability or market confidence 
in the Union.”145 This may be done on ESMA’s own initiative, or at the request of 
national regulators, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission. 
This is a very significant provision, because it covers corporate as well as 
sovereign CDS markets, and it is not conditional on any actual threat to financial 
stability.  
                                                 
142 Short Selling Regulation, Art. 2(1)(j)(v): “in relation to a financial instrument other than 
an instrument referred to in points (i) to (iv), the competent authority for that financial 
instrument as defined in point (7) of Article 2 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 
and determined in accordance with Chapter III of that Regulation”. The detailed rules for the 
determination are thus found in Commission Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 of 10 August 2006 
implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
record-keeping obligations for investment firms, transaction reporting, market transparency, 
admission of financial instruments to trading, and defined terms for the purposes of that 
Directive. 
143 Short Selling Regulation, Art. 22. 
144 Art. 28(2). The Commission’s Short Selling Supplement, Art. 24(3), specifies that, for 
purposes of this Article, “a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets 
or to the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union shall mean: (a) any 
threat of serious financial, monetary or budgetary instability concerning a Member State or 
the financial system within a Member State when this may seriously threaten the orderly 
functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the 
financial system in the Union; (b) the possibility of a default by any Member State or supra-
national issuer; (c) any serious damage to the physical structures of important financial 
issuers, market infrastructures, clearing and settlement systems, and supervisors which may 
seriously affect cross-border markets in particular where such damage results from a natural 
disaster or terrorist attack when this may seriously threaten the orderly functioning and 
integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the 
Union; (d) any serious disruption in any payment system or settlement process, in particular 
when it is related to interbank operations, that causes or may cause significant payments or 
settlement failures or delays within the Union cross-border payment systems, especially when 
these may lead to the propagation of financial or economic stress in the whole or part of the 
financial system in the Union.” 
145 Short Selling Regulation, Art. 31. 
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6.2.2 Limits of Transparency Regulation 
6.2.2.1 Disclosure to Markets or to Regulators Only? 
Improved transparency is certainly important for the development of CDS 
regulation, but it should not be seen as the fundamental strategy. One reason for 
its limited nature is that the reformed rules mainly improve disclosures to 
regulators, whereas disclosures to the market are limited to aggregate market 
data which has very limited value for resolving the issues associated with CDSs.  
There is in fact the argument in the financial regulatory literature that 
disclosures to regulators only tend to be relatively ineffectual.146 For example, 
some critics of the regulatory failure before the financial crisis have argued that 
much of the relevant information was available to the supervisors much before 
the crash, but they failed to take determined act, perhaps in part because they did 
not have tangible incentives to do so.147 According to Eamonn Butler, “[t]he Bank 
of England warned the FSA that Northern Rock was operating riskily in October 
2006, long before it collapsed; but no effective action was taken.”148 The 
Commission impact assessment for EMIR noted this in positive terms, writing 
that “the publication of data on individual positions would enable any market 
participant to estimate better the counterparty credit risk it is exposed to when 
dealing with a particular counterparty and would therefore allow it to secure 
itself better against this risk.”149 
Naturally, the limits and failures of regulatory action are complex issues, but 
so is the question of providing more disclosures to other market participants.150 
In the preparation of the European Short Selling Regulation, this was debated in 
the context of significant short positions. The impact assessment of the European 
Commission noted that, in the public consultation, “serious concerns were 
expressed about the potential negative impact on liquidity of public disclosure of 
sovereign bonds and sovereign CDS short positions.”151 Behind those concerns 
was a widely cited study, which claimed that the imposition in the UK of a partial 
public disclosure on shares in 2008 led to a 20–25% reduction in short selling, a 
13% decrease in trading volume and an incredible 45% increase in bid-ask 
spreads.152 In reality, those findings were highly dubious, because there was a 
                                                 
146 See Juurikkala 2012b: 60–61. 
147 Beenstock 2009: 59. 
148 Butler 2009: 56. 
149 European Commission 2010a: 44. 
150 See Juurikkala 2012: 316–318. 
151 European Commission 2010b: 64. 
152 See Ziff and Moeller 2010: 4–5. 
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general market decline in 2008, so that the effects cannot be attributed causally to 
the regulatory intervention.153 
There are, however, other concerns that may be valid. One is that public 
knowledge of trading positions may disadvantage investors (particularly hedge 
funds) that engage in price arbitrage strategies.154 To be sure, this is a loss to 
trades, not to market efficiency, although in longer term it may also discourage 
market research. The Commission impact assessment proposed that this problem 
could be reduced by publishing individual positions with a time lag.155 
Another concern is herd behaviour, which may occur when poorly-informed 
investors make decisions based on imitation. As herding reinforces the price 
tendency, public disclosure of short positions will exacerbate downward price 
spirals if investors imitate major short sellers on trust.156 However, this effect may 
be produced also without the public disclosure of trading positions, and perhaps 
even more so when the imitators do not know who is pushing the prices, so that 
it is not clear whether more disclosure would be damaging in the end. 
In conclusion, there seems to be a reasonable argument for extending public 
disclosures towards individual positions, not only aggregate market data, 
although the details of such disclosures require more study. The current 
regulations do not go so far, but the regulatory framework provides the 
infrastructure needed for more extensive transparency. 
6.2.2.2 Limits of Financial Risk Reporting 
It must be recognized, in any case, that there are limits to both what can be done 
to improve transparency, and how much it will help. Even if CDS positions are 
not publicly disclosed to the market under a special regime, they have already 
been subject to some transparency, given that in terms of company financial 
reporting, CDSs are on-balance sheet transactions, so that in principle they must be 
reported already in that context, which of course has its imperfections.157 The 
problem is in the general difficulty of regulating financial risk disclosures, so that 
it is not difficult to misrepresent and conceal derivatives risks in compulsory 
financial disclosures.158  
                                                 
153 This was explicitly noted in European Commission 2010b: 59. 
154 Ziff and Shu 2011: 29–30. 
155 European Commission 2010a: 44. 
156 FSA 2009: 25. 
157 Shadab 2012: 1026. See also ibid. 1025, noting that the new US standards, revised in 
2009, make it “substantially more difficult to achieve off-balance sheet treatment for most 
securitization transactions.” 
158 See Stulz 2004: 184–185. 
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Indeed, it has been argued that CDS users may exploit imperfections of 
accounting rules.159 The unique properties of credit risk render them “difficult to 
measure, observe, and hence predict.”160 Moreover, given that CDSs pay off 
rarely, “accounting for them is prone to large ex post errors, […] suggesting that 
[they] are less valuable than in fact they are.”161 
To mitigate the problem, some scholars have proposed demanding more 
detailed information on concentration risk, historical data used to value the 
positions, and other important estimation assumptions.162 These are worthwhile 
ideas, but one wonders how much difference they can make, given that credit risk 
is inherently “difficult to measure, observe, and hence predict.”163 Some experts 
go so far as to claim that financial innovation has rendered the traditional 
disclosure paradigm unworkable.164 There are experienced investors who agree: 
Improved “transparency”—a favorite remedy of politicians, commentators and financial 
regulators for averting future train wrecks—won’t cure the problems that derivatives 
pose. I know of no reporting mechanism that would come close to describing and 
measuring the risks in a huge and complex portfolio of derivatives. Auditors can’t audit 
these contracts, and regulators can’t regulate them. When I read the pages of “disclosure” 
in 10-Ks of companies that are entangled with these instruments, all I end up knowing is 
that I don’t know what is going on in their portfolios (and then I reach for some aspirin).165 
In addition to the imperfections of financial reporting, there are limits to how 
much information can be effectively analyzed by time-constrained and 
boundedly rational actors.166 Sometimes, “in addition to being a disinfectant, 
sunlight can also be blinding.”167 In brief, there are limits not only to what can be 
effective communicated but also to what information can be effectively received 
and analyzed. 
6.2.2.3 The Limited Relevance of Transparency: Negative Externalities 
Finally, it is necessary to remember that transparency can never solve all the 
problems, especially when they are due to the negative externalities of certain 
                                                 
159 Shadab 2012: 1026–1027. 
160 Ibid. 1021. 
161 Acharya et al. 2010: 276. 
162 Ibid. 270. See also Partnoy and Skeel 2007: 1047 (proposing more disclosure “in 
narrative form”). 
163 Shadab 2012: 1021. 
164 See Hu 2012: 1614–1628 (2012) (describing the traditional disclosure paradigm), 1633–
1687 (arguing this with examples). 
165 Buffett 2009: 16–17. 
166 Paredes 2003: 434–443 (summarizing research in cognitive psychology). 
167 Ibid. 419. 
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activities. The principal function of transparency is to facilitate corporate 
governance, and better corporate governance curbs excessive risk-taking by 
traders and executives, which can be a problem.168 Yet research following the 
recent crisis suggests that shareholders actively encouraged excessive leverage 
and risk-taking by financial institution executives, because they also stood to 
benefit.169 Both phenomena can happen at the same time, because even if 
executives profit disproportionately from risk-taking, shareholders also profit 
disproportionately relative to the broader public, when an important part of the 
social cost of risk-taking is external.170 
Therefore, reform proposals limited to disclosure fail to acknowledge the 
more fundamental problems of how CDSs affect credit markets and risk-taking. 
Transparency is necessary for effective corporate governance and for other 
regulatory interventions, but in the presence of major negative externalities, it is 
not enough. 
6.3 COMPULSORY CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY (CCP) 
CLEARING 
Alongside transparency, the other reform approach that has attracted the greatest 
amount of political and academic attention is the imposition of compulsory 
clearing by a central counterparty (CCP). This has probably been the most 
important legislative strategy for unregulated financial derivatives after the 
global financial crisis.171 The importance given to centralized clearing is 
understandable in the sense that this form of light-touch regulation has proved to 
be a cost-effective solution in other areas of finance, but the problem is, as will be 
seen shortly in detail, that this approach was never really designed with credit 
default swaps in mind. In other words, the advantages of this approach were 
based on fundamentally different financial contracts; it has now been unwittingly 
extended to CDSs, simply because CDSs were routinely grouped among OTC 
derivatives. 
Given that this is the principal post-crisis regulatory reform for OTC 
derivatives, it has already been subjected to numerous academic analyses.172 In 
order to focus on the issues that are relevant for the objectives of the present 
                                                 
168 See Bebchuk and Spamann 2010: 249–50 (highlighting intra-institutional moral hazard); 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann 2010: 261 (2010) (providing empirical evidence). 
169 See Beltratti and Stulz 2009; Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2009. 
170 Coffee 2011: 811. 
171 See Chander and Costa 2010: 658–672 (2010) (describing the emergence and 
consolidation of this view in the United States and Europe). 
172 See for example Johnson 2011: 234–242 (critically describing Dodd-Frank reforms for 
CDSs); Stulz 2010: 88–89 (comparing the pros and cons of OTC, exchange trading, and 
clearinghouses without exchange trading); Shadab 2012: 1044; Nosal 2011. 
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study, this section first seeks to explain the logic of centralized clearing and the 
potential benefits of compulsory clearing; it then analyzes the various criticisms 
that have been raised against this approach, especially in relation to credit default 
swaps; the section finishes with some reform proposals. 
6.3.1 The Logic and Benefits of Compulsory CCP Clearing 
6.3.1.1 Governance Mechanisms and Co-Regulation 
Given the importance that this approach has obtained in the new regulatory 
regimes, it seems opportune to seek a good understanding of the fundamentals 
of centralized clearing. The general concept has been well explained by Shadab 
as follows: 
Clearing refers to the myriad of activities and processes designed to ensure that financial 
contract counterparties perform their obligations from the time a trade is executed until 
final legal settlement. Clearing includes confirming the parties to and terms of a contract, 
determining and settling periodic payments, evaluating the collateral, monitoring the 
creditworthiness of counterparties, determining whether a credit event took place, and 
whether to exercise closeout rights.173 
It is sometimes inaccurately said that the new regulations impose compulsory 
clearing of OTC derivatives, as if these contracts were otherwise not cleared at all. 
The correct notion however is centralized clearing as opposed to bilateral clearing: 
“OTC derivative transactions, including CDSs, are generally cleared and settled 
bilaterally, while the utilization of a central counterparty for clearing and 
settlement is a characteristic of exchanged-traded instruments.”174 
To be precise, a central counterparty is not necessarily an exchange in the strict 
sense; what is essential is that it becomes an intermediary entity between the 
principal transactors by way of novations.175 It thereby reduces the counterparty 
risk of the original buyers and sellers, or to say it more accurately, the CCP 
assumes those counterparty risks, and the counterparty risk faced by the end-
users is that of the CCP. The difference between bilateral and centralized clearing 
can be represented visually as in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Bilateral versus central counterparty clearing.176 
The CCP approach to derivatives regulation can be called co-regulation, because 
the central counterparties perform various regulatory or governance functions 
and can in turn be regulated by the public financial regulators.177 In fact, 
regardless of whether CCPs are required by law to do so, they will employ a range 
of governance mechanism in order to manage their risks and guarantee their long-
term business viability. Specifically, they may “require each clearing member to 
post collateral and meet creditworthiness qualifications, establish a reserve fund 
to cover losses that a defaulting clearing member’s collateral does not, and 
mutualize losses among other clearing members if losses are in excess of the 
CCP’s reserve fund.”178 As Shadab points out, “CCPs have an incentive to limit 
membership only to dealers that can afford to meet certain capital and other 
requirements. A dealer-owned CCP may require non-member dealers and end-
users to pay fees to clear trades through dealer-members.”179 
Regulators may moreover specifically target CCPs. For example, the Dodd-
Frank Act specifically regulates derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs), which in 
the United States must be registered with the CFTC or the SEC. In addition to 
registration, they must perform various enforcement functions, such as “assuming 
liability for performing the trade, setting membership eligibility and capital 
requirements, requiring that traders post collateral (‘margin’) to ensure 
performance, making daily settlements of contracts, and setting standards for 
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accepting contracts for trading.”180 In Europe, the new European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) similarly provides a detailed framework for the 
regulation of central counterparties.181 
In addition to these benefits due to risk management and co-regulation, 
Steven Schwarcz contends that the CCP approach fosters the standardization of 
OTC derivatives, which in turn will help to reduce systemic risks, because it 
reduces complexity.182 As will be seen a bit later, though, there are major doubts 
concerning this argument, particularly when it comes to CDSs. 
6.3.1.2 Why Compulsory: Is Central Clearing Efficiency-Enhancing? 
An important preliminary question relative to the normative evaluation of the 
CCP regulatory approach concerns the reasons for the efficiency or inefficiency 
of CCP clearing. If centralized clearing is supposed to be efficiency enhancing, 
why did the industry not adopt it for CDSs voluntarily, and why does it largely 
continue to oppose it for most CDSs?183 
One explanation that has been offered in the literature is that CCP clearing is 
more costly due to informational asymmetries between clearing members and 
CCPs.184 This implies that the CCP solution might, in fact, be efficiency-reducing 
rather than efficiency-enhancing. There may be truth to this, as will be seen later 
in detail, but we must also be aware that there are other possible explanations for 
the lack of industry enthusiasm for centralized clearing. 
The most obvious explanation is the opposition from dealers, who have an 
incentive to keep the market non-standardized, because non-standardized 
contracts offer more scope for large intermediary fees.185 By providing 
transparency, and by replacing many functions performed by dealers in OTC 
markets, centralized clearing may be perceived as a threat. Indeed, insofar as 
CCPs are essentially a form of intermediary, they are in direct competition with 
the traditional dealers of OTC derivatives, even if in practice the latter may 
continue to perform certain functions in these markets when the CCPs do not 
amount to full-fledged exchanges. 
A third possible explanation is that even if setting up centralized clearing is 
costly, the benefits are partly collective, so that in the absence of regulatory 
intervention, market participants alone may lack incentives to set up CCP 
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arrangements.186 In other words, we would be dealing with a collective action 
problem, not an efficiency problem. The implication then would be that 
compulsory CCP clearing might be efficiency enhancing even if, on  the face of it, 
it is costly to arrange. 
This is likely to be true, but again it is not the full picture: one further potential 
reason for the lack of market incentives is the externalities problem discussed 
earlier: it is not only that the benefits of CCP clearing are partly collective, but also 
that they are partly external to the industry, precisely because they may help to 
reduce negative externalities such as market instabilities that are partly borne by 
the rest of the society. On the other hand, as will seen shortly, CCP arrangements 
may also create new kinds of negative externality that are not visible in the short 
term. 
Overall, then, there is a range of factors that may contribute to the supposed 
need for compulsory CCP clearing. It is difficult to say what role is played by each 
factor, which in turn implies that we do not know whether this approach is 
efficiency-enhancing overall. The benefits are probably weightier than the costs, 
but the latter should not be ignored. 
6.3.2 Doubts and Worries 
There are, indeed, significant doubts concerning this approach to derivatives and 
CDS regulation. In this section the three leading criticisms will be discussed: 
firstly, that centralized clearing may not improve netting efficiency without 
reducing competition; secondly, that the compulsory clearing rules are subject to 
exceptions; and thirdly, that the entire arrangement may create unprecedented 
systemic risks. 
6.3.2.1 Netting Efficiency: Competition versus Monopoly 
In addition to the governance mechanisms of CCPs, the economic argument in 
favour of centralized clearing relies on the notion of netting efficiency, which in 
principle is improved by centralized clearing.187 To be sure, John Hull points out 
that even without netting efficiency, “[c]entral clearing will lead to an increase in 
transparency because the positions of different dealers can be more readily 
ascertained.”188 Netting efficiency is however important both overall and in 
relation to the design of the regulated clearing regime. 
The point discovered by recent studies is that central clearing does not 
automatically improve netting efficiency; specifically, greater netting efficiency 
requires most contracts are cleared and that there are few clearing organizations. 
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As a rule, “netting efficiency increases as the percentage of OTC trades that are 
cleared increases. With multiple CCPs, the netting efficiency may decline.”189 
There is a difficult trade-off. On the one hand, when netting efficiency is low—
for example, when there are multiple small CCPs—the situation economically 
resembles bilateral clearing, because each clearing member becomes more exposed 
to clearing member default.190 Moreover, if dealers act as clearing members in 
multiple CCPs, this makes it more difficult for CCPs to estimate their risk 
exposures.191 This is centralized clearing only in name, not in reality. 
On the other hand, competition between CCPs is good as it lowers clearing 
member margins; but it may encourage a race to the bottom—much like in 
traditional insurance—as the costs of CCP default are partly external.192 Large 
CCPs thus have a natural oligopoly or monopoly in normal times (due to netting 
and risk-management efficiency). Yet in hard times, large CCPs become a 
significant source of systemic risk.193 
If there are multiple CCPs, netting and operational efficiency can be improved 
by their interoperability (much desired by industry). Yet this, too, has its problems, 
because interoperability is a source of contagion risk.194 In the end, CCPs face the 
same problems as the pre-crisis system: they do not make risks disappear, and 
they give rise to the same too-big-to-fail and too-interconnected-to-fail problems 
that led to the massive bailouts of banks. 
These concerns are moreover closely connected to the following two issues: 
netting efficiency requires that most transactions are centrally cleared, which may 
not be the case for CDSs; and the creation of large or interoperable CCPs 
contributes to systemic risks. 
6.3.2.2 Effectiveness of the Compulsory Rule 
The first of the two frequent worries is that the compulsory clearing rules may 
turn out to the ineffective. The point is not so much, as Lynn Stout has helpfully 
clarified, that market participants would simply avoid the rule by trading 
elsewhere; the reason is that at least as far as United States financial institutions 
are concerned, the Dodd-Frank rules are applicable “to swaps-related activities 
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outside the United States if those activities ‘have a direct and significant 
connection with activities in, or effect on, the commerce of the United States.’”195 
This will “discourage offshore counterparties from seeking to engage U.S. 
institutions in speculative OTC trading elsewhere.”196 
It remains to be seen whether Stout’s optimism is warranted, but it is also the 
case that the bigger worry concerns the exceptions explicitly permitted by the new 
legislation. As was already mentioned earlier in relation to the Dodd-Frank 
reforms, it has been widely acknowledged that the rule on compulsory 
centralized clearing will not apply to all transactions. In fact, several Dodd-Frank 
analysts in the United States have claimed that there is an automatic exemption for 
non-standardized CDSs and other derivatives that clearinghouses will not accept 
for clearing.197 The legal basis of such affirmation is not entirely clear, however, 
so it merits a closer look. 
Section 723(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act (amending § 2(h) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act) provides that the regulators must determine whether and under 
what conditions, if any, a “swap, or group, category, type, or class of swaps” must 
be subject to centralized clearing.198 In making this determination, the crucial 
question for the regulators is whether the contracts satisfy § 2(h)(2)(D), which 
provides different factors to consider, including trading liquidity.199 § 763(a) of 
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the Dodd-Frank Act similarly empowers the SEC to exempt transactions that it 
deems, among other things, insufficiently standardized and liquid. 
Therefore, there is a legal basis for exempting some contracts from the 
mandatory clearing requirement, but it is not an automatic exemption and is 
subject to significant prudential judgment. On this account, Lynn Stout has been 
more sceptical given the significant pressure power of financial institutions.200 But 
regardless of lobbying considerations, there seems to be a consensus emerging 
that most CDSs will not be centrally cleared.201 
In Europe, the clearing obligation and the eligibility requirements for central 
clearing under EMIR are essentially similar to the Dodd-Frank rules.202 The 
European Central Bank highlighted already in 2009 that, in order to “be eligible 
for clearing, a product must, as a minimum, be liquid, have price transparency 
and be standardised.”203 While CDSs are relatively standardized, the majority of 
them are hardly if at all traded (in fact, they are not traded at all in the strict sense, 
because the transfer of the contract requires novation, as we saw earlier). A New 
York Fed calculation in 2011 estimated that only 19% corporate single-name CDSs 
(and 52% of index CDSs) were clearing-eligible.204 
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It remains to be seen how the situation develops both economically and 
legally. Generally it has been observed that market participants are not interested 
in actively trading CDSs.205 In part, this reflects the fact that CDSs are structurally 
different from normal derivatives, and managing the counterparty relationship is 
crucial. There is also the paradox that it is estimated that “all liquidity” comes 
from the dealers, which prefer OTC contracts that offer more profit 
opportunities.206 Thus it may be that if the investment banks want to keep the CDS 
market as it was before, they can largely succeed in doing so. 
If non-standardized transactions are exempted, there may be a major 
regulatory loophole.207 To be sure, the new rules in both the United States and the 
European Union impose compulsory collateral for uncleared swaps, which 
remains an area for further development.208 Moreover, the SEC and the CFTC 
have powers to investigate “abusive swaps”, i.e. transactions seen to be 
“detrimental to […] the stability of a financial market […] or […] participants in 
financial markets.”209 As we saw earlier, similar powers have been given to ESMA 
in Europe, so that if CDSs continue to be widely used by hedge funds and 
investment banks, these powers of investigation should be duly exercised. 
Viral Acharya and Alberto Bisin have further proposed that central clearing 
of OTC derivatives could be encouraged by a change in insolvency law, granting 
“a seniority rule in bankruptcy in favour of centrally cleared positions over OTC 
positions.”210 Their argument is that this would be economically sound, because 
non-cleared OTC derivatives encourage excess leverage due to lack of mutual 
transparency, so that default risks are externalized. The difficulty with this 
proposal is that it would imply a fundamental challenge to the deeply 
consolidated ISDA close-out netting regime, so that we would not be speaking 
about a minor technical reform. Moreover, it implies a somewhat naive view of 
the externalities of centralized clearing, as will be seen next. 
6.3.2.3 Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Systemic Risk 
There is still another paradox, namely that maybe it would be best to keep credit 
default swaps away from centralized clearing. First of all, it should not be 
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supposed that centralized clearing as such removes the principal risks involved 
in CDSs. The clearing organization simply becomes the intermediary, and it must 
engage in the same risk management activities that other market participants 
do—and that many of them failed to do adequately. As Shadab has pointed out, 
“even if AIGFP’s CDSs were centrally cleared, a clearinghouse likely would have 
also unduly relied upon AIG’s credit rating and failed to incorporate AIG’s 
balance sheet risks into its decision about whether and to what extent it would 
have required AIGFP to post margin collateral.”211 
Secondly, some experts believe that the clearinghouse arrangement may in 
fact weaken risk management by exacerbating the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection.212 According to Shadab, centralized clearing is likely to reduce 
counterparty risk management, because market participants will consider that 
counterparty risks are shifted to the clearinghouse.213 This includes error risk, 
because much more will depend on whether the CCP does its risk management 
well or not. 
Adverse selection may also increase, because derivatives and CDS dealers and 
other experts will be better informed about these products than CCP risk 
managers.214 In fact, “the potentially high costs associated with replacing the CDS 
contract of a defaulted clearing member may lead to only relatively high-risk 
traders utilizing CCPs, thereby giving rise to CCPs that have a relatively greater 
risk of insolvency.”215 Chester Spatt argues likewise that in the new regulatory 
regime, “the incentives to trade with weak counter-parties would be heightened 
[…], and more generally, the clearinghouse would tend to attract transactions that 
it was mis-marking.”216 
Thirdly and most importantly, the centralized clearing is likely to contribute 
to systemic risk instead of removing it. There are at least two reasons for this. One 
is that the clearinghouse arrangement creates institutions that are too big to fail 
and too interconnected to fail, so that moral hazard and adverse selection affects 
not only the market participants by also the clearing organizations. Competition 
between CCPs will encourage a race to the bottom if it perceived that their risk 
taking is implicitly subsidized by public rescue policies.217 This means that CCP 
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risk management may become deliberately over-optimistic; and even in the 
absence of cynical will to exploit public funds, this arrangement will encourage 
imprudence on the part of boundedly rational actors. 
The other reason for the increase of systemic risk is that centralized clearing 
of CDSs means that this arrangement leads to huge concentrations of complex 
risks.218 According to Spatt, “it is plausible that central clearing would raise 
systemic risks greatly when another crisis occurred and perhaps even raise the 
likelihood of a crisis.”219 Essentially, the reason is that the concentration of risks 
implies more correlation, so that counterparty risk becomes systemic risk.220 
Acharya and Richardson explain this in more detail: 
“The [Dodd-Frank] Act relies heavily on margin requirements as the first line of defense 
against leverage buildup through derivatives. In particular, clearinghouses are required 
to charge margins such that they can withstand the failure of their largest exposure among 
the various members. Assuming that it is highly unlikely that two single names will 
default in the same day, the clearinghouse is reasonably well protected most of the time, 
and yet offers substantial collateral efficiency to its members. The problem of course arises 
during a systemic event when there might be multiple exposure failures. Tremendous 
amounts of systemic risk are housed within clearinghouses with potentially catastrophic 
consequences for the financial system.221 
To understand the problem of CDS risk concentration, it is essential to 
remember that CDSs are not transacted like traditional financial securities. Again, 
two different levels can be distinguished here, first in relation to OTC derivatives 
generally and secondly in relation to credit default swaps specifically. Regarding 
OTC derivatives generally, investor Warren Buffett explains in practical terms 
how their clearing differs drastically from the clearing of ordinary financial 
securities: 
A normal stock or bond trade is completed in a few days with one party getting its cash, 
the other its securities. Counterparty risk therefore quickly disappears, which means 
credit problems can’t accumulate. This rapid settlement process is key to maintaining the 
integrity of markets. That, in fact, is a reason for NYSE and NASDAQ shortening the 
settlement period from five days to three days in 1995. Derivatives contracts, in contrast, 
often go unsettled for years, or even decades, with counterparties building up huge claims 
against each other. “Paper” assets and liabilities—often hard to quantify—become 
important parts of financial statements though these items will not be validated for many 
years. Additionally, a frightening web of mutual dependence develops among huge 
                                                 
governmental policies and access to central bank liquidity facilities that implicitly subsidize 
CCP risk taking.” See also Culp 2010: 125–126; Ripatti 2004: 20–24. 
218 This is admitted by Schwarcz 2011: 101 n.29, even though he is in principle favorable 
towards the compulsory clearing rule: “the clearinghouse requirement might inadvertently 
concentrate systemic risk in the clearinghouses themselves”. 
219 Spatt 2012: 6. 
220 Duquerroy, Gex and Gauthier 2009: 82–83.  
221 Acharya and Richardson 2012: 33. 
CDS REGULATION: THE PRINCIPAL STRATEGIES 
 
236 
financial institutions. Receivables and payables by the billions become concentrated in the 
hands of a few large dealers who are apt to be highly-leveraged in other ways as well.222 
Buffett in this text was mainly criticizing the pre-reform state of OTC 
derivatives markets, but the point is equally if not more valid for the centralized 
clearing approach, because the accumulation now becomes even greater. 
Houman Shadab has expressly made this point, noting that firstly, in contrast to 
cash equities markets, in OTC derivatives it is difficult to achieve interoperability 
between central counterparties due to “different margin standards and default 
fund requirements.”223 Secondly and regardless of interoperability, there are 
doubts as to whether clearing works for CDSs.224 According to Michael Bodson, 
chief operating officer of Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), 
“Credit-default swaps are ‘scary, scary products’,” as they are much more 
complicated and risky than simple derivatives such as futures.225 
6.3.2.4 The Inherent Problem with Credit Default Swaps 
The second point, then, is one of the central theses of the present study, namely 
that credit default swaps do not function like financial derivatives—at least 
economically. The practical difficulties of centrally clearing some CDSs are 
related to the inherent features of CDSs. Frederik Dømler, who is generally critical 
of CDS regulation, has summarized this as follows: 
Compared with interest rate swaps, CDSs are volatile; asymmetric in exposure profile; 
contain wrong-way risk (that is, strong correlation between counterparty and the credit 
quality of the reference entity), which is magnified by the concentrated market structure; 
contain jump-to-default risk (that is, a credit event that triggers a sudden rise in the mark-
to-market CDS premium in which the collateral is too low, leaving the protection buyer 
uncovered if the counterpart defaults); and have difficulties in offsetting CDS trades 
(particularly for single names).226 
All of this means that centrally clearing credit default swaps is nothing like 
clearing ordinary financial securities. The traditional way in which CCPs 
determine margins is based on product risk, not counterparty (clearing member) 
balance sheet risk. But product risk is an inadequate basis for assessing CDS 
clearing, because the principal danger is that CDS protection sellers may 
accumulate excessive obligations, as happened with AIG. Even if CCPs decide to 
include balance sheet risk, it is unclear whether they can do so effectively, given 
                                                 
222 Buffett 2009: 16. 
223 Shadab 2011c. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Steinert-Threlkeld 2011. 
226 Dømler 2013: 47. 
COMPULSORY CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY (CCP) CLEARING 
237 
the “opaque and information-intensive balance sheets” of large financial 
institutions.227 
CCPs are in principle poorly-positioned for this kind of risk assessment, and 
their task will be even more difficult if there are multiple, interoperable CCPs. 
Moreover, Dømler insightfully notes that the difficulties involved in estimating 
these risks will expose CCPs to the danger of a “CCP run” much like a bank run: 
a large failure of a clearing member—one that can be caused by CDSs—might, in 
circumstances of imperfect information, precipitate a self-fulfilling prophecy 
whereby other entities run away from a CCP even if it was in reality solvent.228 
6.3.2.5 Can Clearinghouses Never Fail?  
The foregoing is important when we consider the argument that clearinghouses 
have almost never failed. Moreover, even ignoring the inherent problems with 
CDS clearing, we must take note of Spatt who writes that “in fact in recent 
decades there have been a number of clearinghouse failures, and the nature of the 
risks that would be assumed by a swap clearinghouse would be huge compared 
to that in traditional clearinghouses.”229 Even Ben Bernanke has made the same 
point: “Overall, the historical record shows that clearinghouse arrangements 
have generally withstood even severe crises. This solid performance reflects good 
planning and sound institutional structures but also some degree of good luck.”230 
Besides, not a long ago the markets witnesses a colossal clearinghouse failure 
that was not even involved in CDS. This is the case of MF Global, “a broker-dealer 
and futures commission merchant” whose corporate history goes back to the 18th 
century, and which filed for bankruptcy on October 31, 2011.231 One cause was 
that, between 2007 and 2011, MF Global was trying to redefine its business model 
under the leadership of John Corzine, “former senator and governor of New 
Jersey and ex-CEO of Goldman Sachs.”232 
The new profit-orientation implied more risk-taking. This included 
investments in European sovereign debt, with high-leverage bets using the bonds 
as collateral for short-term lending.233 The collapse was essentially due to short-
term financing liquidity problems, as MF Global’s trading partners demanded 
increasing collateral, with the consequence that “clients, fearing the firm’s 
excessive risk, pulled out, MF Global found itself without the cash necessary to 
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service its short-term debt.”234 To be sure, the funding liquidity problems did not 
lead to immediate bankruptcy, but attempts to sell the distressed company failed 
when the worst was discovered during sales negotiations: “up to $1.2 billion from 
customers’ accounts was missing.”235 This was possible essentially because the 
firm had been mixing company assets with client assets.236 
What makes this case interesting and important is not so much the Goldman 
Sachs connection as the fact that the downward dynamics of MF Global greatly 
resembled the failure of AIG and Lehman Brothers. It reveals that clearinghouses, 
too, and their employees, may be tempted by short-term profit opportunities and 
excessive risk taking. No doubt the MF Global executives believed that their risks 
were under control; what they failed to realize is that changes in the broader 
market dynamics could lead to drastic changes that invalidated their risk models. 
Of course, advocates of the clearinghouse cure will insist on the prudent 
regulation and capitalization of the CCP.237 However, one must not expect 
miracles: even the largest clearinghouses would at this moment be poorly 
equipped to face a serious CDS-related crisis. According to René Stulz, “CME 
Clearing, the largest futures clearinghouse in the United States, can draw on 
resources of $64 billion to cope with failures, which might not have been enough 
to deal with the problems of a huge firm like AIG.”238 
The MF Global case also implies another major regulatory concern, which is 
that the law in the books was already sufficient for preventing the abuses from 
taking place (mixing company assets with client assets was illegal); but 
enforcement was insufficient, and the firm bent the rules when it was hard-
pressed to do so.239 We should similarly be sceptical of the new clearinghouse 
regulatory regime if it merely looks good on paper but can be twisted by the 
market in gamble-for-life situations. 
6.3.3 Reform Proposals 
Importantly, the suitability of the clearinghouse approach for credit default 
swaps will only be revealed in a major economic downturn or financial crisis. We 
should nevertheless not wait for that before we start looking for improvements to 
the current regulatory regime. The focus here is on issue of systemic risk, because 
it seems to be the fundamental issue. In contrast, the exceptions to the compulsory 
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clearing rule are not so important, because they can be easily removed by a 
legislative amendment if that is deemed appropriate; at present it is however not 
clear whether it is appropriate, precisely because centralized clearing appears so 
inadequate for CDSs if the systemic risk problem is not resolved first. To this issue 
there is no simple solution; not surprisingly, the most promising avenues can be 
found from the viewpoint of insurance regulation, because credit default swaps 
are functionally like insurance. 
6.3.3.1 Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund 
One proposal is the creation of a systemic emergency insurance fund specifically for 
rescuing a failing clearinghouse at the least cost to the public.240 This may also 
reduce the likelihood of a crisis: a truly fair resolution scheme that refuses to 
externalize the costs will provide better incentives for clearinghouses to manage 
their risks properly. In its essentials, this proposal does not imply anything very 
innovative:  “the idea of such a private insurance fund funded by the relevant 
industry is not new and provided the rationale for both the FDIC [Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation] and the Securities Insurance Protection Corporation, 
which protect depositors and investors from the failure of banks and brokers, 
respectively.”241 
Commentators such as John Coffee are however sceptical about the 
effectiveness of this solution: “the ‘wholesale’ character of the crisis explains why 
reforms such as private, industry-funded bailout funds are likely to prove 
inadequate. Insurance can work to avert a crisis when a small percentage of the 
industry may fail, but not when a plurality may all fail contemporaneously 
because of risk correlation.”242 Thus, we are again faced with the key underlying 
problem, which is that concentrating credit risks in this way is likely to create a 
highly correlated, system-wide risk. Creating something like a safety net perhaps 
makes sense, but there are always practical limits to how big that safety net can 
be.  
Moreover, a safety net may even make things worse if it weakens the ordinary 
market mechanisms of governance and discipline. This, after all, has been the 
experience with banks deposit insurance, as Ross Levine among many others has 
argued: 
Deposit insurance—implicit or explicit—substantively changes the equity and debt 
channels of corporate governance in a number of manners. First, deposit insurance 
reduces the incentives of depositors to monitor banks, which directly hinders corporate 
governance. Second, deposit insurance induces banks to rely less on uninsured creditors 
with incentives to monitor and more on insured depositors with no incentives to exert 
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corporate governance. Third, deposit insurance—along with the rise of central banks as 
lenders of last resort—have helped produce banks with very low capital-asset ratios 
relative to other firms. As capital-asset ratios fall, this increases the incentives of 
controlling owners to increase the riskiness of the bank. Thus, deposit insurance both 
increases the ability of owners to increase risk because depositors no longer have 
incentives to monitor and deposit insurance increases the incentives for bank owners to 
increase risk because of lower capital-asset ratios. Not surprisingly, therefore, countries 
with more generous deposit insurance tend to have a higher likelihood of suffering 
banking crises.243 
This powerful critique is equally applicable to the present question insofar as 
the emergency insurance fund for clearinghouses implies a transfer of the 
monitoring task from the market to the state or to private bodies monitored by 
the state. Even if the safety net is funded by the market participants, the ultimate 
problem remains the same, in that the costs of a systemic failure are 
externalized—either to the market at large, or to the wider public. In the long 
term, this arrangement is not uncertain but is also likely to encourage more risk-
taking, thereby increasing the risk of systemic failure. 
6.3.3.2 Insulating CDS Risks 
If CDSs are cleared through ordinary clearinghouses, there is the further danger 
that the peculiarities of CDSs will cause a clearinghouse failure that extends to 
other classes of derivatives, thereby exacerbating a financial crisis in 
unpredictable ways. One might argue that CDS clearing should therefore be 
insulated from other asset classes, so that in effect we should have specialist CDS 
clearinghouses. 
This approach would, however, reduce transactional efficiencies, possibly 
even to a level without central clearing.244 Moreover, even if it were well 
insulated, a CDS clearinghouse would be like a giant CDS trader. Given the 
peculiarities of credit risk, it is likely that a major depression or a financial crisis 
would cause systematic losses on protection sellers that could not be fully covered 
by margins (which in any case are procyclical). It is essential to remember that 
CDSs are not cleared like ordinary financial securities, which can be settled in a 
matter of days; the counterparty risks due to CDS protection selling remain as 
long as the contract remains valid, which can be months or years. Therefore, the 
CDS clearinghouse does not have a neutral position, as it shares in the risk of 
protection selling. 
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6.3.3.3 Risk Concentration Limits: Towards Insurance Regulation 
If the problem cannot be resolved merely by insulating CDS clearing from other 
financial clearing, it may be opportune to look for more proposals from the 
experience of insurance regulation. Indeed, the UK Turner Review among others 
has acknowledged that there are other issues that cannot be addressed with 
central clearing, so that the reform project cannot be limited to that.245 
Benjamin Saunders, for example, has suggested that prudential regulation of 
CDS protection sellers may be equally relevant when these contracts are centrally 
cleared.246 We will discuss that approach in more detail shortly, but it should be 
added here that this approach might be relevant not only for protection selling but 
also for CDS clearing. Indeed, if we think of credit default swaps are functionally 
equivalent to insurance, it implies that an intermediary body like a clearinghouse 
is functionally equivalent to a reinsurer. Naturally, the risks of reinsurance may 
be smaller,247 but they will not be zero, so that it will be adequate to learn from 
the traditional wisdom in insurance—particularly financial guaranty insurance—
such as the need for risk concentration limits. All of this will be discussed in detail 
in what follows. 
6.4 CREDIT DEFAULT INSURANCE: TARGETED 
INSURANCE REGULATION 
We have seen earlier that both the legal-doctrinal and the regulatory-political 
analyses conclude with an important connection between credit default swaps 
and insurance. At the same time, CDSs and insurance regulation have a 
complicated relationship. Certainly, it cannot be denied that CDSs are 
functionally equivalent to insurance contracts and that many of the concerns 
related to CDSs are similar to those that have historically motivated insurance 
regulation. On the other hand, it is evidence that general insurance law as such 
may be unsuited or at least suboptimal for CDSs, because insurance regulation is 
a complex totality, which has not been developed with CDSs in mind.248 
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Indeed, insurance law in many countries is subject to path-dependent 
idiosyncrasies, and the reform of CDS regulation cannot be made dependent on 
a widescale reform of insurance law that is not forthcoming.249 It may be that the 
optimal solution is to create a special regime that adopts the best parts of different 
approaches. This section therefore seeks to provide a holistic assessment of the 
prospects of insurance-based regulation for credit default swaps. 
6.4.1 CDS and Insurance Regulation Generally 
It may be that a special regulatory is optimal, but at the same time, the 
applicability of ordinary insurance rules to credit default swaps should not be 
ruled out too easily, or at least based on faulty arguments. This section therefore 
critically considers a range of such arguments against the application of insurance 
law to CDSs in order to better identify the exact need for a special regime. 
6.4.1.1 Did the Crisis Prove that Insurance Regulation Failed? 
One line of argument, advanced by Todd Henderson, is that the fiascos caused 
by credit default swaps demonstrate that insurance regulation cannot deal with 
this issue adequately. This is based on three observations: firstly, he writes, “the 
fact that some insurance companies were harmed by [CDSs] justifies different 
regulation on insurance companies.”250 Secondly, insurance regulators were not 
up to the task of regulating CDSs: “No regulators or private actors were aware of 
the mispricing problem, despite the fact that there were numerous regulators, 
including insurance regulators (AIG is an insurance company after all!) 
monitoring these markets closely […]”.251 Thirdly, the failure of AIG definitively 
proofs, according to Henderson, that insurance regulation failed to prevent the 
reckless use of CDSs: “In addition, capital requirements did not work well if at all 
in preventing insurance companies, such as AIG, from investing aggressively 
and, as it turns out, dangerously in credit derivative markets.”252 
But this is all an incredible misunderstanding. The CDS market was practically 
unregulated and was not closely monitored by numerous regulators, let alone by 
insurance regulators; as we have seen, it was only after the crisis that insurance 
regulators and legislators woke up to the reality that they had been practically 
deceived into treating these transactions as unregulated non-insurance 
derivatives. Moreover, the CDS problems at AIG were caused by a hedge fund 
that was an unregulated subsidiary of the insurance giant. This has been correctly 
observed by the Turner Review: “AIG is a primary example of a group that was 
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damaged not by an event relating to its traditional activities but by contagion 
from an unregulated part of the group assuming risk through non-regulated 
products.”253  
It is true that the AIG case raises issues concerning non-insurance activities by 
regulated insurance companies. On the other hand, we also saw earlier that the 
main reason for the public rescue of AIG seems to have been not so much the 
failure of the insurance company as the fear that the non-payment of its huge CDS 
obligations would have threatened the stability of the banking sector.254 
Therefore, given that AIG’s CDS business involved unregulated derivatives sold 
by an unregulated entity, the AIG case raises many questions about the lack of 
CDS regulation, but it proves little or nothing about insurance regulation as such. 
6.4.1.2 Would Insurance Law Be Ineffective? 
Another line of argument against the application of insurance law to credit 
default swaps is that it would be practically ineffective. This argument has been 
advanced mainly in the United States, where insurance is regulated by the states, 
and one of the worries is that states might adopt different rules to deal with CDSs, 
so that the regulatory situation could become confused.255 The concern is 
nevertheless equally relevant elsewhere, given that CDSs are contracted in a 
global market. The challenge of regulatory competition is evidence: can one 
jurisdiction avoid the problems by imposing tighter rules if others do not do the 
same? 
This concern was lively felt during the post-crisis debates on the prospects of 
applying insurance law to credit default swaps: representatives of ISDA and the 
financial industry threatened that the proposed regulations “might cause 
financial institutions to move their CDS businesses out of state or offshore. These 
consequences are likely and they would harm local economies.”256 Indeed, one of 
the weaknesses of the plans to regulate CDSs as insurance was the fact that this 
would have meant state-level regulation in the US, implying uncertainty 
regarding jurisdictional reach, as it was unclear on what basis state regulators 
would enforce the proposed legislation. One option was to enforce it “based on 
the location of the credit default insurer or the situs of the credit default insurance 
contract,” but this “might lead to the relocation of CDS businesses to non-
adopting states or offshore.”257 On the other hand, transaction location could 
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alternatively be defined according to the location of the CDS buyer, in which case 
the legislation would be more effective.258 
This is a technical legal issue that involves complex conflict of laws questions 
and would merit a more detailed evaluation in accordance with the principles of 
private international law of a given jurisdiction. Nevertheless, at the general level 
evaluation of the present study, it is sufficient to note that there are relatively 
efficacious options available for the practical regulatory concerns even if there is 
no global coordination.259 The experience in financial securities regulation 
generally is that the rather demanding US rules have been successfully enforced 
despite fierce jurisdictional competition.260 
The design of the specific rules depends on the regulatory objective. For 
example, insofar as the regulatory motive is rooted in the risks associated with 
CDS protection selling—and the public costs of bailing out financial institutions—
, the enforcement should target such protection-selling activities by regulated 
institutions in the given jurisdiction. Naturally, the stability issue must be 
extended to extraterritorial activities insofar as it involves banks that may seek 
regulatory capital relief by transferring credit risks to potentially unregulated 
institutions in other jurisdictions; the solution is relatively simple, however, 
because it only requires that the banking regulators of the home jurisdiction 
refuse to admit regulatory capital relief unless the protection seller is equally 
regulated elsewhere. This would mean, for example, that the CDS protection sold 
by the unregulated subsidiary of AIG should not have been valid for purposes of 
regulatory capital. 
What may be more difficult to enforce is the buy-side, where the doctrine of 
insurable interest limits purely speculative CDS positions. In this respect, 
however, it may be possible to learn from the common law rule that traditionally 
sought to regulate speculative difference contracts: “under U.S. choice-of-law 
rules, speculative difference contracts could not be enforced against a party 
located in a state that viewed the contracts as unenforceable due to public policy, 
no matter where the contract was entered or what choice-of-law provisions it 
might contain.”261 This would not prevent all extraterritorial activity, but it would 
probably reduce it, especially if it were also backed up by administrative penalties 
on regulated institutions engaging in such transactions. Naturally, to say this is 
not to say anything about the advisability of the substantive rule; that must 
always be considered separately. 
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Finally, it can be noted that insofar as the question is the dilemma between 
federal versus state-based insurance regulation in the United States, one wonders 
whether there is any practical sense in opposing the establishment of a federal 
insurance regulator, at least for larger companies.262 It would also alleviate the 
skill and competence problems associated with some state-level insurance 
supervisors.263 
6.4.1.3 Would It Impose Excessive Costs? 
A third line of argument against insurance law is that it would impose excessive 
costs. It is thought, for example, that insurance contract regulation particularly in 
the United States is extremely detailed and costly to comply with.264 This type of 
regulation may be beneficial for consumer markets, but unnecessary for 
institutional investors. In this respect, there obviously should be a separate 
regime not subject to retail insurance contract regulations. This should perhaps 
be extended to the duties of disclosure, which in insurance law tend to cause great 
uncertainty and in any case would have to be separately designed for credit risk 
issues.265 
Another concern in this perspective is that insurance markets would be less 
efficient in terms of contracting process and claims settlement. To be sure, many 
insurance markets are also highly standardized, and “[m]any types of insurance 
are commodities sold by numerous insurers in a highly competitive industry.”266 
The problem seems to be not at the beginning but at the end of the contracting 
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process: insurance dispute resolution tends to be slow and costly, which 
compares poorly with the settlement efficacy of the ISDA derivatives regime.267 
This is at least in part due to the peculiar culture of suspicion in insurance 
markets.268 Even if that culture may be understandable, this is a powerful 
argument in favour of targeted regulation that would address specific problems 
without abolishing the advantages of the current CDS contracting architecture. 
ISDA has also argued, together with the US Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association (SIFMA), that the insurance regulation of credit default 
swaps would reduce transparency and liquidity: 
We also question the wisdom of replacing a market where CDS are actively traded with a 
non-transparent, illiquid market limited to insurance companies as sellers of protection. 
These insurance companies could amass large CDS positions, which would not be marked 
to market. They would not post collateral to their counterparties, and a decline in their 
CDS positions would likely be highly correlated with declines in their investment 
portfolios. This does not seem like the best way to address any deficiencies in the current 
CDS market. Moreover, given the market’s adverse experience with this model in 
purchasing CDS from the monolines, we think it unlikely that market participants will be 
willing to purchase protection from these newly created insurers.269 
This argument includes valid points, but mixed with erroneous claims. For 
one thing, there are no “actively traded” CDS markets presently, as we have seen 
earlier (in fact, CDSs are never traded in the strict sense, and the majority of CDSs 
are not subject to liquid novation markets, either). There is some post-trade price 
transparency, as we have seen, and the development of centrally cleared markets 
may facilitate these developments, but the latter prospect has its limits. Regarding 
collateral, the rules regulating insurance company loss reserves and 
concentration limits are possibly more effective than the bilateral collateral of the 
OTC derivatives markets, and the correlation problem was equally present in the 
CDS markets. Finally, the adverse experience seems to be an implicit reference to 
AIG, which is point against the sale of unregulated CDSs, not against insurance 
regulation. But despite these errors, ISDA and SIFMA are right that transparency 
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(and possibly liquidity) are valuable aspects of financial markets, and the 
traditional insurance model fails to develop them. 
6.4.2 Targeted Regulation: Protection Selling 
Although CDSs are much like insurance, they are also very unlike ordinary 
insurance contracts, because they are connected to the complex world of 
international finance, and because credit risk is a peculiar type of risk that raises 
special concerns. In what follows, we will therefore consider the prospects for 
targeted regulation for CDS protection selling. First, general considerations are 
discussed, after which we look at the existing special US regime called financial 
guaranty insurance. We then examine some arguments against this approach in 
light of the question surrounding the insurability of credit risk. The section 
finishes with some observations concerning alternative models towards the 
regulation of insurance and on the development of insurance principles within 
the existing regulatory framework. 
6.4.2.1 Prudential Regulation 
The motive for regulating CDS protection selling is functionally very similar to 
the motive for regulating other forms of credit-related insurance such as financial 
guaranty insurance. In fact, the Geneva Association for Risk and Insurance, when 
comparing different forms of credit enhancement, finds that CDS protection 
selling presently creates significant systemic risks due to lack of regulation, no 
reserves, close connection with banks, jump-to-default behaviour of CDS, and 
procyclical collateral agreements that can quickly transmit problems between 
counterparties.270 The insurance economist Robert Jarrow has similarly argued 
that even though CDSs can facilitate economic risk allocation, they currently give 
rise to negative externalities that are not priced into the contracts, so that it is 
necessary to impose stricter collateral and higher equity capital requirements.271 
Therefore, the main interest here is in what is generally known as prudential 
regulation.272 This has two principal aims, which in fact coincide with the two main 
objectives of financial regulation generally: to protect policyholders (i.e. 
                                                 
270 Geneva Association 2010: 61–63. 
271 See Jarrow 2011. 
272 This term can refer to both insurance and banking regulation. On the prudential 
regulation of insurers, see for example Saunders 2010: 436–441 and Spencer 2000: 68–69. 
Chandler 2000: 838–841 covers similar issues under the notion of solvency regulation. On the 
prudential regulation of banks, see for example Heremans 2000: 964–965. 
CDS REGULATION: THE PRINCIPAL STRATEGIES 
 
248 
consumers),273 and to protect systemic stability and reduce contagion risk.274 The 
principal regulatory strategy is reserves regulation; the key principle is that 
shareholders and other main actors have a limited downside risk combined with 
a virtually unlimited upside potential, giving rise to incentives to take excessive 
risks, especially if the company gets into difficulties, because then it has an 
incentive to take more risks in order to gamble for life.275 Moreover, as we have 
seen, bilateral risk management mechanisms may be insufficient for restricting 
the risk taking of insurers, because bilateral agreements will generally fail to take 
into account the development of the total risk of protection sellers, which thus are 
tempted to under-price risk in ways that are disruptive for markets.276 
Apart from capital and reserves regulations, other important prudential 
regulatory strategies include investment restrictions, which limit risk taking in 
terms of asset classes and types of instruments,277 and risk concentration or large 
exposure counterparty limits, which likewise seek to control failure risks but in 
terms of the sale of insurance policies.278 
6.4.2.2 The Financial Guaranty Insurance Model 
Without going into different national insurance regulations, which are 
exceedingly complex, it is worthwhile to consider in some detail the US model 
known as financial guaranty insurance. As has been mentioned earlier, the legal 
regulation of financial guaranty insurance started in the late 1980s in the US in 
order to isolate these financial-risk related insurance contracts from other lines 
insurance.279 But this was done in reaction to a contract that had been developed 
by market participants. 
In fact, this type of insurance arose in part due to the slow settlement culture 
of insurance markets: in order to offer credit insurance that would not be subject 
to such legal uncertainty, some US insurance companies came up with the special 
category of insurance called financial guaranty insurance, which provides “an 
absolute, unconditional, and irrevocable obligation to pay an insured for the non-
payment of principal and interest when due by an obligor on an underlying debt 
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obligation.”280 Thus the financial guaranty insurance industry committed itself to 
an insurance product that provides immediate and unconditional payment, and 
the monoline insurers (that is, those who sell financial guaranty insurance) seem 
to have “scrupulously” followed this commitment.281 To be sure, there may be 
scope for greater legal clarity in this question, particularly in other jurisdictions; 
this would be justified if insurance law were essentially seen as enforcing the 
contractual obligations created by the parties.282 In principle, in any event, 
financial guaranty insurance provides a model to learn from for the development 
of CDS law and regulation. 
Indeed, there remains the question of why CDSs are not, or should not be 
reclassified as, financial guaranty insurance. As we saw earlier, this was the view 
taken by some US insurance regulators following the financial crisis,283 but we 
also saw that this would require clarifying the question to what extent financial 
guaranty insurance is structurally intended as a tripartite credit enhancement as 
opposed to CDSs which are structurally flexible two-party insurance contracts.284 
Moreover, it now seems politically less likely that the financial guaranty 
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between market expectations (also concerning financial guaranty insurance) and the Mahonia 
decision was due to the fact that the supposedly “absolute and unconditional” nature of the 
financial guaranty insurance obligations had been created by the transacting parties rather 
than by legal reform. The legal regulation of financial guaranty insurance, starting in the late 
1980s, was concerned with isolating these risks from other lines insurance, but it did not 
overrule the traditional surety insurance and general insurance law defenses (see Aicher, 
Cotton and Khan 2004: 937). The solution is simply to import the so-called independence 
principle—developed in the law of letters of credit—to financial guaranty insurance and 
eventually to CDSs. 
283 See above, chapter 3.2.3.2. 
284 See above, chapter 2.2.3.1 and 2.2.4.1. Aicher, Cotton and Khan 2004: 930–932 argue that 
financial guaranty insurance is essentially a tripartite insurance product, linked to “the non-
payment of principal and interest when due by an obligor on an underlying debt obligation” 
(ibid. 930). In contrast, CDSs are often linked to more general credit events, which do not 
necessarily imply non-payment. On the other hand, the statutory definitions of financial 
guaranty insurance are broad (see ibid. 934–935), so at least some CDSs would be financial 
guaranty insurance. 
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insurance path might be follows in the future, so that it may be more expedient 
to advance specific CDS regulation along the lines of the principles developed for 
financial guaranty insurance. 
A separate regime for CDSs was, as we have also seen, the subsequent plan of 
United States insurance legislators before the Dodd-Frank insurance pre-
emption. For example, the New York Bill for the regulation of credit default 
insurance (CDI) included the following rules for CDI protection sellers: 
In order to qualify as a CDI Insurer, an entity must initially have at least $15,000,000 of 
paid-in capital and $165,000,000 of paid-in surplus, and shall at all times maintain 
minimum surplus to policyholders of at least $150,000,000. CDI Insurers are also required 
to maintain minimum levels of contingency reserves, loss reserves and unearned 
premium reserves, in each case based on their applicable business written and/or 
reinsured and otherwise comply with the rules and regulations applicable to property and 
casualty insurers in New York. Finally, the NY Bill also applies risk diversification 
requirements that limit the exposure to loss on any one risk insured, net of collateral and 
reinsurance, to specified percentages with respect to specific classes of debt obligations, 
such as municipal bonds, asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities and 
corporate obligations.285 
These are precisely the sorts of requirements that we have seen as responding 
to the challenges of CDSs, so that there is at least a prima facie case for developing 
this approach further even though it did not become law in the earlier 
circumstances. 
6.4.2.3 The Insurability of Credit Risk 
Although it is not possible here to enter into a technical evaluation of insurance 
risk regulation, some awareness of this regime even at a general level is of interest 
for present purposes, because both financial guaranty insurance and credit 
default swaps have raised discussions concerning the insurability of credit and 
financial market related risk. What seems certain is that traditional insurance 
regulation is not well-equipped to dealing with the peculiarities of credit risk. As 
Alfred Steinherr summarizes the challenge: 
Protection against default is far more complex to price […]. The difficulty is that credit 
events, such as default, are rare events (discontinuous stochastic processes or “jumps”). 
[…] Pricing default risk is based on the correlation between the interest rate risk, default 
risk and recovery rate of the underlying instrument—a tricky task, given that default is a 
one-off, often unanticipated event, for which there is no correlated, offsetting position 
with which to hedge.286 
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Indeed, it has been observed recently that the regulation of insurers becomes 
especially difficult get involved in non-insurance activities such as financial and 
savings products.287 In addition to the peculiarities of credit risk, there is the 
problem that these activities make insurance companies interconnected with 
systemically important financial institutions and capital markets, which implies 
that the negative externalities of insurer failure are far greater. Credit-related 
insurance obligations also tend to become payable during macroeconomic 
downturns, making institutional failure more likely. In light of this, it should be 
clear that CDSs should not be regulated like traditional insurance, which is not 
systemically so risky and therefore can be regulated quite lightly.288 Financial 
products such as CDSs are much more problematic: 
[T]hey all involve insurers or their affiliates writing put options explicitly or implicitly 
tied to macroeconomic variables. Such put options on macroeconomic variables are 
nondiversifiable and pay off in times of macroeconomic downturns. Financial guarantees 
also provide direct interconnections between insurers and other systemically important 
financial institutions […]. For these reasons, these products are far more systemically 
important than is traditional insurance.289 
This is an important point precisely because the difficulty is not merely that 
CDSs can be concentrated in specific insurers (a problem that traditional 
insurance regulates through loss exposure limits), but also that the payments are 
highly correlated in macroeconomic terms.  
The subsequent question is whether the financial guaranty insurance model is 
sufficient. Robert D. Aicher and others argue that it is sufficient in some respects, 
as the motivation for a special regulatory scheme was precisely that these 
products led to “large and concentrated risks of loss,” so that additional reserves 
and risk-taking restrictions were needed, and these risks were isolated from other 
lines of insurance.290 US insurance supervisors such as the New York Insurance 
Department have also taken an active approach in limiting the permitted financial 
guaranty insurance products to certain classes of obligation, presumably 
perceiving them to be less risky.291 Obviously, the problem with this latter point 
is that applying similar direct product regulation to CDSs might compromise the 
                                                 
287 The Economist 2013. 
288 On traditional insurance, see for example Acharya et al. 2010: 258 (“Traditional 
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[...] Traditional insurers typically are not significantly interconnected with systemically 
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flexibility of the market, and furthermore it may place too much responsibility in 
the supervisors. 
It may still be asked whether the crisis revealed the insufficiency of financial 
guaranty insurance regulation, because since around 2000, monoline insurers got 
heavily involved in insuring mortgage-related securities and suffered big losses 
during the crisis.292 On the other hand, a big part of the problem was that these 
financial insurance guaranties were structured through minimally-capitalized 
“transformer” companies, which exploited regulatory loopholes that made the 
guarantees cheap in terms of loss reserves and apparently profitable in 
accounting terms.293 The resulting structure was highly opaque, difficult to value, 
and crisis-prone as it crucially depended on the insurers’ credit ratings.294 
Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear whether the macroeconomic dimension has 
been resolved; in theory, these interconnections can also be analyzed statistically, 
but credit cycles are complex and relatively rare. 
Regardless of the prospects of targeted regulation for credit default swaps, 
there are attempts to improve insurance regulation overall. For example, the 
controversial European Solvency II regime seeks to develop insurance regulation 
towards more risk-responsive regulation, like in banking, including recognition 
of risk-mitigation techniques and the use of firms’ internal models.295 In principle, 
this development might incorporate the systemic risk concerns discussed here.296 
In practice, however, the tendency seems more problematic than promising, 
because internal risk models and risk-mitigation techniques are factors that 
greatly contributed to the previous financial crisis. 
6.4.2.4 Competitive Voluntary Regulation? 
Given the limitations of existing insurance regulation models, it may further be 
asked whether there are be radically different approaches that might address the 
concerns raised by CDSs. In the insurance literature, authors such as Philip Booth 
and Alan Morrison have argued in favour of a relatively liberal regime, which 
would focus on achieving contract enforcement and would principally rely on 
                                                 
292 See Shadab 2010: 444–446 (describing this development). See also Geneva Association 
2010: 59–60 (discussing systemic risk related to financial guarantees) 
293 Shadab 2010: 445. 
294 Ibid. 445–446. Geneva Association 2010: 59–60 identifies the reliance on credit ratings—
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295 See for example Davies and Green 2008: 77; Parker 2007: 19. 
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voluntary regulation provided by competing private and public agencies.297 There 
is much that can be learnt from their analyzes, particularly as it is attentive to the 
real-world challenges of political process and therefore the permanent 
imperfections of public regulatory regimes.298  
Importantly, however, the argument of Booth and Morrison is based on the 
analysis of life insurance, and it explicitly relies on the assumption of no third-
party externalities.299 It cannot therefore be extended without CDS regulation 
without great difficulties. 
6.4.2.5 Prospects within the Current Framework: EMIR 
It seems politically unlikely that full-fledged CDS protection selling legislation 
could be attained in the near future, which means that it is interesting to consider 
whether the existing, post-crisis regulatory framework could be further 
developed or fine-tuned along the lines of the principles advanced here. It seems 
that there is indeed scope for development. For one thing, the existing framework 
for the regulation and supervision of central counterparties (CCPs) could be 
developed along these lines.300 For example, the regulation of the CDS-related risk 
taking should learn from the technical experience obtained in the regulation of 
financial guaranty insurance. It might also be opportune, as was mentioned 
earlier, to isolate CDS-related CCP clearing from ordinary financial derivatives 
clearing, because the macroeconomic dynamics of these products are peculiar and 
such isolation would reduce the danger of systemic spillovers from credit risk 
markets to broader financial markets. 
                                                 
297 See Booth and Morrison 2007: 24–31, 33–35; Morrison 2004: 48–51. See also Booth 2007 
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300 In Europe, EMIR, Art. 40–50 provide for a range of prudential regulations for 
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Another field for further development is the regulation of bilateral collateral 
arrangements. To be sure, bilateral arrangements will probably never fully deal 
with credit risk concentration and interconnectedness, but there are interesting 
ideas worth pursuing. For example, the UK FSA’s Turner Review in 2009 sought 
to identifies co-regulatory prospects for reducing the procyclical nature of margin 
calls.301 The simplest option proposed by the FSA was “to set minimum levels of 
haircut” in order to “offset the procyclical tendency for levels to fall in boom years 
and reduce the extent to which increases in haircuts in periods of rising volatility 
contribute to deflationary pressures.”302 The more radical option was to “vary 
these requirements over the cycle in an actively countercyclical fashion.”303 
In both cases, the Turner Review noted enforcement difficulties,304 but the 
post-crisis reform framework in both Europe and the US empowers regulators to 
develop these ideas in practice.305 The current approach of ESMA does not seem 
to address CDS-related concerns, however.306 
6.4.3 Targeted Regulation: Protection Buying or Default Betting 
We saw earlier that there is a modest case for restricting purely speculative CDS 
positions, at least with respect to relatively opaque and illiquid credit markets 
that are more prone to overshooting and self-fulfilling prophesies in times of 
crisis.307 This question involves the potential impositions of limits to what is 
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notionally the protection buying side of the transaction, although naturally here we 
are interested precisely in CDS buying that is not for protection. 
The question has already been partly discussed in relation to the traditional 
insurance doctrine of insurable interest.308 It was seen that the application of the 
traditional insurance law rule would probably result in a reasonably broad notion 
of insurable interest, which would permit CDS protection buying according to an 
economic hedging position. For example, it would not exclude the non-
speculative use of index CDSs even though parties investing in these will 
normally not legally own the underlying assets. 
Nevertheless, what concerns us here is the possibility of creating a targeted 
regime for CDS protection selling. This question is important for many reasons: 
firstly, because the application of traditional insurance law seems relatively 
unlikely for practical reasons; secondly, because the traditional doctrine has been 
criticized for creating uncertainty and being potentially useless—and these 
criticisms are especially relevant in the context of credit default swaps; thirdly, 
there is a new targeted regulatory regime that may provide a workable approach 
and that also has attracted useful empirical studies. 
6.4.3.1 The European Short Selling Regulation 
The idea of targeted regulation in this field finds general support in the academic 
literature: even if CDSs continue to be treated as derivatives, there exists the 
possibility of developing regulation along functional lines, as Hazen writes: “If 
the insurable interest requirement remains justifiable for insurance contracts, 
then there may be good reason to close the gap with respect to parallel derivatives 
transactions.”309 In Europe, there has been no CDS reform movement comparable 
to the plans of United States insurance legislators, but whereas that movement in 
the US was thwarted by federal pre-emption, in Europe a different political 
atmosphere led to the effective implementation of the Short Selling Regulation, 
which imposes a quasi-insurable interest doctrine for sovereign CDSs.310 
In its totality, the Short Selling Regulation consists of two principal elements: 
first, mandatory disclosure rules for major net short positions in shares, sovereign 
debt, and sovereign-debt related CDSs;311 and second, restrictions to uncovered 
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short positions in shares, sovereign debt, and some—mainly sovereign-debt 
related—CDSs.312 It is this latter CDS dimension that is relevant here. 
The basic prohibition concerns uncovered positions in sovereign-debt related 
credit default swaps.313 Sovereign debt is defined broadly to include any debt 
instrument issued by the European Union; a Member State or a government 
department, agency or special purpose vehicle (SPV) of the Member State; a 
member of a federal Member State; an SPV for several Member States (e.g. the 
European Financial Stability Facility); an international financial institution 
established by Member States (e.g. the European Stability Mechanism); and the 
European Investment Bank.314 
The technical scope and possible exceptions to this prohibition will be 
discussed shortly in detail, but it should be added that regulators are also 
empowered to intervene in other short selling transactions—including corporate 
CDSs—in exceptional circumstances, such as adverse events threatening financial 
stability or a significant fall in the price of financial assets.315 Let us analyze these 
related but separate categories in detail. 
More specifically, Articles 20 and 21 of the Regulation state that there are two 
general conditions for invoking these emergency powers when there are adverse 
events threatening financial stability: (a) “there are adverse events or 
developments which constitute a serious threat to financial stability or to market 
confidence”, and (b) “the measure is necessary to address the threat and will not 
have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial markets which is 
disproportionate to its benefits.”316 
These general conditions for the extension of the intervention powers are 
obviously subject to interpretive difficulties. In order to provide further precision, 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has stated that these 
interventions should principally concern troubled members states and 
systemically important financial institutions.317 It has further highlighted the 
proactive approach that regulators should adopt in these cases: “it is essential to 
make sure that competent authorities and ESMA can take steps before the risk 
situation spreads. The possibility of the development of self-fulfilling 
phenomena, like rumours of bank runs or sovereign or financial issuer defaults is 
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a particular factor to watch when assessing adverse market conditions.”318 The 
Commission has confirmed this approach in its subsequent Delegated 
Regulation.319 
These interventions may extend to all CDSs, and can take a range of forms.320 
Specifically, Article 20 empowers national regulators not only to prohibit but also 
to impose conditions relating to (a) “a short sale” and (b) 
a transaction other than a short sale which creates, or relates to, a financial instrument and 
the effect or one of the effects of that transaction is to confer a financial advantage on the 
natural or legal person in the event of a decrease in the price or value of another financial 
instrument.321 
These interventions are not limited to CDSs, and they certainly may cover 
non-sovereign CDSs.322 Moreover, the wording of Article 20(2)(b) cited above 
seems to include the possibility of prohibiting or imposing conditions to covered 
CDS positions as well. 
Article 21 further states that regulatory authorities “may restrict the ability of 
natural or legal persons to enter into sovereign credit default swap transactions 
or may limit the value of sovereign credit default swap positions that those 
persons are permitted to enter into.”323 This intervention also includes covered 
positions, but it is limited to sovereign-debt CDSs. The legislative materials do 
not provide further clarity to the notion of limiting the value of sovereign CDS 
positions, however. 
It remains to be seen whether and how these emergency powers will be 
exercised, but this would be most likely to happen when systematically important 
financial institutions are under pressure. Uncertainty is increased by the fact that 
the Regulation empowers different national and European regulators to intervene 
in different situations, and they may act differently given conflicting national 
interests and divergent regulatory traditions.324 So far, in any case, the 
Commission considers that these emergency provisions have been appropriate 
and well-functioning.325 
Finally, Article 23 of the Regulation separately empowers regulators to restrict 
short selling of financial instruments temporarily in the case of a significant fall in 
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price.326 Importantly, the Commission Delegated Regulation has determined that 
for many derivatives the question depends on the value of the underlying 
financial instrument, which implies that Article 23 might in some cases be used 
the intervene in credit default swap markets.327 The practical experience with this 
article has, however, been negative, because it has created confusion and 
illiquidity, and there has been inconsistent application when trading in one 
instrument has been temporarily banned in one member state but not in others.328 
ESMA has proposed giving more discretion to regulators and changing some of 
the thresholds, but the Commission has preferred to wait and insisted on better 
coordination.329 
6.4.3.2 Opting-Out Provisions: Temporary Suspension of the Prohibition 
In the original proposal by the European Commission, there was no permanent 
prohibition but only an authorization to temporarily restrict short positions in 
sovereign CDSs; it was the European Parliament that amended this in favour of a 
permanent prohibition.330 To be precise, though, the final prohibition is only semi-
permanent, because the Regulation enables regulators to suspend the prohibition 
under certain conditions.331 Technically, “the difference is a question of 
presumption: the Commission proposal would have permitted CDS short selling 
as a rule, allowing its prohibition as an exception; the final Regulation made 
prohibition the rule and permission the exception.”332  
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In part, this semi-permanent rule was a concession to countries such as the UK 
which were opposed to a total prohibition.333 It is moreover economically more 
prudent than the original intervention powers, because the experience has it that 
sudden changes to short selling rules tend to be particularly destabilizing, which 
implies that they are problematic precisely when they might be justified.334  
In addition to being economically sounder, the final presumption is likely to 
make all the practical difference. This is because the temporary suspension of the 
sovereign CDS short-selling prohibition by national regulatory authorities 
requires that  
it has objective grounds for believing that its sovereign debt market is not functioning 
properly and that such restrictions might have a negative impact on the sovereign credit 
default swap market, especially by increasing the cost of borrowing for sovereign issuers 
or affecting the sovereign issuers’ ability to issue new debt.335 
Further, the contemplation of such temporary suspension, which must be in 
communication with ESMA and the other European national financial regulators, 
must be based on the following five indicators that support lifting the restrictions: 
(a) a high or rising interest rate on the sovereign debt; 
(b) a widening of interest rate spreads on the sovereign debt compared to the sovereign 
debt of other sovereign issuers; 
(c) a widening of the sovereign credit default swap spreads compared to the own curve 
and compared to other sovereign issuers; 
(d) the timeliness of the return of the price of the sovereign debt to its original equilibrium 
after a large trade; 
(e) the amounts of sovereign debt that can be traded.336 
The irony is that these are the sort of indicators that speak of serious distress 
faced by the borrower, and the empirical evidence suggests that in those times 
CDS prices tend to be inefficient and speculation in CDS markets is likely to 
encourage short-term overshooting, thereby only feeding the downward spiral of 
the distressed sovereign.337 I have, moreover, argued elsewhere that there is a 
further paradox here in that  
it is precisely in those times that regulators may invoke their emergency powers to restrict 
other forms of short selling, including corporate CDSs. If, in the extreme, sovereign CDS 
speculation is permitted at the same time as corporate CDS speculation is restricted, the 
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effect may be a major market dislocation as investors rush from one area (normally 
allowed, now banned) to another (normally banned, now allowed).338 
The conclusion seems to be that there is little if any economically sound scope 
for the use of the temporary opting-out provisions, and if they are employed, 
there should at least be coordination both between regulators and across financial 
instruments so that destabilizing relocations are avoided. 
6.4.3.3 The Scope of Uncovered Positions: Hedging Rules 
In view of the development of targeted CDS regulation, one of the main reasons 
why the EU Regulation merits attention is that it is the first attempt to develop 
clearer rules for the delineation of insurable interest in CDSs.339 The need for this 
was widely recognized during the legislative process, as many politicians first 
favoured a narrow rule based on ownership of underlying debt (similar to the 
narrow, traditional English rule on insurable interest), but in the end a wider rule 
was adopted based on the economic notion of hedging.340 Specifically, Article 4 of 
the Regulation states: 
For the purposes of this Regulation, a natural or legal person shall be considered to have 
an uncovered position in a sovereign credit default swap where the sovereign credit 
default swap does not serve to hedge against: 
(a) the risk of default of the issuer where the natural or legal person has a long position in 
the sovereign debt of that issuer to which the sovereign credit default swap relates; or 
(b) the risk of a decline of the value of the sovereign debt where the natural or legal person 
holds assets or is subject to liabilities, including but not limited to financial contracts, a 
portfolio of assets or financial obligations the value of which is correlated to the value of 
the sovereign debt.341 
Thus the economic hedging principle is not only present in the reference to a 
long position in general but also much more widely in the reference to asset value 
correlation. Thus there is a recognition of the legitimacy of proxy hedging, which is 
frequently used when direct hedges are not available.342 Obviously, the notion of 
value correlation has been left deliberately ambiguous, as the Regulation 
empowers the European Commission to determine specific legislation on the 
matter, based on technical advice from ESMA.343 
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ESMA has specified its technical advice gradually. In its 2012 report, ESMA 
discussed a range of issues but refused to provide quantitative measures.344 It 
favoured a relatively liberal approach, stating that “a very wide range of 
exposures could potentially be eligible for hedging through a sovereign CDS 
position.”345 It only laid down two broad principles, namely those of correlation 
and proportionality between the risks being hedged and the referenced sovereign 
debt.346 
Regarding the notion of correlation, ESMA explicitly considered it “better not 
to produce a very precise quantitative definition as to the extent of the correlation 
required. There must be a meaningful positive (or negative) correlation but a 
general qualitative statement should be sufficient and would not risk setting an 
overly precise boundary.”347 It did however specify that correlation should be 
demonstrated by reference to historical data “for a sufficiently long period 
(normally at least 12 calendar months of trading days).”348 
Regarding proportionality, what ESMA wished to highlight and add to the 
notion of correlation was that the relevant CDS positions should not be totally 
disproportionate in comparison with the risks being hedged, even if a perfect 
match cannot be expected.349 It further clarified that market participants are 
responsible for ensuring that their CDS positions remain covered, but they should 
not be punished for changes in market valuations that involved no active change 
of position.350 Overall, ESMA was quite shy of providing meaningful legal 
certainty, but it may have been its intention to make sure that markets are not 
scared off by excessively restrictive rules or by complex requirements that create 
compliance costs. Perhaps it also wanted to obtain more empirical observations 
of the effects of the Regulation before committing to rules that would have to be 
immediately revised. 
Some specific rules were, however, determined by ESMA.351 One is that if 
involuntary uncovered CDS positions are imposed upon a member of a central 
counterparty, these shall not fall within the scope of the prohibition.352 Another is 
a limitation of the geographic scope of proxy hedging so that cross-country risk 
management is restricted: the risk being hedged should be located in the same 
                                                 
344 Juurikkala 2012a: 329–330. See generally ESMA 2012b: 34–42. 
345 ESMA 2012b: 38 (para. 78). 
346 Juurikkala 2012a: 329; see ESMA 2012b: 34–36. 
347 ESMA 2012b: 39 (para. 83). Negative correlation is relevant when a liability (as opposed 
to an asset) is being hedged.  
348 Ibid. 40 (para. 84). For exposures without a liquid market price or sufficiently long price 
history, a suitable proxy is to be used: ibid. 40 (para. 85). 
349 Ibid. 40 (para. 87). 
350 Ibid. 41 (para. 89). 
351 See Juurikkala 2012a: 330. 
352 See ESMA 2012b: 41–42. 
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member state whose sovereign debt is referenced in the CDS being used as a 
hedge.353 There are minor exceptions, for example when the counterparty is a 
supra-national European body, and further “it should be permissible to hedge the 
counterparty risk with an appropriately chosen basket of sovereign CDS” (i.e. an 
index CDS).354 
In its 2013 report on the Short Selling Regulation, ESMA sought to develop 
and clarify some of the issues, also responding to certain criticisms.355 The 
principal criticisms were, firstly, the imprecision of the requirements, or more 
precisely “[t]he restrictive nature of the correlation tests (with the emphasis on 
historical data) and uncertainty over whether the quantitative and qualitative 
tests were alternatives or to be used in combination.”356 ESMA did not see a 
problem with the historical data requirement, but it accepted that “there does 
seem to be confusion among market participants over the quantitative and 
qualitative correlation tests”, clarifying therefore that “these are separate 
alternatives rather than to be applied in combination.”357 
Secondly, there were complains concerning the “limitation on the geographic 
scope of sovereign CDS hedges”,358 as there had in fact been already during the 
consultation for the 2012 report.359 Market participants also criticized “[t]he 
inability to use a sovereign CDS index unless the exposure related to all 
sovereigns in the index or an appropriate supra-national issuer was thought to be 
particular problem preventing the use of such indices to hedge risks in several 
MSs [member states].”360 This time, ESMA agreed that it would be reasonable to 
relax the rules on index CDSs and cross-border hedging.361 In broader terms, 
however, ESMA concluded that there was no “compelling evidence warranting 
major changes.”362 
In the resulting Commission Delegated Regulation, the principles proposed 
by ESMA were broadly followed, but there is also more precision.363 Firstly, the 
Delegated Regulation provides a more comprehensive list of cases that are not 
included in the prohibition.364 Secondly, it has added quantitative and qualitative 
                                                 
353 Ibid. 39 (para 81). 
354 Ibid. 
355 See ESMA 2013a: 29–30.  
356 Ibid. 29 (para. 109). 
357 Ibid. 30 (para. 114). 
358 Ibid. 29 (para. 109). 
359 See AFME et al. 2012: 26–28. 
360 ESMA 2013a: 29 (para. 109). 
361 Ibid. 30 (para. 115). 
362 Ibid. 29 (para. 112). 
363 See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 918/2012 of 5 July 2012 (Short Selling 
Supplement), Art. 14–20. 
364 Short Selling Supplement, Art. 14(1). 
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precision to the correlation tests365 as well as qualitative precision to the 
proportionality test.366 
6.4.3.4 Possible Loopholes and Enforcement Concerns 
In addition to the complaints of market participants, there have been several 
minor criticisms of the Regulation from those that fear that it may be ineffective. 
One criticism concerns the use of uncovered CDSs for proxy hedging. In general, 
proxy hedging is not controversial, and many investors use sovereign CDSs to 
hedge corporate and other risks, because the sovereign CDS market is more liquid 
than the corporate CDS market.367 However, the European Parliament Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs examining the Regulation made the valid 
point that proxy hedging might be damaging for sovereign borrowers: “Using a 
                                                 
365 See Short Selling Supplement, Art. 18. Specifically, Art. 18(1) determines the 
complementarity of the quantitative and qualitative tests, and reads: “The correlation test 
referred to in this Chapter shall be met in either of the following cases: (a) the quantitative 
correlation test shall be met by showing a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of at least 70 % 
between the price of the assets or liabilities and the price of the sovereign debt calculated on 
a historical basis using data for at least a period of 12 months of trading days immediately 
preceding the date when the sovereign credit default swap position is taken out; (b) the 
qualitative correlation shall be met by showing meaningful correlation, which means a 
correlation that is based on appropriate data and is not evidence of a merely temporary 
dependence. The correlation shall be calculated on a historical basis using data for the 12 
months of trading days before the sovereign credit default swap position is taken out, 
weighted to the most recent time. A different time-frame shall be used if it is demonstrated 
that the conditions prevailing in that period were similar to those at the time that the 
sovereign credit default swap position is to be taken out or which would occur in the period 
of the exposure being hedged. For assets for which there is not a liquid market price or where 
there is not a sufficiently long price history, an appropriate proxy shall be used.” 
366 See Short Selling Supplement, Art. 19, which follows the flexible approach of ESMA. 
Specifically, Art. 19(1) reads: “In determining whether the size of the sovereign credit default 
swap position is proportionate to the size of the exposures hedged, where a perfect hedge is 
not possible, an exact match is not required and limited over-provision shall be permitted in 
accordance with paragraph 2. The relevant party shall justify upon request to the competent 
authority why an exact match was not possible.” Art. 19(2) adds further qualitative precision: 
“Where justified by the nature of the assets and liabilities being hedged and their relationship 
to the value of the obligations of the sovereign which are within the scope of the credit default 
swap, a greater value of sovereign credit default swap shall be held to hedge a given value of 
exposures. However, this shall only be permitted where it is demonstrated that a larger value 
of sovereign credit default swap is necessary to match a relevant measure of risk associated 
with the reference portfolio, taking into account as the following factors: (a) the size of the 
nominal position; (b) the sensitivity ratio of the exposures to the obligations of the sovereign 
which are within the scope of the credit default swap; (c) whether the hedging strategy 
involved is dynamic or static.” 
367 Juurikkala 2012a: 331. See also Rao 2012 (citing evidence of proxy-hedging using 
sovereign CDSs). 
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CDS as a proxy for hedging other financial instruments by increasing demand for 
sovereign CDS is prone to sending misleading signals to the market. Such 
misleading signal could put Member State’s financing costs at risk and thus 
increases the pressure on already strained public finances.”368 Naturally, the 
current rules provide some scope for intervention on this basis if there is evidence 
of problems. 
One could add that, as the general prohibition only covers naked CDSs based 
on European sovereign debt, this raises another proxy concern: investors seeking 
to bet against distressed governments may do so using strategic corporate CDSs 
such as the CDSs of leading banks.369 This possibility was hinted at by the Lex 
column of the Financial Times during the legislative process: “Privately, they 
[hedge funds] add that if they want to bet that a country defaults, they will find 
proxies—such as leading bank stocks. Beware the unintended consequences.”370 
The market effect of such speculation might be different from betting against 
the government, but it would be unfair to the companies concerned. Advocates 
of the ban would argue that this is evidence that the restrictions should extend to 
corporate-debt CDSs.371 There remains the possibility of targeted restrictions, but 
the empirical evidence suggests that temporary short-selling bans are particularly 
destabilizing.372 
Another concern is that the Regulation cannot be easily enforced. To be sure, 
the use of economically similar transactions to circumvent the restrictions is 
probably precluded by the fact that the Regulation defines credit default swaps 
on a functional basis.373 Trickier issues include, firstly, that the exemption of 
market-making activities may become a loophole.374 It has been feared that this 
exemption could render the Regulation almost useless since market-making 
investment banks are the principal actors in CDSs.375 Maybe the problem is not so 
                                                 
368 European Parliament 2010: 79. 
369 Juurikkala 2012a: 331. See also Kerr 2012. 
370 Financial Times 2011. 
371 In fact, this option received substantial support in the European Parliament: Juurikkala 
2012a: 330–331. 
372 See ibid. 336–337 (summarizing evidence). 
373 Short Selling Regulation, Art. 2(1)(c): “‘credit default swap’ means a derivative contract 
in which one party pays a fee to another party in return for a payment or other benefit in the 
case of a credit event relating to a reference entity and of any other default, relating to that 
derivative contract, which has a similar economic effect”. 
374 See Juurikkala 2012a: 338–339. Short Selling Regulation, Art. 17 provides a general 
exemption for market-making activities and primary market operations (market making in 
sovereign debt issues) from the requirements of Art. 5–7 (disclosure of net short positions) 
and Art. 12–14 (restrictions on uncovered short positions). 
375 Delatte 2012. See also EP Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 2010: 81, where 
the the rapporteur demanded that “market makers that do not have a Chinese wall between 
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serious in practice, firstly because the definition of market-making is quite 
restrictive, so that even major investment banks playing an active role in CDSs 
will not automatically fall within the exemption.376 Secondly, ESMA seems to be 
aware of the concern and has taken a strict approach to the granting of the market-
making exemption, for example giving exemptions separately for each 
instrument,377 and refusing the exemption for products not traded on a regulated 
market.378 Thirdly, the Regulation empowers the relevant competent authorities 
to request information about short positions held or activities conducted under 
the exemption,379 and to prohibit the use of the exemption if they consider that 
the conditions for the exemption are no longer satisfied.380 
The final concern is whether the prohibition can be policed in the global 
financial markets.381 This is part of the general enforcement problem mentioned 
earlier, and it was explicitly recognized in the impact assessment of the initial 
proposal of the European Commission, which did not include the semi-
                                                 
the activities and those of property trading not initiated by clients’ orders should not be 
allowed to use these exemptions.” 
376 The notion of market-making activities is subject to a complex but rather restrictive 
definition in Art. 2(1)(k): it means “the activities of an investment firm, a credit institution, a 
third-country entity, or a firm as referred to in point (l) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC, 
which is a member of a trading venue or of a market in a third country, the legal and 
supervisory framework of which has been declared equivalent by the Commission pursuant 
to Article 17(2) where it deals as principal in a financial instrument, whether traded on or 
outside a trading venue, in any of the following capacities: (i) by posting firm, simultaneous 
two-way quotes of comparable size and at competitive prices, with the result of providing 
liquidity on a regular and ongoing basis to the market; (ii) as part of its usual business, by 
fulfilling orders initiated by clients or in response to clients’ requests to trade; (iii) by hedging 
positions arising from the fulfilment of tasks under points (i) and (ii)”. The notion of authorised 
primary dealer is defined in Art. 2(1)(n) as meaning “a natural or legal person who has signed 
an agreement with a sovereign issuer or who has been formally recognised as a primary dealer 
by or on behalf of a sovereign issuer and who, in accordance with that agreement or 
recognition, has committed to dealing as principal in connection with primary and secondary 
market operations relating to debt issued by that issuer”. 
377 Newton 2012. The ESMA Guidelines on the market-making exemption put it thus: 
“According to Article 2(1)(k), market making activities, in their turn, are defined as dealing 
as principal in a financial instrument. Consequently, the exemption under Article 17(1) 
applies to activities in a financial instrument, i.e. on an instrument per instrument basis, and 
should not be considered as a global exemption for market making activities in general.” 
(ESMA 2013b: para. 28.) 
378 Moshinsky 2013. ESMA has subsequently proposed reconsidering the scope of and the 
conditions for the market-making exemption (ESMA 2013a: para. 149); the Commission has 
however preferred to wait more and gain more experience before changing the rules 
(European Commission 2013: 6). 
379 Short Selling Regulation, Art. 17(11). 
380 Short Selling Regulation, Art. 17(7). 
381 See Juurikkala 2012a: 339–340. 
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permanent prohibition: “a ban could easily be circumvented by investors trading 
in CDS in non-EU countries not subject to the ban and there would be very little 
that EU regulators could do about this.”382 Strangely, the Regulation does not 
specify extra-territorial effect for the uncovered CDS restrictions. It therefore 
remains to be seen how their enforcement is developed. 
6.4.3.5 Economic Implications: Preliminary Assessment 
Beyond the legal details, the controversial question surrounding the European 
Regulation is what economic consequences it will have. Before it was passed, 
critics claimed that it would “impose unnecessary expenses” and “increase the 
costs of sovereign borrowing.”383 No doubt, the Regulation had political 
motivations and its rapid passage was “facilitated by the European sovereign 
debt crisis.”384 However, some commentators went so far as to claim that 
“prohibiting naked positions in credit default swaps would essentially destroy 
this market. […] with speculators banned, hedgers will not find counterparties 
because the market will have no liquidity.”385 
There is some exaggeration here. The Regulation limits purely speculative 
positions, but it is essentially just like the doctrine of insurable interest, which has 
not abolished insurance markets. The error seems to be to suppose that CDSs are 
like forward contracts, where upside and downside risks are symmetrical. CDSs 
are not like that: a covered protection buyer does not need an uncovered 
protection buyer, but a protection seller. The insurable interest requirement 
prohibits betting on other people’s misfortunes; it does not prohibit the sale of 
insurance. What one would expect is a decline in the quasi-trading liquidity of 
the transactions; investment banks should also lose their dealer role unless they 
are given the market-making exemption. 
As we saw earlier, previous academic studies suggest that prohibiting 
uncovered sovereign-debt CDS positions could reduce borrowing costs instead of 
increasing them.386 The initial observations on the effects of the Regulation seem 
to support this view, as there is evidence of downward pressure on sovereign 
CDS prices.387 Likewise, there are signs of lower liquidity,388 the effect of which 
on underlying markets is unclear.389  
                                                 
382 European Commission 2010b: 47. 
383 Juurikkala 2012a: 308–309 (citing critics). See Baker 2011 and Duffie 2010. 
384 Juurikkala 2012a: 311. 
385 Stulz 2010: 85. 
386 Juurikkala 2012a: 325–327. 
387 See Rao 2012 (discussing JP Morgan data on EU member-state CDS prices that have 
come down more than the comparison group). 
388 See Kerr 2012; Newton 2012 (citing market participants). 
389 See Porters 2012. 
CREDIT DEFAULT INSURANCE: TARGETED INSURANCE REGULATION 
267 
Further information has been provided in the 2013 report of ESMA, which 
makes a quantitative analysis on the market impact of the Regulation.390 Trying 
to isolate the effect of the ban, and comparing with non-EU countries, the ESMA 
study concludes, like the initial observations, that “the effect of the ban is found 
to be a slight reduction of around 26 basis points in the CDS spread of countries 
subject to the Regulation (only significant at the 10% confidence level).”391 With 
respect to the underlying long-term (10-year) sovereign bond markets, there was 
“a slight structural break” when the Regulation came into force, but no 
statistically significant permanent effect.392  
This suggests that at least there was no major problem caused in the market. 
Alternatively, one might ask whether the Regulation is making any different; but 
it must be noted in response that the ESMA study is based on a very short (5-
month) time frame after the entry into force of the Regulation,393 and during this 
period there was no particular sovereign market tension or stress taking place.394 
With respect to sovereign-debt CDS market size and liquidity, ESMA finds 
that “liquidity, as measured by bid-ask spreads, does not seem to have been 
significantly impaired by the Regulation”.395 In fact, the comparison of empirical 
data and feed-back from market participants seems to suggest that the latter may 
express subjective perceptions that are not supported by empirical evidence.396 
The exception is “sovereign CDS indices, for which a sharp decline was 
observed.”397  
In contrast, “net notional European CDS outstanding have sharply declined 
since August 2011, much earlier than the entry into force of the Regulation.”398 
One possible reason is that it was until then that there was significant speculative 
short-selling activity in European sovereign debt, after which the situation 
gradually calmed down.399 
The ESMA report from 2013 overall suggests no major difficulties, and it also 
raises further questions for investigation, for example whether the sharp decline 
                                                 
390 ESMA 2013a: 27–28. 
391 Ibid. 27 (para. 100). For technical details, see ibid. 89–90. 
392 Ibid. 27 (para. 101). 
393 Ibid. 8 (para. 10). 
394 Ibid. 28 (para. 108): “the short time period since the application of the Regulation and 
the generally improved market sentiment towards the euro-area made it difficult to assess the 
effect.” 
395 Ibid. 27 (para. 102). For technical details, see ibid. 91–92. 
396 See ibid. 28 (para. 106): “It was commented [by market participants] that with liquidity 
in the smaller sovereign CDS markets (such as Eastern European countries) having dried up 
completely, although this is not entirely perceivable in the empirical evidence described in 
the previous section.” 
397 Ibid. 28 (para. 103). 
398 Ibid. 
399 Ibid. 
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in sovereign CDS index transactions was due to the initially too restrictive 
requirements on index CDSs and cross-border hedging. From the view point of 
economic research, the Regulation creates an unequalled opportunity for 
empirical studies on the effects of CDSs on underlying debt markets, because the 
prohibition enables comparative studies that are normally not possible. 
 
  FINDINGS AND REFLECTION 
The study has been structured around two broad questions: one concerning the 
legal-doctrinal characterization of credit default swaps (chapters 2–4), the other 
concerning what should be done to adequately regulate them (chapter 5–6). In 
what follows, I will summarize the main results and draw some overall 
conclusions. 
7.1 PRINCIPAL FINDINGS  
7.1.1 Legal Doctrine 
The first legal question, discussed in chapter 2, dealt with the general reasons for 
the uncertainty and confusion surrounding credit default swaps. It was argued 
that these are historically novel financial instruments that have mostly failed to 
receive systematic attention from legislatures or courts. It was shown that this is 
not the only source of confusion, but that CDSs have been transacted with a 
terminology that differs from traditional legal terminology, and they also happen 
to be situated in an intersection of different legal categories that in some cases are 
quite similar economically. 
Regarding the various potentially relevant categorizations, it was argued that 
gambling has been clearly excluded by legislation in the leading jurisdictions. The 
category of financial securities in general is less clear, but it was shown that the 
way in which CDSs are traded (so-called novations) implies that strictly speaking 
these transactions are not subject to secondary-market trading, so that they cannot 
be classified as securities in the normal sense. With respect to letters of credit and 
third-party guarantees, the situation is quite unclear, but it was pointed out that 
these in principle are always tripartite arrangements whereas CDSs are 
structured as two-party arrangements, like insurance contracts. 
Chapters 3–4 focused on the two principal alternatives advocated in the 
existing literature, namely the insurance-based and the derivatives-based 
understanding of CDSs.  The overall argument in the present study is that both 
views can be supported, but for different reasons. Chapter 3 analyzed the 
relationship between credit default swaps and insurance law. Given that this is 
among the biggest and most complex questions here, the analysis was divided 
into smaller questions, which resulted in several important findings. Some widely 
cited arguments, such as the Potts opinion, were found to be severely flawed in 
law, as they tend to engage in circular reasoning by presuming those terms that 
should be demonstrated. It was moreover shown that the no-intention-to-insure 
argument is defective both in law and in fact, and that credit default swaps are 
structurally and economically not swaps at all. The notions of insurable interest 
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and loss indemnity were explained and clarified in terms of both the law and their 
correct application to CDSs. 
These findings were essentially based on English insurance law, but they 
would largely be applicable in most other jurisdictions, because they have to do 
with relatively generic insurance law principles. Similar findings would seem to 
obtain in Finland, as was tentatively demonstrated. The results would obviously 
be partly different in Australia where the requirement of insurable interest has 
been abolished. 
Chapter 3 furthermore provided a detailed discussion of the evolution of the 
thinking of US insurance regulators and legislators on this matter. The fluctuating 
position of New York insurance supervisors in particular helps us to better 
understand the history of not only the relevant law but also the different positions 
found among scholars and practitioners. The fact that US insurance legislators 
across the board—not only the New York—were willing to regulate these 
transactions under a targeted insurance framework is further evidence that the 
insurance-based understanding of CDSs is a theoretically correct one. 
The legislative project of US insurance legislators could not be put into 
practice due to the pre-emption clause of the Dodd-Frank reforms, which raises 
major questions about the dynamics of financial derivatives regulation generally. 
Chapter 4 sought to shed further light on the matter by tracking the historical 
roots and development of the derivatives-classification of CDSs, and of the 
regulation of derivatives and swaps. This historical study was mainly confined to 
the US, where the novel category of largely unregulated swaps was created and 
later extended to these transactions which, since then, have been internationally 
called credit default swaps. It was argued that this outcome was rooted in legal 
categories going back more than a century, but the fundamental factor was the 
exploitation and reformulation of imprecise concepts—swap, derivatives, and the 
notion of legal certainty—by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA). It is argued here that the legal notion of swaps (and of CDSs) can only be 
fully understood in light of this legal-institutional history. This is also true of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which in terms of this developed appears essentially as a 
lobbying victory that consolidated the approach advocated by ISDA. 
These findings imply several questions for scholars and policymakers. In 
terms of legal doctrine, the development of CDSs has challenged the traditional 
demarcation of insurance law in a puzzling way, as functionally identical 
transactions may now be insurance, derivatives, or even both. The conflict is only 
exacerbated by the Dodd-Frank Act’s pre-emption of insurance law, which is 
coupled with an all-encompassing notion of swaps that entirely differs from the 
economic and financial notion of swaps. 
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7.1.2 Regulatory Policy 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the normative analysis of the regulation of credit 
default swaps. This analysis was divided into main parts, one of which (chapter 
5) examined the broader challenge and the regulatory motive, in order to critically 
examine whether there really is a need for a specific regulatory reaction to CDSs. 
Great attention was given to the general regulatory issues in present-day financial 
markets, because the question of CDS regulation cannot be adequately considered 
without taking the real situation into account. It was found that even if a broadly 
regulatory-sceptical attitude is adopted, there are clear reasons why the current 
situation is unsatisfactory.  
In particular, it was shown that there are serious limits to the allocation of 
financial risk through markets and corporate governance, and that CDSs in their 
present legal status (and more so in their pre-reform status) create grave 
difficulties for financial stability. The argument concerning purely speculative 
(so-called “naked”) CDSs received a more nuanced reply in this study, because 
short selling was found to provide undeniable benefits in ordinary market 
conditions, but there is modest evidence that speculative CDSs exacerbate the 
problem of overshooting in some markets and may threaten the stability of 
opaque borrowers such a sovereigns and financial institutions. In terms of 
regulatory policy, this implies that the regulation of speculative CDS buying 
should probably be targeted, and that it is necessary to obtain more accurate 
information about the extent to which the potential problems can be cost-
effectively reduced through regulatory intervention. 
Chapter 6 studied several regulatory approaches and alternatives. It covered 
the four approaches that are both practically and theoretically important in the 
current financial regulatory architecture, namely (i) industry self-governance led 
by ISDA, (ii) disclosure and transparency regulation, (iii) compulsory central 
counterparty clearing, and (iv) targeted regulation along the lines of insurance 
regulation. These regulatory strategies were considered as complementary rather 
than mutually exclusive. 
Regarding ISDA and industry self-regulation, it was found that the current 
ISDA architecture provides significant efficiency benefits in terms of both 
contracting and dispute resolution, but it also seems to suffer from certain 
technical weaknesses, especially with respect to the dispute resolution regime in 
sovereign-debt CDSs. Moreover, it definitely fails to address the externality 
concerns associated with CDSs, so that as long as these are a serious concern, self-
regulation is hardly a sufficient policy. There have been proposals for the 
development of co-regulation in the form of light-touch interventions in the ISDA 
regime itself; these were found to be potentially interesting, but of relatively little 
practical importance for the purpose of resolving the regulatory motives found 
earlier. 
Transparency regulation is without doubt fundamental for CDSs, just as it is 
important for financial regulation generally. The recent reforms on both sides of 
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the Atlantic take steps in the better direction, but they seem quite modest when it 
comes to transparency to the market as opposed to transparency to the regulators. 
There are limits to how much transparency can be demanded in these markets, 
so that it is unlikely that these approach could be pushed much further. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that increased disclosures would greatly reduce the 
major problems associated with CDSs. 
Compulsory CCP clearing is the leading post-crisis regulatory strategy for the 
regulation of OTC derivatives. It was argued, however, that its suitability for 
CDSs is at least doubtful, and its efficacy as a regulatory strategy in this respect 
has been questioned. There are seriously doubts as to whether compulsory central 
clearing reduces or increases CDS-related systemic risks. It seems likely that 
many CDSs will ultimately be exempted from the central clearing rule; in that 
case the new rules provide some potential improvements to the provision of 
bilateral collateral, but it is too early to say how much will or can be achieved. 
In light of the foregoing findings, targeted regulation along the lines of 
insurance principles seems to be a relevant approach that merits detailed 
consideration. The direct recharacterization of CDSs as insurance may be unlikely 
in most jurisdictions, and it probably would be disruptive anyway given the 
current situation of global CDS markets. The more interesting prospect is the 
development of targeted interventions, especially for CDS protection selling and 
possibly for CDS protection buying. With respect to protection selling, it is 
possible to learn from extensive earlier experience in insurance regulation, so that 
this is not a question of inventing something entirely new but of applied known 
principles to a new situation, possibly with some adaptation given the 
peculiarities of credit risk. With respect to protection buying, the new European 
short selling regulation provides an interesting test case, which despite its critics 
seems to manage to provide a workable legal framework and satisfactory initial 
results. 
Regarding targeted regulation of CDS sellers, the question was also posed 
whether these principles might be developed within the existing regulatory 
framework without the necessity of new legislative reforms. It was argued that 
the answer probably is affirmative, in that the principles could be applied in the 
context the post-crisis regulatory regime including central counterparties and 
compulsory collateral requirements. This is an important finding, because it is 
unlikely that there would be political interest in CDS regulation before a new 
financial crisis. 
7.2 REFLECTION 
Considering the present study as a whole, special attention has been given to two 
distinct perspectives. One is the comparative approach to regulatory strategies, 
so that policy alternatives should not be considered in isolation but in critical 
dialogue with the other alternatives. This approach includes the idea of 
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cumulative and complementary strategies, meaning that different regulatory 
solutions should, when possible, be analyzed as contributing to a common cause. 
The other distinct perspective is that of looking at CDS regulation from the 
viewpoint of insurance regulation. This perspective has received only limited 
attention in the earlier literature, probably because CDSs have tended to be 
categorized as OTC derivatives without much critical reflection, and the 
regulatory policies have mostly been drawn from that context. Yet it is now 
commonly acknowledged that CDSs are functionally and economically insurance 
contracts, which also implies that their regulation should not fail to benefit from 
the tradition of insurance regulation—obviously, without being blind to the limits 
and disadvantages of that approach. In the present study, this tradition has, 
furthermore, been seen in terms of the peculiarities of credit risk, which is an 
unusual risk category with dynamics that the regulation must take into account. 
The key contribution of the present study is precisely the combination of these 
two perspectives. The principles of insurance regulation are not to be considered 
in isolation, but in conversation with the current regulatory system as well as with 
the specific problems posed by CDSs for financial market stability. What emerges 
from this holistic analysis is that the classical principles of insurance regulation 
are relevant—and can be developed—also in the current context of relatively 
unregulated CDS markets with partially-compulsory centralized clearing. It is 
also found that the development of further regulation along the lines of insurance 
principles must learn from the challenges faced by financial guaranty insurance 
regulation, because credit risk has peculiarities that differentiate it from other 
kinds of insurable risk. 
The perspective of insurance regulation has also been developed here in the 
context of restrictions on CDS protection buying. This closely parallels the 
traditional doctrine of insurable interest, but in the CDS context the traditional 
doctrine must be examined anew, because the empirical finance literature has 
demonstrated that purely speculative short positions can be beneficial for 
financial markets. Moreover, the insurable interest doctrine has also faced 
criticism within the ambit of ordinary insurance law, suggesting that it should 
not be applied to CDSs without critical examination. 
In order to arrive at a balanced assessment of the suitability of restrictions on 
CDS protection buying, the present study has, firstly, carefully examined both the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the various positive and negative effects of 
so-called uncovered CDS positions. In this context, the overall finding was that 
there are real worries regarding the broader effects of unrestricted CDS buying, 
particularly in relation to market stability. Secondly, the practical prospect of 
imposing restrictions on such activity has been analyzed in light of the European 
short selling regulation, which provides preliminary information on the 
workability and consequences of such restrictions. In this respect, it is not yet 
possible to pronounce any firm conclusion, but at least it can be concluded that 
the adoption of insurance-like restrictions on CDS buying may function as hoped 
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and therefore it is possible to contemplate their extension beyond the scope of the 
current European regulation. 
Now, if we consider the findings of the legal-doctrinal and the regulatory-
political aspects of the study together, we discover a certain harmony. The legal-
doctrinal analysis shows that CDSs share essential features with insurance 
contracts, and their characterization as non-insurance financial derivatives seems 
strained at best; at the same time, they clearly differ from the traditional varieties 
of insurance, and their recharacterization as insurance contracts is pragmatically 
speaking not forthcoming in the major jurisdictions. The legal-doctrinal 
perspective therefore suggests that if we wish to develop the law of credit default 
swaps (or whatever they should eventually be called by the relevant reform 
legislation), the law should recognize their insurance-characteristics but treat 
them as a separate category, just as has been done in many countries with respect 
to special forms of insurance such as life and marine insurance. 
The regulatory-political analysis supports this perspective by showing that 
the regulation of CDSs along the lines of financial derivatives regulation is clearly 
inadequate for purposes of financial stability regulation. Both the self-regulatory 
ISDA architecture and the novel central counterparties clearing regulations have 
major weaknesses and fail to provide convincing answers to the regulatory 
concerns raised by credit default swaps. At the same time, traditional insurance 
regulation is not automatically suited to dealing with the kinds of challenges that 
these large-scale credit risk transfer contracts imply. It is therefore necessary to 
develop a targeted regulatory regime. 
This was, in fact, the proposal of the US insurance legislators during the 
financial crisis, and their proposal closely mirrored the existing regime for 
financial guaranty insurance in the US. Whether these two regimes should 
ultimately form a single regime is a technical question beyond the scope of the 
present study. Insofar as the financial instruments are functionally similar, it is 
probably best to avoid creating separate regimes; on the other hand, the 
regulation of financial guaranty insurance in the US has not been without 
criticism, so that there is an opportunity here to reconsider the foundations of that 
regulation, and it may be politically easier to develop a reformed regime that 
specifically targets credit default swaps. 
It should be emphasized, finally, that the findings of the present study are 
greatly dependent on certain factual considerations that are ultimately 
contingent, or could be otherwise. The legal classification of CDSs will naturally 
depend on the existing legal framework, including the relevant insurance law 
principles. Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, the policy conclusions 
greatly depend on the examination of the actual challenges in financial markets 
and risk management, challenges that also depend on the actual financial market 
rules and institutions. These rules could be different, the institutions could be 
governed differently, and financial risk modelling could be less imperfect; in that 
case, the regulatory motives would be different, and the question of CDS 
regulatory policy should be examined accordingly. 
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